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Unlike the Russian Civil War or Second World War, the Soviet-Afghan War (1979–1989) never 
acquired a stable, dominant narrative in Soviet or Russian culture. Even as the war was in 
progress, Soviet media revised its evaluation of key events and players to reflect the changing 
political tides through the 1980s. After the war ended, state leaders were distracted by the 
political turbulence of the 1990s, and the citizens—largely unaffected by the war on a personal 
level—were not particularly interested in assessing either the war’s successes or failures. This 
lack of definition left the descriptions and representations of the Soviet-Afghan War open to the 
influence of evolving political realities and agendas. This study examines the literary techniques 
and strategies that writers Svetlana Alexievich and Alexander Prokhanov have employed in 
articulating different narratives that responded to the shifting demands of the moment. 
With respect to the several revisions that Alexievich made to her documentary novel 
Zinky Boys from its initial publication in 1990 through its final version in 2007, I argue that the 
author’s position as anti-authoritarian and anti-war becomes increasingly rigid. Like many 
liberal-minded members of the intelligentsia after the fall of the Soviet Union, Alexievich had 
early hopes for a transition from totalitarianism to democracy in her native Belarus which would 
be disappointed. The poetics of her documentary prose, I argue, challenge the traditional 
identities and relationships of author, character, and reader by destabilizing the boundaries and 
allowing crossovers between roles. By engaging the reader in constructing the deeper meaning of 
the novel, Alexievich projects her reader into the full and active participation of a citizen 
building a new post-Soviet state. 
Prokhanov, situated on the opposite side of the political divide, also made substantial 
revisions to his novels about the Soviet-Afghan War. Prokhanov’s 1994 novel The Palace is 
remarkable for its change in message and tone from the narratives of his Soviet-era writing on 
Afghanistan: it openly questions the Soviet Politburo’s decision to invade, and includes surreal 
dreamlike sequences that, I argue, reflect his contemporaneous collaboration with Alexander 
Dugin, founding proponent of neo-Eurasianism. In Dream about Kabul—his 2001 “remake” of 
his own 1982 novel Tree in the Center of Kabul—Prokhanov’s alter-ego protagonist becomes an 
even more passive participant in the progression of the Soviet-Afghan War, compared to The 
Palace, as well as a powerless pawn in the political conspiracies involving the Russian 
Federation, Israel, and the United States. His reader is more like the obedient subject of a tsar 
than the politically engaged citizen of a democracy, as envisioned by Alexievich. 
In my study of the substantial revisions that Alexievich and Prokhanov made to their 
Soviet-Afghan War stories from the 1980s into the twenty-first century, I demonstrate how the 
literary representations of a military conflict in recent Soviet history reflect the increasing 
polarization of political and social realities facing authors and readers in the post-Soviet states of 
Russia and Belarus. The aesthetic decisions that Alexievich and Prokhanov made in revising 
their Soviet-Afghan War stories carry political and ethical implications. Thus, the relationship 
between implied author and implied reader in a literary text becomes a political statement about 
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A NOTE ON TRANSLITERATION AND TRANSLATION 
 
 
Throughout the dissertation I use the Library of Congress system of transliteration except when 
writing the names of well-known Russian writers, literary critics, and public figures, and first 
names that are common in English. Therefore, I transliterate Belosel'tsev, Kariakin, and 
Ekaterina, but write Alexievich rather than Aleksievich, Yeltsin rather than Eltsin, and 
Alexander instead of Aleksandr. When providing bibliographic information, I use the Library of 
Congress system, except when citing English-language translations or articles. There I cite the 
author’s name as it was transliterated by the translator or literary critic. All translations are mine 
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The Soviet-Afghan War (1979–1989) is often called a “forgotten” war. State leaders were 
distracted by the political turbulence of the 1990s, and the citizens—largely unaffected by the 
war on a personal level—were not particularly interested in assessing either the war’s successes 
or evils. For the first half of the war, the reality of its violence was hidden from the Soviet public 
by strict censorship. The disaster of the war, once it became more widely known, was almost 
immediately overshadowed by other catastrophic events: Chernobyl in 1986, a steady stream of 
revelations about Stalin and other Soviet secrets, the revolutions of 1989 in Eastern Europe 
(including the fall of the Berlin Wall), the attempted coup in August 1991, and, of course, the 
dissolution of the Soviet Union at the end of that same year. Thus the Soviet Union ceased to 
exist before there was time for the government to reassert control over the narrative of what 
happened in Afghanistan, and why. Sergei Oushakine describes the unique problem this 
presented: 
Military losses such as these [i.e., in Afghanistan] acquired a somewhat unusual 
dimension after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Caused by state-sponsored violence, the 
deaths of soldiers in hidden and forgotten wars, as well as in the army in general, were 
ostensibly devoid of the justifying ideological context that was so prominent, for 
example, in public representations of the losses of the Second World War (Tumarkin 
1994; Schleifman 2001). The absence of an authoritative interpretation of the 
consequences of state military politics produced an uncommon cultural and political 
situation.1 
 
My dissertation considers, as case studies, two authors who took advantage of this “uncommon 
cultural and political situation” to disseminate their own interpretations of the Soviet-Afghan 
War: Svetlana Alexievich and Alexander Prokhanov. Their competing versions of this war story 
                                               
1 Sergei Alex. Oushakine, The Patriotism of Despair: Nation, War, and Loss in Russia (Ithaca, NY: 
Cornell University Press, 2009), 206–07. 
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would become cornerstones in their respective ideologies for the new post-Soviet states and help 
them define the roles that citizens—together with heads of state, the military, and religion—
should play in this new world. After all, as Gregory Carleton says in his recent book on the 
mythologization of war in Russian culture: “Victory can write itself; defeat needs a boost to 
deflect attention away from the reality on the ground.”2 In other words, the Soviet-Afghan War 
presents a particularly useful chronotope for Prokhanov and Alexievich because its narrative is 
so problematic. The war’s lack of mythologization in the 1990s allowed them the opportunity 
and flexibility to infuse events with different, even positive, values and meanings. In so doing, 
Alexievich and Prokhanov set themselves up to be the voices for new countries, modern-day 
prophets with special knowledge of the past and a vision for the future. 
 War myths are an important part of any nation’s history, but they are an especially 
important part of Russian history and national identity. (Although Alexievich has lived most of 
her life in Belarus, she has repeatedly declared that her cultural and literary heritage is Russian.) 
For centuries, Russia’s sense of its place in the world has been forged in war: breaking the 
Mongol Yoke, defeating Napoleon, pushing back the Ottomans, overcoming Hitler. The 
archetype of a Russian war, therefore, is that Russia must continuously go to battle to defend 
itself and save the rest of the civilized world from evil. As a consequence, Soviet and Russian 
culture is heavily militarized, and the stories of war serve as important vehicles for a post-Soviet 
national identity and political ideology. The Soviet-Afghan War, however, fits into this paradigm 
of war in the Russian cultural consciousness only with some difficulty. Gregory Carleton writes:  
No conflict has vexed Russia’s self-image more than the Soviet-Afghan War. The 
quandary only begins with the fact that it ended in 1989 in a defeat that helped bring 
down the Soviet Union. Equally problematic is that it took place outside of the imagined 
space of the motherland and, worse still, violated inherited tradition. Soviet Russia was 
                                               
2 Gregory Carleton, Russia: The Story of War (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2017), 166. 
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the unqualified aggressor, invading a neighbor torn by a civil war, and the conduct of its 
troops was often abominable.3 
 
In fact, Carleton is describing widespread (mis)understandings of the war stemming from the 
lack of an officially-controlled narrative. After all, the conduct of Soviet soldiers and certain 
decisions made by Soviet political and military leaders were also “abominable” during World 
War II, which is widely understood to be the (non-problematic) foundation myth for the Soviet 
Union as a legitimate world power.4 Rather, it has been the lack of an official narrative of the 
Soviet-Afghan War that most vexes Russia’s self-image, rather than defeat or any other aspect of 
the war.5  
 One version of the Soviet-Afghan War is as the Soviet Union’s “Vietnam.” In the 
absence of any other readily available war narrative to apply to the Soviet experience in 
Afghanistan, it is understandable that people were tempted—even from the earliest days of the 
war—to co-opt the Vietnam war narrative(s) that American culture had already developed. 
Soviet officers, for example, screened The Deer Hunter to some of their units serving in 
Afghanistan.6 One paratrooper commander played songs over heavy-duty speakers as his 
                                               
3 Ibid., 155. 
4 For example, it has become known that Soviet soldiers on their way to Berlin systematically raped 
German women and girls, as well as their female comrades. The decision not to surrender Leningrad 
during the Blockade has also been questioned. The Soviet atrocities, however, are largely denied in 
Russia, and those who dare question the official narrative of Soviet heroism in World War II have faced 
serious consequences. For conducting an online survey that asked whether Leningrad should have been 
surrendered, the independent television channel Dozhd was cut off from eighty percent of its broadcasting 
when the largest Russian television providers disconnected the channel. 
5 In the twenty-first century, Russian President Vladimir Putin and “patriotic” producers of culture have 
managed quite successfully to integrate the Soviet-Afghan War into the Russian consciousness. 
6 Mark Galeotti, Afghanistan: The Soviet Union’s Last War (London: Frank Cass, 1995), 39. 
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battalion attacked, in imitation of Apocalypse Now.7 When asked to describe the “sort of people” 
that Afghan veterans are, a teenager in 1991 Moscow enthusiastically answered, “Rambo!”8 (It is 
a positive identification for the teenager.) There was international collaboration between 
Vietnam veterans and Afghan veterans, with the Vietnam vets often working to support afgantsy 
in various ways. Larry Heinemann, a prominent Vietnam War veteran and author, wrote the 
introduction for the first English language translation of Alexievich’s Zinky Boys in 1992. In it 
he, too, underscores the parallel in their experiences: “I’d heard that the Afgantsi had to endure 
the same military grind as American soldiers in Vietnam, and would no doubt have to endure the 
same personal reverberations when they got home.”9 In fact, the phrase “afganskii sindrom” 
(“Afghan syndrome”) was adopted in Russian parlance in imitation of the American term 
“Vietnam Syndrome,” in order to refer to the damaged psyche of a Soviet-Afghan War veteran.10  
It is certainly true that there are some similarities between the U.S.-Vietnam War and the 
Soviet-Afghan War.11 However, it is also misleading to overstate these similarities, to conflate 
the two wars, or to merely adapt Afghan war narratives to the Vietnam war narratives already 
                                               
7 Ibid., 147. 
8 Ibid., 151–52. Rambo is the famous hero, played by Sylvester Stallone, in a series of American films 
about the Vietnam War.  
9 Svetlana Alexievich, Zinky Boys: Soviet Voices from a Forgotten War, trans. Julia and Robin Whitby 
(London: Chatto & Windus, 1992), viii. 
10 However, the Russian term seems to have a much different meaning than the American term. Russians 
tend to use the phrase “Afghan syndrome” to describe a veteran with PTSD or other such issues; 
Americans, on the other hand, use “Vietnam syndrome” to refer to the public aversion to military 
involvement overseas after the costly debacle in Vietnam. See Oleg Sarin and Lev Dvoretsky, The Afghan 
Syndrome: The Soviet Union’s Vietnam (Novato, CA: Presidio, 1993). 
11 Both wars, driven by ideology, were proxy conflicts of the Cold War: the two great global powers, the 
United States and the Soviet Union, were covertly fighting each other, one out in the open and the other in 
secret. Both wars dragged on far too long and ended in defeat. Both wars were unpopular at home and 
around the world.  
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developed by Americans writers and filmmakers. For one thing, the Soviet-Afghan War touched 
a much smaller percentage of the Soviet population than the percentage of Americans affected by 
the Vietnam War.12 Even more to the point for the purposes of this dissertation, there was a 
significant difference in the opportunity (or lack thereof) to “process” the war—in the political 
arena, but also in the cultural sphere. Whereas Vietnam War literature, film, and memorials 
prolifereated in the U.S., Soviet and post-Soviet citizens did not experience the same cultural 
process. However, this gave Alexander Prokhanov and Svetlana Alexievich the space they 
needed to produce such radically different narratives of the Soviet-Afghan War. 
 
ALEXANDER PROKHANOV AND SVETLANA ALEXIEVICH 
 Born in 1938 in the Georgian SSR, Prokhanov tried his hand at several different careers 
before settling on that of a writer. After graduating from the Moscow Aviation Institute, he 
worked first as an engineer and then as a forester. His first short story was not published until 
1967, when he was nearly thirty years old; after that, he continued to publish novels and 
collections of short stories that explored themes of village life. Initially, however, he was rather 
                                               
12 Of the roughly 22,2000,000 Soviet men who turned 18 during the war, only 3.4 percent served in 
Afghanistan (Galeotti, 30). By comparison, almost ten percent of the American men who turned eighteen 
between August 1964 and March 1973 (i.e., the baby boomer generation) served in Vietnam (Lawrence 
M. Baskir and William A. Strauss, Chance and Circumstance: The Draft, the War, and the Vietnam 
Generation (New York: Knopf, 1978), 3–5.). At most only 120,000 soldiers were serving in Afghanistan 
at any one time, making the war a relatively small-scale operation, even at its most intense. Again, by 
comparison with the Vietnam War, US troop numbers peaked in 1969 at about 543,000 soldiers. 
According to the chair of the Supreme Soviet Committee for Soldier-Internationalists’ Affairs, the total 
number of Soviet soldiers and specialists who served in Afghanistan was 730,000. As Galeotti points out, 
in context, this is not very many people. He calculates that this represented only 3.6 percent of the entire 
military establishment of that decade. And lastly, while any fatality is a tragedy, the truth is that 14,453 
fatalities and 53,753 wounded in a nine-year war is relatively low for a country with such a large 
population. As Galeotti observes, “the dead represent tragedies, but in one year almost five times as many 
Soviets died on the roads as in the whole war” (Galeotti, 30). The Vietnam War, on the other hand, 
claimed 58,318 American lives and left 303,644 American soldiers wounded—and that in a country with 
a smaller population than in the whole Soviet Union. 
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more successful as a correspondent for the newspapers Pravda and Literaturnaia gazeta, for 
which he had been working since 1968.13 He was sent to several “hot spots” around the globe, 
including Afghanistan, Nicaragua, Cambodia, Angola, and Ethiopia, to write dramatic reports 
about fledgling communist states that were fighting to survive. Eventually Prokhanov began 
writing fiction that closely mirrored his experience as a correspondent, often with a barely 
disguised alter-ego as the protagonist. It was these novels—beginning with Tree in the Center of 
Kabul (Derevo v tsentre Kabula), his first novel about the Soviet-Afghan War, published in 
1982—that would finally bring him fame as a writer. His biographer, Lev Danilkin, reports that 
Prokhanov always uses “special intonation” when he says that he has been back to Afghanistan 
nineteen times: 
Prokhanov puts in a special sect [sekta]—or a knightly order—the ‘shuravi.’ Words such 
as “Salang” and “Panjshir” act on his heroes like a magic spell, plunging them into a long 
lethargic swoon [...]. [Prokhanov’s] eternal duty [is] to erect and maintain in proper 
conditions a commemorative shrine to the Soviet ‘warrior-martyrs.’14  
 
However, like many in the Soviet Union, Prokhanov’s attention to the Soviet-Afghan War was 
distracted for some time by the political unrest of the late 1980s and early 1990s, as he took on 
an important position within the conservative opposition movement in vehement protest of 
liberal reforms. In 1990 he founded and became editor-in-chief of the ultra-conservative 
“patriotic” newspaper Den', an “organ of the spiritual opposition,” which brought together 
oppositionists as diverse as hardline Communists, ultranationalists, and the religious right. 
Prokhanov was an outspoken supporter of the “Gang of Eight” during the attempted coup in 
                                               
13 Lev Danilkin, Chelovek s iatsom: Zhizn' i mneniia Aleksandra Prokhanova (Moscow: Ad Marginem, 
2007), 211–12. 
14 Ibid., 307–08. “Shuravi” is the Afghan word for Soviets. “Salang” and “Panjshir” refer to places in 
Afghanistan. 
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August 1991, and of the White House occupiers during the Russian constitutional crisis in 
September and October of 1993. As a consequence to the latter, Yeltin’s government banned 
Den' from publication; however, losing barely any time, the similarly-aligned newspaper Zavtra 
was established the following month, with Prokhanov once again at the helm.  
 Meanwhile, Prokhanov continued to write novels that were loosely-fictionalized accounts 
of recent historical events, eventually finding his way back to the Soviet-Afghan War with The 
Palace (Dvorets) in 1994 and Dream about Kabul (Son o Kabule) in 2001. These novels 
received scant attention outside of a relatively small but dedicated circle of readers who 
identified with Prokhanov’s conservative, nationalistic, anti-Semitic politics. When Prokhanov 
unexpectedly won the Russian Bestseller literary prize in 2002 for his controversial novel Mister 
Hexogen (Gospodin Geksogen), however, he became a household name in Russia. Since then, 
his new novels are widely read and even the focus of scholarly attention. He has also become a 
regular fixture on Russian broadcast media, including not only the conservative state-owned 
television station Pervyi kanal but even the liberal radio station Ekho Moskvy and the popular 
television talk show Vladimir Solov'ev’s program “K bar'eru!” on NTV. On these platforms, he 
unapologetically insists that Russia needs to be ruled by a strong (authoritarian) leader, with 
nationalist policies, and even calls for a return to the pre-Soviet monarchy. Although it was the 
nadir of his career as a novelist—between his Soviet-era fame in the 1980s and his post-Soviet 
return to fame in 2002—Prokhanov’s novels of the 1990s represent an important but 
understudied step toward the ultraconservative ideology that has become mainstream and 
normalized in Russia today. 
Alexievich was born exactly one decade after Prokhanov, in 1948, in western Ukraine; 
she soon moved with her family to Belarus, where she has lived for most of her life. She was 
 8 
originally trained as a journalist and wrote for newspapers in Belarus for several years. In the late 
1970s, she abandoned her career in journalism to pursue a different kind of literature under the 
mentorship of documentary prose writer Ales' Adamovich. In her new approach, she interviews 
hundreds of witnesses to a traumatic event in Soviet history and then meticulously crafts the 
interview transcripts into a series of freestanding dramatic monologues, which she arranges into 
sections and/or chapters of a book. While Russian-language publishers typically categorize her 
work as “documentary prose” (dokumental'naia proza) or a “documentary tale” 
(dokumental'naia povest'), Alexievich has most often used the more creative appellation of a 
“novel in voices” (roman golosov).15 Although her books are generally considered non-fiction, 
even advertised as “oral history” in the West, she has consistently distanced herself from the 
genre of history and instead insists that she writes “literature.” Indeed, many critics have pointed 
out that it is difficult to pinpoint the genre of her writing, because her work is a unique, 
trailblazing blend of documentary material and literary art, where Alexievich intentionally blurs 
and even disregards the line dividing the two forms.16 Alexievich argues that her “novel in 
voices”—rather than straightforward journalism, fiction, or history—is the closest and most 
ethical representation of our world as it is today. 
                                               
15 Alexievich has used the term “novel in voices” in many places, including her personal website, 
alexievich.info. She uses the term “super-literature” in her Nobel Prize Lecture, delivered on December 7, 
2015. In English-language scholarship, the genre of Alexievich’s writing has been described as a 
“documentary novel” (Felix Ackerman and Michael Galbas,“Back from Afghanistan: Experiences of 
Soviet Afghan War Veterans in Transnational Perspective,” Journal of Soviet and Post-Soviet Politics 
and Society 1, no. 2 (2015), 8), “testimonial literature” (Danijela Lugarić Vukas, “Witnessing the 
Unspeakable: On Testimony and Trauma in Svetlana Alexievich’s The War’s Unwomanly Face and Zinky 
Boys,” Kul'tura i tekst 18, no. 3 (2014), 19–20), and “literary reportage” (John C. Hartsock, “Literary 
Reportage: The ‘Other’ Literary Journalism”, Literary Journalism Across the Globe: Journalistic 
Traditions and Transnational Influences, eds. John S. Bak and Bill Reynolds (Amherst: University of 
Massachusetts Press, 2011), 23–24). 
16 See, for example, Elena Gapova, “Stradanie i poisk smysla: ‘moral'nye revoliutsii’ Svetlany 
Aleksievich,” Novoe Literaturnoe Obozrenie 99 (January 2015), http://www.nlobooks.ru/node/5953. 
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Alexievich’s third novel, Zinky Boys (Tsinkovye mal'chiki), first published in 1990, 
vividly illustrates the evils of the Soviet-Afghan War, both in the criminal acts committed during 
the war as well as the deep physical and psychological wounds inflicted on veterans and their 
loved ones. Alexievich makes significant revisions and additions to Zinky Boys over the next 
seventeen years that strengthen the overarching message of pacifism and anti-authoritarianism. 
These changes were likely made in response to libel and defamation charges brought against her 
by Soviet-Afghan War veterans and their mothers, as well as the changing political realities in 
Belarus and Russia that have increasingly tended toward the authoritarian. Alexievich has been 
an outspoken critic of Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko and, after 2000, Russian 
President Vladimir Putin. Alexievich considers Lukashenko (who has held the office of President 
of Belarus since it was created in 1994) a dictator and his administration a holdover from the 
country’s totalitarian Soviet period. As a consequence of her stance in opposition to the 
undemocratic administrations of Lukashenko and Putin, Alexievich faced political persecution 
severe enough that she fled Belarus in 2000 and lived abroad for over a decade. In 2011 she 
returned to Minsk, where she still resides today. In 2015 she became the first writer from Belarus 
to receive the Nobel Prize in Literature, which she was awarded for her “polyphonic writings, a 
monument to suffering and courage in our time.” Since then, her novels have received a great 
deal of new attention from readers and literary critics around the world. 
 It may seem that grouping Prokhanov and Alexievich together is like comparing apples to 
oranges; however, the two writers share certain significant biographical details. Prokhanov and 
Alexievich both worked as journalists in the Brezhnev era before they eventually earned 
recognition as novelists. They were both well-regarded in their respective circles for decades, 
and they were both located somewhat on the fringe and not widely known outside of Russian-
 10 
speaking audiences—until recently. In a 2015 survey conducted in Russia, for example, 65% of 
the respondents reported that they had never even heard of Alexievich, and 17% reported that, 
while they had heard of her, they had never read any of her books.17 As scholarly attention to 
Prokhanov and Alexievich continues to grow, however, the significance of the Soviet-Afghan 
War in their writing remains understudied. In fact, they were among the limited number of 
Soviet writers allowed access to Afghanistan during the war—and it was an experience that had 
a profound effect on both of them. Prokhanov was sent to Kabul in January 1980, the first month 
of the war, as a correspondent for Literaturnaia gazeta, and he has returned several times. In 
1988, in the final few months of the war, Alexievich collected interviews in Kabul as well as in 
Tashkent, a border city in Uzbekistan that was an important staging ground for the Soviet Army. 
Writing and rewriting their narratives of the Soviet-Afghan War in the 1990s and 2000s served 
as critical turning points in each of their careers. For both Prokhanov and Alexievich, their 
novels featuring this war represent significant steps in the development of their artistic as well as 
political voices. 
 And yet, despite their shared interest in the Soviet-Afghan War, the resulting work of 
literature is radically different in terms artistic, ethical, and political. Alexievich’s work is 
distinctive in that she has learned to exploit the hyper-realism of documentary prose. In contrast, 
Prokhanov has moved in the opposite direction, imbuing his realist novels with mysticism and 
the surreal. While Prokhanov rewrites the Soviet presence in Afghanistan as a spiritual 
collaboration between two brother-nations, Alexievich presents the war as nothing less than a 
crime against humanity. The imperialist sheen to the war fought in Russia’s southern backyard is 
                                               
17 “Dve treti rossiian ne znaiut Svetlanu Aleksievich,” Novye izvestiia, November 2, 2015, 9, 
https://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/45635601. 
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another reason that the Soviet-Afghan War becomes an important vehicle for both Prokhanov 
and Alexievich, but they use it to very different ends. Prokhanov spins the war’s imperialist 
nature as a positive and incorporates it into his pro-imperialist neo-Eurasianist dogma. With her 
overall message of anti-imperialist pacifism, Alexievich points to perceived imperialist 
ambitions as a reason to condemn the war. That it was the final war of the Soviet era also means 
that the Soviet-Afghan War works well as a distillation—negative or positive—for the entire 
Soviet experiment. The two authors’ diametrically-opposed versions of the war represent the two 
sides of a much larger debate ongoing in Russia and Belarus since the fall of the Soviet Union: 
whether the Soviet Union was a failure or a success, and, consequently, how the roles of 
government, the military, religion, and citizens today may or may not need to change. Neither 
Alexievich nor Prokhanov goes so far as to invent history, but both of them treat the facts and 
events of the Soviet-Afghan War selectively in order to support their respective political beliefs. 
Alexievich and Prokhanov have been aware of each other’s writing on the Soviet-Afghan 
War since at least the early 1990s. During the court trials in which her Zinky Boys interviewees 
accused Alexievich of libel and defamation of character, Prokhanov’s newspaper Zavtra 
published a long “afterword” to the trial. Introducing the article, an editor (possibly Prokhanov 
himself) describes the “consequences of a battle, in which the Afghan War was only the 
instrument [stredstvo]. This battle is being carried out against the army and against our 
Fatherland.”18 In a chapter of court documents that Alexievich adds to the end of a new edition 
of Zinky Boys later the same year, she includes a letter from World War II “writer-veterans,” who 
decry the “opposition” that Alexievich has faced from “writers such as the infamous Alexander 
                                               
18 Petr Tkachenko, “Ia, konechno, vernus’... Posleslovie k istorii o ‘Tsinkovykh mal'chikakh,” Zavtra, 
April 13, 1994, 6. 
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Prokhanov (during the Afghan War, he earned the title of ‘the General Staff’s tireless 
nightingale’).”19 The following year, complaining about the “masculine” trends to romanticize 
war in Soviet and post-Soviet culture, Alexievich dismisses Prokhanov’s war novels as being 
“not even romanticism, just complexes.”20 It is doubtful that the two writers have ever met in 
person, and it is possible that they have not even read each other’s work, but it is clear that, to 
some extent, each writer is nonetheless positioning his or her story of the Soviet-Afghan War in 
response to the other. 
 
POLITICAL CONCERNS 
We have long used the word “war” as a literary and rhetorical trope when there is not any 
literal war, even in the broadest sense. Recall, for example, J. Edgar Hoover’s “war on crime” in 
the 1930s, Lyndon B. Johnson’s “war on poverty” in the 1960s, Ronald Reagan’s “war on drugs” 
in the 1980s, or even the decades-long “Cold War” between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. In 
these situations, the term “war” was understood to be metaphorical, not literal. When President 
George W. Bush declared a “global war on terrorism” in 2001, however, he further muddied our 
modern idea of war. Although used rhetorically in much the same way as the metaphorical wars, 
the “war on terror” did entail the very real, costly engagement of American troops against real 
enemy combatants—unlike the wars on crime or drugs. In our current mode, the language of 
                                               
19 Svetlana Aleksievich, “Tsinkovye mal'chiki,” in Zacharovannye smertiu (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo 
“Slovo,” 1994), 186. 
20 Tat'iana Bek and Svetlana Aleksievich, “V tvorcheskoi masterskoi: Moia edinstvennaia zhizn',” 
Voprosy literatury 1 (February 1996), 208, https://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/9690316. 
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war—the very word “war” itself—has become more opaque, more open to interpretation, more 
partisan, and thus more vulnerable to misunderstanding and even misuse.21 
Our concept of what constitutes the more literal kind of war has also undergone a 
dramatic change since the end of World War II.22 We talk about the Soviet-Afghan War and the 
U.S.-Vietnam War, but it is important to remember that neither the Soviet Union nor the United 
States ever issued a formal declaration of war in either case. In fact, the Soviet Union never 
declared war again after World War II.23 The United States also has not declared war since 
World War II, despite the many large-scale and prolonged international conflicts involving 
American soldiers in the last half-century.24 Although its soldiers have fought in not one but two 
Chechen Wars, the Russian Federation has never officially declared war. These are military 
engagements that look like war, feel like war to the soldiers fighting, and are commonly referred 
to as “war” by politicians and journalists. Yet, officially, these have been only “interventions” or 
“armed conflicts.” We are now living in a new age of undeclared wars being waged around the 
world. 
                                               
21 See James F. Childress, “The War Metaphor in Public Policy: Some Moral Reflections,” in The 
Leader’s Imperative: Ethics, Integrity, and Responsibility, ed. J. Carl Ficarrotta (West Lafayette, IN: 
Purdue University Press, 2001), 181–97. 
22 Recently, the term has been broadened to embrace more different types of violent engagements and 
participants. In fact, international lawyers now prefer to drop the word “war” altogether and instead speak 
of “armed conflict”. See Hew Strachan, “The Idea of War,” in The Cambridge Companion to War 
Writing, ed. Kate McLoughlin (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 11. 
23 Between 1945 and 1979, the Soviet Union certainly sent troops into several international conflicts 
without declaring war, so there were other conflicts that could be considered “undeclared wars,” but none 
were on the same scale as the Soviet-Afghan War or received the same level of public scrutiny 
(eventually).  
24 For example, the Korean War (1950-53), the Vietnam War (1965-75), the Gulf War (1990-91), and Iraq 
War (2003-11) the War in Afghanistan (2001-present), etc. 
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 Several philosophers and theorists (and writers and others artists) have responded to the 
new kind of violence and terror that has become characteristic of the current era. In their own 
way, Alexievich and Prokhanov, too, are responding to the paradoxical quality of the Soviet-
Afghan War—a war that was not a war—when they write about it. The Italian philosopher 
Giorgio Agamben has become particularly well known for his investigations into this kind of 
violence; he has written extensively about the power dynamics between a sovereign state and its 
citizens that have led to the current situation of continuous, ill-defined, and bloody wars. 
Although he does not discuss the Soviet-Afghan War specifically, the type of violence that 
interests Agamben was certainly a feature of this war (and its literary representations). In my 
dissertation I draw on those of his ideas that help highlight aspects of different power dynamics 
that Alexievich and Prokhanov use in telling their story of the Soviet-Afghan War, as well as the 
implications of these dynamics—which are occurring simultaneously within the text and outside 
of it. Although Agamben’s ideas are primarily applied to socio-political contexts, they can also 
be useful to investigations into the complicated power dynamics of a twentieth-century literary 
text, particularly one about the real events of a twentieth-century war. The basic concept of a 
writer as the creator of her literary world, in which characters are subjects and readers mere 
passive voyagers who are present at the writer’s discretion, is not new. But the unusual kind of 
violence that occurred during the Soviet-Afghan War, which is the chronotope of the literary 
works considered in this dissertation, and the unusual political terrain of the new post-Soviet 
states in which Alexievich and Prokhanov were writing, calls for a concept of power dynamics 




 Writing about war entails certain ethical considerations, in addition to political messages 
and national cultural consciousness. War is inherently chaotic and unpredictable, which presents 
a similar dilemma for the military commander trying to win the war as for the writer trying to 
represent it: “[t]he challenge for commanders is to master this chaotic environment, not to be 
overwhelmed by the bloodiness of the battlefield, and still to try to impose order and direction—
a challenge also encountered by any writer attempting to describe war.”25 In a similar vein, Kate 
McLoughlin argues that writing about war with order and direction is a way of controlling the 
narrative: “imposing at least verbal order on the chaos makes it seem more comprehensible and 
therefore feel safer.”26 War is chaotic, but the writer imposes narrative order on this chaos; in so 
doing, the writer risks controlling or even negating the chaos that is a fundamental reality of war. 
One ethical dilemma in war writing, therefore, is that a writer’s attempt to render something 
comprehensible to a reader is a step toward normalizing it and thereby rendering it acceptable.27 
                                               
25 Strachan, “The Idea of War,” 12. 
26 Kate McLoughlin, “War and Words,” in The Cambridge Companion to War Writing, ed. Kate 
McLoughlin (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 19. 
27 Some writers and critics of war literature have suggested that literary devices that represent war’s chaos 
and incomprehensibility is one way to neutralize this ethical dilemma. For example, silence and/or 
inarticulacy can be responses to physical and psychological pain and trauma, and war literature that 
reflects this symptom of trauma might be considered a more ethical representation. Maurice Blanchot 
describes “the voiceless cry, which breaks with all utterances, which is addressed to no one and which no 
one receives, the cry that lapses and decries” (Maurice Blanchot, The Writing of the Disaster, trans. Ann 
Smock (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1995), 51). This formulation accords with Elaine Scarry’s 
finding that physical pain “has no voice [...] resists language and destroys it [...] reverts to the state 
anterior to language” (Elaine Scarry, The Body in Pain: The Making and Unmaking of the World (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1987), 3-4). McLoughlin concludes that, in this sense, the purest and most 
ethical word of war would be an unquotable scream of pain. The well-documented response to trauma and 
grief—when an individual’s literal ability to speak is impaired—may be reflected in sentences that 
become interrupted, exhausted, or come to a standstill (Julia Kristeva, Black Sun: Depression and 
Melancholia, trans. Leon S. Roudiez (New York: Columbia University Press, 1992), 33). In this approach 
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This concern relates, in very different ways, to the war writing of Alexievich and Prokhanov. In 
her unusual approach to documentary prose, Alexievich’s narrative may be considered a more 
ethical way to represent the war: the parade of freestanding monologues is fragmentary, not 
coherently chronological, every character and most events disconnected. Prokhanov, on the other 
hand, seems to write more conventional war stories, with a clearer chronology and events that 
reflect a simpler, more logical cause and effect. However, literary devices that he increasingly 
incorporates in his Soviet-Afghan War novels after the fall of the Soviet Union make the war, 
and post-Soviet life, considerably less normal or comprehensible. 
Another important ethical consideration is that the representation of violence may give 
the reader pleasure. The excitement of the fight is a compelling, if ethically distasteful, motive 
for writing about war. Joanna Bourke, who has insisted on this element of “pleasure” in her 
intimate history of killing, writes of twentieth-century veterans from the United States, Britain, 
and Australia: “typically, combatants were able to construct a story around acts of exceptional 
violence which could render their actions pleasurable.”28 Is the artistic expression of violence 
that seeks to please readers excused as cathartic, an “acceptable outlet for anti-social impulses,” 
as film critic Margaret Bruder suggests?29 Or, in the same vein as the ethical concern that war 
literature normalizes war by imposing narrative order, does the literary representation of violence 
risks normalizing violence and desensitizing readers? This question of ethics connects to 
                                               
to war literature, writers represent war as an attack on language, “as though words themselves have been 
blasted to smithereens or else suffer from combat fatigue” (McLoughlin, “War and Words,” 17). 
28 Joanna Bourke, An Intimate History of Killing: Face to Face Killing Twentieth Century Warfare (New 
York: Basic Books, 1999), 257–58. 
29 Margaret Ervin Bruder, “Aestheticizing Violence, or How to Do Things with Style,” PhD diss., 
(Indiana University, 2003). 
 17 
decades-long critical debates about the aestheticization of violence, suffering, and horror. 
Violence (as well as suffering and horror) is increasingly used as a form of expressive art, with 
perhaps the most vivid examples in cinema.30 Ultimately, the question of whether Alexievich or 
Prokhanov represent war violence and suffering in an ethical way should be answered with 
attention to symbolism and style, and the reason for the pleasure. Just as there are ways to write 
war literature that do not smooth over war’s chaos and inhumanity, there are ways to write 
violence that delivers jouissance, or intellectual pleasure—rather than mere voyeuristic 
pleasure—and which may therefore have artistic merit.31 This can be difficult to determine, 
though. In some war literature, particularly in Prokhanov’s later novels about war, one or more 
of the characters will experience a sublime, blissful, ecstatic kind of jouissance in response to 
war violence. Alexievich’s examples of the horrifyingly gruesome crimes that Soviet troops 
committed against Afghan mujahideen as well as civilians have drawn both criticism and praise: 
criticism for her bias against the Soviet military, praise for exposing difficult truths of the war. 
Alexievich has claimed that her inclusion of such violence was a decision guided by her concern 
for an honest, ethical representation of the war; her critics, however, point out that the shock 
effect of these “confessions” helped her sell books. 
                                               
30 Think of the neo-noir representation of sexual violence in Blue Velvet (1986), or Anthony Hopkin’s 
depiction of Hannibal Lector in The Silence of the Lambs (1991), or Quentin Tarantino’s Kill Bill: 
Volume 1 “Beauty and Violence” (2003). The artistic use of horror and excessive violence can be found 
in Russian cinema, as well, such as Balanabov’s chilling Gruz 200 (2007); the title refers to the Russian 
military codename for the transport of soldiers’ bodies back home from war, and the film is set in 1984, 
during the Soviet-Afghan War. 
31 Roland Barthes uses Jacques Lacan’s idea of “jouissance” in his distinction between readerly and 
writerly texts (Roland Barthes, The Pleasure of the Text, trans. Richard Miller (New York: Hill and 
Wang, 1975). 
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One final important point in considering the ethical dilemmas facing Alexievich and 
Prokhanov is that of the “truth”—however slippery, complicated and (therefore) ultimately 
imaginary an ideal that might be.  War writing is often about record keeping, either a personal 
record for the writer, or, more often, a record for those who were there and can no longer speak 
for themselves, and those who were not there and need to be told what happened. Both writers 
have professed their motivation for writing about the Soviet-Afghan War to be somehow 
connected to telling the “truth” and setting the record straight. Perhaps they share this obsession 
with the truth, at least in part because both writers began their writing careers as journalists. This 
imperative to keep and preserve the record of what happened is particularly relevant to writers 
who were not themselves directly involved in the traumatic event. After all, as was discussed 
above, victims of trauma are often incapable of expressing themselves; victims react to pain and 
trauma with silence or wordless sounds. It falls to war reporters, or other bystanders, therefore, to 
write the war stories—those who can write, must write. It is a moral and ethical duty. This reason 
for writing about a war that one did not participate in is deeply connected to the need to tell the 
“truth.” 
On the other hand, there are special hurdles for writers of war literature who did not 
themselves participate in the war—such as Alexievich and Prokhanov, neither of whom ever 
served in the military. The natural desire to fixate on “truth-telling” is already problematized, 
especially in our postmodernist-era rejection of absolute truth. When the idea of truth as 
something variable and artificially constructed is widely accepted, the non-participant writer has 
even less authority to tell his or her version of the truth. Unlike war-veteran authors, writers of 
war literature without “insider” status must prove their authority (credibility, believability, etc.) 
and the authenticity of their version of what happened. If the writer was not a direct participant in 
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the conflict, then his or her authority may derive from how close he or she can get to the conflict 
and its participants. The underlying principle of war correspondence, after all, is that “the 
credibility of an account is in direct proportion to the news-gatherer’s proximity to events.”32 Put 
another way, the primary objective of modern war reporting has long been “to achieve 
believability through an ethos (the Aristotelian term for persuasive appeal located in character) 
based on autopsy or firsthand experience.”33 The reader-war reporter relationship, therefore, is 
founded on a ratio of credibility and closeness. This anxiety of credibility is apparent throughout 
Alexievich’s and Prokhanov’s literature about the Soviet-Afghan War. Both writers draw on 
their trips to Afghanistan during the war, and their close contact with the soldiers there, for 
evidence of their authority and ability to tell the “truth” about the war, in order to claim 
credibility through proximity.34  
 
AESTHETIC DECISIONS 
Political and ethical concerns coincide in the aesthetic decisions that Prokhanov and 
Alexievich make in writing their stories about the Soviet-Afghan War. For example, both writers 
highlight historical events, facts, and documents in their text about the war in response to, or to 
compensate for, the period’s anxiety about “truth.” The volatility of narratives about the Soviet-
Afghan War is connected to a general crisis of authority that plagued literary texts from the final 
decade of the Soviet Union and into the 1990s. Mikhael Epstein identifies a postmodern 
                                               
32 Kate McLoughlin, “War in Print Journalism,” in The Cambridge Companion to War Writing, ed. Kate 
McLoughlin (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 47. 
33 McLoughlin, “War in Print Journalism,” 48. 
34 This has become known as “embedded” journalism or the “journalism of attachment.” An ethical issue 
in this kind of journalism is the journalist’s degree of participation and their level of objectivity. 
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“hyperreality” in texts from late socialism: “no one knows [...] whether the harvests reported in 
Stalin’s or Brezhnev’s Russia were ever actually reaped, but the fact that the number of tilled 
hectares or tons of milled grain was always reported down to the tenth of a percent gave the 
simulacra the character of hyperreality [...] more tangible and reliable than anything else.”35 
Alexei Yurchak traces this phenomenon to the efforts of authors in late socialism to convert their 
voices “from that of the producer of new knowledge to that of the mediator of preexisting 
knowledge.”36 As a result, meaning and reality became increasingly slippery concepts in late 
Soviet and post-Soviet literature. The genres that Prokhanov and Alexievich chose for their 
respective narratives of the Soviet-Afghan War reflect the impact of political and ethical 
concerns on each writer’s aesthetic decisions. 
In this dissertation, though, I am most interested in their aesthetic decisions to complicate 
the roles of “author” and “reader,” and consequences that shifts in these roles may have in the 
realm of political or ethical considerations. Russian Formalism during the first decades of the 
twentieth century explored the concept of an authorial persona that is distinct from the biological 
author.37 However, the term “implied author” was coined by Wayne C. Booth in his 1961 book 
The Rhetoric of Fiction to distinguish between the “so-called real author” and “his various 
official versions of himself” in whatever he writes: 
                                               
35 Mikhail Epstein, “Postmodernism, Communism, and Sots-Art” in Russian Postmodernism: New 
Perspectives on Post-Soviet Culture, trans. Slobodanka Vladiv-Glover (New York: Berghahn Books, 
1999 [2016]), 55. 
36 Alexei Yurchak, Everything Was Forever, Until It Was No More: The Last Soviet Generation, 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2006), 75. 
37 The Russian Formalist Iurii Tynianov, for example, coined the term “literary personality” to refer to a 
work’s internal abstract authorial entity (Iurii Tynianov, “On Literary Evolution,” in Readings in Russian 
Poetics: Formalist and Structuralist Views, ed. Ladislav Matejka and Krystyna Pomorska (Cambridge, 
MA: MIT Press, 1971), 68–78). 
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As [the author] writes, he creates not simply an ideal, impersonal “man in general” but an 
implied version of “himself” that is different from the implied authors we meet in other 
men’s works. To some novelists it has seemed, indeed, that they were discovering 
themselves as they wrote.  
 [...] regardless of how sincere an author may try to be, his different works will 
imply different versions, different ideal combinations of norms. Just as one’s personal 
letters imply different versions of oneself, depending on the different relationships with 
each correspondent and the purpose of each letter, so the writer sets himself out with a 
different air depending on the needs of particular works.38 
 
Gerald Prince summarizes the implied author as “the implicit image of an author in the text, 
taken to be standing behind the scenes and to be responsible for its design and for the values and 
cultural norms it adheres to.”39 According to these theories, the literary text is regarded as an 
integral whole that should be analyzed separately from the intention of a biographical author and 
without any references to an outer world. Given that the implied author is detected by a close 
reading of the text’s aesthetic composition, this concept is intimately connected to that of the 
implied reader—also a term that Booth coins—which designates the implied author’s image of 
his reader. Thus, the concepts of implied author and implied reader served as the first steps 
towards a reader-response theory, which would soon be developed by theorists Wolfgang Iser 
and Roland Barthes, among others. 
 Wolfgang Iser significantly advanced Booth’s concept of the implied reader in his 1974 
book The Implied Reader: Patterns of Communication in Prose Fiction from Bunyan to Beckett. 
For Iser, meaning is not an object to be found within a text, but is an event of construction that 
occurs somewhere between the text and the reader. Although the text is a fixed world, meaning is 
realized through the act of reading; it depends on how a reader connects the structures of the text 
                                               
38 Wayne Booth, The Rhetoric of Fiction (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1961 [1983]), 70–71. 
39 Gerald Prince, A Dictionary of Narratology (Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 2003), 42. 
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to their own experience. At roughly the same time, Roland Barthes introduced the terms 
“readerly” (lisible) and “writerly” (scriptible) texts: 
On the one hand, there is what it is possible to write, and on the other, what it is no longer 
possible to write: [...] which texts would I consent to write (to re-write), to desire, to put 
forth as a force in this world of mine? The writerly. Why is the writerly to our value? 
Because the goal of literary work is to make the reader no longer a consumer, but a 
producer of the text. [The reader] is plunged into a kind of idleness—[...] instead of 
functioning himself, instead of gaining access to the [...] the pleasure of writing, he is left 
with no more than the poor freedom either to accept or reject the text: reading is nothing 
more than a referendum. Opposite the writerly text, then, its counter-value, its negative, 
reactive value: what can be read, but not written: the readerly.40 
 
Barthes further explores this distinction in his 1973 book The Pleasure of the Text, in which he 
divides the effects of texts into “pleasure” (plaisir) and “bliss” (jouissance), where a readerly 
text gives a reader pleasure, and a writerly text affords the reader bliss.41 
I am interested in the effect of Alexievich’s and Prokhanov’s texts on the reader, in how 
and by what devices the reader engages (or does not engage) in constructing the text’s meaning; 
and, with the overlay of politics in my approach to these texts, my focus on the reader becomes a 
focus on the citizen. But I am also interested in the writer’s control over the meaning of the text; 
both Prokhanov and Alexievich have been public figures since at least the early 1990s, 
outspoken in their criticism of (or, occasionally, praise for) political leaders and events.42 I 
examine their novels as political messages from the author as a sovereign poet-prophet, speaking 
to the reader as a being that ranges from political to natural, both author and reader existing in 
the modern political state of exception. In their address to post-Soviet citizens via novels about 
                                               
40 Roland Barthes, S/Z, trans. Richard Miller (New York: Hill and Wang, 1974), 4. 
41 Some theorists focus on the role of “narrator” rather than implied author. But in Alexievich’s writing, 
the implied author does not narrate a story so much as her various “voices” do; thus, my focus on theories 
of the “implied author” rather than “narrator.” 
42 Alexievich’s Nobel Prize has been interpreted in Russia as a dig by the West against Putin. 
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the Soviet-Afghan War, Prokhanov and Alexievich illustrate the very different relationships that 
citizens may have with their elected leaders, military, and religion.43 
 
CHAPTER BREAKDOWN 
My first chapter reviews the shifting representation of Afghanistan in Soviet media, with 
particular emphasis on reports that appeared in Pravda, the official newspaper of the Communist 
Party of the Soviet Union, and Izvestiia, the official newspaper of the Soviet government. The 
chapter is organized chronologically around the Soviet-Afghan War, with discussion of state-
approved representations of Afghanistan and the Soviet-Afghan relationship before, during, and 
after the war. Afghanistan was the first country to recognize the Bolshevik government after the 
1917 Revolution, and, in 1919, the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic (RSFSR) 
became the first country in the world to officially recognize Afghanistan’s sovereignty.44 In 
1921, the first Afghan-Soviet Nonaggression Pact was signed.45 My chapter picks up with stories 
about Afghanistan in Soviet media from the 1950s, at the advent of the Cold War. This is 
followed by a discussion of the Soviet war coverage and propaganda campaigns that emerged 
over the course of the nine-year war, divided into the four phases of Soviet military operations, 
from intervention in 1979 to withdrawal in 1989. Lastly, I consider the flurry of memoirs that 
                                               
43 This is reminiscent of “fourth estate theory,” wherein Alexievich and Prokhanov (as writers rather than 
journalists) are operating in the fourth estate to indirectly influence society by shaping the citizenry’s 
understanding of its government and major institutions. 
44 Feifer, The Great Gamble, 21. That same year, Afghanistan would become one of the first recipients of 
Soviet economic aid (Grau and Gress, The Soviet-Afghan War, 7). 
45 Ibid., 182. When Amanullah visited Moscow in 1928, he was greeted as a close friend of the still 
diplomatically-isolated Soviet Union. In return, though, Amanullah was forced to not merely abandon his 
support of the Islamic basmachi rebellion in Central Asia against the Soviet Union, but even to aid in the 
Soviet repression of it. 
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appeared in the first few years after the war ended, as military officers and journalists hurried to 
disclose their own “truth” of the war once the strict censorship had finally lifted. 
 The second and third chapters deal with Svetlana Alexievich’s writing about the Soviet-
Afghan War. In chapter two, I trace the many changes that Alexievich makes to her documentary 
novel Zinky Boys, from its initial publication in 1990 until its final version in 2007. I argue that 
these edits reflect the author’s hardening political position as anti-authoritarian and anti-war. 
With increasing uniformity, she cautions her reader against trusting the government’s 
propaganda and its control over information, and against being seduced by the romantic image of 
the military. A book that began with an embrace of an individual’s right to his or her own 
version of the truth becomes, in the end, a condemnation of anyone (reader or character) who 
disagrees with the author’s interpretation.  
 In the third chapter, I analyze more closely Alexievich’s poetics of author and reader 
roles in the final version of Zinky Boys. I argue that she challenges the traditional identities of 
author, character, and reader—and the relationships between them—by destabilizing the 
boundaries and allowing crossovers. In a work that essentially lacks plot, this is a clever device 
that allows Alexievich to immerse the reader in her story with minimal voyeurism. Alexievich’s 
readers are immersed in her text because they are made active participants, are themselves 
involved in the telling of the story, rather than eavesdropping on someone else’s trauma from a 
distance. By engaging the reader so closely in constructing the deeper meaning of the novel, 
Alexievich mimics the full and active participation of a citizen in building a new post-Soviet 
state. I also suggest that, along the way, she offers a subtle commentary on the role that religion 
should, or should not, play in the reader-citizen’s acceptance of authoritative institutions. 
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 In the fourth and fifth chapters, I turn to Alexander Prokhanov’s writing about the Soviet-
Afghan War. The fourth chapter is focused on his 1994 novel The Palace, Prohanov’s first post-
Soviet return to his favorite literary setting of the Soviet-Afghan War. This novel is remarkable 
for its change in both message and tone from the narratives of his Soviet-era writing on 
Afghanistan: it openly questions the Soviet Politburo’s decision to invade and includes surreal 
dream-like sequences more likely found in works of magical than socialist realism. I argue that 
the deep, spiritual connection that Prokhanov describes in his protagonist’s relationships with the 
Afghan soldiers and Afghan landscape is an illustration of his contemporaneous collaboration 
with Alexander Dugin, founding proponent of neo-Eurasianism. Military comradery, 
unhesitating obedience, and mystical spiritualism are key elements in this literary prototype of 
what will develop into Prokhanov’s pro-imperialist ideology.  
 My fifth and final chapter is similar in approach to my chapter on Alexievich’s changing 
narrative: I consider the revisions that Prokhanov makes to his 1982 novel Tree in the Center of 
Kabul in a 2000 “remake,” retitled Dream about Kabul. This novel about the Soviet-Afghan War 
becomes the first in a new seven-book series that will conclude with Mr. Hexogin—Prokhanov’s 
post-Soviet literary claim to fame. In Dream about Kabul, Prokhanov’s alter-ego protagonist 
becomes an even more passive participant in the progression of the Soviet-Afghan War, 
compared to The Palace, as well as a powerless pawn in the political conspiracies involving the 
Russian Federation, Israel, and the United States. By detaching the protagonist and reader from 
participation in the plot, Prokhanov instructs his reader in the submission and subservience of 
subject to tsar. Although religion is not presented as an institution, Prokhanov refines his interest 
in mysticism into the more specific theories of Nikolai Fedorov and Russian Cosmism, 
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integrating them into his neo-Eurasianist understanding of Afghanistan’s place in the future 
Russian Empire.  
 With these two authors, I demonstrate how the literary representations of a military 
conflict in recent Soviet history reflects the increasing polarization of political and social realities 
facing authors and readers in the post-Soviet states of Russia and Belarus. In so doing, I also 
show how the relationship between implied author and implied reader in a literary text becomes 
a political statement about the relationship between the state and the citizen. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
The Shifting Story of Afghanistan in Soviet Media 
 
INTRODUCTION 
As Mark Galeotti argues in his history of the Soviet-Afghan War, contrary to what others 
suggest, in many ways this war was not all that significant an event in Soviet history.1 The most 
compelling reason for studying this event, or, more precisely, studying how this event has been 
characterized and mythologized in Soviet and Russian culture, lies elsewhere:  
For this was a relatively minor, if ill-conceived and uncomfortable military adventure, 
eminently supportable, a negligible drain on the resources of the USSR. Its real 
importance is two-fold: as a myth and as a window. In the context of the collapse of the 
Soviet system, the war became used as a symbol for a variety of issues, from the cost of 
supporting such a huge and seemingly useless army to the arrogant foolishness of the old 
regime. Scattered, politically marginalized, ostracized, disempowered, the veterans and 
the other victims of the war could not make their views heard, and thus the mythological 
picture of the war, conjured from the prejudices, perceptions and political needs of a 
variety of journalists, politicians, academics and propagandists, came to dominate. For 
the outsider, though, the war also provides an extraordinarily rich source of insights into 
the Soviet Union of the 1980s and early 1990s and the new Russia which succeeded it.2  
 
                                               
1 Some scholars of the Soviet-Afghan War argue that its significance is overlooked: “In less than a 
decade, it [the Soviet-Afghan War] exposed fatal defects in the Soviet political structure as well as in 
communist ideology itself, helped trigger and sustain the policy of internal reform led by Mikhail 
Gorbachev [...], contributed strongly to the collapse of the communist party and the consequent end to the 
Cold War and, finally, played a decisive contributing role in the disintegration of the USSR” (Gregory 
Fremont-Barnes, The Soviet-Afghan War 1979-89, (Long Island City, NY: Osprey Publishing, 2012), 7). 
Personally, having studied both sides of the argument, I am most persuaded by those, such as Mark 
Galeotti, who see the Afghan War as one of very many factors leading to the collapse of the Soviet 
Union, but seriously doubt that it had such an important impact on the course of events within the Soviet 
Union. To the contrary, I would argue that it is the significance of the Soviet-Afghan War on U.S. history 
that is more often overlooked: the prolonged war and inevitable collapse of the Communist regime in 
Kabul after Soviet troops left much more directly led to the establishment of Al-Qaeda and the Taliban 
government in Afghanistan, the 9/11 attack, and the U.S.-led “global war on terrorism,” than to the 
collapse of the Soviet Union. Yet, despite this relative insignificance of the Soviet-Afghan War from the 
Soviet/post-Soviet historical perspective, for some reason the specter of this war continues to haunt post-
Soviet culture, even decades later. 
2 Mark Galeotti, Afghanistan: The Soviet Union’s Last War (London: Frank Cass, 1995), 2. 
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In my analysis of the Soviet-Afghan War as an important chronotope for two well-known 
writers, I take a similar mindset and approach to the war as a symbol that can be used, 
successfully, to very different ends. Over the several decades, from the 1980s into the twenty-
first century, Alexievich and Prokhanov repeatedly revise and refine their message. The 
following chapters focus primarily on the literary devices that each writer employs in 
communicating to the reader his or her evolving message, framed by certain historical figures, 
events, and interpretations of the war. The present chapter lays the groundwork for that literary 
analysis by examining the shifting representation of Afghanistan in Soviet media, with particular 
emphasis on reports that appeared in Pravda, the official newspaper of the Communist Party of 
the Soviet Union, and Izvestiia, the official newspaper of the Soviet government. The chapter is 
organized chronologically around the Soviet-Afghan War, with discussion of state-approved 
representations of Afghanistan and the Soviet-Afghan relationship before, during, and after the 
war. This will provide an important context for understanding how both Alexievich and 
Prokhanov developed narratives of the Soviet-Afghan War as a vehicle for their competing 
ideological beliefs by exploiting or reacting to stories (positive and negative, true and less true) 
about the war in Soviet media. 
  
BEFORE THE WAR 
Before Soviet troops invaded Afghanistan in 1979, there had already been nearly two 
centuries of continuous, even close Russian and then Soviet relations with Afghanistan. Often, 
this relationship was spurred on by competition with the British Empire and, later, the United 
States for influence over the land and leaders of this mountainous tribal nation located in 
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Russia’s southern backyard. Perhaps more than anything else, it is Afghanistan’s location that 
has attracted the attention of outsiders. 
Landlocked Afghanistan lies in the heart of Asia, and links three major cultural and 
geographic regions: the Indian subcontinent to the southeast, central Asia to the north, 
and the Iranian plateau in the west. Geography may not be destiny but it has set the 
course of Afghan history for millennia as the gateway for invaders spilling out of Iran or 
central Asia and into India: Cyrus the Great, Alexander the Great, Mahmud of Ghazni, 
Chingis Khan, Tamerlane, and Babur, to mention some of the most illustrious examples. 
During this period, Afghanistan was part of many different empires ruled by outsiders 
and the center of a couple of its own.3 
 
Soviet interest in Afghanistan is no exception. In the beginning of the nineteenth century, 
sustained Russian interest in and contact with the area of land that would become Afghanistan 
can be attributed to this region’s geographic position vis-à-vis the British and Russian empires.  
In the so-called “Great Game,” Great Britain and the Russian Empire vied for control over 
Afghanistan and neighboring territories in Central and Southern Asia.4 
 
The Great Game and Beyond 
Afghanistan was the first country to recognize the Bolshevik government after the 1917 
Revolution, and, in 1919, the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic (RSFSR) became the 
first country in the world to officially recognize Afghanistan’s sovereignty.5 The Afghan-Soviet 
Nonaggression Pact, which was formalized in 1921, formed the basis of friendly relations 
                                               
3 Thomas J. Barfield, Afghanistan: A Cultural and Political History (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 2010), 1. 
4 The phrase “The Great Game” was popularized by Rudyard Kipling in his 1901 novel, Kim. Alexander 
Prokhanov is occasionally called the “Russian Kipling” or the “Soviet Kipling.” 
5 Feifer, The Great Gamble, 21. That same year, Afghanistan would become one of the first recipients of 
Soviet economic aid (Grau and Gress, The Soviet-Afghan War, 7). 
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between the two countries.6 Afghanistan was one of the very first recipients of Soviet economic 
aid: “as far back as 1919, the Soviet government gave Afghanistan gratuitous aid in the form of a 
million gold rubles, small arms, ammunition, and a few aircraft to support the Afghan resistance 
to the British conquerors.”7 Throughout the decades leading up to the invasion of Soviet troops, 
Kabul would continue to receive substantial amounts of aid, support, and personnel from the 
Soviet Union. Soviet-Afghan military cooperation began on a regular basis in 1956, when the 
Soviet Union supplied $25 million in arms, and the Soviet Minister of Defense became 
responsible for training Afghan military units. In less than a decade, some 4,000 Afghan officers 
received military education and training—and Marxist indoctrination—in the Soviet Union.8 A 
major driving factor in these initiatives was competition with the United States for a sphere of 
influence in the Cold War years.  
From the earliest days of the Cold War, the Soviet press participated in this competition 
by ridiculing Western aid as a ploy to gain political influence in and economic benefit from the 
                                               
6 Ibid., 182. When Amanullah visited Moscow in 1928, he was greeted as a close friend of the still 
diplomatically-isolated Soviet Union. In return, though, Amanullah was forced to not merely abandon his 
support of the Islamic basmachi rebellion in Central Asia against the Soviet Union, but even to aid in the 
Soviet repression of it. 
7 Grau and Gress, The Soviet-Afghan War, 10. The head of the Russian General Staff authors’ collective, 
Colonel V. A. Runov, notes that the gold rubles are a matter of debate. Other early Soviet assistance 
included personnel such as aircraft technicians and telegraph operators. Soviet interest in the area 
redoubled after Stalin’s death in 1953. In 1954, for example, the Soviet Union loaned Afghanistan $3.5 
million to aid in the construction of two silos and bakeries. In 1955, the two countries renewed a barter 
protocol on commodity exchange that guaranteed Soviet imports, including petroleum, construction 
materials and metals, in exchange for Afghan wool, raw cotton, and animal hides, and the Soviet Union 
gave Afghanistan a $100 million long-term development loan to fund infrastructure projects including 
roads, river ports, telecommunications, hydroelectric dams, and airfields. See Fremont-Barnes, The 
Soviet-Afghan War, 20. 
8 Fremont-Barnes, The Soviet-Afghan War, 20. In 1972, up to 100 Soviet consultants and specialists were 
sent to train Afghan armed forces in Afghanistan; in May 1978, up to 400 Soviet military advisers were 
sent. See Grau and Gress, The Soviet-Afghan War, 10. 
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Middle East. In Pravda, for example, one journalist writes ironically of the U.S. “aid” packages 
in the Middle East in the late 1940s. 
During the Second World War, and immediately after its end, the American monopolists 
raised the question of a re-shuffle of colonies and “spheres of influence” between the 
imperialist powers in accordance with the altered balance of power within the capitalist 
system. […] The infiltration of the American expansionists into the countries of the Near 
and Middle East (including Turkey, the Arab countries, Iran and Afghanistan) is, to a 
great extent, conditioned by the aggressive military-political plans of the U.S.A. which 
are directed against the Soviet Union and the countries of people’s democracy. The 
American militarists are striving to establish a chain of places d’armes and bases along 
the southern frontiers of the U.S.S.R.9 
 
The concern that the Soviet Union might lose its sphere of influence was heightened by another 
article published that same year in the journal Voprosy istorii, which claimed that England and 
France had planned to attack the Soviet Union in 1939 via Iran and Afghanistan.10 In 1950, 
TASS (Telegrafnoe agentstvo Sovetskogo Soiuza), the Soviet Union’s central information 
agency, reported the “dubious activity” of the U.N. mission in Afghanistan; officially sent to 
Kabul for the purpose of “rendering technological assistance to Afghanistan, the mission was 
apparently scouting the Afghan-Soviet border, instead. The story was picked up by both Pravda 
and Izvestiia.11 Even poetry and prose, which was then published and reviewed in popular 
newspapers or journals, disparaged the American influence in Afghanistan. In his 1951 cycle 
“Two Streams,” Nikolai Trikhonov, for example, wrote about the “hard life of the peoples [of 
                                               
9 E. Zhukov, “Kolonial'nye appetity amerikanskikh monologii: O plane ‘pomoshchi’ otstalym stranam,” 
Pravda, July 9, 1949, 4, https://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/21398609. 
10 R. Iurev, “Preparations of England and France for an Attack on the Soviet Union from the South in 
1939–40,” Voprosy istorii, no. 2 (1949). 
11 “Podozritel'naia deiatel'nost' missii OON v Afganistane,” Pravda, October 21, 1950, 4, 
https://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/21401497. Also printed in Izvestiia. See also “Amerikanskie proiski 
v Afganistane,” Izvestiia, July 5, 1951, 4, https://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/24767498; “Suspicious 
Activity of American ‘Specialists’ in Afghanistan,” Pravda, August 21, 1952, 3; and “Gazeta ‘Nacht-
ekspress’ o shpionskoi deiatel'nosti sotrudnikov tekhnicheskoi missii OON v Afganistane,” Izvestiia, 
February 22, 1953, 4, https://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/25704380. 
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Pakistan and Afghanistan] destined by the Anglo-American imperialists and their own 
governments to hunger, poverty and deprivation of rights.”12 
Already in 1949, a long article in Voprosy istorii was devoted to the “question of the 
formation of the Afghan Nation.”13 The article, which begins in the fourteenth century but 
quickly moves into the twentieth century, describes Afghanistan’s history in Marxist terms of 
social and economic development. Its author I. Reisner emphasizes the defeat of the “British 
aggressors” in the Anglo-Afghan Wars of the nineteenth century. Furthermore, in describing the 
formation of Afghanistan as a centralized multinational state at the end of the nineteenth century 
after these wars, Reisner writes, 
There is no doubt that the repeated attacks by Britain on Afghanistan—first in 1838 to 
1842 and then in 1878 to 1880—and the prolonged and just wars which the peoples of 
Afghanistan fought against the colonial aggressors were of great importance in 
strengthening the rule of the Emirs and in forming the Afghan multinational centralized 
state. In this case the rebuff given the British by the peoples of Afghanistan evidently 
played approximately the same part as the struggle against invasions from the East in the 
formation of the Russian multinational state. 
 
The Bolshevik Revolution of 1917, of course, plays an important role as a “mighty impetus to 
Afghan national feeling,” as “thanks only to Soviet Russia was Afghanistan able to throw off the 
chains of the British protectorate and to restore her independence.” As noted above in an earlier 
article, Reisner’s essay echoes the concern that “imperialists” wish to turn Afghanistan into a 
base against the Soviet Union, but he concludes on an optimistic note that the “young Afghan 
proletariat are more and more making themselves felt.” In a speech at the 19th All-Union Party 
                                               
12 A. Turkov, “Stikhi o gore i gneve naroda,” Pravda, November 14, 1951, 3, 
https://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/21402807. Tikhonov’s “Two Streams” was published in Znamia, 
no. 8 (1951). 
13 I. Reisner, “On the Question of the Formation of the Afghan Nation,” Voprosy istorii, no. 7 (October 6, 
1949): 66–85. 
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Congress in 1952, and subsequently published in Pravda, NKVD chief Lavrentii Beria echoes 
this sense of shared Soviet and Afghan destinies with the comment that, “in the not distant past,” 
the Central Asian territories of the Russian Empire were about on the same level as neighboring 
Afghanistan, but, under Soviet influence, had moved far ahead in industrial development.14 The 
implication is not only to laud the achievements of Soviet Central Asia, but also to suggest that 
Afghanistan would similarly benefit from Soviet influence. In February 1956, the 35th 
anniversary of the Soviet-Afghan Friendship Treaty, which Vladimir Lenin signed in 1920, is 
celebrated in several newspapers.15 
With help from the Soviet Union, the United States, France, and Germany, Kabul 
University had opened its doors to students in 1932. Meanwhile, thousands of Afghan citizens 
studied in the Soviet Union and learned to speak Russian before returning to Afghanistan. By the 
1960s, foreign-educated scholars populated the campus, which exposed even more Afghan 
students to new ideas, including communism, capitalism, and even feminism. Bringing together a 
group of talented young people with advanced educational opportunities but limited job 
prospects, combined with exposure to radical new ideas in an otherwise extremely conservative 
society, however, rarely ends well for the state. The university, and eventually the whole capitol 
city, became a hotbed of political radicalism in Afghanistan. These radical politics “flourished 
within secret societies formed to seek the overthrow of Afghanistan’s social and political order. 
At opposite ends of the spectrum, the two most important actors were the Islamists and the 
                                               
14 “Rech' tov. Berii,” Pravda, October 9, 1952, 2–3, https://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/21403519. 
15 I. Aleksandrov, “Prochnaia druzhba sovetskogo i Afganskogo narodov: K 35-i Sovetsko-Afganskogo 
Dogovora o druzhbe,” Pravda (February 28, 1956): 4, https://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/21419177. 
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Communists, who often clashed violently on campus and in the streets of Kabul.”16 The 
Communist students at Kabul University formed their own political party called the People’s 
Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) in 1965, under the joint leadership of Nur Muhammad 
Taraki and Babrak Karmal, but this event went essentially unnoticed in Soviet media. 
In 1973, with help from PDPA members, former Prime Minister Mohammed Daoud 
overthrew the monarchy and established Afghanistan as a republic. The coup was reported in 
Soviet media in relatively positive terms, including the announcement that the Soviet Union 
officially recognizes the Republic of Afghanistan.17 The following year, in April 1977, President 
Daoud was in the Soviet Union on an official friendly visit, where he met with Brezhnev and 
members of the Politburo. Afterward, a joint statement of the Soviet Union and the Republic of 
Afghanistan—which was published in Pravda and Izvestiia, described the visit—and the 
relationship between the two countries—in terms of “friendship, trust, and mutual 
understanding.”18  
 
                                               
16 Barfield, Afghanistan, 213. 
17 The following articles appeared in Pravda and Izvestiia in only July 17–23, 1973: “Coup d'etat during 
King Zahir Shah’s visit to Italy,” Pravda-Izvestiia 18/5-250; “Situation after change of regime,” Pravda 
19/5-350; “Situation in Afghanistan,” Pravda 20/5-250; “Events in Afghanistan,” Izvestiia 20/8-400; 
“Life is returning to normal,” Pravda 21/5-125; “Soviet Union recognizes Republic of Afghanistan,” 
Pravda 21/5-15, Izvestiia 21/1-15, “Official statements,” Pravda 21/5-100; “Situation is being 
normalized,” Izvestiia 21/5-275; “Official statement,” Pravda 22/4-10; “Recognition of republic,” 
Izvestiia 22/2-200; “Calm atmosphere,” Pravda 23/3-75. The flurry of articles reporting on Daoud’s coup 
in either neutral or positive terms will continue for the rest of the summer. 
18 “Joint Statement of the Soviet Union and the Republic of Afghanistan,” Pravda (June 9, 1974): 1, 4; 
“Joint Statement of the Soviet Union and the Republic of Afghanistan,” Izvestiia (June 9, 1974): 1–2, 
https://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/13639705. 
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The April Revolution 
On April 29, 1978, Pravda printed the following dry report, conveyed from TASS in 
Islamabad the day before: 
According to reports received here from Afghanistan, a coup d’etat was carried out there 
yesterday. Power in the country has passed into the hands of a Revolutionary Council of 
the armed forces. An announcement of the Revolutionary Council, read over Kabul radio 
by Col. Abdul Khadir, Air Force Chief of Staff, says: “The armed forces have assumed 
responsibility for the defense of the homeland, of national independence and of the 
freedom and honor of the Afghanistan people.” 
The Revolutionary Council announced that its domestic policy will be based “on 
defense of the principles of Islam, democracy, freedom and inviolability of the person 
and that it will strive for progress in all areas for Afghanistan.” In foreign affairs it will 
“pursue a policy of positive and active neutrality.” Citing Kabul radio, a Reuters’ 
correspondent reports from Islamabad that Mohammad Daoud, the deposed head of state 
and Prime Minister, and his brother Mohammad Nairn, both of whom refused to 
surrender to the troops, were killed during the fierce firefight in the Afghan capital 
yesterday. 
According to Kabul radio, the Revolutionary Council is in control of the situation 
in Kabul and other areas of the country. The constitution has been suspended. A curfew is 
in effect in Kabul. 
 
Thus, on April 27–28, 1978, the communist PDPA took control of the Afghan government 
almost overnight, without ever mobilizing a popular following within the country or many close 
allies from outside, and proclaimed itself the head of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan 
(DRA).19  
Although it would become known as a “revolution,” the change in power was more like a 
military coup d’état than a popular uprising—and, in fact, “coup d’etat” is how this event is 
described in Soviet mass media, as seen above. Soviet journalists would switch to using the term 
“revolution” within a week. On May 6, 1978, for example, Pravda’s correspondent in Kabul 
                                               
19 The fighting caused about two thousand deaths and lasted only a couple of days (Fiefer, 23). 
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chronicles the events that led to the “revolution.”20 The uprising, he writes, was a response to the 
April 17 murder of Amir Akbar Khyber, “a known progressive figure in the country,” and arrests 
of state employees known to hold opposition views on April 25. Two days later, tanks began 
moving into Kabul and, at 7:00 p.m., Kabul radio broadcast a statement from N. M. Taraki, 
Chairman of the Revolutionary Council, that “All state power has now come into the hands of 
the Afghan people!” In analyzing the underlying sociopolitical causes of the revolution, the 
correspondent writes that they “lie in the contradictory tendencies of Afghanistan’s political 
development in recent years, the extreme social inequality among difference strata of the 
population, and the exacerbation of the class struggle.” Much of the blame is placed on Daoud, 
with descriptions of the important economic and political reforms that he promised but failed to 
deliver. In this situation, he concludes, “widespread discontent grew in the country and 
eventually touched off an explosion.”  
 
Taraki versus Amin 
Several articles describe the friendly relationship between Brezhnev and Noor 
Mohammad Taraki, Prime Minister of Afghanistan. At a dinner given in Taraki’s honor at the 
Kremlin in December 1978, for example, Brezhnev gave a speech in which he characterized their 
relationship as “not simply good-neighborliness but a profound, sincere and durable friendship, 
permeated by a spirit of comradeship and revolutionary solidarity.”21 The talks themselves were 
described as taking place “in an atmosphere of cordiality, friendship and mutual 
                                               
20 V. Baikov, “Pervye dni revoliutsii,” Pravda (May 6, 1978): 5, 
https://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/21523232. 
21 “V druzhestvennoi obstanovke,” Pravda (December 6, 1978): 2, 
https://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/21523276. Reprinted the following day in Izvestiia. 
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understanding.”22 The talks resulted in the “Treaty of Friendship, Good-Neighborliness, and 
Cooperation between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Democratic Republic of 
Afghanistan,” which “reaffirmed their fidelity to the goals and principles of the Soviet-Afghan 
treaties of 1921 and 1931” and their desire “to strengthen in every way friendship and all-wround 
cooperation between the two countries.”23 The treaty was printed in full on the frontpage of both 
Pravda and Izvestiia on December 6, 1978. 
On September 17, 1979, Pravda reports that, “due to the condition of his health, [N. M. 
Taraki] cannot continue to carry out his party and state responsibilities,” and that Hafizullah 
Amin was elected to replace him.24 The next day on its front page Pravda prints the letter of 
congratulations, signed by Brezhnev and Kosygin, for “Comrade” Hafizullah Amin, on his 
election to the posts of General Secretary of the Central Committee of the People’s Democratic 
Party of Afghanistan, Chairman of the Revolutionary Council and Prime Minister of the 
Democratic Republic of Afghanistan.  
We are confident that fraternal relations between the Soviet Union and revolutionary 
Afghanistan will continue to develop successfully on the basis of the Treaty of 
Friendship, Good-Neighbor Relations and Cooperation, in the interests of our countries’ 
peoples and to the benefit of peace and progress in Asia and around the world.25 
 
                                               
22 “Sovmestnoe sovetsko-afganskoe kommiunike,” Pravda (December 8, 1978): 1, 4, 
https://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/21524619, https://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/21524605. Also 
printed in Izvestiia the same day. 
23 “Dogovor o druzhbe, dobrososedstve i sotrudnichestve mezhdu Soiuzom Sovetskikh 
Sotsiolisticheskikh Respublik i Demokraticheskoi Respublikoi Afganistan,” Pravda (December 6, 1978): 
1, https://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/21523260. 
24 “Resheniia plenuma TsK Narodno-demokraticheskoi partii Afganistana i Revoliutsionnogo soveta 
DRA,” Pravda (September 17, 1979): 1, https://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/21529605. 
25 “General'nomu sekretariu TsK NDPA, Predsedateliu Revoliutsionnogo soveta i Prem'er-Ministru 
Demokraticheskoi Respubliki Afganistan tovarishchu Khafizulle Aminu,” Pravda (September 18, 1979): 
1, https://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/21532625. 
 38 
Publicly, at this point, nothing but support for Amin is expressed in Soviet media; of course, this 
would soon change. 
The Kremlin’s first public statement on events in Afghanistan, read on Soviet television 
and radio on December 30, 1979, acknowledges that it had sent a “limited military contingent” to 
Afghanistan but insists that these troops were there solely to repel “external armed interference.” 
The Kremlin promises that all Soviet troops in Afghanistan will be withdrawn when threats to 
the Afghan regime are eliminated. Furthermore, the Kremlin accuses the United States, China, 
and Egypt of providing “unlimited backing” to rebel Islamic tribesmen in Afghanistan. The US, 
it states, embarked on such a course in Afghanistan with the hope of “replacing the positions that 
were lost as result of the downfall of the Shah of Iran. […] Cracks have appeared in the 
notorious ‘strategic arc’ that Americans have been building for decades close to the southern 
borders of the Soviet Union.” Justifying Soviet support for Babrak Karmal’s nascent government 
as an effort to repel American imperialist ambitions in the country, the statement charges that the 
US and other antirevolutionary forces, found in the “usurper” Amin “a suitable figure for 
implementing their plans.” 
Through deception and intrigues, he seized control of the main levers of state 
administration, after which he overthrew the legitimate President N. Taraki and killed 
him. By his criminal actions, his flagrant violations of legality and law and order, his 
cruelty and abuses of power, Main undermined the ideals of the April revolution. He had 
on his hands the blood of many representatives of the industrious Afghan people, party 
officials, honored military officers, Muslim dignitaries and other honest citizens. To all 
intents and purposes, Amin teamed up with the enemies of the April revolution. 26 
 
The statement claims that the Afghan people rose up against Amin and removed him, but that 
they requested aid and support from the Soviet Union to fight against “outside aggression.” The 
                                               
26 A. Petrov, “K sobytiiam v Afganistane,” Pravda (December 31, 1979): 4, 
https://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/21526973. 
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statement quotes Article 4 of the Soviet-Afghan friendship treaty in its justification of Moscow’s 
assistance to Afghanistan, as well as Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, which, the 
statement says, “speaks of the inherent right of every nation to individual or collective self-
defense.” Finally, the statement seeks to reassure Iran and Pakistan by noting, “Soviet assistance 
to and support of Afghanistan is not directed against any of its neighbor countries.”27 The next 
day, this message was printed in the central newspaper Pravda, in an article entitled “K 
sobytiiam v Afganistane,” signed by A. Petrov. “Aleksei Petrov” would author many Pravda 
articles in the late 1970s and early 80s, but this is a pseudonym used often in those years for 
high-level press statements, which was understood by readers to convey the authoritative views 
of the Kremlin. 
This initial public statement, which was read over television and radio in the Soviet 
Union the day before it appeared in print in Pravda, hints toward several themes that will arise in 
Soviet coverage of the war for the first few years of the conflict: 
(1) Their Afghan brothers requested and welcome Soviet intervention 
(2) Soviet intervention is limited in scope and basically nonviolent 
(3) Soviet intervention is the fulfillment of their international duty to their communist 
brothers; it is not imperialism 
(4) Soviet intervention is necessary to repel American imperialism in the region 
(5) Western imperialist media is telling lies about events in Afghanistan 
 
Prokhanov’s first Soviet-Afghan War novel, published in 1982, closely reflects the above 
themes, often found in Soviet newspapers. As late as the fall of 1985, Soviet newspapers were 
                                               
27 Robert Rand, “A Chronology of Soviet-Afghan Relations: April 1978 – January 1980,” Russkaia 
literatura 17 (January 2, 1980), 9. 
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still justifying the war as necessary to counter the United States efforts to support (and arm) the 
mujahedeen.28 
 
DURING THE WAR 
The Soviet-Afghan War is generally divided into four distinct phases: December 1979-
February 1980, March 1980-April 1985, May 1985-December 1986, and November 1986-
February 1989.29 The different phases in Soviet reporting on the war more or less correspond to 
the four military phases. 
 
Period One: December 1979–February 1980 
By January 1980, the central newspapers, Pravda and Izvestiia, as well as Radio 
Moscow, already had correspondents stationed in Kabul. Prokhanov, sent to Kabul by 
Literaturnaia gazeta, was there, as well. A major theme in Soviet media coverage of the first 
phase was fact versus fiction: identifying and refuting lies fabricated by ‘imperialist anti-Soviet 
Western propaganda machine.’ In the first year that Soviet troops were in Afghanistan, Soviet 
newspaper articles about the intervention routinely appeared under titles such as “The Duplicity 
of Imperialist Propaganda,” “Slanderers Rebuffed: Afghanistan Expels ‘Lying’ Journalists,” 
                                               
28 See “Obrecheno na proval: dlia chego vedetsia neob''iavlennaia voina protiv Afganistana,” Pravda, 
February 14, 1985, 6, https://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/21559952. 
29 The division between the third and fourth phases sometimes varies slightly from source to source. I 
have provided the timeline that Braithwaite (139–45) and Fremont-Barnes (40–62) indicate, but The 
Russian General Staff writes that the third phase ended and the fourth began in January 1987. All sources 
agree that the fourth phase was marked by “Soviet forces’ participation in the Afghan government’s 
program of national reconciliation” (Grau and Gress, The Soviet-Afghan War, 13; see also 27–29). I 
agree, therefore, with the logic that the fourth phase began in November 1986, a few months before 
January 1987, because this was closer to the time when the Soviet Union installed Najibullah—with his 
“Policy of National Reconciliation—as the new president of Afghanistan. 
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“Foul Concoction: Massacre in Afghan Village? An Anti-Soviet Lie,” “How Lies are 
Fabricated,” “The Voice of America’s Latest Fabrication,” “A Policy of Disorientation,” “A Lie 
Exposed,” “Who Is Inspiring Slander Against the Soviet Union?,” “Singing Somebody Else’s 
Tune,” and “Yet Another Lie.” Soviet audiences were inundated with diatribes against anti-
Soviet propaganda and repeatedly instructed not to believe the American, French, and Chinese 
lies about what was happening in Afghanistan.30 The Soviet media also printed several articles 
that quoted the new President Karmal and other high-ranking Afghan government leaders 
thanking and praising the Soviet Union for its military “aid.”31 
In this early stage of media coverage, there were certainly no reports of Soviet casualties 
or even violence; in fact, there was rarely discussion of the Soviet troops. Instead, media 
coverage tended to focus on the People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA), their cause, 
and the heroism of their leaders and troops. Soviet reporters worked to create the impression that 
the war was being fought primarily by the Afghan government troops, and that the Soviet 
soldiers in Afghanistan were engaged exclusively in noncombat support duties, such as driving 
trucks and delivering supplies. While covering the Kabul Riot in February 1980, for example, the 
Soviet press does not mention any Soviet casualties or even any participation of Soviet troops in 
subduing the riot, crediting only the PDPA-backed Afghan army and local police in bringing the 
capitol back under control—and, of course, blaming outside “interventionist” forces for causing 
                                               
30 Aaron Trehub, “Soviet Press Coverage of the War in Afghanistan: From Cheerleading to 
Disenchantment,” Report on the USSR 1, no. 10 (March 10, 1989), 1. 
31 For example, TASS quotes President Karmal on 10 January 1980 as stating unequivocally that the 
USSR was not interfering in their affairs, and Afghan Foreign Minister Muhammed Dost on 17 January 
1980 as thanking the USSR for its assistance. 
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the disorder.32 A common scene on Soviet television in the early years of the war was that of 
Soviet soldiers planting trees in Afghanistan. Unofficial information about the war could spread 
only through samizdat publications, word of mouth by soldiers returning from the war with 
stories of death, atrocities, and drug addictions, and the steady trickle of sealed coffins.33 
Meanwhile, Hafizullah Amin was aggressively disparaged in Soviet media. There were 
several articles that claimed he had worked for the CIA to subvert the revolution in Afghanistan. 
“Every day there is more and more evidence that H. Amin was a hireling of American 
imperialism and an agent of the US Central Intelligence Agent,” begins one article.34 They make 
much of the fact that Amin studied in the U.S. from 1962 and 1964, and claim that he was 
recruited by CIA agents while he was there. In an interview, a member of the PDPA Central 
Committee states, “We can say precisely where and with which CIA intelligence agents Amin 
had meetings in 1973–1978 to receive assignments to wreck our party. The time will come when 
the whole world will learn the details of how Amin and his henchmen villainously assassinated 
N. M. Taraki, and what an ugly role the American special services played in this deed.” 
 
Period Two: March 1980–April 1985 
Despite the increased violence of the second phase of war, initially, Soviet reporting on 
the war did not deviate far from the narratives of the first phase. Iurii Gavrilov, for example, 
wrote several articles for the Red Star about solidarity between the Afghan civilian population 
                                               
32 “Soviet Press Coverage of the Kabul Disasters,” Radio Liberty 91/80, February 29, 1980. 
33 U.S. News and World Report, March 16, 1987, 39; also Der Spiegel, March 7, 1988, 180–186; see Alex 
Alexiev, Inside the Soviet Army in Afghanistan (Santa Monica, CA: The Rand Corporation, 1988), 49–60. 
34 “Kh. Amin—agent TsRU,” Pravda, January 17, 1980, 5, 
https://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/21528623. 
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and the Soviet troops in the earliest years of the war. In “Reliable Friends,” printed on March 11, 
1980, he describes his visit to a village near Kabul where Soviet troops are stationed to help 
peasants make repairs, plant trees and shrubs, and to “make things brighter.”35 The following 
year, Komsomol'skai pravda correspondent Vladimir Snegirev answered a letter to the editor 
from a concerned mother, whose son was serving in Afghanistan, and who wanted to know more 
about the situation there. Snegirev acknowledged that there were “many difficulties” facing the 
Afghan government and that “service in Afghanistan is difficult,” but then he described merely 
the mountainous terrain, the heat, the lack of water. Or, for example, he described “one episode” 
when a Soviet tank, delivering food to an Afghan village, fell into a pit dug by the resistance. 
This is the extent of the violence that he reported; no one was harmed.36  
By the spring of 1984, however, Soviet newspapers were regularly running articles about 
wounded Afghan veterans. Merely acknowledging the existence of these wounded veterans—
missing body parts, scars from bullets and explosions—obviously made it impossible to continue 
denying the danger and violence facing Soviet soldiers in Afghanistan. However, in 1984 and 
1985, the Soviet press still managed to put a positive “spin” on the Afghan intervention and the 
fate of these wounded Afghan veterans.37 Having admitted that Soviet soldiers were being 
wounded in active combat in Afghanistan, many journalists wrote stories about veterans who 
                                               
35 Iurii Gavrilov, “Nadezhnye druz'ia,” in Krasnaia Zvezda (March 11, 1980), 3. See also Peter Kruzhin 
and John Hartland, “Krasnaya zvezda Describes Reception of Soviet Troops in Afghanistan,” in Radio 
Liberty, March 14, 1980. 
36 Vladimir Snegirev, “Mesto sluzhby—Afganistan,” in Komsomol'skaia pravda, August 7, 1981, 8. In 
the glasnost' years and beyond, Snegirev would change his tune, authoring some of the earliest articles 
and books revealing the true nature of service in Afghanistan to be published in the Soviet Union (see, for 
example, Vladimir Snegirev and David Gai, Vtorzhenie: neizvestnye stranitsy ne''obiavlennoi voiny 
(Moscow: SP “IKPA,” 1991). 
37 Trehub, “Soviet Press Coverage,” 2. 
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triumphed over the loss of limbs or other debilitating wounds to live happy and productive lives. 
These articles turned stories about wounded veterans into tales of heroism and strength. In 
Krasnaia zvezda, for example, an article entitled “Loyalty” tells the story of private who lost 
both of his legs when a mine exploded under the wheels of the armored personnel carrier in 
which he was riding. At first, the article reports, he did not want to burden his girlfriend, now 
that he was an amputee, but an “elderly nurse” at the hospital where he was recuperating 
exclaimed, “Why, if our women hadn’t waited for their men to come home from the front, 
healthy or crippled, we might not have won the Great Patriotic War!”  So, he wrote to his 
girlfriend, who rushed to his side at the hospital; they got married, had a son, and moved into a 
three-bedroom apartment. Also, the articles notes, he learned to walk again.38 Or, the press 
printed stories about soldiers who volunteered to return to Afghanistan after being maimed or 
otherwise severely wounded, as examples of true Soviet heroism.39 Even the deaths of Soviet 
soldiers in Afghanistan were reframed as tales of martyred heroes.40  Some of these articles about 
wounded veterans were critical of the treatment that they were receiving back home in the Soviet 
                                               
38 Capt. A. Slobozhanyuk, “Loyalty: A Legless Veteran is Rehabilitated, Marries his Faithful Girlfriend,” 
Krasnaia zvezda, June 23, 1984. 
39 “I snitsya im Salang,…” Pravda, July 24, 1984; “Snova snitsya Salang,” Pravda, September 10, 1985.  
See also, for example, “This Kind Doesn’t Surrender,” Sovetskaia Belorussia, January 6, 1985, Current 
Digest of the Soviet Press 37, no. 7, 5. 
40 One article in Krasnaia zvezda told the story of a father who asked to rejoin the army after his son had 
died “heroically” earlier that year, “fulfilling his internationalist duty on Afghan soil,” because he wished 
to serve out his son’s remaining term of service and complete his military duty to the homeland. After 
reporting the heroic circumstances under which the son was killed, the article concluded: “Thanks to you, 
Valentin Ivanovich, for rearing the fighting man that Alexander was, and thanks to you for passing on to 
your son a very precious thing — Soviet character.” See A. Alyabev, “Soviet Character: According to the 
Laws of Courage,” Krasnaia zvezda, October 2, 1984. 
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Union, but even these articles almost always focused on a single corrupt bureaucrat rather than a 
systemic failure to assist returned veterans.41  
 
Period Three: May 1985–December 1986 
Gorbachev’s initiative to open up press coverage—including coverage of events in 
Afghanistan—had more immediate, substantial effects and affected how the war was 
perceived.42 Already in June 1985, General Varennikov drafted a new set of guidelines that 
significantly expanded the aspects of the fighting which could be addressed in print and other 
media. For the most part, the memorandum focused on widening the reporting of individual 
heroic acts, as well as of minor combat engagements.43 That same month, even before the final 
approval of Varennikov’s memorandum, Soviet television showed footage of fighting in 
Afghanistan. It lasted two and a half minutes, and it showed young conscripts and burning 
vehicles.44 The beginning of 1986 brought another important turning point in coverage of the 
war. In his keynote speech at the 27th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in 
February 1986, Gorbachev described Afghanistan as a “bleeding wound.” This was a clear signal 
to the assembled delegates, the Union, and the world that the Soviet leadership saw the war as a 
drain on the country. To journalists and writers, it signaled that there might be more freedom to 
                                               
41 Trehub, “What’s in Store for Wounded Veterans of the Afghanistan War?” Radio Liberty 282, July 20, 
1984. 
42 Kalinovsky, A Long Goodbye, 84. 
43 “Regarding Publication in the Mass Media of Material Relating to the Activity of the Limited 
Contingent of Soviet Troops in Afghanistan,” CC CPSU Document and draft by Varennikov and 
Kirpichenko, RGANI Fond 89, Perechen 11, Document 103, n.d. Pierre Allan et al., eds., Sowjetische 
Geheimdokumente zum Afghanistankrieg 1978– 1991 (Zurich: Hochschulverlag, 1995): 414-22, quoted in 
Kalinovsky, 248, fn 39. 
44 “Soviet TV Gives Its Viewers Rare Glimpse of Afghan War,” New York Times, July 24, 1985. 
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show different—darker or at least more balanced—representations of the conflict. One way that 
editors began presenting opposing viewpoints in their newspapers during this phase of the war 
was to print negative letters from veterans or bereaved parents. In general, more media attention 
was paid to the plight of veterans, their psychological issues and lack of medical treatment, as 
well as their critical opinions of the war.  
Nevertheless the primary image of the war conveyed by the state in the third phase 
remained that of heroic deeds featuring self-sacrifice by young soldiers fulfilling their 
international duty.45 The Soviet journalist Ivan Dynin, for example, wrote four book-length 
pieces about his experience reporting from Afghanistan; all four books glorify the Soviet 
intervention in Afghanistan. The first book (Stars from Acts of Bravery: On the Land of 
Afghanistan) and the fourth book (Stars of Battle Glory: On the Land of Afghanistan) were 
published by Voenizdat, the state military publishing company, in 1985 and 1988 – a range of 
years in which you might hope for a more balanced or even critical perspective on the Afghan 
War to emerge. Soviet coverage of the war, therefore, was starting to change, but only so 
much.46 It was at the end of this phase of the war that, according to Zinky Boys, Alexievich was 
writing in her diary about the visible effects of the Soviet-Afghan War around her: a disturbed 
veteran being escorted home by an officer, for example, and a child crying at her father’s funeral. 
 
                                               
45 Articles in Pravda, Izvestiia, Komsomol'skaia Pravda, and Krasnaya gazeta reported acts of terrorism 
committed by the extremist counterrevolunaries against the civilian Afghan population, often pointing a 
finger at the CIA for supplying these groups with weapons and thus dragging on a war that would 
otherwise have already been won. Occasionally the newspapers printed letters from Afghan veterans, or 
from people who encountered them, with concern over the psychological state of veterans. (See: “We 
Wear Masks” (September 24, 1985), “That Meeting Shook Up My Whole Life” (January 8, 1986), and 
“The Confession That Shook Up My Whole Life” (April 16, 1986) in Komsomol'skaia pravda.) 
46 Kalinovsky, A Long Goodbye, 88. 
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Period Four: November 1986–February 1989 
 
By 1987, overtly critical pieces of original journalism finally began to appear in Soviet 
newspapers. As Ann Cooper, who was NPR’s bureau chief in Moscow in the late 1980s, 
explains, 
Ogonyok’s 1987 series on Afghanistan revealed for the first time the deprivation and 
death faced by young Soviet soldiers sent to fight there. Moscow News dared to publish a 
letter from Soviet émigrés, calling on Gorbachev to withdraw from Afghanistan. 
Unvarnished truths and criticism of official policies were brand-new features in Soviet 
journalism, and circulation figures for Moscow News and Ogonyok soared.47 
 
Ogonyok’s series on Afghanistan was written by the young journalist Artem Borovik.48 He 
“described the life and death of Soviet airborne troops in terms that exposed previous articles on 
the war as sanitized half-truths,” showing the Soviet soldiers as weary, ready to stop fighting and 
go home.49 The reality of the war continued to come out, at last.  
On February 9, 1988, in a statement that was printed in Pravda and Izvestiia, Gorbachev 
announced that the governments of the Soviet Union and of Afghanistan had agreed that Soviet 
troops would begin to withdraw on May 15, 1988 and that the withdrawal would be completed 
over a period of ten months. And in May 1988, General Aleksei D. Lizichev, the highest political 
officer in the Ministry of Defense, finally revealed the closely guarded figures at a press 
conference: 35,478 wounded, 13,310 killed, and 311 missing.50 This announcement was soon 
                                               
47 Ann Cooper, “The Death of Glasnost: How Russia’s Attempt at Openness Failed,” in Committee to 
Protect Journalists, April 27, 2015, https://cpj.org/2015/04/attacks-on-the-press-death-of-glasnost-russia-
attempt-at-openness-failed.php. 
48 Artem Borovik, “Vstretimsya u trekh zhuravlei,” Ogonek, nos. 28–30 (August 1987). 
49 In one memorable passage, Borovik quoted from the diary of a dead helicopter pilot, who described 
how the smell of burnt flesh lingered on his flight suit after he had recovered the corpses of two comrades 
from their gutted craft (Trehub, “Soviet Press Coverage,” 2–3). 
50 Philip Taubman, “Soviet Lists Afghan War Toll: 13,310 Dead, 35,478 Wounded,” New York Times, 
May 26, 1988, 14, https://www.nytimes.com/1988/05/26/world/soviet-lists-afghan-war-toll-13310-dead-
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followed by an interview, published in Izvestiia, in which a correspondent asks D. Venediktov, 
Chairman of the Executive Committee of the USSR Union of Red Cross and Red Crescent  
Societies, about the 311 missing men and what measures are being taken to find them, or at least 
to obtain precise information about what happened to them. In the interview, Venediktov admits 
that his offices have been receiving hundreds of letters recently from Soviet citizens who are 
deeply concerned about the fate of these missing soldiers.51 
In an Ogonyok article printed a couple months later, in July 1988, Borovik interviewed 
Major General Kim Tsagolov, who openly shared his pessimistic take on the war. In his final 
question, Borovik asks the general what he would wish for representatives of the Soviet press. 
The general answered that, in the early 1980s, newspapers and TV reports gave audiences the 
impression that Soviet troops were not involved in fighting. As a result, “Soviet people began to 
see in the luster of combat medals and decorations a certain fake window-dressing rather than an 
assessment of the hard, mortally dangerous labor of soldiers,” which was insulting to soldiers 
who had earned their medals. He wished that the press would “avoid a false truth ‘from the 
trenches’ and avoid exploiting the Afghan events” and finally noted that it was “necessary to 
make up for the deficit in truth that has built up during the war.” 52 The anger and frustration of a 
returned veteran that General Tsagolov describes in this interview with Borovik is a common 
refrain in the character monologues throughout Alexievich’s Zinky Boys. 
 
                                               
35478-wounded.html. This number would creep upward over the years and eventually go as high as 
15,051 Soviet fatalities (see Steele, Ghosts of Afghanistan, 94). 
51 S. Taranov, “The Fate of MIAs in Afghanistan,” Izvestiia, May 29, 1988, 6. 
52 Borovik, “Afganistan: Predvaritel'nye itogi,” Ogonek, no. 30 (July 23–30, 1988): 25–27. 
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AFTER THE WAR 
In the first few years after the Soviet troop’s final withdrawal from Afghanistan, a flurry 
of memoirs came out as military officers and journalists hurried to disclose their own “truth” of 
the war.53 Major General Oleg Sarin and Colonel Lev Dvoretsky, for example, co-wrote a war 
memoir that was published in English in 1993 through the efforts of Rotary International. In their 
final assessment of the war, they conclude: 
The real truth about the Afghan war has not yet been told. The Soviets still do not have a 
complete picture of what happened and why it happened and what the consequences are. 
What they have instead is a heap of unconnected facts: the talk about internationalist 
obligations and about the necessity of sending Soviet troops into Afghanistan; the 
political assessment of the war made by the USSR Supreme Soviet; the life of the 
Afgantsi; and the classified research conducted by military experts who viewed the 
Afghan theater of war as a training ground. 54  
 
Journalists’ memoirs were often less ambivalent. David Gai and Vladimir Snegirev, who had 
reported from Afghanistan since the war’s early years, condemned the war as a crime and a 
political mistake in their book, which they said was “an attempt at the truth” and a “journalist 
understanding” of what had happened in Afghanistan.55 They called their book Invasion: 
                                               
53 See, for example, Borovik, Kak ia byl soldatom amerikanskoi armii (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo Agenstva 
pechati Novosti, 1989); Borovik, Afganistan: eshche raz pro voinu (Moscow: “Mezhdunarodnye 
otnosheniia,” 1990); Borovik, Spriatannaia voina (Moscow: PIK, nezavisimoe izdatel'stvo, 1992); Boris 
Gromov, Ogranichennyi contingent (Moscow: Izdatel'stvaia gruppa “Progress” / “Kul'tura,” 1994); Ivan 
Dynin, Posle Afganistana: “afgantsy” v pismakh, dokumentakh, svidel'stvakh ochevidtsev (Moscow: 
Profizdat, 1990); Aleksandr Liakhovskii, Tainy afganskoi voiny (Moscow: “Planeta,” 1991); Aleksandr 
Liakhovskii, Tragediia i doblest' Afgana (Moscow: GPI Iskona, 1995); Elena Losoto, Komandirovka na 
voinu (Moscow: “Kniga,” 1990); A. L. Petrashkevich, ed., Pamiat’: Afganistan (Minsk: “Belaruskaia 
savetskaia entsyklapedyia,” 1991); N. I. Pikov, ed., Voina v Afganistane (Moscow: Voennoe izdatel'stvo, 
1991); Nina Strel'tsova, Vozvrashchenie iz Afganistana (Moscow: Molodaia Gvardiia, 1990). 
54 Oleg Sarin and Lev Dvoretsky, The Afghan Syndrome: The Soviet Union’s Vietnam (Novato, CA: 
Presidio, 1993), 146-47. 
55 Above, Snegirev’s article “Mesto sluzhby” is quoted as an example of the officially-approved reporting 
that concealed the war’s violence from Soviet families. Later, he would express regret that he participated 
in hiding the truth about the war.  See Aleksandr Kots, “Zhurnalist Vladimir Snegirev: Ia vinovat pered 
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Unknown Pages from an Undeclared War (Vtorzhenie: Neizvestnye stranitsy neob''iavlennoi 
voiny). The word “invasion” is a powerful, politically-charged word in this context: during the 
war, journalists had been strictly forbidden from using it.  (In fact, a Moscow Radio 
correspondent who used the word “invasion” on air in 1983 was removed from work and forced 
to receive psychiatric treatment.) It should be no surprise that Prokhanov does not use the word 
“invasion” to describe the Soviet presence in Afghanistan in his 1982 novel, but neither does it 
appear in his 1994 novel; it first appears in his 2001 novel, although even then it is only the 
“bad” MOSSAD agent who uses the word.56 Even Alexievich does not use the word “invasion” 
in Zinky Boys until 1994, after her interviewees had accused her of libel and defamation of 
character, and her anti-war message became more overtly politicized.  
 
CONCLUSION 
Whereas journalists and military officers have sought to define the Soviet-Afghan War in 
specific and correct terminology, Prokhanov and Alexievich approach the war with a writer’s 
interest in literary devices. The difference between Prokhanov’s and Alexievich’s illustration of 
what happened during the war, and why, is best represented by contrasting symbols and images. 
In Zinky Boys, for example, Alexievich writes about a tank she sees in Afghanistan with the 
phrase “We’ll pay them back for Malkin” written in red paint.57 In Prokhanov’s novel Tree in the 
Center of Kabul, there is a parade of blue Belarusian tractors with the word “friendship” 
                                               
geroiami moikh reportazhei...” in Komsomol'skaia pravda (February 2, 2014), accessed August 29, 2018, 
https://www.vladimir.kp.ru/daily/26195.7/3082321/. 
56 Alexander Prokhanov, “Son o Kabule” in Voina s Vostoka: Kniga ob afganskom pokhode (Moscow: 
ITRK, 2001), 324. 
57 Aleksievich, Tsinkovye mal'chiki, 23. 
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scrawled in red paint. Alexievich’s tank stands in contrast to Prokhanov’s tractor; a message of 
hate and revenge for a fallen comrade, instead of a message of friendship and aid. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
Svetlana Alexievich’s Monophonic Truth about the Soviet-Afghan War: 
History, Memory, and the Document 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Belarusian writer Svetlana Alexievich was trained as a journalist and had been writing for 
newspapers for several years when, in the late 1970s, she abandoned her career in journalism to 
pursue a different kind of writing. In this new approach, she interviews hundreds of witnesses to 
a traumatic event in Soviet history, such as war, and then meticulously crafts the interview 
transcripts into a series of freestanding dramatic monologues, which she arranges into sections 
and/or chapters of a book. Alexievich labels her work “a novel in voices” (roman golosov) or 
“super-literature” (sverkhliteratura), while Russian-language publishers typically categorize it as 
“documentary prose” (dokumental'naia proza) or a “documentary tale” (dokumental'naia 
povest').1 It is difficult to pinpoint the genre of her writing, because her work is a unique, 
trailblazing blend of documentary material and literary art, where Alexievich intentionally blurs 
and even disregards the line dividing the two forms.2 Alexievich argues that her “novel in 
voices”—rather than straightforward journalism, fiction, or history—is the closest and most 
                                               
1 Alexievich has used the term “novel in voices” in many places, including her personal website, 
alexievich.info. She uses the term “super-literature” in her Nobel Prize Lecture, delivered on December 7, 
2015. In English-language scholarship, the genre of Alexievich’s writing has been described as a 
“documentary novel” (Ackerman and Galbas, “Back from Afghanistan,” 8), “testimonial literature” 
(Vukas, “Witnessing the Unspeakable,” 19–20), and “literary reportage” (Hartsock, “Literary Reportage,” 
23–24). 
2 See, for example, Elena Gapova, “Stradanie i poisk smysla: ‘moral'nye revoliutsii’ Svetlany 
Aleksievich.” Novoe Literaturnoe Obozrenie 99 (January 2015), accessed October 9, 2017, 
http://www.nlobooks.ru/node/5953. 
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ethical representation of our world as it is today. “Information, which serves more and more as 
the foundation for our civilization,” she announced at the PEN World Voices Festival in 2005, 
“has discredited itself as a way of knowing human beings.”3  Information alone does not suffice, 
but, according to Alexievich, neither does art. As her mentor, Ales' Adamovich, argued when he 
wrote documentary prose about World War II, Alexievich believes that traumatic events in the 
twentieth and twenty-first centuries are too unimaginably horrific to describe or represent by 
means of art.4 It is no longer possible, she says, for a writer to imagine a story or characters that 
reflect our reality. “Art,” she says, “has failed.”5 Alexievich’s answer to the perceived failures of 
the traditional genres is to elude generic boundaries and develop a technique for combining 
document with art. After completing two works on the Great Patriotic War in the first half of the 
1980s, Alexievich shifted her focus to the then ongoing Soviet war in Afghanistan, applying the 
same technique in creating what would be her third “novel in voices,” Zinky Boys (Tsinkovye 
mal'chiki).6 
The first few years of the Soviet-Afghan War were kept shrouded in secrecy from the 
Soviet public. Information about violent combat and the widespread Afghan opposition to the 
                                               
3 “Confronting the Worst: Writing and Catastrophe”, presented at the PEN World Voices Festival, New 
York City, April 16, 2005, accessed December 12, 2016, http://www.c-span.org/video/?186358-
1/confronting-worst-writing-catastrophe&start=234. For Alexievich on genre, see clip 8:55-13:17. 
4 Of course, this attitude was not necessarily new. Theodor Adorno, for example, also questioned whether 
and how to write poetry after Auschwitz. For a discussion of testimony and trauma in Alexievich’s work, 
see Vukas, “Witnessing the Unspeakable.” 
5 On homepage of the author’s personal website, accessed September 13, 2016, alexievich.info. 
6 The title refers to a code phrase for soldiers killed in Afghanistan, because the bodies were often shipped 
back in zinc-lined coffins to hide the smell of decay. These coffins were sealed shut, sometimes without a 
window to show the face, to hide bodily remains that would have revealed the violence and combat that 
Soviet soldiers were facing in Afghanistan. The bereaved were not allowed to talk in public about what 
had happened to their loved one, or to make any reference to the cause or place of death on the 
gravestone. 
 54 
Soviet presence was heavily censored. Most newspapers were printing stories about Soviet 
soldiers in Afghanistan building schools or planting trees—certainly not fighting or dying.7 
Public discourse about the war began to shift after Mikhail Gorbachev became General Secretary 
in 1985 and took steps to reform the Soviet government under a new policy of “glasnost',” which 
was designed to reduce corruption and censorship by increasing government transparency and 
freedom of speech. Gorbachev insisted that there must be “no forgotten names [or] blank spots” 
in Soviet history or literature.8 The policy of glasnost' extended to the Soviet-Afghan War. At 
the 27th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) in March 1986, 
Gorbachev himself characterized Afghanistan as a “bleeding wound.” In 1987, the Soviet 
military finally released statistics on Soviet-Afghan War casualties. Journalists began writing 
shocking exposés about the violence and poor living conditions facing Soviet troops in 
Afghanistan, and about the low morale of soldiers and generals alike. 
In many ways, Alexievich’s Zinky Boys, written between 1986 and 1989, published in 
1990, is typical of the glasnost' era.9 The book opens with an excerpt from Alexievich’s diary on 
June 14, 1986: 
                                               
7 See chapter one for a historical overview of the Soviet-Afghan War and more information about what 
was printed in Soviet newspapers about the war. 
8 Stephen White, After Gorbachev (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 80. 
9 An excerpt from Zinky Boys first appeared in a Belarusian-language weekly literary newspaper from 
Minsk (Svetlana Aleksievich, “My viartaemsia adtul'… Staroini z knigi ‘Tsynkavyia khlopchyki” – 
manalogi tykh, khto praishol Afganistan,” Litaratura i mastatstva, October 6, 1989, 8–9). A second 
excerpt was printed in the Russian newspaper, Komsomol'skaia pravda (Aleksievich, “Tsinkovye 
mal'chiki: Monologi tekh, kto proshel Afganistan,” Komsomol'skaia Pravda, February 15, 1990, 2). 
Komsomol'skaia pravda was the official mouthpiece of the Communist Union of Youth, known by the 
acronym Komsomol, which served as the youth wing of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. The 
full text of Zinky Boys was first published in the literary journal, Druzhba narodov (Svetlana Aleksievich, 
“Tsinkovye mal'chiki,” Druzhba narodov no. 7 (1990): 5–88). Soon after that, in 1991, the Moscow-
based publishing houses “Molodaia Gvardiia” and “Izvestiia” both published the text in book form. The 
English translation of the title as “Zinky Boys” comes from Julia and Robin Whitby’s 1992 English 
translation of the book, published by Norton. Many in the academic community have expressed 
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What is being talked about around me? What is being written about? About the 
internationalist duty, about geopolitics, about our sovereign interests, about southern 
borders. [...] The censor watches attentively, so that military sketches do not mention the 
deaths of our soldiers, we are reassured that the “limited contingent of Soviet troops” is 
helping a brotherly people build roads, distributing fertilizer to the villages, while Soviet 
military doctors are delivering babies from Afghan women.10 
 
The date is important, because it places the diary entry just after Gorbachev’s address at the 
Congress, which had signalled that some criticism of the war may be acceptable, but, in June 
1986, negative opinions about the war had not yet entered most platforms of public discourse in 
the Soviet Union. Apparently frustrated by war propaganda that did not correspond to reality, 
Alexievich set out to collect interviews from soldiers, personnel, veterans and bereaved loved 
ones that would finally reveal the Soviet-Afghan War’s ugly truths. Soon after Zinky Boys was 
published, fellow Belarusian writer Dmitrii Bykov praised Alexievich’s new work precisely for 
its “uncompromising truth” about the war: 
From recent reading, I will highlight Svetlana Alexievich’s book Zinky Boys, published in 
the seventh volume of Druzhba narodov.  
 The value of Alexievich’s new work, above all, is on a documentary basis, where, 
one assumes, there is not a word from the area of authorial fantasy, speculation [domysl], 
much less invention [vymysl].The nature of documentary is such—uncompromising truth 
[pravda]—that many pages of the book are capable of causing shock. Even in our time, 
when thanks to mass media, we know a lot about this adventure of the century, our 
knowledge pales before blatant evidence of “afgantsy,” soldiers and officers, the mothers 
of the dead, the many wounded and mutilated. 
 S. Alexievich’s book exposes and denounces the perpetrators of this international 
robbery, reveals the mechanism of political and military arbitrariness in relation to the 
sovereign neighboring country, the available ease of victory over which was so illusory. 
Afghanistan did not kneel down, but that does not make it easier for the thousands of our 
boys, or for their mothers. And in this is a paradoxical, tangled lesson for our people and, 
                                               
dissatisfaction with this translation decision. A new English translation based on Alexievich’s updated 
and expanded text, translated by Andrew Bromsfield, was recently published with the much preferable 
title, Boys in Zinc (Penguin Classics, 2017). 
10 Aleksievich, “Tsinkovye mal'chiki,” 5. There are two 1990 works by Alexievich with the same short 
title, “Tsinkovye mal'chiki.” All footnote references to “Tsinkovye mal'chiki” in the present chapter are to 
the full text that appeared in Druzhba narodov rather than to the short article excerpt in Komsomol'skaia 
pravda. 
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apparently, to the whole of mankind. S. Alexievich’s wonderful book serves as the 
mastering of this lesson.11 
 
The revelation of war’s terrible “truth,” as opposed to the romanticized image of war, is a proud 
tradition in Russian literature, and certainly not only a glasnost'-era phenomenon. Perhaps most 
famously, at the end of his second Sevastopol story, “Sevastopol in May,” Lev Tolstoy 
concludes: “The hero of my tale, whom I love with all my heart and soul, whom I have attempted 
to reproduce in all the beauty that always is and will be splendid, is truth.”12 The “truth” that 
Tolstoy exposes in the Sevastopol Sketches is the senselessness and vanity of war, the heavy cost 
in human lives, and unfairness in the socioeconomic divide between ranks. Bykov informs us in 
his review that Alexievich’s Zinky Boys, carrying on in the Russian tradition of war literature 
exemplified here by Tolstoy’s Sevastopol Sketches, also exposes the “arbitrariness,” crimes, and 
costs of the recent war. 
Several more printings and editions of Zinky Boys in Russia have come out in the two and 
a half decades since 1990 with periodic alterations and updates.13 Variations between editions 
exist from the level of words and phrases to that of entire monologues and chapters. Changes to 
the text involve additions and deletions, as well as rewording and rephrasing. Another common 
                                               
11 “Chto pishu? Chto chitaiu?” Literaturnaia gazeta, January 9, 1991, 9, 
https://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/26632252. 
12 Lev Tolstoi, Polnoe sobranie sochinenii v devianostykh tomakh, iubileinoe izd., ed. V.G. Chertkov, vol. 
4 (Moscow: Gos. Izdatel'stvo khudozhestvennoi literatury, 1929–1964), 59. 
13 “Slovo” published Zinky Boys alongside Alexievich’s newest work, Zacharovannye smert'iu 
(Enchanted by Death), in 1994; “Vagrius” published Zinky Boys in 1996; “Ostozh'e” published the work 
in the second volume of her collected works (Sobraniie sochinenii v dvukh tomakh), alongside Enchanted 
by Death and Chernobyl Prayer, in 1998; “Eksmo” published it in 2001; and finally, “Vremia” published 
the text in 2007 as the third of five books in the cycle, Voices of Utopia, with a revised printing in 2013, 
which was reprinted most recently—at the time of writing—in 2016. There are minimal differences 
between the 2007 and later “Vremia” printings; there are no apparent differences between the 2013 and 
2016 printings. 
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change involves moving a word or phrase from one place to another, or, less common, moving a 
monologue from one chapter to another.14 As a result, the text of Zinky Boys has undergone 
significant revisions since its first appearance in 1990.15 One clear explanation for certain 
changes, which will be addressed in detail below, is the series of court cases in the early 1990s, 
when Alexievich was sued by several of her interviewees. In an interview at the Brooklyn Public 
Library in June 2016, Alexievich answered a question about motivations for the changes she 
makes to new editions with the explanation that she considers the interviewees’ monologues to 
be “living documents” rather than a “frozen canon.” She keeps in touch with many of her 
interview subjects, she went on to explain, and, as their interpretations of past events change and 
develop, she edits their monologues to reflect that development.16 This answer, as well as the 
experience of the court cases, may account for some of the changes that Alexievich makes in her 
rewrites but certainly not all or even most. 
                                               
14 Others have commented on the changes that Alexievich makes to her text from one edition to the next. 
Some have been quite critical in their assessment of the ethical problems raised by Alexievich’s penchant 
to rewrite interviews. Sophie Pinkham, for example, makes the point that Alexievich “draws on some of 
the techniques of traditional history and journalism without assuming responsibilities of either” (Sophie 
Pinkham, “Witness Tampering,” New Republic, August 29, 2016, 
https://newrepublic.com/article/135719/witness-tampering). See also Galia Ackerman and Frédérick 
Lemarchand, “Du bon et du mauvais usage du témoignage dans l’oeuvre de Svetlana Alexievitch,” 
Tumultes 1, nos. 32–33 (2009), 29–55, https://www.cairn.info/revue-tumultes-2009-1-page-29.htm. 
Ackerman is Alexievich’s French translator. 
15 It is difficult to be certain, given the plethora of editions and printings of Zinky Boys that exist, but it 
seems that materials from the courtroom first appeared in the 1994 “Slovo” edition, and that Alexievich 
first made major changes to the book’s epigraphs, author’s diary entries, ‘main character’ dialogues, and 
courtroom documents in the 2013 printing of the 2007 “Vremia” edition, although it is possible that some 
or all of these changes were made to the “Vremia” edition in 2007. 
16 “Brooklyn by the Book: Svetlana Alexievich,” interview by Sophie Pinkham, the Brooklyn Public 
Library, New York, June 12, 2016, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BiJulj6qT_0. For Alexievich’s 
answer to the question about motivations for making changes to new editions of a book, see clip 1:13:08-
1:16:55. 
 58 
Across these rewritings, Alexievich ostensibly preserves the “polyphonic” nature of her 
writing and consistently presents an array of disparate “voices” with varied backgrounds, 
opinions, and perspectives.17 However, as a close textual analysis of different editions reveals, 
Alexievich rewrites in a way that tends toward greater uniformity in the book’s message about 
the war. In the earliest editions of Zinky Boys, Alexievich seemed to celebrate the existence of 
competing truths, supporting an individual’s right to process the memory of the Soviet-Afghan 
War in his or her own way. In the later editions, she has subdued or undercut voices that suggest 
a positive or even merely ambivalent assessment of the war, and she has more overtly asserted 
her own message—the evilness, inhumanity, and absolute “irredeemability” of the war—as the 
(only) truth. The present chapter traces these changes in Alexievich’s narrative of the Soviet-
Afghan War by contrasting her initial representation of the truth about Afghanistan, in the 1990 
full-text edition of Zinky Boys from Druzhba narodov, to subsequent iterations that included 
major changes to the text: the 1991 edition released by “Molodaia gvardiia,” the 1994 edition 
released by “Slovo” alongside Enchanted by Death, the 1996 edition released by “Vagrius,” the 
1998 edition released by “Ostozh'e” alongside Enchanted by Death and Chernobyl Prayer, the 
2001 edition released by “Eksmo-Press” alongside Enchanted by Death and Chernobyl Prayer, 
and the 2007 edition released by the publishing house “Vremia.” Alexievich makes the most 
dramatic changes to the 1994, 1996, and 2007 editions, so the chapter’s main focus will be on 
developments in these three editions. Alexievich’s evolving representation of truth is considered 
in four interrelated concerns: 1) truth as it relates to the genre of historical accounts; 2) truth as it 
                                               
17 After all, the Swedish Academy awarded Alexievich the 2015 Nobel Prize in Literature “for her 
polyphonic writings, a monument to suffering and courage in our time” (emphasis mine; see The Nobel 
Prize, “The Nobel Prize in Literature 2015,” Nobel Media AB: 2014, 
https://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/literature/laureates/2015/). 
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relates to individual memory processing; 3) truth as it relates to the document; and 4) truth as it 
relates to pravda and istina, the two Russian words for truth. A deeper understanding of the 
evolution of this particular narrative of the Soviet-Afghan War has become all the more 
significant since its author received the 2015 Nobel Prize in Literature, with the publicity and 
tacit Western approval that such an award entails. 
 
TRUTH AND HISTORY 
 
The last remaining Soviet troops pulled out of Afghanistan on 15 February 1989, and the 
war officially became history. Writing about history from within the Soviet context, however, 
was always a tricky project and, in some ways, it had become more complicated during 
Gorbachev’s new glasnost'-era policy to disseminate information more openly.18 Under previous 
administrations, information had been a strictly guarded commodity, and histories published in 
the Soviet Union were necessarily sanctioned by—and therefore often in the service of—the 
state. With the unprecedented access to information that suddenly became available during 
glasnost', accompanied by new freedoms to circulate uncensored opinions, the Soviet media at 
this time was often preoccupied with uncovering lies in official state-sanctioned Soviet history. 
We now know that some of the most famous Soviet narratives of the Great Patriotic War, for 
example, were largely fictions, although many Soviet citizens had believed these stories to be 
                                               
18 For more on this topic, see Arup Banerji, Writing History in the Soviet Union: Making the Past Work 
(New Delhi: Social Science Press, 2008) and Arthur Markwick, The New Nature of History: Knowledge, 
Evidence, Language (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2001). Of course, the question of “truth” and “history” is a 
complicated one in any context, as the narrative quality of any written historical account forces the author 
to make decisions about what to include, or not, and how to arrange the pieces on the page. Absolute 
objectivity in history is, of course, illusory. For a discussion of these issues, see, for example, Markwick, 
The New Nature of History. 
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historically accurate.19 Soviet audiences quickly learned to greet overt claims of authority and 
factual accuracy with cynicism and distrust. When Gorbachev called for the “blank spots” of 
Soviet history to be filled in, writers and journalists led the charge, sharply challenging the 
conventional Soviet view of its past. As historian Robert Strayer points out, “[s]o widely and 
quickly had Soviet historical understanding been transformed that authorities cancelled the 1988 
school examinations in history for lack of adequate textbooks on which exams could be based.”20 
In the following years, there would even be a competition for a new Soviet history textbook, 
although none would be selected before the Soviet Union had already begun to disintegrate.  
Most investigative reporting during glasnost' was focused on the Stalinist era, but certain 
journalists were interested in uncovering information about more recent events. In 1987 and 
1988, for example, Artem Borovik wrote several pieces for Ogonek that exposed the sanitized 
half-truths of previous reports about the then on-going Soviet-Afghan War, revealing deep-
seated pessimism throughout the military at all levels. Soviet soldiers, he reported, were ready to 
stop fighting and come home; even the generals acknowledged that it was time tell the truth 
about Afghanistan at home.21 The full text of Alexievich’s Zinky Boys, published in 1990—only 
one year after the war ended—may have been the first Russian-language book-length treatment 
of the war since the withdrawal of troops.  
                                               
19 The Russian historian Andrei Zubov, for example, has recently proved through archival research that 
the famed “Panfilov 28” narrative is a fiction. See Tom Balmforth, “Soviet WWII Legend of Panfilov 
Guardsmen Debunked as ‘Fiction.’” Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty, July 12, 2015, 
https://www.rferl.org/a/soviet-wwii-panfilov-guardsmenfiction/27123430.html. My thanks to Ben 
McVicker (University of Toronto) for drawing my attention to this. 
20 Robert W. Strayer, Why Did the Soviet Union Collapse?: Understanding Historical Change (Armonk, 
NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1998), 99. 
21 Borovik, “Afganistan: Predvaritel'nye itogi,” Ogonek, no. 30 (July 23-30, 1988): 27. 
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In this first edition of Zinky Boys, however, Alexievich shied away from donning the 
mantle of authority over history and instead offered the book as a platform for alternative 
histories about the war. There is considerable tentativeness in her representation of truth as it 
relates to history and the unilateral authority of a historical account. In the first chapter of this 
edition we find several admonitory passages about history. For example, the first piece of text 
that the reader encounters (after the author’s name and the book’s evocative title) is an epigraph 
that states rather bluntly: “history will lie.”22 This line, attributed to George Bernard Shaw, is 
presumably from Act III of his 1897 play, The Devil’s Disciple, set during the American 
Revolution. A character in the play wonders aloud how the upcoming battle will be remembered, 
and an American general responds: “History, sir, will tell lies, as usual.”23 With the first line of 
text that greets readers, therefore, Alexievich distances herself and her book about the Soviet-
Afghan War from traditional historical accounts, reminding her readers that such accounts are 
not to be trusted. Alexievich’s reluctance to affiliate her work with the idea of authoritative 
historical truth is also in keeping with the mood of the times, when suspicion of written histories 
reigned supreme.  
Shaw is a particularly meaningful choice in this context. A self-proclaimed socialist 
fascinated by the Soviet utopian experiment, the Nobel Prize-winning playwright from Ireland 
made a much-publicized tour of the Soviet Union in 1935 and remained thereafter “an 
unrepentant advocate of Stalin’s policies.”24 Not surprisingly, Shaw’s plays were popular in the 
                                               
22 Aleksievich, “Tsinkovye mal'chiki,” 5. 
23 George Bernard Shaw, Selected Plays, vol. 3 (New York: Dodd, Mead and Co., 1948), 338. 
24 See Olga Sobolev and Angus Wrenn, The Only Hope of the World: George Bernard Shaw and Russia 
(Bern: Peter Lang Publishing, 2012). 
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Soviet Union. Alexievich’s use of this line from one of his plays, therefore, takes on a doubly 
ironic tone. Shaw’s character functions as a vessel for the truth that Shaw himself could not, or 
would not, admit: history is one lie after another, including, of course, the atrocities against 
Soviet citizens that occurred under Stalin and other Soviet leaders. 
After the epigraph from Shaw, the 1990 edition of Zinky Boys opens with an excerpt from 
Alexievich’s diary, part of which was already quoted in the introduction above. Toward the end 
of this diary fragment, Alexievich muses over the patriotic-militaristic principles by which the 
afgantsy judge their own actions in Afghanistan. She recounts a conversation she had with one 
such veteran. Alexievich wants to hear him talk about the agony of the terrible choice, whether to 
shoot or not. Much to her confusion, however, she discovers that the soldier had not agonized at 
all over this question, apparently quite ready to kill in the name of socialism, to do as his officer 
commands. Alexievich concludes that this young man’s moral code represents the militarized 
principles of all “these boys” fighting in Afghanistan, but, in the next breath, she seems to 
forgive this failure in judgment when she quotes the Dostoevsky scholar Iurii Kariakin: “One 
must not judge any history by the manner in which it is conscious of itself. This self-perception 
[samosoznanie] is tragically inadequate.”25 With this citation, Alexievich implies that the 
veterans’ “consciousness” of the war in which they recently participated is “tragically 
inadequate.” Of course, such an attitude toward history may be applied to any contemporary of 
this period, not only the veterans. One might assume that Alexievich’s sense of history, her own 
“consciousness” of the Soviet-Afghan War, is something that interests her readers—presumably, 
it is one reason that readers have turned to her book. Here, however, she cautions her readers 
against this mindset. Alexievich signals to them that they should not trust explicitly the 
                                               
25 Aleksievich, “Tsinkovye mal'chiki,” 6. 
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participants’ views or even the author’s narrative of the historical era that is the subject of this 
book. In other words, we can be especially poor judges and unreliable witnesses of our own 
experiences; knowing or telling the truth about history requires more distance. 
Alexievich places these two sentences attributed to Kariakin within quotation marks, 
suggesting a direct quotation rather than summary or approximation. However, I was unable to 
find these exact lines in Kariakin’s published works. The idea does appear in Kariakin’s well-
known work Raskolnikov’s Self-Deception (Samoobman Raskol'nikova), where he paraphrases 
Karl Marx’s argument that it is difficult to objectively judge or believe what a person or era 
(epokha) says about itself.26 In Alexievich’s quotation thus lies another powerful—if more 
subtle—message of caution. What appears to be a quotation of Kariakin is not a quotation at all, 
but a reference to Kariakin’s paraphrase of Marx. Apparently—like the claim of historical 
accuracy—the appearance of precision or accuracy in reported speech is not to be trusted, either. 
Instead, the close reader familiar with Kariakin and/or Marx will learn to beware: the reported 
speech is actually Alexievich’s appropriation of that speech in order to convey her own intended 
message. Furthermore, Alexievich’s modification—replacing the word “era” (epokha) with 
“history” (istoriia)—functions to further draw her reader’s attention to the issue of truth and 
reliability in written histories. 
Later in this chapter, Alexievich addresses these concerns about history when she 
describes the intention of her book: “the object of my research is the history of feelings, not the 
history of the war itself. What do people think about? What do they want? What gives them joy? 
What are they afraid of? What do they keep in mind?”27 Once again, Alexievich cautions her 
                                               
26 Iurii Kariakin, Samoobman Raskol'nikova (Moscow: “Khudozhestvennaia literatura,” 1976), 151. 
27 Aleksievich, “Tsinkovye mal'chiki,” 8. 
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readers not to mistake Zinky Boys for a conventional, authoritative history of the Soviet-Afghan 
War. She does not claim or intend that kind of history; she does not want to be read that way, for 
information or revelations concerning facts and figures. Thus, in these brief references to Shaw 
and Kariakin (or Marx), as well as her own personal observations, Alexievich raises several 
important questions about the nature of history and its relationship to the truth. She warns us that 
historical sources can be unreliable, cautioning against false or duplicitous claims to the truth. 
She also warns us that history rarely tells the whole story. This distrust in official or authoritative 
accounts of history is in keeping with the context of Soviet literature as well as the lessons of 
glasnost', which have taught Soviet citizens that history will lie. 
 This distrust of history will all but evaporate in subsequent editions of Zinky Boys. 
Alexievich’s reference to Kariakin and her stated objective to write a history of emotions, 
not of the war, are both removed from the 2007 edition. The epigraph citation of Shaw’s 
play, with its cynical prediction that history will lie, is missing from the 1998 and 2001 
editions; in the 2007 edition, it is replaced with excerpts from two works of Russian 
history! The first new epigraph is taken from Pages from the Political History of the 
Russian Empire in the Seventeenth Century (Stranitsy politicheskoi istorii Rossii XVII 
veka), published in 1988. It describes the Russian Empire’s colonial drive southward into 
Central Asia and Afghanistan in 1801. This exact passage appeared in the earlier editions, 
but it was buried in a fragment from Alexievich’s diary under the heading “From 
history,” without any bibliographic information. Now it has been given a place of 
considerable importance, as the first epigraph to the entire book. The obvious implication 
of the passage in this book is that Soviet motivations in the Afghan War were similarly 
impure, born of modern imperial ambitions. It also suggests support for the false myth 
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that the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan was merely a pretext for attempting to acquire a 
warm-water port.  Throughout the 1990s, this “history” is suggested as one possible 
perspective; in the 2007 edition, readers are invited to read the entire book from this 
perspective. 
The second new epigraph in the 2007 edition is taken from the website polit.ru, 
dated 2003. It lists statistics of the Soviet-Afghan War: its duration, and the number of 
Soviet troops who served there, were killed, imprisoned, and are still missing. This is new 
text that did not appear in any previous editions. In editions published throughout the 
1990s, Alexievich quite clearly cautions against the tendency to equate historical fact 
with the whole story. Yet here, in the 2007 edition, she seems to encourage her readers to 
equate not only history but also numbers and statistics with authoritative truth. Of course, 
just like historical accounts and other forms of non-fiction, numbers and statistics can 
also be used in the service of various interpretations of reality. This early and prominent 
use of statistics in the 2007 edition sets readers up for an opposite expectation of truth as 
it relates to history: a history (in numbers) does not, will not lie. 
As a result of these deletions and additions to the epigraph and chapter of diary 
fragments, Alexievich’s reader after 2007 is significantly less prepared to evaluate the 
book with a healthy suspicion of the “truth” in historical accounts. Indeed, after 2007, her 
reader may very well settle into the mindset of reading Zinky Boys as though it were a 
straightforward (oral) history of the Soviet-Afghan War, with erroneous assumptions 
about the work’s authority, objectivity, and breadth. 
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TRUTH AND INDIVIDUAL MEMORY PROCESSING 
In the 1990 edition of Zinky Boys, a key component to Alexievich’s narrative of the 
Soviet-Afghan War is the possibility of dissimilar but equally valid versions of truth. In other 
words, individuals who have experienced or been affected by the war have their own means for 
processing memories of these events. This early edition of Zinky Boys accepts and even 
celebrates individual voices and competing perspectives. As a result, in the 1990 edition, truth 
about the war is represented as polyphonic, variable, and fundamentally dependent on individual 
memory processing. Although Alexievich’s horror at the war is apparent throughout the 1990 
edition of Zinky Boys, she also openly promotes her subjects’ right to claim an alternative and 
personal version of the truth.  
At the beginning of the first diary fragment at the outset of the book, Alexievich writes: 
“Birds, fish, like all living things, also have the right to their own history. It [their own history] 
will still be written sometime.”28 After the assertion that “history will lie” in the unusual 
epigraph just above this paragraph, “history” is a word that takes on heightened significance in 
the book, especially in this first chapter. Here, the reader encounters that special word again after 
only a few sentences, but with another layer or two of meaning. Even though history will lie, it is 
nonetheless a right that all living things have. Moreover, the implicit suggestion is that history 
can differ from one living thing to the next. If birds and fish have the right to “their own [svoiu] 
history,” then presumably that history differs in some way from ours. Histories are personal and 
distinct, as well as a right. In the 1990 edition, this early concept of “one’s own history” will 
soon develop into the idea each individual processes his or her memories in a highly personal 
                                               
28 Ibid., 5. 
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and distinct way. Theoretically, this suggests that there are as many variations of the truth as 
there are individuals, each variation of truth equally valid. 
Alexievich promotes this idea throughout the 1990 edition but most persuasively, 
perhaps, in the transcriptions of three telephone conversations she has with an unnamed man, to 
whom she refers as her “main character.” These conversations function as structural as well as 
thematic pillars in the book. She begins each chapter of monologues with one of these 
conversations, and the chapter titles (all biblical quotations) are either direct citations from or 
otherwise inspired by these conversations. The man claims to be one of Alexievich’s interview 
subjects, calling to complain about the so-called libel (paskvil') she has printed about him in the 
newspapers. He rejects the notion that she—someone who never fought in Afghanistan—has 
anything to say about the war. 
“I hate pacifists! Did you carry a full pack up into the mountains, go in the 
armoured personnel carrier when it was seventy degrees above zero? Do you hear 
the sharp howl of the barbed wire at night? You don’t hear [it]… That means 
don’t touch [it]! This is ours!! What’s it to you?” 
 
He then goes on to describe what the war means to him and the painful memories that he 
is struggling to process. 
“I carried my best friend, he was a brother to me, in a plastic bag from a raid… 
Head separate, arms separate, legs… Peeled-off skin… A split carcass in place of 
a strong, handsome guy… He played the violin, he wrote poems… See, he could 
have written this, but not you…”29 
 
In just a few phrases strung together to describe his friend’s death, the horror and violence that 
this man faced in Afghanistan is immediately apparent. A sense of inhumanity, the loss of human 
dignity, is especially palpable in this description. A strong, handsome, and talented young man is 
transformed into a decapitated head, a few limbs, and some skin. The sum of these parts is less 
                                               
29 Ibid., 10. 
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than human. Indeed, the man uses the term “split carcass” rather than corpse, further indicating 
that remains such as these are more animal than human: and, as one would treat animal rather 
than human body parts, these pieces are transported in nothing more than a plastic bag. When 
Alexievich quotes the Gospel of Matthew to him, the man becomes even more furious: “I spit on 
your New Testament, on your truth [vashu pravdu].” Then he describes the same disturbing 
image of his best friend’s remains, but this time replacing “my best friend” with what will be a 
key phrase: “I carried my own truth [svoiu pravdu] in a plastic bag… Head separate, arms 
separate, but… Peeled-off skin…” He swears and hangs up the phone.30 
Before the reader encounters a single monologue, therefore, Alexievich presents her 
“main character,” whose main message is to insist that he has his own truth (svoia pravda) that 
he presents in opposition to her truth (vasha pravda). The phrase “one’s own truth” (svoia 
pravda) will become a refrain that reappears at significant moments throughout the rest of the 
book. Also, her main character introduces what will become a meaningful recurring image: his 
best friend transformed into a mess of body parts carried in a plastic bag. At the end of their first 
conversation, the main character connects the phrase and the image in a single sentence, linking 
the refrain and the visual symbol with the larger idea that an individual’s version of truth about 
the war is personal and valid. In the 1990 edition, the main character refers to the image of his 
friend’s remains in each of the three telephone transcriptions, including twice in the first 
transcript, for a total of four times. This interviewee has a prominent place and role in the book: 
this is the author’s only reported dialogue, this is the only repeated voice, the only unnamed 
voice, and the only voice to be labelled the main character. 
                                               
30 Ibid. 
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The 1990 edition ends with a final chapter of diary fragments, letters from readers, and, at 
the very end, Alexievich’s direct appeal to her readers. She calls on the Soviet people to worship 
a god of Truth (Istina) but makes it clear that everyone will answer to this Truth according to his 
or her own conscience. Thus, she underscores once again the idea of polyphonic truth and 
individual moral responsibility for how one processes personal, emotional memory:  
We have had many gods, some now on the garbage heap, others in the museum. Let us 
turn Truth into a god. And let us answer before it each for himself, and not, as we have 
been taught, as a whole class, as a whole course, as a whole collective... As a whole 
people.31  
 
Shortly thereafter, in the final paragraphs of the book, Alexievich reminds readers one last time 
of the important lesson to be learned from her main character: “[Let us] be kind-hearted toward 
those who paid more than us for insight [into the war]. Remember: ‘I carried my own friend… 
my own truth from the battle in a plastic bag… Head separate… Arms separate, legs, peeled-off 
skin.”32 In the 1990 edition of Zinky Boys, therefore, the main character and his fallen friend are 
a powerful symbol for the idea of polyphonic truths, a symbol to which Alexievich draws her 
readers’ attention in the beginning, middle, and end of the book, in both his voice and her own. 
She disavows historical truths and false authority, drawing instead on the idea that a polyphony 
of equally valid truths can and do and should coexist. The reader in 1990 may reasonably 
surmise that history inevitably will lie (according to Shaw), because it tends to insist on only one 
version of the truth.  
The reader of Zinky Boys in 2007 does not encounter the same persistent reminder to 
respect an individual’s right to his or her own version of truth. The description of the best 
                                               
31 Ibid., 87. 
32 Ibid. 
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friend’s messy remains is consistently truncated or removed. The terrible image, which recurs in 
its entirety five times throughout the 1990 edition, is fully described only once in the 2007 
edition, in the first conversation. Alexievich shortens its second appearance in that conversation, 
removing “legs” and “peeled-off skin.”33 She truncates the phrase in their next conversation, as 
well, again by removing the words “legs” and “peeled-off.”34 Alexievich deletes the image 
altogether from their final conversation, and it never appears anywhere else in the 2007 edition.35 
As a result, there is no longer a clear literary signal to readers that these words carry special 
meaning. Moreover, the final chapter of diary fragments, which had contained Alexievich’s 
appeal to the reader to answer before the “Truth” as the new god “each for himself” has been 
deleted. In this most recent edition of Zinky Boys, therefore, Alexievich has muted the idea that 
veterans and other individuals affected by the Soviet-Afghan War have their own versions of 
truth and the right to their own ways of processing memories of the war.  
 
TRUTH AND THE DOCUMENT 
From the earliest to the most recent edition of Zinky Boys there is also a marked change 
in the relationship between truth and the document. In the 1990 edition, Alexievich seems to 
distance herself from a reliance on the document as a source of truth or reality. The final diary 
fragment at the end of the first chapter, for example, begins with a revealing passage: 
                                               
33 Aleksievich, Tsinkovye mal'chiki (Moscow: Vremia, 2007), 32. There are several editions with the 
same title, Tsinkovye mal'chiki. Unless otherwise indicated, footnote references to Tsinkovye mal'chiki in 
the present chapter are to the 2007 edition published by “Vremia.” My translations from this edition are 
based on the translation by Andrew Bromfield (New York: Penguin Classics, 2017) with modifications 
for accuracy. 
34 Ibid., 105. 
35 See Figures 1, 2, and 3 in the Appendix for a comparison of the text of the three telephone 
conversations from the 1990 and 2007 editions. 
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Again my path is from person to person, from document to image [obraz]. Each 
confession [ispoved'] is like a portrait in a painting: no one speaks and it is a 
document, they speak and it is an image [obraz]. They speak about the fiction 
[fantastika] of reality. To create a world not according to the laws of everyday 
verisimilitude [bytovogo pravdopodobiia], but “its image and spirit.”36 
 
In the 1990 edition, therefore, Alexievich’s message regarding the truth about Afghanistan is that 
it does not lie in the document alone but in her artistic imagining of the spirit of these documents. 
Here, Alexievich is questioning or problematizing the assumption that the document itself has 
any special claim to truth. It is not the document that speaks, after all, but the artistic image.  
 In the early 1990s, several of Alexievich’s subjects in Belarus sued her for libel and 
defamation of character in response to the 1989 and 1990 newspaper excerpts and the 1990 full-
text edition of Zinky Boys. Alexievich compiles excerpts from the courtroom transcripts and 
newspaper coverage of the cases, as well as bits of conversations from around the courthouse 
during the trials, and private and official letters related to the trial’s proceedings. Called “Zinky 
Boys On Trial (A History in Documents) (“Sud nad ‘Tsinkovymi mal'chikami’ (Istoriia v 
dokumentakh)”), this new piece of writing appears in print for the first time in 1994, when 
“Slovo” releases Zinky Boys in a volume alongside Alexievich’s newest book, Enchanted by 
Death. In fact, the Table of Contents lists Zinky Boys, then Zinky Boys On Trial (A History in 
Documents), then Enchanted by Death, such that the piece of writing from the court trial could 
be considered its own separate work—equal to Zinky Boys or Enchanted by Death. Although 
Alexievich has made changes to Zinky Boys in this 1994 edition—she rearranges some words 
and sentences, adds some new voices, and adds a new section at the end called “Eshche odin 
rasskaz vmesto epiloga, on zhe prolog” (“Another Story in Place of an Epilogue, It’s Really a 
Prologue”)—none of these changes includes a reference to the court trials she faced.  At this 
                                               
36 Aleksievich, “Tsinkovye mal'chiki,” 8. 
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point, in 1994, the “History in Documents” from the court trials may be considered a separate 
new piece of writing, not necessarily a new chapter added to Zinky Boys. It is not until 1996, 
when “Vagrius” prints the “Zinky Boys On Trial: A History in Documents” at the end of a book 
titled Zinky Boys, without any Table of Contents, that it is no longer possible to consider them 
two separate pieces of writing. Furthermore, to the beginning of this edition in 1996, Alexievich 
adds a new ten-page section called “The Eternal Man with a Gun: Author’s Foreword” (“Vechnyi 
chelovek s ruzh'em: Predislovie avtora”), in which she refers to the court trials.37 However, in 
this new foreword, Alexievich raises serious concern about an over-reliance on documents and 
their ability to reveal any reliable, objective truth. Thus, when the court trial documents are 
clearly incorporated into the book for the first time, Alexievich sends a message to her readers 
from the beginning to treat “documents” with some skepticism. 
In the foreword, Alexievich describes her growing disillusionment with the romanticized 
portrayals of war and armed violence. She explicitly refers to her new cynicism for the highly-
sentimentalized images of World War II.38 Alexievich notes that the wars in Afghanistan and 
Chechnya are “something else,” something that challenges the romantic and patriotic narratives 
of World War II, and thus “[f]rom the tragically simplistic world in which we lived, we are 
returning to the multiplicity of suddenly discovered connections, and I can no longer pronounce 
                                               
37 Presumably the main title of Alexievich’s foreword in 1996 refers to the 1938 film Chelovek s ruzh'em 
(The Man with a Gun). Produced at the height of Stalin’s Great Terror, the popular film depicts an 
ordinary Russian soldier’s chance encounter with an anonymous Vladimir Lenin during the 1917 Russian 
Revolution. Ivan Shadrin, a simple peasant soldier, has been sent by his fellow soldiers to hand Lenin a 
letter with a list of his comrades’ questions about the revolution. While wandering around Smolny, 
Shadrin accidentally stumbles upon a short man in a three-piece suit; he shows great interest in Shadrin’s 
needs and answers all his questions. Later, a guard informs him that his interlocutor was none other than 
Vladimir Lenin. In other scenes with Lenin, Stalin is often by his side; the film was re-released in 1965 
without any reference to Stalin. 
38 Although Alexievich does not explicitly mention the Russian Revolution, she connotes it in her 
reference to the “man with a gun” that “we have been taught for so long to love.” 
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clear answers—there are none.”39 However, the most intriguing part of this foreword is not the 
author’s self-doubts about her book’s conclusions, but about its documentary form: 
That which I have been working with for already twenty years is a document, a document 
in the form of art. But I don’t know what a document is. The more I work with it, the 
more I have doubt. The only document, a document, so to speak, in its purest form, that 
doesn’t inspire me with mistrust, is a passport or a tram ticket. But what can they, if they 
are preserved, say in a hundred or two hundred years [...] about our time and about us? 
Only that we had bad printing. Everything else that we know by the name of document 
are versions. This is someone’s truth, someone’s passion, someone's prejudices, 
someone’s lie, someone’s life. 
 At the trial of my book Zinky Boys, the document was in close, hand-to-hand 
combat with the mass consciousness. Then I again understood, God forbid that 
documents be ruled by their contemporaries, that only they alone had the right to them. 
That, thirty-fifty years ago, they had rewritten Gulag Archipelago, Shalamov, 
Grossman... Albert Camus: “The truth is mysterious and elusive, and it always has to be 
conquered anew.” To conquer, of course, in the sense of comprehending. Mothers of sons 
who had died in Afghanistan came to the trial with portraits of their children, with their 
medals and insignia. They cried and screamed: “People, look, they’re so young, so 
beautiful, our boys, but she writes that they murdered over there!” And, to me, the 
mothers said, “We do not need your truth, we have our own truth.”  
 And it’s true that they have their own truth. 
 So what, then, is a document? How much is it at the mercy of people? How much 
does it belong to people, and how much to history and to art? For me, these are painful 
questions...40 
 
It is the lengthiest and most straightforward expression of the author’s misgivings regarding the 
documentary genre that exists in any edition of Zinky Boys. Inspired by her experience in the 
court trials when she was sued by some of her interviewees, the passage is an author’s painful 
and sincere confession of insecurity, uncertain of her responsibilities toward her readers.41  
Alexievich’s concerns about the document, however, apparently diminish in the twenty-first 
century. The above passage—indeed the entire foreword “The Eternal Man with a Gun”—is 
                                               
39 Aleksievich, Tsinkovye mal'chiki (Moscow: Vagrius, 1996), 8. 
40 Ibid., 9–10. 
41 Her interviewees are also her readers; they become angry only after they read her book (or excerpts of 
it). 
 74 
missing from all subsequent editions. (It only appears in the 1996 “Vagrius” edition.) 
Furthermore, in the 2007 edition, Alexievich removed the entire diary fragment that contains the 
passage with which this section started. Indeed, by 2007, there are no more cautions against the 
document, no cause to question the authority of documents to tell the truth. In this changed 
context, the book’s final chapter, consisting almost exclusively of documents from the court 
trials, reads very differently.  
 The 2007 edition’s final chapter “Zinky Boys On Trial” opens with an excerpt from a 
short article by L. Grigor'ev from the Belarusian newspaper Vechernii Minsk dated June 12, 
1992. The article reports that a group of veterans’ mothers recently petitioned the Minsk court to 
sue Alexievich over objections to a stage adaptation of Zinky Boys that was produced at the Ianki 
Kupalii Theatre in Minsk and subsequently broadcast on state television in Belarus. According to 
this report, the mothers, who had “been carrying unrelenting grief within themselves all these 
years,” were offended that their sons were “shown only as soulless robot-murderers, looters, drug 
addicts and rapists....”42 Although Alexievich includes nearly the entire short article in her book, 
she chooses to remove the final phrase (“giving quarter to neither the old nor the young”). 
Alexievich also adds two pieces of information that did not appear in the original newspaper 
article: at the first mention of her own name, she adds the identification “author of the book 
Zinky Boys;” then, when listing the reasons for the mothers’ petition, Alexievich adds “and 
publication of excerpts from the book in the newspaper Komsomol'skai pravda.”43 While the 
removal and additions are innocuous in that the article remains factually accurate, it is 
nonetheless noteworthy that she freely alters this first “document.” It is also significant that these 
                                               
42 Aleksievich, Tsinkovye mal'chiki, 247. 
43 L. Grigor'ev, “Isk materei,” Vechernii Minsk, June 12, 1992. 
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minor changes to the actual newspaper article do not appear until the 2007 edition; in all 
previous editions, the article was reprinted in its entirety, without any alteration. 
The chapter opens and closes with a series of newspaper article excerpts—twelve in 
total—suggesting that journalism was still an important genre for Alexievich despite her 
departure from it. There were certainly more newspaper articles about the court cases than 
Alexievich could include in this chapter, but there is one—which she did not include—that 
merits mention here. Ten days before Grigor'ev’s short article on the court case appeared, 
Krasnaia zvezda printed a piece by Colonel V. Kovalev on the same topic. Kovalev sympathizes 
with Alexievich’s “anti-war” agenda, even calling it noble and humane, but questions whether 
one should pursue that agenda if it pains and torments people who are already suffering from the 
war: 
Guided by even the most charitable idea, are we allowed to distort facts, resort to 
literary fiction, giving free rein to the writer’s imagination and pen, make 
thousands and thousands of “afgantsy” into stupid thugs and murderers without 
conscience and honour? Namely thus are they represented on television. “Killing 
is easy…” “I did not count how many I killed…” “Because they killed one of 
ours, we cut down the whole village…” “We took the caravan and shot 
everyone—men separately, donkeys separately…” “Conscience is a luxury for a 
marine…”—such revelations, which make your skin crawl, are many in the 
television production. And all of them are presented as the truth, as documentary 
evidence from participants of the Afghan War.44 
 
The mothers, Kovalev goes on, do not want to believe such a “truth” about their sons, which is 
why they want to go to court to present their own truth: evidence in the form of their sons’ 
letters. Kovalev’s article raises some difficult questions about the issue of truth and the document 
in Alexievich’s book—which may be why Alexievich does not include this “document.” Indeed, 
layer upon layer of documents will play a central role throughout the court cases. The mothers 
                                               
44 L. Kovalev, “Delo o ‘Tsinkovykh mal'chikakh,’ ili o tom, kak otreagirovali v Belarusi na odin 
telespektakl,” Krasnaia zvezda, June 2, 1992. 
 76 
object to the kind of documentary evidence that Zinky Boys represents; to counter it, they present 
to the court the documentary evidence of their sons’ letters; and Alexievich, defending herself in 
court, counters their objections and letters by reading out loud transcripts of their interviews.  
 After the newspaper excerpts comes a section with the heading, “From the lawsuit of 
Oleg Liashenko, former private and bomber,” followed by what we assume is Private 
Liashenko’s complete and unaltered complaint against Alexievich. (The note that the document 
was not personally signed, however, is odd and slightly suspicious). According to this document, 
Liashenko’s primary complaint is with the 1989 excerpt of Zinky Boys that was printed in the 
Belarusian newspaper: 
In the monologue is reflected my story about the Afghan War and my stay 
in Afghanistan, about relationships between people at the war, after the war, etc. 
Alexievich completely distorted my story, wrote down what I did not say, 
or, if I did say it, then I understood it differently. She made independent 
conclusions, which I did not make.  
Part of the statements that Alexievich wrote under my name humiliated 
and insulted my honour and dignity.45 
 
Liashenko notes that his last name was not printed correctly. (His name was spelled 
“Leliushenka” in the Belarusian newspaper.) Then he lists four examples of specific passages 
from the monologue that were lies and that had defamed his character. The next document 
excerpt, appearing under the heading “From the stenograph of the pre-trial hearing,” is a court 
transcript that shows Alexievich challenging Liashenko’s complaints and Liashenko’s lawyer 
objecting from time to time that Alexievich is using psychological pressure. Alexievich reminds 
Liashenko that he had cried when they met, that he did not believe that his “truth” (tvoiu pravdu) 
could ever be printed, and that he asked her to publish it. “So I wrote it down,” Alexievich 
continues, “and what now? You are again being deceived and used. A second time... But you 
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said that you will never give yourself over to deception?”46 Liashenko, in response, seems to 
suggest that he was motivated by financial hardship, or even bribes, to sue Alexievich. His 
lawyer interrupts her own client to object—or, at least, from the presentation of the transcript 
excerpt in Zinky Boys, her objection appears to interrupt her client.  
When the judge enquires as to what Liashenko wishes as reparation, he asks the court to 
order Alexievich to publicly apologize to him and to pay him 50,000 roubles for his damaged 
soldier’s honour. Aleksievch speaks up: “Oleg, I do not believe that these are your words. You 
are saying this with someone else’s [chuzhikh] words... I remember you being different... And 
you too cheaply value your burned face, [your] lost eye... Only it’s not me who needs to be 
called to court. You have confused me with the Ministry of Defence and the Politburo of the 
CPSU...”47 Liashenko does not appear to respond to this, but his lawyer strenuously objects to 
Alexievich’s words as being, once again, psychological pressure. The lawyer’s objection appears 
to go unnoticed by the judge or Alexievich, who continues addressing Liashenko, this time to 
point out that she had printed Liashenko’s monologue under an altered surname, and to explain 
why. She was afraid for him, afraid that he would run into trouble with the KGB, because “all of 
you” had been forced to sign an agreement not to disclose military secrets. “And I changed your 
surname,” she continued. “I changed it in order to protect you, but now, I should use this to 
protect myself from you. In so far as it is not your surname, then it is a collective image... And 
your claims are groundless...”48 At this, Liashenko seems to become confused, protesting: “But 
no, they’re my words. I said this... That’s where and how I was wounded... And... Everything 
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there is mine.”49 With this confused protestation, the excerpt comes to an end, leaving the reader 
to digest what appears to be a document with damning testimony in favour of Alexievich’s 
assertion that she did print the truth about Liashenko and his experience with the war, as well as 
the unchallenged accusation that a government agency has bribed Liashenko to sue her. This 
document thus functions to effectively validate the truth as Alexievich wrote it in Zinky Boys, as 
well as to discredit those who say otherwise. 
From Liashenko’s testimony, the chapter moves on to Ekaterina Platitsina, mother of a 
fallen soldier. Platitsina complains that Alexievich distorted her story about her son in the 
excerpt published in the 1989 Belarusian newspaper and in the full text published in 1990: 
“Alexievich, despite the fact that the book is documentary, added several facts on her own, much 
from my stories was left out, she made her own independent conclusions, and she signed the 
monologue with my name...”50 Echoing Liashenko, Platitsina argues that Alexievich had 
stretched the truth of her words beyond recognition. “The image of my son imprinted in my 
mind,” she insists, “has no relationship to the image that came out in the book.”51 When the 
judge asks her to be more specific, she answers, “Everything there is not as I said [it]. My son 
was not like that. He loved his homeland.”  Platitsina reads out loud part of the monologue that 
Alexievich had published under her name, in which she describes seeing her son weeping in the 
middle of the night after he had returned from Afghanistan. Protesting that her son was a military 
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officer and “could not cry,” Platitsina seems to dispute that this scene ever occurred, much less 
that she would have told Alexievich about it.52  
Then she addresses Alexievich directly: “You say that I should hate the state, the party… 
But I’m proud of my son! He died as a military officer. All his comrades loved him. I love the 
state that we lived in, the USSR, because my son died for it. And I hate you! I don’t need your 
terrible truth [vasha strashnaia pravda]. We don’t need it! Do you hear?!”53 Once again, the idea 
of multiple truths comes up in the text (“my truth versus your truth”), but now that notion seems 
cowardly or self-serving. Although bereaved mothers might declare that they do not need this 
truth, the clear implication here is that Alexievich’s Zinky Boys nonetheless is the one truth. 
Alexievich responds: “I could have heard you out. We could have talked. But why do we have to 
talk about it in court? I cannot understand...”54 These are the final words on Platitsina’s case, as it 
is presented in Zinky Boys. As in the “documentary” presentation of Liashenko’s case, the 
documents here unequivocally support Alexievich’s point of view. 
Interspersed between documents about the cases are three short sections with bulleted 
lists of unconnected sentences that express various opinions about the war, the trials, and 
Alexievich. The first section is titled “Voices from the hall” (“Golosa iz zala”);55 the second and 
third sections are titled “From conversations in the courtroom” (“Iz razgovorov v zale suda”).56 
There are no other context clues, and the natural assumption is that these are bits of conversation 
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that Alexievich somehow overheard during the trials. It turns out, however, that this assumption 
is not true. A close comparison of editions reveals that, in fact, several of these “courtroom 
voices” in the 2007 edition are deleted passages that, in previous editions, appeared at the end of 
a chapter of the author’s diary fragments; in other words, in previous editions, these “courtroom 
voices” were quite clearly the author’s own voice, speaking to her reader. For example, the final 
three bulleted comments in the second section read:  
— Remember, Arthur Koestler said: “Why, when we speak the truth, does it always 
sounds like a lie? [...]  
— Shooting hushed villages, bombing roads in the mountains—we were shooting 
and bombing our own ideals. This cruel truth [pravdu] must be confessed. [...] 
Now let us gather courage to find out the truth [pravdu] about ourselves. [...] 
— “We have [U nas] two paths: knowing the truth or running [begstvo] from the 
truth. [We] must open [our] eyes... [Nado otkryt' glaza...].”57  
 
At the end of the 1990 edition, Alexievich had addressed her reader with each the above 
comments, with only a few slight edits.58 How odd, and telling, that Alexievich has moved these 
lines to a new chapter called “A History in Documents.” Among other things, it suggests the 
extent to which the author has tampered with this chapter of “documents.” It also underscores 
Alexievich’s new position on the authority of documents to tell the truth.  
Another section in the new chapter of documents functions as a more obvious platform 
for the author to openly speak to her reader. It appears under the heading “From the statement of 
S. Alexievich, author of Zinky Boys (from that which was said and was not allowed to be said)” 
                                               
57 Ibid., 269. 
58 In the 1990 edition, the last comment, for example, read: “Two paths: knowing the truth or escape 
[spasenie] from the truth. Will we again hide? [Opiat' spriachemsia?]” The revised line in the 2007 
edition more explicitly emphasizes the collective responsibility with the addition of the first-person plural 
pronoun “we” (in the genitive case). There is also a shift from the perhaps forgivable notion of mere 
“escape” in the 1990s to the more cowardly and reprehensible “running” in 2007. The despondent 
question in the 1990s has been replaced with an imperative in the twenty-first century: hiding is no longer 
an option; the truth must be faced with open eyes. (See Aleksievich, “Tsinkovye mal'chiki,” 87.) 
 81 
(“Iz vystupleniia S. Alexievich, avtora ‘Tsinkovykh mal'chikov’ (iz togo, chto bylo skazano i chto 
ne dali skazat')”), so here, at least, there is a clear signal that this section is not an unaltered 
document from Alexievich’s testimony in the courtroom, but rather an author freely and directly 
addressing her reader. At the end of her statement, she includes an extended excerpt from the 
monologue of Taras Ketsmur, another of her subjects who had brought charges against her. In 
the excerpt, Ketsmur describes a dream in which he finds himself lying in a coffin, alive. The 
faces of the crowd around him show grief but also a secret ecstasy, Alexievich says that he said, 
as they carry him in the coffin from his house to the cemetery. He hears someone say three times, 
“give me a hammer,” then begin hammering nails into the lid of the coffin over him.59 He beats 
against the lid and sits up but finds that he cannot speak; the crowd silently looks at him until he 
lies back in the coffin. In his dream, Ketsmur decides that if they want him to be dead, then 
maybe he really is dead and needs to be quiet. The phrase “give me a hammer” is heard once 
again, and the excerpt ends. Alexievich concludes her statement: “And he did not contest this. 
And this will protect his honour and dignity in the court of History. And me, too.”60 In this 
statement, therefore, Alexievich connects her assertion of speaking the truth in Zinky Boys to the 
authenticating experience of the court trials, as conveyed through various types of so-called 
“documents.” Interestingly, with this reference to the “court of History”—which in earlier 
editions was merely “the main Court”—Alexievich also emphasizes a strong correlation between 
documentary evidence, truth, and history. 
                                               
59 The hammer, of course, is an obvious reference to the Soviet Union. The emblem of a hammer and 
sickle that decorated the USSR coat of arms may be the most recognizable symbol of Soviet power and 
ideology. The hammer represented the workers (and the sickle the peasants). 
60 Aleksievich, Tsinkovye mal'chiki, 297. 
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The chapter (and the book) ends with a section of newspaper excerpts published after the 
trials had concluded, almost all of them favorable to Alexievich. The final excerpt comes from 
For the Glory of the Motherland (Vo slavu Rodiny), a Belarusian military newspaper. In this 
article, Petr Tkachenko argues that the battle waged in these court trials was not over the truth of 
the war, but over the right of man’s soul to exist despite the war.61 War, he insists, will always 
continue while “it rages on in our addled minds,” because war is the inescapable consequence of 
the spite and evil that has accumulated in our souls. In this sense, then, Tkachenko finds 
symbolic and prophetic meaning in a phrase from the diary of the fallen senior lieutenant Iurii 
Galovnev, who wrote: “I, of course, will return, I have always returned...”62 This is an interesting 
way for Alexievich to end the chapter (and the book) for at least a couple of reasons. First, 
Tkachenko openly does with Galovnev’s words exactly what Alexievich had been charged with 
doing to her subjects’ testimony in Zinky Boys: using their words to his/her own end, finding 
meaning in the words that the speaker never intended. In fact, Galovnev’s mother was one of the 
women who sued Alexievich for misrepresenting her son in Zinky Boys, and in her testimony, 
she read this and other parts from her son’s diary out loud in court. In choosing to end the 2016 
edition with these quoted words, Alexievich has layered document upon document upon 
document. This line was taken from Galovnev’s diary entry, which appeared in a court 
stenographer’s transcript of Galovnev’s mother’s statement, which then appeared in Tkachenko’s 
article, which then appeared in Alexievich’s book. This final document functions to preach 
                                               
61 As mentioned in the dissertation’s Introduction, Petr Tkachenko writes an “afterword” to Zinky Boys in 
Prokhanov’s newspaper Zavtra; he is highly critical of Alexievich’s depiction of Soviet-Afghan War 
veterans. 
62 Aleksievich, Tsinkovye mal'chiki, 315. 
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Alexievich’s lesson for her readers about the true evilness of war, as well as validate 
Alexievich’s artistic appropriation of documentary evidence to highlight this truth.  
Although the additional material of courtroom documents undoubtedly functions to 
intensify the drama of the book, another important function is to establish the authenticity of 
Zinky Boys. In her article, “Toward a Poetics of Documentary Prose—from the Perspective of 
Gulag Testimonies,” Leona Toker notes that works of documentary prose typically lack “self-
sufficiency,” because, for the reader to accept the work as true and accurate, the reader must 
consult outside texts such as historical research or other works of documentary prose on the same 
topic. 63 The success of a work of documentary prose, Toker argues, depends on whether readers 
ultimately accept its material as the truth. After the court trials, then, Alexievich conveniently 
had at her disposal the very texts that her readers would need in order to accept Zinky Boys as 
true. Material from court cases in which the book’s accuracy was vindicated would encourage 
readers to trust in the reliability and authenticity of the book, and Zinky Boys thus becomes a 
“self-sufficient” source of truth, a reliable authority of past events. The presence and 
overwhelming volume of what are presented as documents in the most literal sense is perhaps the 
strongest and most obvious evidence of a stark shift in Alexievich’s attitude to documents, 
moving toward a greater reliance on the written record to present a single persuasive 
authoritative narrative of the Soviet-Afghan War. 
 
                                               
63 Leona Toker, “Towards a Poetics of Documentary Prose—From the Perspective of Gulag 
Testimonies,” Poetics Today 18, no. 2 (Summer 1997): 194–95. 
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TRUTH AND TRUTH 
A discussion of Alexievich’s concept of truth in Zinky Boys would be incomplete without 
some analysis of the distinction she draws between pravda and istina—the two Russian words 
that translate as “truth” in English. The distinction in almost any context is difficult to pinpoint. 
In his Explanatory Dictionary of the Living Great Russian Language, first published in 1863-66, 
Vladimir Dal' defines istina as “the opposite of lies; all that is correct [verno], authentic 
[podlinno], accurate [tochno], and just [spravedlivo],” and he states that “istina is related to the 
mind and reason.” Although the word istina may be considered almost a synonym for pravda, 
Dal' maintains the important difference, based on Psalm 85:11: “Istina is from the earth, the 
domain of human reason, while pravda is from the heavens, a blessed gift.”64 Pravda, according 
to Dal', is “for the good [blago], legal justice [pravosudie], or justice in general 
[spravedlivost'].”65 This understanding of pravda as connoting the righteousness and justice of 
God, rather than the rational, objective, or scientific truth known to man, is reflected in the 
opening lines of Alexander Pushkin’s short play, Mozart and Salieri. The unhappy composer 
Salieri states, “Everyone says that there is no truth [pravda] on earth. But neither is there truth 
[pravda] above. For me this is as clear as a simple gamma.”66 In his Dictionary of the Russian 
Language, first published in 1949, Sergei Ivanovich Ozhegov further supports this distinction by 
defining istina as “objective” truth, a “claim, judgment, tested by practice, experience.” In some 
                                               
64 In the King James Bible this verse is translated as “Truth shall spring out of the earth; and 
righteousness shall look down from heaven” (emphasis mine). 
65 Vladimir Dal', Tolkovyi slovar', vol. 3 (Moscow: “Khudozhestvennaia literatura,” 1935), 379. 
66 Aleksandr Pushkin, “Motsart i Sal'eri,” in Sobranie sochinenii v desiati tomakh, vol. 4, Moscow: 
Gosudarstvennoe izdatel'stvo khudozhestvennoi literatury, 1959. 
 85 
of his earliest writing, “Toward a Philosophy of the Act,” Bakhtin differentiates between pravda 
and istina: 
It is an unfortunate misunderstanding (a legacy of rationalism) to think that truth [pravda] 
can only be the truth [istina] that is composed of universal moments; that the truth 
[pravda] of a situation is precisely that which is repeatable and constant in it. Moreover, 
that which is universal and identical (logically identical) is fundamental and essential, 
whereas individual truth [pravda] is artistic and irresponsible, i.e., it isolates the given 
individuality.67  
 
In his chapter on pravda as a “charismatic word,” Richard Wortman argues that “the boundaries 
of the word’s meanings are vague and shifting, adapting to the needs of the speaker to lend legal, 
philosophical, political, even theological gravitas and uplift to his particular viewpoint. In this 
way, pravda is the perfect charismatic word: its cloudy meanings are given to associations with 
higher authorities of any type on any occasion, evoking sacral overtones for its referent.”68 Note 
that a common saying in the Soviet Union played with the titles of the two official newspapers, 
Pravda (i.e., truth) and Izvestiia (i.e., the news): “v Pravde net izvestii, v Izvestiiakh net pravdy.” 
In the Truth there is no news, and in the News there is no truth. 
Most of the references to truth thus far in this chapter have been to pravda. As we know, 
Alexievich’s “main character,” for example, repeatedly insists that he has his own truth (svoia 
pravda), which he presents in opposition to the author’s truth (vasha pravda). And, in court, a 
bereaved mother yells at Alexievich that she doesn’t need her terrible truth.69 In fact, the idea of 
different versions of truth (pravda) belonging to different people reappears throughout the book 
                                               
67 Mikhail Bakhtin, Toward a Philosophy of the Act, trans. Vadim Liapunov, ed. Vadim Liapunov and 
Michael Holquist (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1993), 37. 
68 Richard Wortman, The Power of Language and Rhetoric in Russian Political History: Charismatic 
Words from the 18th to the 21st Centuries (New York: Bloomsbury Academic, 2018), 132. 
69 Aleksievich, Tsinkovye mal'chiki, 255. 
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even more frequently than has already been described. A female civilian employee working in 
Afghanistan, for example, says, “there isn’t one truth [pravdy], it’s varied.”70 A private, who 
dislikes that there are different versions of truth, blames it on glasnost' —a time, he says, when 
there are “many truths [mnogo pravd]”—and he asks, “where is it, my truth [moia pravda]?”71 In 
a letter to Alexievich in response to the court trials, the former afganets Pavel Shet'ko writes that 
he is only surprised that even veterans, having “looked death in the eye,” are nevertheless afraid 
of “their own truth [svoia pravda] about the Afghan war.”72 And so on. References to pravda 
abound in Alexievich’s Zinky Boys, regardless of edition; the change has been in the author’s 
decreasing sympathy for these different versions of it, not that others continue to believe that 
different versions exist. 
Alexievich’s use of istina is markedly less, in all editions.  In the original version, the 
first and only appearance of istina occurs in the author’s closing remarks at the end of the final 
chapter “From the Writer’s Diaries After the Book” in two passages already cited above. The 
first— 
Arthur Kestler: “Why, when we speak the truth, does it always sounds like a lie?” [...] 
Shooting hushed villages, bombing roads in the mountains—we were shooting and 
bombing our own ideals. This cruel truth [pravdu] must be confessed. [...] Now let us 
gather courage to find out the truth [pravdu] about ourselves. [...] Two paths: knowing 
the truth [istiny] or escape from the truth [istiny].” 
 
—was discussed above in the context of truth and documents, because, in the 2007 edition, this 
passage was moved to the chapter of courtroom documents without any indication that it is the 
                                               
70 Ibid., 75. 
71 Ibid., 95. 
72 Ibid., 363. 
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author’s voice.73 The second passage—“We have had many gods, some now on the garbage 
heap, others in the museum. Let’s turn Truth [Istinu] into a god”—was discussed above in the 
context of truth and individual memory processing, because the author continues with 
instructions for her reader to worship Truth (Istina) according to his or her own truth (pravda).74 
It is significant that both passages—the only occurrence of istina in the original version of the 
book—occur in text that is clearly identified as the author’s voice. In this edition, her heroes are 
concerned exclusively with pravda, not istina.  
This is no longer the case in the 1991 “Molodaia gvardiia” edition, the first book-form 
publication of Zinky Boys: toward the end of the “Day Three” chapter Alexievich adds a new 
soldier’s monologue that includes a rather extended discussion of istina. It opens with the same 
questions that trouble many of the veterans. He asks how one is to reconcile the ideas of “the 
motherland, the people, and duty” with the charges that the Afghan War was “dirty” and 
“misguided,” that the Soviet soldiers were an “occupying force,” and he wonders whether people 
see veterans as “naïve idiots, mere cannon fodder” because they were “searching for the truth 
[istinu].”75 The soldier recalls the scene from the Bible, when Jesus is brought before Pontius 
Pilate to be examined, and he paraphrases the dialogue between the two men: “Jesus said, ‘To 
this end I was born and came into the world, that I should bear witness unto the truth [istina].’ 
Pilate asks him, ‘What is the truth [istina]?’ The question is left without an answer.” The soldier 
continues, speaking about himself now: “I have my own truth [istina]. My own truth [pravda]: 
                                               




although we might have been naïve, we were also innocent.”76 This monologue, with its 
references to both istina and pravda is preserved in all subsequent editions of Zinky Boys, 
including the 2007 edition.  
In “The Eternal Man with a Gun,” the author’s foreword that appears only in the 1996 
edition, Alexievich writes that when there are three witnesses to one event there will be “three 
versions... Three attempts at truth [istiny].” In other words, there are not three different versions 
of istina—there is only one istina—but three different attempts to get to it. Although this use of 
istina in Zinky Boys is short-lived, it is in keeping with the distinction that Alexievich seems to 
be making between pravda and istina.  Different versions of pravda (i.e., justice) are possible; 
different versions of istina (i.e., objective reality) are not. Thus, in the above-quoted passage 
from her 1996 author’s foreword, Alexievich replaces “versions” with “attempts” when talking 
about istina. And, in fact, the only time that the word istina occurs in her most recent novel, 
Secondhand Time (Vremia sekond khend) is when an anonymous interviewee is speaking about 
Sergei Akhromeev, a Marshal of the Soviet Union, who served in Afghanistan and committed 
suicide after participating in the failed August Coup of 1991. His monologue begins with some 
musing on truth, both istina and pravda: 
Have you been to see... (He names a few famous people.) [...] Their version—he was 
murdered!—I don’t believe it. [...] Who has the truth [istina]? As I understand it, especially 
trained people search for the truth: judges, scientists, priests. All the rest are controlled by their 
ambitions... emotions... (Pause.) I read your books... It’s in vain that you are so trusting of 
people... of people’s truth [chelovecheskoi pravde]... History—this is the life of an idea. It’s not 
people who write it, but the time that writes it. But people’s truth [chelovecheskaia pravda]—this 
is a nail on which everyone hangs his own hat.77 
 
                                               
76 Aleksievich, Tsinkovye mal'chiki (Moscow: Molodaia gvardiia, 1991), 142–43. 
77 Aleksievich, Vremia sekond khend (Moscow: Vremia, 2013), 124–25. 
 89 
In general, the distinction between pravda and istina in Alexievich’s writing follows most 
closely Bakhtin’s description of pravda as “individual” and “artistic,” whereas istina is rational, 
“universal and identical.” Although she maintains this distinction from the earliest to the most 
recent editions of her works, her edits and later writing reflect her evolving attitude to the 
importance of pravda versus istina in her narrative of the Soviet-Afghan War, where the 
universal truth takes precedence over individual truths. 
 
CONCLUSION 
Alexievich was awarded the 2015 Nobel Prize in Literature for her “polyphonic 
writings,” which brings to mind, of course, Mikhail Bakhtin’s theory of polyphony in literature, 
as well as his related theories of heteroglossia and unfinalizability. Bakhtin was the first to 
borrow the term “polyphony” from music as a metaphor for literary narrative that contains 
diverse points of view; he uses the term to describe the diversity of voices, perspectives, and 
belief systems in Dostoevsky’s novels. In his treatise on Dostoevsky’s poetics, Bakhtin argues 
that Dostoevsky creates “free people, capable of standing alongside their creator, capable of not 
agreeing with him and even of rebelling against him.” This “plurality of independent and 
unmerged voices and consciousnesses, a genuine polyphony of fully valid voices” is the chief 
characteristic of what Bakhtin terms the “polyphonic novel.”78 Decades later, Bakhtin develops 
and refines his understanding of the polyphonic novel in the essay “Discourse in the Novel.” He 
describes “heteroglossia” as many different languages that “are specific points of view on the 
world, forms for conceptualizing the world in words, specific world views, each characterized by 
                                               
78 Mikhail Bakhtin, Problems of Dostoevsky’s Poetics, ed. and trans. Caryl Emerson (Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 1984), 6. 
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its own objects, meanings and values.”79 Viewing languages as distinct worldviews relates to the 
“dialogic novel,” which “is constructed not as the whole of a single consciousness […] but as a 
whole formed by the interaction of several consciousness, none of which entirely becomes an 
object for the other.”80 Characters in a dialogic novel speak in their individual languages, which 
represent their worldviews, and their meanings are affected by the context into which they speak. 
He argues against the assumption that, if two people disagree, at least one of them must be in 
error. Instead, he argues that understanding (i.e., truth) requires a multitude of voices and minds 
and perspectives—even if they are contradictory and logically inconsistent. This is related to his 
concept of the individual person being “unfinalizable” because he cannot be completely 
understood, known, or labelled; a person can always change, a person is never fully revealed or 
fully known in the world. 
A monologic artistic world, on the other hand, corresponds to a single and unified 
authorial consciousness that “does not recognize someone else’s thought, someone else’s idea, as 
an object of representation.” In this monologic world, Bakhtin points out, 
everything ideological falls into two categories. Certain thoughts—true, signifying 
thoughts—gravitate toward the author’s consciousness, and strive to shape themselves in 
the purely semantic unity of a worldview; such a thought is not represented, it is affirmed 
[...] Other thoughts and ideas—untrue or indifferent from the author’s point of view, not 
fitting into his worldview—are not affirmed; they are either polemically repudiated, or 
else they lose their power to signify directly and become simple elements of 
characterization, the mental gestures of the hero or his more stable mental qualities.”81  
 
                                               
79 Mikhail Bakhtin, The Dialogic Imagination: Four Essays, trans. Caryl Emerson and Michael Holquist, 
ed. Michael Holquist (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1981), 291–92. 
80 Bakhtin, Problems of Dostoevsky’s Poetics, 18. 
81 Ibid., 79–80. 
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Monologic discourse “is a discourse in which only one point of view is represented, however 
diverse the means of representation.” For Bakhtin, monologism emerges wherever and whenever 
universal truth statements, or istina, do not allow any other sort of truth, such as pravda, to 
appear. From the Nobel Prize committee’s description of Alexievich’s style of writing as 
polyphonic, one might reasonably surmise that her writing is somehow in line with Bakhtin’s 
theories of polyphony, heteroglossia, and unfinalizability. There may be an element of the 
“unfinalizability” to Alexievich’s books, of course, in that she is constantly editing and re-editing 
them when they come out in new editions. However, as I hope that this chapter makes quite 
clear, I conclude that Alexievich’s final narrative of the Soviet-Afghan War does not possess 
these qualities of polyphony, heteroglossia, dialogism, or even unfinalizability in the sense that 
Bakhtin understands them. 
The unusual technique by which Alexievich imposes art on the document has two 
important consequences that strengthen and focus the impact of her message on the reader. First, 
her artistic manipulation results in a subtle uniformity throughout the freestanding monologues, 
which reinforces her message to the reader on an almost subconscious level. As a result of the 
literary license she takes with the documents of her interview transcripts, what could have been a 
polyphony of raw voices and competing perspectives in Alexievich’s works instead takes on a 
more monochromatic tone. Voices begin to sound like echoes of one another. Words and phrases 
can be found repeated in different monologues throughout the book, which imbues those words 
and phrases with heightened significance. There is a smoothness and aesthetic lilt throughout 
most of the prose, a delicate literary undertone that connects the otherwise disjointed 
monologues. In this way, overlaying the document with art, Alexievich leads her reader to 
discover the meaning she intends to be found, over and over again, in each of these ostensibly 
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individual voices and disparate passages. Second, this kind of artistic manipulation is so difficult 
to locate in any precise way that the art itself remains almost invisible, which functions to 
increase the reader’s receptiveness to the author’s message. Methodological explanations from 
the author, contexts for the interviews, and the interviewer’s (or a narrator’s) voice are, for the 
most part, absent from Zinky Boys. In other words, Alexievich subdues almost all signs of overt 
“literariness” (literatur'nost') and elevates the sense of “documentariness” (dokumental'nost') 
wherever possible.82 This is what distinguishes Alexievich’s writing from similar endeavours in 
Russian, Soviet, and world literature.83 This is also why it can be a challenge to read 
Alexievich’s works with any critical distance. The opaqueness of Alexievich’s artistic technique 
greatly heightens the effect of authenticity, disarming even the most sophisticated reader by 
creating the sense of unaltered reality and fact. 
Alexievich’s 2007 narrative of Afghanistan is an even more streamlined anti-war 
message than it was in 1990. This narrative has changed in several significant ways, from 
acknowledgment of polyphonic truths and individual memory processing to a more 
monochromatic presentation of moral authority and the final verdict, from an account of 
the war that distances itself from histories, authorities, or documents to one that 
highlights historical contexts, authority, and documents. In the 1990 edition, Alexievich 
cites Shaw and Kariakin (or Marx) to undercut the notion of historical truths. Neither of 
these extra-literary references is to be found in the 2007 edition, and, in fact, the 
                                               
82 The term literatur'nost' was first introduced by Roman Jakobson in 1921 in Modern Russian Poetry: 
“the object of literary science is not literature but literariness, i.e. what makes a given work a literary 
work” (Bijay Kumar Das, Twentieth Century Literary Criticism (New Delhi: Atlantic, 2005), 78). 
83 An example of a possible exception may be Eve Ensler’s The Vagina Monologues (New York: Villard, 
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epigraphs to the 2016 edition are taken from two works of history that support 
Alexievich’s conclusions about the war. Alexievich’s call to respect different versions of 
truth, for readers to allow themselves and others to have their own individual relationship 
to the truth, has been removed. The 2007 edition of Zinky Boys no longer openly 
promotes the idea that there are different versions of truth that can be equally acceptable 
and valid. Instead, in the 2007 edition, Alexievich has promoted the authority of her 
singular version of this history. In the 1990 edition, Alexievich openly describes her 
artistic process of using the document to create an image that does not follow the rules of 
ordinary verisimilitude, in order to write a history of emotions not a history of the war. 
By 2007, these passages have been removed and, perhaps most striking of all changes, 
she has added an entire chapter of document excerpts from the court cases that interview 
subjects brought against her—challenges to her authority that Alexievich defeated in the 
courtroom and now defeats again on the pages of this chapter. 
The textual modifications made between 1990 and 2007 form the backbone of 
Alexievich’s new narrative of the Soviet-Afghan war, but there are several smaller, more subtle 
moments throughout the 2007 edition that further reflect the direction that Alexievich’s narrative 
has taken. To take one small example in closing, in the chapter of court documents, Alexievich’s 
defense lawyer challenges Taras Ketsmur: “You said that you yourself asked to be sent to 
Afghanistan as a volunteer. I did not understand, how do you relate to this today? Do you hate 
this war, or are you proud that you were there?”84 This type of question reflects exactly the 
current polarization in popular attitudes about the Soviet-Afghan War. And, although this 
passage first appears in the 1994 edition, the other changes that Alexievich makes to later 
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editions, particularly to the 2007 edition, alter the context around the lawyer’s question and 
therefore the message behind it. Alexievich’s new narrative of the war in 2007 securely positions 
her on the side of unqualified condemnation. Alexievich has chosen a side, and now she (like her 
lawyer) demands no less from her interview subjects or her readers. In later editions of Zinky 
Boys, therefore, there is no longer much patience for middle ground, nuance, ambivalence, 
individual memory processing, or competing versions of truth. In the 1990 edition of Zinky Boys, 
Alexievich preached kindness and understanding for those who had paid such a high price for 
their own truth of the Soviet-Afghan War. In the 2007 edition, however, Alexievich seems to be 
saying that we, as a society, can no longer afford to do that. 
 
Alexievich’s message about the Soviet-Afghan War is so explicit by the 2007 edition of Zinky 
Boys that, in this aspect, the work may be considered what Roland Barthes has termed a 
“readerly” text.  As a political project, the book’s final, authorized meaning is quite clear; the 
author owns the only valid truth about the Soviet-Afghan War.  And yet, as the next chapter will 
show, Alexievich’s unique poetics place authors, readers, and characters into unusual new roles 




The Poetics of Svetlana Alexievich’s Soviet-Afghan War: 
Authors, Readers, and the Responsibility of Being “You” 
 
INTRODUCTION 
The Nobel Committee awarded Svetlana Alexievich the 2015 Prize in Literature “for her 
polyphonic writings, a monument to suffering and courage in our time.” However, as I show in 
my first chapter, the superficial polyphony of voices in Zinky Boys is, in fact, Alexievich’s mask 
for the monophony of her politically-motivated anti-war message. The term “polyphonic” is an 
unfortunate red herring for readers and critics who are interested in better understanding the 
unusual form of documentary literature that Alexievich has developed. Instead, as I will argue in 
the present chapter, Alexievich’s literary innovation is the way that she involves her reader in 
opening the inner emotional life of her characters by challenging the traditional roles of author, 
character, and reader—and the relationships between them. 
Although Zinky Boys is the third in a cycle of five books, it is the first time that she works 
with an ongoing controversial event in Soviet history, and her stance in this book is by far the 
most provocative. Certain details of the poetics at work in Zinky Boys are also unique among 
Alexievich’s work: Zinky Boys is the only book with dated excerpts from an author’s diary; the 
only book with conversations between “author” and “main character;” and the only book with 
chapter titles taken from the Bible.1 It is in her work on the Soviet-Afghan War that Alexievich’s 
                                               
1 A detailed comparison of the differences in literary style and form between the five books in Voices 
from Utopia would require its own chapter. For example, however, the “external perspective” is most 
evident in The Unwomanly Face of War and Second-hand Time, where we occasionally encounter the 
interviewer’s voice interrupting the character’s monologue as well as the implied author’s voice in 
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experimentation with the identities of author, character, and reader is the most radical and, 
arguably, the most effective. By destabilizing the conventional relationships between author, 
character and reader, she weakens the boundaries that delimitate each role, which in turn allows 
for some interesting crossovers. For her readers, it means that the gulf between author and 
reader, or—most importantly—between character and reader, becomes noticeably less. For a 
moment, the reader may even share the identity of the author, or step into the role of a character. 
In a work that essentially lacks plot, this is a clever device that allows Alexievich to immerse the 
reader in her story with minimal voyeurism. It is arguably also a more ethical way to tell stories 
about war. Alexievich’s readers are immersed in her text because they are made active 
participants; they are themselves involved in the storytelling event, rather than eavesdropping on 
someone else’s trauma from a distance. The political message of Zinky Boys, therefore, lies not 
only in Alexievich’s (ultimately monophonic) argument against war and a romanticized military, 
but also in the politically-active citizen that she encourages and expects her reader to become. 
Although in the last few decades the classification “documentary literature” has begun to 
be used in Russian to convey the English-language concept of “non-fiction,” or, more recently, 
even the transliterated non-fikshn, the binary of fiction versus non-fiction is not endemic to 
Russian-language literature. Traditionally, “documentary literature” is only one of many 
classifications of Russian-language literature: “artistic literature” (khudozhestvennaia literatura), 
“scientific literature” (nauchnaia literatura), “reference literature” (spravochnaia literatura), and 
“memoiristic literature” (memuarnaia literatura), for example, are all at the same base 
classification level as “documentary literature.” In the Soviet Encyclopedia, “documentary 
                                               
extended comments in italics throughout and/or at the end of a monologue. Chernobyl Prayer is the only 
book with sections of text that are labeled a “choir.” 
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literature” is defined as “scientific-artistic prose [nauchno-khudozh. proza] that, in all factual 
details, is based on documentary materials and representing their full or partial literal 
reproduction [...]” but that “differs from scientific-historical research [nauchno-istoricheskoe 
issledovanie] in its paradigm [ustanovka] of artistic synthesis.”2 Moreover, “documentary 
literature” has its origins in the growing popularity among nineteenth-century Russian readers of 
historical research (such as Alexander Pushkin’s History of Pugachev), on the one hand, and 
historical fiction (including the novels of Dostoevsky and Tolstoy, and the sketches of Vladimir 
Dal' and Nikolai Leskov), on the other. Therefore, it is misleading that “documentary literature” 
in Russian is being used as a translation for “non-fiction,” because elements of “artistic 
literature” have been inextricably woven into “documentary literature” since its earliest 
appearances in Russia. Recalling the many changes that Alexievich makes from one edition of 
Zinky Boys to the next, it is conceivable that Alexievich manipulates the text, even the text of her 
“voices,” almost as freely as any author of straightforward fiction. Furthermore, literary theories 
and concepts that are typically used to analyze fiction not only can be applied to Russian 
“documentary literature,” but are, in fact, essential tools for uncovering the subtle artistry at 
work beneath the documents.  
In a discussion of Alexievich’s unique poetics, therefore, theories of implied author and 
implied reader, and the related concept of a writerly versus a readerly text, are important. In my 
application of Wolfgang Iser’s theoretical frameworks and concepts of authors and readers, my 
proviso that Alexievich manipulates her text almost as freely as an author of fiction is important 
and should not be forgotten: the reader’s knowledge that this is documentary—not fictional—
                                               
2 V. S. Murav'ev, “Dokumental'naia literatura,” Kratkaia literaturnaia entsiklopediia, ed. A. A. Surkov 
(Moscow: Sovetskaia entsiklopediia, 1962–78). 
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literature is important to the poetics of this new kind of writing. The implied author hides, 
obscured, behind the real flesh and blood author that documentary literature, more than fictional 
literature, tends to foreground. The real people (author and characters) behind the text are so 
important to the overall message and significance of a documentary work that it is easier than in 
fiction to forget the objective fact that the text—like any text—only offers us representations of 
those people.  
In her recent article on the “polyphonic performance of testimony” in Alexievich’s work, 
Johanna Lindbladh also applies the theoretical framework of the implied author, which she 
describes as “a meaning in the text that is possible to detect only with the help of an analysis of 
the aesthetic composition of the text.”3 However, Lindbladh focuses on how Alexievich’s 
implied author relates to theories elaborated within trauma research, such as the question of how 
to (ethically) represent what seems to be impossible to represent, and she identifies the defining 
trait of Alexievich’s poetics as its “performativity.” Acknowledging that Alexievich does not 
intend to imitate the recorded interviews, Lindbladh concludes that Alexievich creates “another 
sort of truth [that] emerges in relation to the implied reader’s response to the testimonies 
performed in the text.”4 However, Lindbladh makes a broad conclusion that applies to the entire 
five-book cycle.5 The Soviet-Afghan War, more so than the topics Alexievich explores in her 
other books, speaks to the violence that citizens experience living in a state of exception. In the 
relationship between authors and readers in Zinky Boys, Alexievich demonstrates the relationship 
                                               
3 Johanna Lindbladh, “The Polyphonic Performance of Testimony in Svetlana Aleksievich’s Voices from 
Utopia,” Canadian Slavonic Papers 59, no. 3/4, (2017): 283. 
4 Ibid., 285. 
5 Ibid., 295. 
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between state and citizen that she wants to see happen in post-Soviet states. By reducing the 
overt presence of the implied author in the text, relative to other works of documentary literature 
that have served as models for Alexievich, she creates new dynamics between authors and 
readers, real and implied, political reality and the literary text.6 A closer look at references to 
authors and readers in Zinky Boys will reveal insights into Alexievich’s poetics that are unique to 
her book on the Soviet-Afghan War, and, therefore, will provide further insights into the way 
Alexievich coaches her reader into a political being.7  
The authoritative version of Zinky Boys is generally considered to be the “Vremia” 
edition, which was first published in 2007 with only minor revisions to the 2016 printing. The 
contents of the “Vremia” edition are as follows: 
Prologue 
From the Notebooks (At War) [Iz zapisnykh knizhek (na voine)] 
Day One: “For many shall come in my name...” 
Day Two: “And another dieth in the bitterness of his soul...” 
Day Three: “Do not turn to mediums nor seek out wizards...” 
                                               
6 The works of Soviet documentary prose most often associated with Alexievich are Khatynskaia povest' 
and Karatelye by Ales' Adamovich; Blokadnaia kniga by Ales' Adamovich and David Granin; “Klavdiia 
Vilor” by David Granin; and documentary writing by A. Kron and V. Karpov. See Vs. Surganov, 
“Kachestvo vremeni. Sovetskaia proza-opyt, problem, zadachi,” Voprosy literatury, no. 10 (1985): 18, 
https://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/10302622. (For some reason, Sergei Chuprinin, literary critic and 
editor-in-chief of Znamia, includes Alexievich in his list of village prose writers in a 1987 article for 
Voprosy literatury. See Sergei Chuprinin, “Zhizn', Iskusstvo. Kritika. KRITIKA – ETO KRITIKA!” 
Voprosy literatury, no. 2 (1987): 46.) 
7 Lindbladh cites a discussion of Alexievich’s use of ellipses in Zinky Boys, specifically, in Anna 
Jungstrand, “Svetlana Aleksijevitj och den dokumentära rösten. Om lyssnandets etik och tilltalets dubbla 
botten i Zinkpojkar,” Tidskrift för litteraturvetenskap 46, no. 2 (2016): 49–63, 58–59. According to 
Lindbladh, Jungstrand “notes that the many ellipses function as an ethical address in relation to the reader, 
who is requested to engage in these hesitant narratives, in which the words seem to be insufficient for 
expressing what the suffering person felt” (Lindbladh, “The Polyphonic Performance,” 296). 
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Post mortem 
Zinky Boys on Trial (A History in Documents) 
The “Prologue” is an extended monologue by a mother whose son, an Afghan vet, commits 
murder after returning home from the war; “From the Notebooks” contains diary excerpts by an 
author preparing to write a book about the Soviet-Afghan War, with diary excerpt dates from 
June 1986 to September 1988; “Day One,” “Day Two,” and “Day Three” are chapters with series 
of the monologues from soldiers and civilian employees who served in Afghanistan, returned 
veterans, family members and friends; the brief “Port mortem” lists the tombstone inscriptions of 
seven soldiers killed in action, without any other commentary; lastly, “Zinky Boys On Trial: A 
History in Documents” contains newspaper excerpts, court documents, court transcripts, 
overheard conversations in and around the courtroom, and letters about the two trials in 1993 and 
1994, when four of Alexievich’s interviewees sued her for libel and defamation of character. 
Like Soviet writers of documentary literature the generation before—including Ales' 
Adamovich, David Granin, Alexander Solzhenitsyn, and Vasily Grossman—Alexievich speaks 
with hundreds of witnesses and uses the material of these interviews for the bulk of her books. 
Unlike these other writers, however, Alexievich removes her own voice from the character 
interviews when writing the book, transforming what had been dialogues between interviewer 
and interviewee—author and character—into free-standing character monologues that lack any 
context aside from role description and lack any narrative link from one monologue to the next. 
In this way, Alexievich greatly reduces the overt presence of both the narrator and the implied 
author. In documentary literature by Adamovich and Granin, for example, the interviews retain 
the form of a dialogue; moreover, from one interview or document to the next, the authors give 
the reader information about the setting and context that also helps the reader understand the 
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narrative progression and structure of the book. Alexievich removes these parts of the text where 
the narrative voice would normally be found and, in Zinky Boys, leaves behind only two places 
where a narrator or author is identified: “From the Notebooks” and the beginning of each chapter 
of monologues. In the next section, I will look at these appearances of the author in the text, in 
order to start piecing together the implied author of Zinky Boys.  
 
RELUCTANT AUTHOR, IMPLICATED READER: FROM THE NOTEBOOKS (AT WAR) 
The chapter title (“Notebooks”) already signals the presence of an author.8 The first diary 
excerpt is dated June 1986 and begins: 
I don’t want to write about war anymore... To live again enveloped in a ‘philosophy of 
extinction’ instead of a ‘philosophy of life’. To compile the interminable experience of 
non-existence. When I finished The Unwomanly Face of War I couldn’t bear to see a 
child bleeding from an ordinary bang to the nose. On holiday I fled from fishermen 
merrily tossing onto the sandy shore the fish they had snatched out of the distant depths; 
those frozen, protruding eyes made me feel sick. Everyone has only so much strength to 
defend themselves against pain—both physical and psychological—and my reserves 
were totally exhausted.9 
 
On one hand, the almost immediate extra-literary reference to The Unwomanly Face of War, 
which is Alexievich’s first book, seems to identify the “implied author” as the real flesh and 
blood person Svetlana Alexievich. On the other, the above excerpt introduces some of the book’s 
main themes: death, male versus female narratives of death and suffering (the men are merry 
whereas the woman is sick), connections between human and animal existence, and, above all, 
                                               
8 In all earlier editions of the book (i.e., 1990, 1991, 1994, 1996, 1998, and 2001) this chapter was called 
“From the diary entries for the book” (“Iz dnevnikovykh zapisei dlia knigi”). 
9 Svetlana Aleksievich, Tsinkovye mal'chiki (Moscow: Vremia, 2007), 14. There are several editions with 
the title Tsinkovye mal'chiki. Unless otherwise indicated, references to Tsinkovye mal'chiki are to the 2007 
edition. My translations from this edition are based on the translation by Andrew Bromfield (New York: 
Penguin Classics, 2017) with modifications for accuracy. 
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the foregrounding of emotions. These first eight lines reflect that complicated, blurry line 
between the real life and literary life of authors, characters, and readers in Alexievich’s new style 
of literature. Alexievich creates an authorial persona that performs literary functions within the 
book—here and elsewhere—even while we are constantly reminded of Alexievich the real 
person. 
 Alexievich peppers the next paragraph with first-person plural, which is a vague address 
in Russian as in many languages: “we” could mean “you and I” or “he, she, they and I.” In this 
context, it seems most likely that “we, us, and our” combines the authorial “I” with Soviet 
citizens: “we know nothing” about the war; the zinc coffins “bring us up short with a shudder;” 
“our mythological mindset is unshakeable—we are righteous and great” (10); “our own house is 
ablaze;” “we are straining eagerly towards a new life. What awaits us up ahead? What will we 
prove capable of after so many years of artificially induced, lethargic sleep? Our boys are being 
killed somewhere far away and we don’t understand what for” (11). But the reader’s identity 
affects whether this “we” means “you and I” or “he, she, they and I.” Some readers, therefore, 
could identify with the authorial “I” closely enough to interpret the “we” as grouping reader and 
author together. 
Near the end of the June 1986 diary excerpt, the author describes her first encounter with 
a soldier driven insane. At a bus station, an officer is escorting the soldier home. A group of 
village women gathers around the two of them and ask, “to where, for what, who?”10 The officer 
explains that the soldier has been digging since Kabul, digging with a spade, a fork, a stick, a 
pen, anything can get his hands on. Then the young soldier speaks: “I’ve got to hide... I’ll dig out 
a slit trench. I work quickly. We used to call them ‘communal graves.’ I’ll dig out a big trench 
                                               
10 Ibid., 16. 
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for all of you [vas vsekh]” (11/16). This is the first use of second person that we encounter in this 
chapter, and it is in the quoted speech of a victim of the war, the “all of you” [vas vsekh] 
presumably directed to everyone gathered around him. It might easily pass as nothing more than 
normal speech, if not for what happens in the author’s description of the very next scene. Our 
author moves from “communal graves” to a “city graveyard:” 
I stand in a city graveyard... Surrounded by hundreds of people. At the center there are 
nine coffins, sheathed in red calico. Military men give speeches. A general has taken the 
floor... Women in black are weeping. The people are silent. Only a little girl with plaits 
sobs over a coffin: ‘Papa! Pa-a-pochka!! Where are you [ty]? You [ty] promised to bring 
me a doll. A beautiful doll! I drew a whole sketchbook of little houses and flowers for 
you [tebe]... I’m waiting for you [tebia]...’ A young officer picks up the little girl and 
carries her to a black Volga limousine. But for a long time we can still hear: ‘Papa! Pa-a-
a-pochka... Darling pa-apochka...”  
The general makes his speech... Women in black are weeping. We are silent. Why 
are we silent? 
I don’t want... Can’t write anymore about war.11 
 
The authorial “I” stands among hundreds, a little girl speaks to “you” (her father), and then “we” 
can still hear the little girl for a long time, even after she is physically gone. Again, we encounter 
the second person in the quoted speech of another kind of war victim—a girl who has lost her 
father—but we have graduated from vas to ty, from the second-person plural in an oblique case 
to the second-person singular in the nominative case. This new second-person address is direct, 
precise, personal, and emotional.  
After this ty (which is repeated once in nominative and then twice more in oblique cases), 
the author writes “we.” Theoretically this “we” could refer to the group of people next to whom 
our author is standing, but earlier in the paragraph they are referred to as being separate from the 
author. There is even an ellipsis that typographically separates the “I” from the “people.” In the 
beginning of the author’s description of the scene, it is “the people” who are silent, not “we.” 
                                               
11 Ibid. 
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That comes only later, after “we” continue to hear the little girl calling for her papa even after 
she is gone. Is the “we” only the author united with the people? In fact, the author writes out 
once again the little girl’s plaintive cry for her papa, so that we, the reader, can also “still hear.” 
And now, the text changes from “the people are silent” to “we are silent, why are we silent?” Is 
the implicit shared responsibility underlining this question not also directed at the reader, 
whoever he or she might be? Is the act of reading this book enough to assuage our guilt of 
silence? The author of these notebooks, the implied author of Zinky Boys, draws us (the readers) 
into the text through a character’s emotional address to “you.” We (the readers) hear the 
character’s voice for a long time, yet we stay silent; silent, passive readers will not pass this 
author’s moral test. In her new style of documentary literature, Alexievich challenges the 
traditional roles of, and relationships between, author and reader.  
The original appearance of the above scene underscores the increased importance of the 
reader’s role in the final version. It appears in a chapter titled “The Eternal Man with a Gun 
(Author’s Prologue)”, which only appears in the 1996 edition of Zinky Boys published by 
Vagrius. The chapter is signed “Svetlana Alexievich. Minsk.” This writing showcases perhaps 
the most doubting, troubled authorial voice to speak in any of the many editions of Zinky Boys 
or, indeed, any other of Alexievich’s books. The author contrasts the modern wars in 
Afghanistan, Yugoslavia, Tajikistan, and Chechnya to the more conventional World War II, and 
to nineteenth-century wars of Pushkin’s era. The chapter ends: 
I was at one such funeral… A young officer was being buried, had been brought back 
from Grozny [in Chechnya]. A dense human ring by the freshly-dug grave... A military 
band... Everyone was silent, even the women weren’t crying. A general began speaking... 
All the same words, as ten, and fifty, and a hundred years ago: about our borders, about 
great Russia, about revenge, about hatred, about duty. About the duty to kill?! And only a 
little girl looked defenselessly and naively at the red coffin: “Papa! Papochka... Where 
did you go? Why are you silent? You promised to come back… I drew you an album… 
Papa, papochka, where are you?” Even the military band could not drown out her childish 
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bewilderment. And then, like a little animal [zver'ka], she is torn from the red coffin and 
carried to the car: “Papa... Papochka... Pa-a-a...” 
 There was one normal person among us. A child. While the conspiracy [zagovor] 
of the adults continues. According to ancient rituals... Oath. Salute. We are not at war [my 
ne voiuem]… But the coffins to Russia are already on their way to Russia... 
 And I’m writing about war... 
 
This scene as it appears in the 1996 edition clearly refers to the First Russo-Chechen War (1994-
1996). However, it is reimagined in the final version of Zinky Boys with several key changes. 
The one-man funeral during the Chechen War becomes a four-person funeral during the Soviet-
Afghan War, recorded in the author’s June 1986 diary entry. Another obvious difference is the 
women’s behavior: in the first version, the women are not crying, whereas, in the final version, 
they are. Despite these differences in the details, however, the emotional “truth” and impact of 
the little girl’s address to her father is the same. It is the literary function of the language (i.e., the 
poetics) that has been refined, so that the role the reader can be more effectively drawn into is the 
emotional world of the character. The little girl’s question (“why are you silent”) to her father’s 
corpse has been moved to a different part of the text, so that it becomes the author’s question 
(“why are we silent?”) but to an unspecified addressee. By obfuscating the designations of 
addresser-addressee, Alexievich hides new layers of meaning in this seemingly simple question; 
the possibility that the reader is the addressee and, moreover, part of the “we” in the question, 
bestows a new degree of responsibility, complicity, and participation on the reader of the 2007 
edition. 
An important characteristic of the author we meet in these notebooks is her reluctance to 
be the author of this book. The very first line of the notebooks is “I don’t want to write about war 
anymore.”12 The author ends this first entry with much the same words that began it: “I don’t 
                                               
12 Ibid., 14. 
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want to... Can’t write any more about war.”13 The next diary entry, dated 5 September 1988, also 
ends with a statement of the author’s reluctance to perform this role: “I didn’t want to write 
about war any more. But here I am in a genuine war. War people on all sides. War things. War 
time.”14 In other words, the reluctant author is overcome, overpowered by the story itself, by all 
the basic building blocks of a story: where, who, what, when.  
My transformation of the author’s narrative statements (here, people, things, time) into 
interrogative words (where, who, what, when) echoes the author’s earlier transformation of the 
village women’s flurry of guileless questions into interrogative words—“where to, what for 
[zachem], who?”—as they gathered around the officer and deranged soldier at a bus station.15 A 
significant omission from the two lists of interrogative words, however, is “what for [zachem],” 
which appears in another important passage from the notebooks. The author poses this question 
(“what for?”) to a fellow author in the “writer’s group” in Kabul. She notes that all of the other 
authors are men, who are “champing at the bit to reach the furthest outposts” and want to “get 
into the action.” She asks one of them, “what for? [zachem?]” and his answer is totally 
unsatisfactory—“I’m interested. I’ll say I was in Salang. I’ll do a bit of shooting.” The author 
writes in her notebook that she cannot rid herself of “the feeling that war is a creation of the male 
nature and incomprehensible to me in many ways.”16 Although the author does not record 
anyone posing this same question to her, a penultimate diary passage provides a telling 
comparison to the male author’s answer. The female author of this book decides not to go to an 
                                               
13 Ibid., 16. 
14 Ibid., 19. 
15 Ibid., 16. 
16 Ibid., 21. 
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outpost or into the battle, but to go to the aftermath of action, to watch them assembling the 
pieces of boys who have been blown up by an anti-tank mine:  
I didn’t have to go and watch, but I did, so that I could write about it. Now I’m writing... 
But after all, should I have gone? I heard the officers laughing behind my back, saying 
how scared the fine lady would be. I went and there was nothing heroic about it, because 
I fainted. Perhaps it was from the heat, perhaps from the shock. I want to be honest.17  
 
We have an author who does not want to be the author of this book—her very gender is an 
obstacle. When she does accept the responsibility of writing another book about war—and seeing 
it—she implicates her readers in the crimes of the Soviet-Afghan War. 
 
AUTHOR OR READER: “YOU” IN THE CHARACTER MONOLOGUES 
The reader is drawn into the Notebooks via first-person plural, when “we” continue to 
hear the little girl crying for her papa long after she is gone; the “we” refers to both implied 
author and implied reader, brought together. In the character monologues, the perspective has 
changed: unlike in the author’s Notebooks, now the “I” refers to the character, not the author. 
However, when the second person is used, the identity of the addressee in the character 
monologues can be ambiguous. Sometimes, context implies that the character is addressing the 
author; other times, it could be someone else. Therefore, in the character monologues, it is the 
second-person pronoun “you” that unites the implied author and implied reader, and which pulls 
the reader into the character monologues. 
Sometimes, the use of second person functions as the “generic you” (also known as the 
“impersonal you” or “indefinite you”), a device commonly used in conversational speech to draw 
                                               
17 Ibid., 29. 
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in the addressee, to encourage the audience to empathize with the speaker’s position. In the very 
first character monologue of “Day One,” for example, there is the following passage: 
When a bullet hits someone you hear it; there’s no way to forget it or 
confuse it with anything else – that distinctive wet splat. A young guy you 
know falls face down in dust as bitter as ashes. You turn him over on to his 
back; the cigarette that you just gave him is still clutched in his teeth. It’s still 
smoking … I wasn’t prepared to shoot at anyone, I was still from ordinary 
life. From the normal world … The first time you act as if it’s a dream: you 
run, drag, shoot, but you don’t remember anything. Afterwards you can’t tell 
anyone about it. It’s like it’s all behind a sheet of glass … Behind a wall of 
rain … As if you’re having a terrible dream. You wake up in fright and you 
can’t remember a thing. It turns out that to feel the horror you have to 
remember it, get used to it. After two or three weeks there’ll be nothing of the 
old you left, just your name. You aren’t you any longer, but someone else. I 
think that’s how it is … Clearly that’s it. And that someone else … That person 
isn’t frightened any longer by the sight of someone who’s been killed, but thinks 
calmly or with a feeling of annoyance about how he’ll have to drag him down a 
cliff or lug him for kilometers through the heat. He doesn’t picture it.....18 
 
The above use of second person is the “generic you,” rather a reference to the author or reader, 
and therefore not the focus of this section; however, it is interesting that in this early excerpt 
from the first character monologue, the complexity of pronoun use in Alexievich’s writing is 
already evident. The perspective switches back and forth between the generic “you” and “I,” and 
then between “you” and “he.” In the latter instances, the speaker is referring to himself, despite 
the use of third person; the changing pronoun reflects his shifting sense of self as he transitions 
from the version of himself “from ordinary life” to the version of himself newly at war, then to 
the version of himself fully acclimated to war. At the end of his monologue, this character 
suddenly addresses himself outward, to an unnamed other person, with the now-familiar refrain 
of zachem: 
                                               
18 Ibid., 38. 
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What’s your book for? [Zachem vasha kniga?] Who’s it for? None of us who came back 
from there will like it anyway. How can you possibly tell people how it was?19 
 
The “you” refers to an invisible and silent addressee who never speaks. Given the reference to 
“your book,” presumably the addressee is the author, but the book could belong to the reader, as 
well. 
 In The Rhetoric of Fiction, Booth gives very little attention to the use of second-person 
narration as a literary device. In all, it merits only one (dismissive) footnote: 
Efforts to use the second person have never been very successful, but it is astonishing to 
see how little real difference even this choice makes. [...] the radical unnaturalness is, it is 
true, distracting for a time. But [...] it is surprising how quickly one is absorbed into the 
illusory “present” of the story, identifying one’s vision with the “vous” [“you”] almost as 
fully as with the “I” and “he” in other stories.20 
 
More contemporary theorists, however, contend that the second-person point of view offers 
underappreciated possibilities, especially in complicating the relationships between implied 
author, reader, and character.21 The second person has also gained significance as a rhetorical 
device in the relatively recent phenomenon of role-playing games and online videogames.22 
Despite Brian Richardson’s focus on fiction, he points out precisely the dilemma facing 
Alexievich’s audience in his extensive analysis of second-person narration: 
The “you” [...] threatens the ontological stability of the fictional world insofar as it seems 
it could be addressing the reader as well as the central character. In standard second 
person fiction (unlike other second person forms), the protagonist/narratee is quite 
                                               
19 Ibid., 43. 
20 Wayne Booth, The Rhetoric of Fiction (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1961 [1983]), 150 (fn 3). 
21 See Monika Fludernik, “Second-Person Narrative As a Test Case for Narratology: The Limits of 
Realism,” Style 28, no. 3 (Fall 1994): 445–79 and Monika Fludernik, “Second-Person Narrative: A 
Bibliography,” Style 28, no. 4 (Winter 1994): 525–48 for a bibliography of second-person texts and 
criticism. 
22 The second person has become such an important device in the game world that Austin Grossman’s 
novel about video games is called simply “You.” My thanks to Eliot Borenstein for drawing my attention 
to this fascinating phenomenon. 
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distinct from the actual or implied reader; nevertheless, one of the more unsettling 
features of this mode of narration is that this distinction can be collapsed whenever the 
“you” could refer to the reader as well as the protagonist.23 
 
James Phelan, too, in his study of the second-person story “How” by Lorrie Moore, points out 
how this kind of discourse blurs the “distinction between an intrinsic, textual ‘you’—a narratee-
protagonist—and an extrinsic, extratextual ‘you’—a flesh-and-blood reader.”24 One of the 
distinct features of second person in a narrative, therefore, is the intersubjectivity generated 
between implied reader and character. It “generates an alternating pattern of identification and 
displacement” that “continually places [the reader] in and continually displaces [the reader] from 
the ‘you’ while simultaneously placing and displacing others in and from the ‘you.’”25 
Richardson distinguishes between three different types of second person in fiction; the closest to 
Alexievich’s use of second person is what he calls autotelic second person, the defining criterion 
of which “is the direct address to a ‘you’ that is at times the actual reader of the text and whose 
story is juxtaposed to and can merge with the characters of the fiction.”26  He points to the 
opening of Italo Calvino’s If on a Winter’s Night a Traveler as an example of autotelic second 
person, with an ever-shifting referent of the ‘you’ that is continuously addressed, at times 
applying to every actual reader—so that the extradiegetic reader suddenly becomes the subject of 
diegesis—and at other times, designating a dramatized narratee, a fictional character—so that the 
                                               
23 Brian Richardson, Unnatural Voices: Extreme Narration in Modern and Contemporary Fiction 
(Columbus, OH: Ohio State University Press, 2006), 20. 
24 James Phelan, “‘Self-Help’ for Narratee and Narrative Audience: How ‘I’—and ‘You’?—Read 
‘How’,” Style 28, no. 3 (Fall 1994): 350. 
25 Darlene Hantzis, “You Are About to Begin Reading: The Nature and Function of Second Person Point 
of View” PhD diss. (Louisiana State University, 1988), 69. 
26 Richardson, Unnatural Voices, 30. 
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reader returns to his more conventional, familiar role outside of the text.27 Richardson describes 
the rich “ideological possibilities” of second person narration: 
It invites a rewriting of commercial discourses intended to exploit their readers through 
the illusion of identification, it helps dramatize the mental battles of a [sic] individual 
struggling against the internalized discourse of an oppressive authority, and it is a useful 
vehicle for minority writers to foreground a subjectivity typically excluded from 
common, unexamined notions of “you” and “us.” And at a more philosophical level, it is 
admirably suited to express the unstable nature and intersubjective constitution of the 
self.28 
 
In hypothesizing as to why theorists of a universal narratology have resisted conceptualizing 
second person narrative for so long, Richardson points out that the device of second person “is 
an exclusively and distinctively literary phenomenon” that has “no precise nonfictional 
equivalent.” Russian “documentary literature,” however, is not purely nonfiction, and the literary 
device of second person narration is an important artistic component of Alexievich’s 
documentary writing.29 
Alexievich preserves countless occasions when her characters use second person in a way 
that refers to an addressee, to someone receiving the monologue. One such example is cited 
above, when the character delivering the very first monologue in Zinky Boys lashes out with the 
question, “What’s your book for?” The reader probably knows that these monologues come from 
interviews that Alexievich has conducted, so, in this example, the reader might simply assume 
that “you” refers to the author, and leave it at that. However, many of the second-person 
                                               
27 Ibid., 31. 
28 Ibid., 36. 
29 See also Gary Saul Morson, “The Reader as Voyeur: Tolstoi and the Poetics of Didactic Fiction,” 
Canadian-American Slavic Studies 12, no. 4 (Winter 1978): 465–80. 
 112 
addresses in these character monologues do not necessarily refer only to an author, but—
perhaps—to any audience, any recipient of the character’s story: 
So now I’ve told you... For the first time I’ve tried to say what I think. It feels strange.30 
 
I’m afraid to start telling you about it. Those shadows will pounce on me again...31 
 
Just hear us out and understand us. [...] We’ve come to you to unburden ourselves. We’re 
making our confession. And don’t forget the secrecy of the confessional...32 
 
Pardon me for being so frank. I can only confide in you, someone I don’t know. It’s hard 
to talk to anyone close. ‘If you could just come back for one minute ... and see how your 
daughter has grown!’ I tell him at night. ‘For you that senseless war is over. But not for 
me. And for our daughter. Our children are the most unfortunate ones—they’ll bear the 
brunt of everything. Do you hear me...’ Who am I shouting to? Who will hear me?33 
 
Any of the above addresses to “you” could just as easily be a character “speaking” to the reader 
rather than only to the author. In this way, Alexievich’s use of second person—which typically 
occur at the end, or less often, the beginning of the character monologue— affects the distance 
between the addressee (implied reader) and the real flesh-and-blood reader. And just as the real 
flesh and blood woman was confiding in the real author Alexievich, the wife-character in the 
book is confiding to the implied reader, and when the character addresses “you” it could be the 
reader as well as the author. When the character asks “who will hear me?” I as reader want to 
answer her, I do, I hear you. Here the blending between author and reader is all the more intense 
because the wife is likely already thinking about future readers, as she tells this author her story, 
wondering who among the future readers will hear (and understand) her. 
                                               
30 Aleksievich, Tsinkovye mal'chiki, 32. 
31 Ibid. 
32 Ibid., 48. 
33 Ibid., 136. 
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 In fact, following Richardson’s description of autotelic second person, sometimes the 
“you” can shift to suddenly match up very well with the actual real person reading Zinky Boys. It 
can cause a shock to suddenly feel as though the character is speaking directly to you.  
These were our boys who were being killed. Our own boys. You have to understand 
that... Have you ever seen a roasted man? You haven’t.34 
 
It’s all been paid for! And we paid more than anyone. More than you...35 
 
What about you? Have you ever taken the unsent letters from a dead man’s pocket? ‘My 
dear darling...’ ‘Dearest...’ ‘My love...’ Have you ever seen a soldier shot simultaneously 
by a matchlock arquebus and a Chinese automatic rifle?36 
 
Many of Alexievich’s readers are not themselves veterans, so the “you” that the characters 
address in the above passages (and others like them) will match the real readers, who will not 
have ever seen a roasted man, who did not sacrifice much or at all for the war, who never took 
letters from a dead man’s pocket or saw a soldier shot simultaneously by a matchlock arquebus 
and a Chinese automatic rifle. In the latter example, the reference to specific weapons will 
strengthen the sense that the character is addressing the real reader, if the reader (like most 
civilians who have not been to war) cannot even imagine what these weapons might look like. In 
other examples, the gender of the addressee is specified, which can also shift the identity of 
“you.”  
I live alone a lot of the time; I’ll forget how to talk soon. Stop speaking altogether. I can 
admit this to you... I’d hide it from a man, but I can tell a woman.37 
 
                                               
34 Ibid., 34. 
35 Ibid., 48. 
36 Ibid., 123. 
37 Ibid., 214.  
 114 
If the gender of the addressee matches that of the actual reader, the identity shifts closer toward a 
match, drawing the extradiegetic reader into the diegesis; if not, then the identity of “you” shifts 
toward that a fictional character, allowing the reader to resume a more conventional role, outside 
of the text. A male reader must have a very different response to the above passage than would a 
female reader. Moreover, as in any literature, certain biographical details of the actual reader will 
inspire certain reactions to the text. The addressee of the passage below, for example, might 
closely match an American graduate student who is many degrees removed from the war that 
serves as the chronotope for her dissertation: 
Do you think we’re cruel? Do you have any idea how cruel you all are? Nobody asks us 
anything and they don’t listen to us. But they write about us...38 
 
In other words, there are as many reader responses to Alexievich’s text as there are readers. 
In this and other passages, occurrences of second person in Zinky Boys blur not only the 
distinction between reader and character, but also between reader and author. Often, when the 
reader encounters a second person address in a character monologue, it is about writing: 
Write it! Write the truth! The whole truth! I’m not afraid of anything anymore. I’ve been 
afraid all my life. I’ve had enough.39 
 
Write, madam. Write... But why are women writing about the war? Where are all the 
men? Fuck it all! You have to know war...40 
 
But please don’t just take a wild swipe with this. Be careful with it. There’s a lot of... 
vituperation around just now. Although why hasn’t anyone handed in their Party card? 
No one put a bullet through their head when we were out there, did they? And what about 
you, the famous writer? What were you doing when we were out there? (He’s about to 
end the conversation, but then he changes his mind.) You wrote a book, right?41 
                                               
38 Ibid., 217. 
39 Ibid., 140. 
40 Ibid., 160. 
41 Ibid., 163. 
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The above also serve as examples of second-person addresses that remind the reader of 
Alexievich, the flesh-and-blood author, and the fact that the text is constructed based on the 
interviews she conducted with other real flesh-and-blood people. When a character addresses an 
imagined “you” in the character’s monologue that could be the actual “you” who is reading the 
book, the distance between reader and character decreases; such a use of “you” draws the reader 
closer into the character’s world. On the other hand, references to “you” the author of a book 
about the Soviet-Afghan War has a different function: it decreases the distance between reader 
and author. It could be jarring to the reader, because suddenly the “you” clearly refers to the 
author instead of the reader. However, it could also serve to bring the reader closer to the author, 
putting the reader in the author’s shoes. 
  
READER AS AUTHOR: WRITING IN THE GAPS 
 In my first chapter, I argue that Alexievich strengthens and clarifies her strong anti-war 
message from 1990 to 2007 until she leaves little room for alternative interpretations. On this 
level, Zinky Boys is a “readerly” text; the reader is but a passive passenger. However, the 
merging of author’s and reader’s identities through the characters’ frequent addresses to a 
second-person “you”—which characters occasionally intimate is the author—is one way in 
which Zinky Boys may be considered a “writerly” text. When a character addresses the reader as 
“you,” and perhaps most especially when characters address “you” as a writer, as someone who 
is writing, the reader is invited to assume the identity of the author.  
 The reader of Zinky Boys steps into the role of author even more actively by 
reconstructing or “writing in” the literal and figurative gaps that have been left in the text. The 
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prevalent use of ellipses, for example, is one such device that forces the reader to “write in” the 
gaps. A female civilian employee attempts to describe the experience of being under attack: 
We were being bombarded... This is already a different incident... And a soldier shouted 
something vulgar at me. Something foul! Something disgusting. ‘Well, curse you!’ I 
thought. And he was killed. Half his head was sliced off, and half his body. Right in front 
of my eyes... I started shuddering like I had malaria. Although I’d seen big plastic with 
bodies in them before... Bodies wrapped up... Like... I can’t even think of a comparison... 
I couldn’t write it, I’d be searching for the words forever. Trying them out, seeing how 
they felt. Well, like big toys... But for me to shudder like that, it had never happened 
before... And this time I just couldn’t calm down....42 
 
The ellipses mimic the normal flow of extemporaneous conversational speech, when the speaker 
naturally pauses to find the right word, to consider what was just said, or to decide what to say 
next. An interlocutor naturally makes use of these pauses, too, to absorb what has been said, to 
understand what has been left unsaid, or to guess where the conversation is going next. In the 
character monologues, ellipses fulfill a similar function for the reader but, in leaving these blanks 
on the page, the author is also forcing the reader to fill them in. In the above passage, the link to 
writing (“I couldn’t write it, I’d be searching for the words forever”)— to the impossibility of 
finding the right metaphor to describe the way corpses are wrapped in plastic—makes this 
connection between elliptical gaps and authoring all the more keenly felt. In a subsequent 
monologue, a character says “I want to write... I read what others write.”43 The writing, not the 
reading, is followed by ellipses in Alexievich’s text, because the confrontation with ellipses—
with the lack of words—is a writerly dilemma, not readerly. Recall that the author’s diary begins 
                                               
42 Ibid., 54. 
43 Ibid., 181. 
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with the sentence “I do not want to write about war any more...”44 The ellipses here, too, reflect 
the difficult task facing this author, any author: filling the empty space on the page.... 
 Readers encounter these ellipses several times in each character monologue, and most 
ellipses occur without any explicit reference to writing. Nevertheless, more often than not, 
ellipses force the reader to finish a thought that a character leaves unspoken, or to piece together 
a thought that a character delivers in fragments. A nurse, for example, describes her 
bewilderment at her first Afghan patient’s behavior: 
 She was lying there with her eyes open, she saw us... She started moving her lips... I 
thought she wanted to say something. To thank us. But she wanted to spit at us... I didn’t 
understand then that they had a right to hate us. For some reason I was expecting love. I 
just stood there, turned to stone. We save her life, and she...45 
 
It is not difficult to understand that the end of the thought is something along the lines of “and 
she wants to spit at us,” but according to the aesthetics of the work, it is important that the 
reader—not the author—has to finish the character’s sentence, has to come up with the words. It 
is significant that Alexievich preserves these thoughts that trail off, are left unfinished; in fact, 
sometimes, the monologue becomes so fragmented as to be barely comprehensible. For example, 
an infantryman’s monologue ends: “I’ve seen... I know now that children are born bright and 
radiant. They are angels.”46 What did he see? The logical or causal connection between the two 
sides of the ellipses is not obvious. This kind of gap is more difficult to fill in; it requires 
considerable praxis—imagination and mental activity—from the reader.  
                                               
44 Ibid., 9. 
45 Ibid., 171–72. 
46 Ibid., 92. 
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 Alexievich’s reader is arguably the most active, however, in constructing meaning out of 
the book’s very structure, which is certainly not intuitive. Understanding it requires the reader to 
acknowledge and participate in the writing process by working to construct meaning beyond the 
book’s basic anti-war message. Arguably, the most inscrutable part of the book’s structure is the 
logic by which the author organizes the monologues into three distinct chapters with the 
following chapter titles: “Day One: ‘For many shall come in my name...’,” “Day Two: ‘And 
another dieth in the bitterness of his soul...’,” and “Day Three: ‘Regard not them that have 
familiar spirits, neither seek after wizards...’.” The author’s arrangement of monologues into 
these three chapters is the deepest writerly layer of the book. 
 Certainly, one puzzle is why the chapters are given the titles “Day One,” “Day Two,” and 
“Day Three.” It is not until the third chapter of monologues that the author offers one possible 
interpretation: the author cites passages about the first three days of creation from Genesis. On 
the first day, the author reminds us, God calls the light Day and the darkness Night; on the 
second day, God creates Heaven; on the third day, Earth. It suggests that Chapter “Day One” is 
organized around the idea of day and night, light and darkness; Chapter “Day Two” the idea of 
Heaven, the place where God resides and the pious spend their afterlives; and Chapter “Day 
Three” around the idea of Earth, where mortals live, apart from God. To some extent, this hint 
yields answers. There is not a single reference to heaven (“nebo”) in the “Day One” chapter, in 
accordance with the timeline set out in Genesis: God has not yet created heaven. The first 
reference to heaven occurs in a character monologue in “Day Two;” several references to 
“heaven” appear thereafter in this and the next chapter.47 However, these references alone would 
                                               
47 A female civilian employee in “Day Two” remembers when, during a bombardment, another coworker 
knelt down, crying, praying, and crossing herself—and the speaker wonders “what was she begging 
heaven for” (112). Another woman, a medical bacteriologist, says that she copied down a quote by the 
French philosopher François Marie Charles Fourier (1772–1837) about Afghanistan: “A foreigner who 
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make a fairly flimsy aesthetic principle by which to organize an entire book of monologues. 
Furthermore, references to “earth” occur throughout the book, not only in “Day Three.” It is an 
imperfect fit. 
The Biblical subtitles of the monologue chapters offer another possible clue for the reader 
seeking to understand the author’s organizing principle. “Day One,” for example, is subtitled 
“For many shall come in my name....” This is the beginning of Matthew 24:5, which continues 
“...saying, ‘I am Christ; and shall deceive many.” In the Gospel of Matthew, this passage is a 
warning against false messiahs. And, in fact, most of the characters in this chapter do speak 
about their misplaced faith in the Soviet leadership, in newspaper accounts of the Soviet-Afghan 
War, and in romantic films and literature about war in general. The following remarks about 
feeling deceived appear in only the first five character monologues: 
My family thought that if the government had sent the troops in it needed to be done. 
That was the way my father and the neighbors reasoned. I don’t remember anyone having 
any other opinion.48 
 
                                               
happens to find himself in Afghanistan will be under the special protection of heaven [pod osobym 
pokrovitel'stvom neba] if he comes out of there well, unharmed and with his head still on his shoulders” 
(142). A private, who describes several war crimes committed by Soviet soldiers in Afghanistan, 
concludes “after what we did out there, we’ll never get into heaven [rai]” (162). Another, a private, a 
tankman, says that “Afghanistan seemed like heaven [raem] to me” (166). In “Day Three,” an interpreter 
describes a meeting in which a mullah reads a surah from the Koran, appeals to Allah to protect all true 
believers against universal evil, and he “bends his arms at the elbows and raises his hands to heaven. 
Everybody, including us, repeats these movements after him” (180). A female warrant officer wonders at 
the “heavenly color” of the water in Afghanistan (185). A private remembers that an Afghan policeman 
said to him: “When I die, Allah will take me up into heaven. But where will you end up?” (187). And a 
mother says, “I desperately wanted a son. And I wanted my son to be like [my husband]. The same eyes, 
the same ears, the same nose. It was as if someone up in heaven was eavesdropping: my son was exactly 
like him, alike as two peas” (219). Later in the monologue, when she recounts how she used to joke that 
he was “every inch a military man,” she continues: “If only the heavens above [Nebes Gospodnykh] had 
wept at least one raindrop to give us an inkling... If there’d been a sign...” (221). One may add to this list 
that in the author’s notebooks, in the beginning of the book, she records that, on the flight into Kabul, 
someone on the plane next to her tells her to wake up, or else she would “sleep through the kingdom of 
heaven” (13). 
48 Aleksievich, Tsinkovye mal'chiki, 25. 
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In the newspapers they were still writing the same things: ‘Helicopter X has completed a 
training flight...’ ‘Awarded the Order of the Red Star...’ ‘A concert to celebrate May Day 
was held in Kabul with Soviet soldiers participating...’ Afghanistan set me free. It cured 
me of the belief that everything here is right, that they write the truth in the newspapers 
and show the truth on the television.49 
 
The war, we were told, was a just one. We were helping the Afghan people put an end to 
feudalism and build a bright socialist society. The fact that our boys were being killed 
was glossed over somehow. [...] We couldn’t even write the truth in the death 
notifications. [...] After everything out there I saw my country with different eyes.50 
 
[T]they started going on and on at us about a limited contingent of Soviet forces in 
Afghanistan. Every single political awareness session fed us the same information: ‘Our 
troops are securely protecting the borders of the Homeland, providing help to a friendly 
nation.’ We started getting worried they might send us to the war. I realize now that 
they’d decided to trick us.51 
 
I brought [my son] up just with books, on ideal images: Pavel Korchagin, Oleg Koshevoi, 
Zoya Kosmodemyanskaya. [...] Yura was studying in the military academy. One night, it 
was two o’clock in the morning, the doorbell rings and he’s standing there on the step. 
[...] ‘Mama, I’ve come to tell you that life is hard for me. Those things you taught me... 
None of that exists. Where did you get all that from?’”52 
 
On the first day of creation, the author reminds us, God “called the light Day and the darkness he 
called Night.”53 In the above passages, where characters recount confrontations with false 
messiahs, it is possible to also see a metaphor related to “the light” and “the darkness:” each 
character sees the light (i.e., truth) after being led out of blindness (i.e., lies and false messiahs). 
 However, once again, by the second chapter of monologues, this aesthetic, 
representational framework begins to fall apart. On the second day, according to Genesis, God 
creates Heaven; the subtitle for Day Two—“And another dieth in the bitterness of his soul...”—is 
                                               
49 Ibid., 32. 
50 Ibid., 33, 35, 37. 
51 Ibid., 39. 
52 Ibid., 41. 
53 Ibid., 167. 
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the beginning of Job 21:25. The verse is Job’s response to Zophar, who had been arguing that 
outward prosperity is evidence that a man is truly of God, and that the ruin of a man’s prosperity 
is sufficient to prove him a hypocrite, even if there is no other evidence against him. Denying 
this, Job argues that, while God sometimes punishes a wicked man on earth, He often does 
otherwise, suffering even the worst of sinners to live all their days in prosperity and to die 
without any visible mark of God’s wrath upon them. In the passage quoted as a subtitle to this 
chapter, Job is observing the great variety of God’s providence towards men, even towards bad 
men:   
One dieth in his full strength, being wholly at ease and quiet. 
His breasts are full of milk, and his bones are moistened with marrow. 
And another dieth in the bitterness of his soul, and never eateth with pleasure. 
They shall lie down alike in the dust, and the worms shall cover them.54 
 
Job concludes that the wicked may often escape until their final moments in this world, but their 
destruction is reserved for the other world. Job himself has fallen into visible and remarkable 
ruin, so he is arguing against his friends’ conclusion that he must be a wicked man. The thematic 
link between Job, Heaven, and this chapter’s monologues is tenuous. What a person learns about 
himself in Afghanistan (about his soul; about life and death; about the afterlife) might be 
considered a theme of “Day Two” monologues.55 It is conceivable to associate this self-
                                               
54 Job 21:23–26. 
55 For example: “I went of my own accord. I asked to be sent. If you ask me whether it was for an idea or 
to understand who I am, of course it was the second one. I wanted to test myself, see what I was capable 
of” (96). “I thought that real life was somewhere far away. [...] I wanted to break out of the ordinary 
world... [...] What have I learned here? How can you learn kindness and compassion here? Or joy?” (99, 
101). “What did I learn there? That good never wins. There’s always just as much evil in the world” 
(102). “Out there I got a feeling of what life is. Those were my best years—I tell you that straight. Our 
life here is gray and small: job—home, home—job. There we tried everything, discovered everything” 
(105). “A man has no more than a drop of humanity in him—I realized that at the war” (151). 
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knowledge, this awareness of one’s place in the afterlife, with Job’s argument, but only with 
some difficulty. 
The subtitle for Day Three—“Regard not them that have familiar spirits, neither seek 
after wizards”—is taken from Leviticus 19:31. Those “that have familiar spirits” refers to people 
who are attended by an invisible spirit who supplies them with supernatural information or the 
power to consult, or even raise, the spirits of the dead. The reference to “wizards” denotes 
cunning men who have entered into covenant with the devil, by whose help they foretell future 
events and acquaint people with secret things. With a stretch, it is possible to associate Leviticus 
19:31 with “dukhi”—the Russian slang word for mujahideen, which translated to “spirits”—and 
ghosts, both of which haunt many of the “Day Three” monologues—especially if “ghosts” can 
be broadened to include references to tombstones, graveyards, and dreams about loved ones who 
have died. The first monologue, for example, begins with a character’s admonition to “put 
plaques up on the graves, carve it into the headstones, that it was all in vain.”56 In the second 
monologue, a woman who worked in Afghanistan recalls when her brother asked if she had ever 
seen a “living ‘spirit’” (zhivoi dukh).57 Dreams are mentioned in “Day 1” and “Day Two,” but 
they are discussed nearly twice as often in “Day Three” than in the previous two chapters 
                                               
56 Aleksievich, Tsinkovye mal'chiki, 220. 
57 Ibid., 229. There had already been several references to the mujahedeen as “spirits” in monologues 
from “Day One” and “Day Two,” but this is the first time that the reader encounters the phrase “living 
‘spirit’.” In another reference to the “spirits,” a woman recalls the cairns made of bomb fragments that the 
Soviet side put up at the spot where six of their men had been killed, and they carved their names on 
rocks; the “spirits” flung the rocks over a cliff and shot up the monuments, so that nothing would be left 
of the Soviet army, not even this memorialization of their dead.57 A soldier recalls one night when a 
Soviet soldier and a “spirit” were both wounded, dying, and calling out for their mother, their lover.57 In 
the final monologue in this chapter, a sergeant in the special forces recalls a man in his unit who liked to 
use a cleaning rod to pierce the eardrums of “spirits,” and when he took the boots off of a dead “spirit.” 
Repeatedly, references to “spirits” in “Day Three” are linked to death, whereas in previous chapters they 
were occasionally still alive. 
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combined. Dreams can represent a liminal space between our reality and some otherworld, a 
space where the ghosts of the dead or presentiments of the future can appear. In the third 
monologue, for example, a mother whose son was killed speaks several times about her dreams, 
or lack thereof. She says that she has not dreamed about her son once since he was killed three 
years ago; she puts her son’s trousers and vest under her pillow, then lies there and begs, “Come 
to my dream, son. Come to see me.”58 At the end of her monologue, she describes a dream about 
a coffin:  
With a large opening where the head is. I lean down to kiss him... But who’s this lying 
there? It’s not my son... Someone dark-skinned. Some Afghan boy who looks like 
Sasha... At first I thought he was the one who killed my son. Then I realized that he was 
dead too. And someone had killed him. I leaned down and kissed him through the 
opening. And I woke up feeling afraid. “Where am I? What’s happening to me?” 
 Who was it that came... What news did they bring...59 
 
She seems to be inviting the reader to interpret her disturbing dream about the Afghan boy in the 
coffin, as well as the absence of her son from her dreams. She does not offer any possible 
answers, only questions.  
 These and other allusions to the Bible in Zinky Boys are suggestive in a broad, associative 
sense, but the precise deeper meaning of these suggestive moments is left to each reader to 
construct. Zinky Boys is the only work in which Alexievich quotes so extensively and visibly 
from the Bible. Perhaps Alexievich includes the Bible, because it puts the Soviet-Afghan War 
and the Soviet leadership into dialogue with a system of certain moral values, and her emphasis 
on the Bible is a contrast or, perhaps, rebuke to the atheism of the Soviet state. But what, exactly, 
is the alternative moral system represented by the Bible? Is it necessarily different or better? 
                                               
58 Ibid., 186. 
59 Ibid., 187. 
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Alexievich leaves the answers to these questions unclear. Instead she encourages her reader to 
take over as author in this instance, to freely make his or her own associations with the symbolic 
meaning of the Bible. The reader is freed from the constraints and sovereignty of a religious 
institution—of any institution. In an interview, Alexievich is asked what the post-Soviet 
generation should believe in, without the “God” of socialism She answers that the new 
generation needs something other than socialism, consumerism, or even church; what is needed 
is “a different Bible and different believers” (drugaia Bibliia i drugie veruiushchie).60 The 
“Bibles” of fighting wars to support communist revolutions, of buying new cars and fancy 
houses, even of going to church, are prescribed behaviors that—like the symbolism of Biblical 
passages from “Day One” to the end of the Zinky Boys—ultimately lose meaning along the way.  
 
AUTHOR AS READER: EXTRA-LITERARY REFERENCES 
 In a 1995 interview, Tat'iana Bek suggests that the Dostoevsky’s Notes from a Dead 
House might be considered a founding work of the school that Alexievich calls “constructed 
documentary prose” (konstruirovannaia dokumental'naia proza).61 The term “constructed” is an 
apt description of Alexievich’s method: she does not write so much as she arranges, sculpts, 
constructs. In this way, the work that she does is more like that of a reader than a writer. She uses 
the ready-made material of texts that are created by other people, reads them, and then arranges 
                                               
60 Mariia Ivanova, “‘Proshloe vse vremia ne pozadi, a vperedi nas': pisatel' Svetlana Aleksievich o 
‘krasnom cheloveke’, romantike rabstva i likakh zla,” Theory and Practice, November 7, 2014, accessed 
August 16, 2018, https://theoryandpractice.ru/posts/9820-svetlana-aleksievich. See also 
https://www.svoboda.org/a/24198084.html and https://news.tut.by/culture/467758.html?crnd=93079. 
61 Nadezhda Azkhgikhina, “Ne muza, no tvorets,” Nezavisimaia gazeta, March 7, 2008, 12. 
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them. However, without access to the unedited interview transcripts, it is difficult to make much 
of the way that she reads them. 
 Another more accessible avenue into the work that Alexievich’s author does as a reader 
lies in the abundance of extraliterary references. The way that these references and quotes are 
presented in Zinky Boys is evidence of how the author “reads” other texts. In the “From the 
Notebooks” chapter of diary excerpts, the author repeatedly quotes several other authors. For 
example, after noting that you have to “crack open” the times in order to “capture its spirit,” she 
quotes a line from William Shakespeare’s Richard II: “Each substance of a grief hath twenty 
shadows.” From the context of the diary entry, the line from Shakespeare seems to be saying that 
grief is multiplied twenty times. When a terrible thing happens, it affects more than the person at 
its center; its consequences radiate out and affect all the people around that person. In 
Shakespeare’s play, however, the line is spoken by Bushy to a grieving queen; he means to 
comfort her, saying that, when one grieves, it only seems like everything else is terrible when, in 
fact, the shadows of grief are insubstantial, only shadows. Not surprisingly, this author reads into 
texts the message that she wants to find; this is precisely the complaint against her made by her 
Zinky Boys interviewees in the early 1990s. 
 Most extraliterary references in the author’s diary excerpts are to Russian writers; 
however, it is not clear that Alexievich’s implied author “reads” her fellow Russians any better 
than she does Shakespeare. In her books and in interviews, Alexievich refers to Dostoevsky (his 
novels, his characters, etc.) more often than to any other Russian literary figure. In a 1997 
interview, for example, she recalls hearing an upsetting story from an interview and thinking, 
“here in life there are pages equal to Dostoevsky, in each life there are two-three pages equal to 
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Dostoevsky,” and that her task was to drag them out of the person’s soul and write it down.62 
Again, in a 2006 interview, she says that when her heroes speak about their suffering, “they are 
great, just like Dostoevsky’s heroes,” and that Dostoevsky has all the answers, even to questions 
that seem specific to the modern period.63 In a 2016 interview, she says that each character 
shouts his own truth in Dostoevsky, that “suffering is also a form of communication,” and that 
her own literary “vision” is to provide the same stage for her own heroes.64 Those who are 
writing about Alexievich also often compare various aspects of her and Dostoevsky’s writing. 
Analyzing her Nobel Lecture, for example, Vladimir Borsobin connects Alexievich’s warning 
about the militarization of Russian life and Dostoevsky’s observation that “the most fundamental 
spiritual need of the Russian people is the need for suffering, always and unquenchable, 
everywhere and in everything.”65 He seems to be suggesting that the over-militarization of 
Russian life, criticized by Alexievich in the twenty-first century, can be traced back to a need for 
suffering that has been called an intrinsic part of the Russian spirit at least as far back as 
Dostoevsky in the nineteenth century. 
                                               
62 Elena D'iakova, “Svidanie: Svetlana Aleksievich: Bolevaia tochka – eto ne opora. No mir perevernut' 
mozhet,” Novaia gazeta, April 21, 1997, https://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/3469071. 
63 Ol'ga Timofeeva, “Svetlana Aleksievich: Knigu o liubvi mne tiazhelee pisat', chem vse,” Moskovskie 
novosti, September 15, 2006, 12, https://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/10041826. 
64 Dmitrii Drozdovskii, “Svetlana Aleksievich: Khotela Napisat' Takuiu Knigu, Chtoby Ot Voiny 
Toshnilo Dazhe Generalov,” Zerkalo nedeli, April 9, 2016, 14, 
https://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/46431027. 
65 Ivan Grachev, Vladimir Vorsobin, and Dmitri Steshin, “Nobelevskii laureat po literature Svetlana 
Aleksievich: Rossiia: voina, tiur'ma, bardak i barak,” Komsomol'skaia pravda, December 9, 2015, 4, 
https://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/45825403. 
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 In the chapter of the author’s diary excerpts, “From the Notebooks,” there is a quote from 
Dostoevsky’s character Ivan Shatov, the son of a former serf, speaking to Liamshin, a steward 
who will later participate in his murder:  
In Demons, Dostoevsky says ‘Certainty and the human being seem to be two separate 
things in many ways... Everyone is guilty... If only everyone was certain of that!’ And he 
adds that humankind knows more, a lot more, of itself than it has so far managed to 
document in literature and science. He said that this was not his thought, but Vladimir 
Solovev’s. If I hadn’t read Dostoevsky, I would be in even greater despair...66.  
 
Unlike Ivan Karamazov, Ivan Shatov espouses ideas that are similar to Dostoevsky’s opinions 
about Christianity and Russian culture. In her Nobel Lecture, Alexievich again quotes Shatov, 
this time in a conversation with Stavrogin: “We are two creatures who have met in boundless 
infinity... for the last time in the world. So drop that tone and speak like a human being. At least 
once, speak with a human voice.” In fact, Alexievich has cited this passage from Dostoevsky’s 
Demons in several interviews, before and after her Nobel Lecture. This, she claims, is more or 
less how she begins her interviews, by asking that people speak with their real “human” voice. 
 In the same chapter of author’s diary excerpts, the author also quotes Dostoevsky’s 
character Ivan Karamazov: “An animal can never be as cruel as a human being, as artfully, 
artistically cruel” (16). Certainly, some of the most memorable lines in Brothers Karamazov 
belong to Ivan; the line quoted in Zinky Boys comes from the chapter before Ivan’s “Grand 
Inquisitor” poem, in which he challenges the possibility of a benevolent God, pointing to the 
inexplicable suffering of innocents, and argues that Jesus has misjudged human nature when he 
resisted Satan’s three temptations. Ivan is reciting the poem to his younger brother Alesha, a 
novice monk, and the moral hero of the novel. Ivan’s “Grand Inquisitor” is an ambivalent 
moment in the novel; his argument is not baseless. And yet, Alexievich’s inclusion of a line from 
                                               
66 Aleksievich, Tsinkovye mal'chiki, 19. 
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Ivan’s poem, without any of Alesha’s counterpoint, removes that all-important element of 
ambiguity. 
 In fact, Ivan Karamazov’s point of view—without Alesha or other opposing point of 
view—also appears in the second and fifth books in the Alexievich’s cycle Voice of Utopia.67 
Her second book, The Last Witnesses (Solo for a Child’s Voice), begins with a one-page 
“Afterword Instead of Foreword,” in which the author includes only one citation about World 
War II casualties and “one question of a Russian classic:” 
Once the great Dostoevsky raised the question: Can we find justification for peace, our 
happiness and even eternal harmony, if, in the name of this, for the endurance of the 
foundation, an innocent child shed even one teardrop?  
 And [Dostoevsky] himself answered – this teardrop does not justify any progress, 
nor any revolution. Not any war. It will always outweigh [everything else]. 
 Just one teardrop...68 
 
A “child’s teardrop” is a famous phrase from Dostoevsky’s Brothers Karamazov. Ivan 
Karamazov uses it when he speaks to his brother, Alesha, about his rejection of God; he refuses 
to worship a God who would allow innocent children to suffer. Even in an imaginary scenario, 
where the world could have eternal peace and harmony in exchange for one teardrop from an 
innocent child, Ivan argues that the price would be too high. In Alexievich’s fifth book, Second-
hand Time, the author in “Remarks from an Accomplice” quotes from the “Legend of the Grand 
Inquisitor” at some length: 
In Dostoevsky’s “The Legend of the Grand Inquisitor” there is a debate about freedom. 
That the path of freedom is difficult, anguishing, tragic... “Why do you need to know this 
damned good and evil when it costs so much? A person must always choose: freedom or 
                                               
67 In the chapter of author’s diary excerpts in Alexievich’s first book, The Unwomanly Face of War, the 
author describes the first time she read I Am from a Burning Village, by Ales' Adamovich, Ya. Bryl, and 
V. Kolesnik: “I had experienced such a shock only once before, when I read Dostoevsky.” She also writes 
that she must “ask Dostoevsky’s question: How much human being is in a human being, and how to 
protect this human being in oneself?” 
68 Aleksievich, Poslednie svideteli: solo dlia detskogo golosa (Moscow: Vremia, 2007), 5. 
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well-being and an ordered life, freedom with suffering, or happiness without freedom. 
And most people go the second way.  
 The Grand Inquisitor tells Christ, returned to earth: “Why shouldst Thou now 
return, to impede us in our work? For Thou hast come but for that only, and Thou 
knowest it well. 
 “By valuing him so highly Thou hast acted as if there were no love for him in 
Thine heart, for Thou hast demanded of him more than he could ever give... Hadst Thou 
esteemed him less, less wouldst Thou have demanded of him, and that would have been 
more like love, for his burden would have been made thereby lighter. Man is weak and 
cowardly... Why should a soul incapable of containing such terrible gifts be punished for 
its weakness? 
 “Man has no greater anxiety in life than to find someone to whom he can make 
over that gift of freedom with which the unfortunate creature is born.”69 
 
Here, too, the author cites only one voice or point of view in the conversation—and it is the point 
of view farthest removed from the real flesh-and-blood author Dostoevsky. Alexievich’s 
citations from Brothers Karamazov in all three books highlight passages of the book where a 
character quite persuasively argues opinions that do not match those of the author; Dostoevsky’s 
novel eventually concludes on the opposing side—Alesha is the novel’s hero, and, in the world 
of the novel, his opinion is the right one. Interestingly, in Alexievich’s books, these passages 
seem to be presented as literally true, as the author’s own opinion: freedom is a terrible burden; 
nothing justifies the suffering of children; man truly is the cruelest of all animals. 
 In his novels, Dostoevsky presents both sides of an argument; this is part of the reason 
that Bakhtin judges his novels to be “polyphonic.” Alexievich does not preserve Dostoevsky’s 
polyphony in her works, just as she does not preserve the polyphony of “truths” about the Soviet-
Afghan War in Zinky Boys. 
 
                                               
69 Alexievich, Vremia second khend (Moscow: Vremia, 2013), 14. 
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CONCLUSION: THE PROLOGUE AS EPILOGUE 
 The “Prologue” of the 2007 edition of Zinky Boys first appeared in the 1994 edition as 
“Yet Another Story Instead of an Epilogue, It’s Actually a Prologue” (“Eshche odin rasskaz 
vmesto epiloga, on zhe prolog”), where it appeared after the monologues and before the court 
documents. It is the extended monologue of a mother, whose son—a returned Afghan veteran—
murders a man with her kitchen axe and is then imprisoned for the crime. Hints of the 
complicated author-reader-character relationships can be found in this monologue, which may be 
why it serves so well as a Prologue. It helps train us in how to be a “reader” of a book with 
unusual relationships between authors, characters, and readers.  
 The monologue begins enigmatically: “I walk alone... I’ll be walking alone for a long 
time now.” The reader does not know who this character is, as she has not yet been identified in 
any way. The reader naturally wonder why she is alone, who she has lost. The monologue 
continues: “He killed someone... My son... With a kitchen axe.”70 The ellipses break up the 
sentence “my son killed someone with a kitchen axe.” The jumbled order of phrases reflects the 
mother’s traumatized state of shock over the crime her son committed—she cannot form the 
sentence. It also forces the reader to rewrite the sentence—to put together the pieces—in order to 
make sense of the fragmented thought. The use of ellipses is especially striking in the first two 
lines, but it will continue throughout the monologue, both reflecting the mother’s loss of speech 
through trauma, as well as engaging the reader in praxis. 
 The second-person pronoun “you” appears several times in this important monologue. 
She recalls that her friend called her soon after the murder was reported in the news, and asked: 
                                               
70 Aleksievich, Tsinkovye mal'chiki, 7. 
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“Did you read it?”71 Many of the second-person pronoun “you” discussed above referred to 
writing, but this—the first occurrence of “you” in the book—refers instead to reading. 
Throughout the monologue, the mother repeatedly asks: “Can you hear the dogs barking? No? 
[...] Can’t you hear it? Don’t you hear anything?”72 This prologue comes before the author’s 
diary excerpts, in which she describes her experience listening to witness testimony related to the 
book’s topic. Even for a reader who knows that Alexievich’s method is to collect these stories in 
interviews, this second-person address without any introduction of the author is especially 
strange and jarring. The questions make sense in the context of the interviewee asking the 
interviewer whether she hears anything, but it also seems like the character is addressing the 
reader. In particular, the question “Don’t you hear anything?” makes sense as the character 
asking the reader whether he or she hears anything that is being said in this book about the war. 
Moreover, the character’s question “No?” implies that the reader’s answer is in the negative, 
which, unless the reader happens to be around a barking dog, heightens the strange sense that the 
character really is speaking to the reader. In the middle of the monologue, the mother describes 
visiting her son in prison: “And those dogs barking. I dream about that barking. It won’t ever let 
me be.”73 Thus the reader finally finds out that these mysterious dogs are the dogs that guard the 
prison where her son is serving his sentence. The final sentences of the monologue circle back to 
the mother’s second-person questions at the beginning of her monologue: “Can you hear the 
dogs barking? They’re running after me. I can hear them...”74 The relationship between the 
                                               
71 Ibid. 
72 Ibid. 
73 Ibid., 11. 
74 Ibid., 13. 
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quickly-shifting points of view (“you” and “they” and “me/I”) is emphasized. When the mother 
remembers her son’s face at the end of the day, she trails off: “I can’t describe it to you...” We 
know that Alexievich edits her character monologues, and she could have easily ended the 
sentence before the second-person address: “I can’t describe it.” Keeping the second person 
reminds the reader of the sensation that the character is addressing him or her directly.  
 Toward the end of her monologue, the mother describes seeking out other young men 
who served in the special operations forces in Afghanistan, like her son, to try to understand her 
son’s changed behavior and why he committed this murder. She asks them about killing and fear, 
about what they felt at the sight of death: “I questioned them about it for a long time and realized 
that [my son] could have [killed someone]!”75 And then she reports some pieces of the stories 
they told her. In this way, the mother steps into a role very much like that of the author of Zinky 
Boys. In order to understand a tragic event that is incomprehensible to her, therefore, this 
character searches for witnesses, interviews them, and then arranges their testimony into a form 
that is meaningful to her. 




Alexander Prokhanov’s Post-Soviet Return to the Soviet-Afghan War: 
Moscow, Kabul, and the Eurasian Soul 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Alexander Prokhanov, a well-known proponent of extreme far-right ideology in Russia 
today, is controversial for his xenophobic, anti-Semitic, and pro-imperialist remarks. In literary 
circles, he is also controversial for the unconventional aesthetics of his post-Soviet writing, 
which some decry as crude imitation while others laud as innovative.1 He is an incredibly prolific 
writer, diagnosed by some critics with “graphomania” for the exceptionally high number of 
novels, short stories, essays, and journalistic pieces that he churns out every year.2 His early 
work was generally well received, and he had become a member of the Soviet Union of Writers 
by 1972, but he struggled to make a name for himself—that is, until the Soviet-Afghan War. He 
was sent to Kabul to work as a war correspondent for Literaturnaia gazeta, and, based on this 
                                               
1 Il'ia Kukulin, for example, argues that it is a mistake to recognize Prokhanov as an innovator and that he 
has merely appropriated nonconformist rhetoric, metaphors, and symbols. (See Il'ia Kukulin, “Reaktsiia 
dissotsiatsii: Legitimatsiia ul'trapravogo diskursa v sovremennoi rossiiskoi literature,” Russkii 
natsionalizm: Sotsial'nyi i kul'turnyi kontekst, ed. M. Laruelle (Moscow: NLO, 2008), 257–358, and Il'ia 
Kukulin, “Revoliutsiia oblezlykh drakonov: ul'trapravaia ideiia kak imitatsiia nonkonformizma,” Polit.ru, 
April 8, 2007, accessed August 18, 2018, http://polit.ru/article/2007/04/08/kukproh/#_ednref111. 
2 Before settling on a career as a writer, Prokhanov trained in rocketry and then worked in a nature 
reserve. See Sergei Beliakov, “Etiud v krasno-korichnevykh tonakh: Aleksandr Prokhanov,” Voprosy 
literatury 5 (2009), 44–57, https://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/21979257. Prokhanov’s 1967 short 
story, “The Wedding,” garnered some critical praise, and two years later he was already working for two 
high-profile Soviet newspapers, Pravda and Literaturnaia gazeta. His first short story collection (I Am 
Going My Way, 1971) exalts the ordinary Soviet villager’s way of life, its old traditions and customs; it 
was considered part of the village prose movement, which tended to have nationalist undertones. The 
collection’s foreword was written by Iurii Trifonov, Prokhanov’s then literary ‘mentor,’ who opined: “the 
theme of Russia and Russian people for Prokhanov is not a vogue, but part of his very soul; this young 
author’s prose is incredibly sincere.” 
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experience, he wrote the military-political novel Derevo v tsentre Kabula (Tree in the Center of 
Kabul). It was published in 1982 and, with this novel, Prokhanov finally rose out of obscurity.3 
Through the 1980s, Prokhanov continued writing about the war (and the type of war) that had 
finally earned him fame.4 Later in the decade Prokhanov returned to Afghanistan in two more 
novels and several short stories set during the Soviet-Afghan War, never deviating far from the 
official party line on the Soviet so-called “intervention.”5 For this reason, one literary critic in 
1988 called him the “nightingale of the General Staff,” a nickname that has followed him ever 
since.6 
Prokhanov’s Soviet-era novels—perhaps the Afghan writing even more than anything 
else—reflected dominant trends in officially-approved Soviet literature. As Katerina Clark points 
out, there had been movement in the late 1960s and 1970s away from the “positive hero” of strict 
Socialist Realism toward the “inconsequential people” of byt and village prose, a style with 
which Prokhanov experimented in his early writing. Even after the 1970s, Prokhanov’s 
protagonists are not often a driving force in the plot. The protagonist of Tree in the Center of 
Kabul is a perfect example: as a war correspondent, he cannot participate in the action, but 
                                               
3 Prokhanov’s Derevo v tsnetre kabula was first published in Roman-Gazeta, no. 15 (1982): 1–94 and 
serially in Oktiabr', no. 1 (1982): 3–73 and no. 2 (1982): 74–137.  
4 After his first novel about Afghanistan, Prokhanov wrote in quick succession three more novels about 
similar Cold War conflicts in tropical locales to complete a tetralogy called Hot Gardens (Goriashchie 
sady). The three other novels included in the tetralogy are: V ostrovakh okhotnik (Hunter on the Islands, 
1983), a novel about the Cambodian Civil War; Afrikanist (The Africanist, 1984), about conflicts between 
Namibia, Zambia, Angola, and South Africa during the South African Border War and Angolan Civil 
War; and I vot prikhodit veter (And There Comes the Wind, 1984), about the revolution in Nicaragua. 
5 Rusinki batalista (1986), Shest'sot let posle bitvy (1988); short stories and novellas include “Sedoi 
soldat” (1985), “Svetlei lazury” (1986), “Karavan,” “Rodnen'kii,” “Musul'manaia svadba,” and 
“Kondagarskaia zastava” (all in 1989), and “Znak Devy” (1990). 
6 A. Latynina, “Kolokol'nyi zvon—ne molitva,” Noyi mir, August 1988, 243. 
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merely observe it from a safe distance. In the late 1970s and early 1980s, Soviet critics began to 
call for novels on a more “global” and “impressive” scale. Soviet novelists responded with “a 
topos that had not been popular since the years of the First Five-Year Plan—the ideological duel 
between a representative of the capitalist West (usually an American) and a Soviet acquaintance, 
who would of course prevail.” 7 Clark lists Prokhanov’s A Tree in the Center of Kabul as an 
example of this trend, within the sub-field of “fiction about the exploits of the KGB and novels 
about Soviet engagement against the Western enemy in Third World countries.”8 In direct 
contrast to the proscriptions of Socialist Realism, an overt religious or spiritual dimension even 
appeared.9 At the end of the 1980s, therefore, the Soviet novel had evolved to include 
previously-taboo concerns and different kinds of characters, while still adhering to the most basic 
outlines of Socialist Realism: patriotic, ideological fictional accounts of reality and events. 
In the 1990s, literary (and political, economic, social) currents shifted even more 
dramatically, opening up a whole new range of possibilities. In his essay “A Wake for Soviet 
Literature” (“Pominki po sovetskoi literature”), Viktor Erofeev cheered the opportunity for 
Russian authors to finally shed the burden of a “social mission,” no longer expected to perform 
the roles of politician, sociologist, economist, priest, or prophet, and for writing that is “neither 
                                               
7 Katerina Clark, The Soviet Novel: History as Ritual (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2000 
[1981]), 268. 
8 Ibid. 
9 The first uncensored version of Mikhail Bulgakov’s Master and Margarita (written between 1928 and 
1940) was published in 1973 (Moscow: Khudozhestvennaia literatura). Chingiz Aitmatov’s The 
Executioner’s Block was published in 1986, and his The Day Lasts More Than a Hundred Year in 1988, 
explore overt themes from Christianity and Islam. Among Soviet filmmakers, Andrei Tarkovsky stands 
out his frequent use of religious imagery and themes. In visual art, the paintings of the monarchist, anti-
democratic Il'ia Glazunov are one example. 
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more nor less than literature.”10 Prokhanov’s post-Soviet novels, however, express the opposite 
hope for Russian authors. Writing novel after novel that fictionalizes accounts of recent historical 
events in patriotic and highly ideological tones, Prokhanov reaffirms the tradition of 
“literaturocentrism” in post-Soviet Russian society.11 For Prokhanov, therefore, the primary 
function of literature does not change; instead, it is nuances in his ideological program for the 
new Russian state that evolve after the fall of the Soviet Union and throughout the 1990s. 
In the present chapter, I examine The Palace (Dvorets), Prokhanov’s 1994 novel about 
the days leading up to and including the Soviet operation to “intervene” in Afghanistan. It is the 
first time after the fall of the Soviet Union that Prokhanov returns to his propitious Soviet-era 
topic of Afghanistan, and this novel represents departures in message and tone from the 
narratives of his previous writing on Afghanistan: unlike in the 1980s, now Prokhanov’s writing 
about the war openly questions the Soviet leadership’s decisions and includes surreal dream-like 
sequences more likely found in works of magical rather than socialist realism.12 In The Palace 
                                               
10 Viktor Erofeev, “Pominski po sovetskoi literature,” in Russkaia literatura v zerkale kritiki, eds. S. I. 
Timina, M. A. Cherniak, N. N. Kiashto (Saint Peterburg: Khrestomatiia, 2003), 42. 
11 On literaturocentrism in post-Soviet society, see M. Berg, Literaturokratiia: problema 
pereraspredeleniia i prisvoeniia vlasti (Moscow: NLO, 2000); and Boris Noordenbos, “Post-totalitarian 
Identity and the Struggle with Literaturocentrism,” in Post-Soviet Literature and the Search for a Russian 
Identity (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016).  
12 Prokhanov himself has classified his post-Soviet literature as “magical realism.” In an interview, for 
example, he discusses the “new aesthetic” of his latest period: “Finally, I broke though the unfreedom to 
that, situated in myself and in culture, technologies and methods, which allowed me to form into a new 
artist. I don’t know how to name this aesthetic: let’s say, magical realism” (Zakhar Prilepin, Imeniny 
serdtsa: Razgovory s russkoi literaturoi (Moscow: Astrel', 2009), 21). This classification of his post-
Soviet writing also appears in Zavtra articles and blogs, presumably with the approval of editor-in-chief 
Prokhanov. Related genre classifications include “metaphysical realism” (see Aleksei Tatarinov, 
“Sovremennyi roman: vazhye vstrechi s nebytiem,” Voprosy literatury, no. 6 (2013): 67–82, 
https://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/38949108) and “magical historicism” (see Alexander Etkind, 
“Magical Historicism,” in Warped Mourning: Stories of the Undead in the Land of the Unburied 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2013), 220–42).  
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Prokhanov constructs a new mythology of the conflict and its legacy in Russian geopolitical 
history, interpreting events in Afghanistan as an allegory for events that happened, are 
happening, or will happen in Russia.  The Palace represents an important starting point for 
Prokhanov’s post-Soviet literary career, which forever after will imbue the Soviet-Afghan War 
with mystical significance in Russia’s history and the Russian-Eurasian civilization. 
Furthermore, the story about Soviet troops invading the palace in Kabul in 1979 should be read 
as a metaphor for the shelling of the White House in 1993—a landmark event in post-Soviet 
Russian history that involved Yeltsin’s government, the military, religious leaders, and civilians. 
As such, this novel about the beginning of the Soviet-Afghan War—written at the beginning of a 
new Russian state—is an important place to look for Prokhanov’s changing understanding of the 
roles of the military, the government, religious belief, and the citizenry in the Russian 
Federation, as well as how he envisions his meta-role as an author in influencing society. 
The Palace was published serially in 1994 in the conservative journal Nash sovremennik 
(Our Contemporary).13 The plot of the novel follows one Soviet commander’s involvement in 
the preparation for and execution of Operation Storm-333; this is the five-day Soviet military 
“intervention” in Kabul at the end of December 1979 that would lead to the nine-year Soviet 
occupation of Afghanistan.14 The year before, in the so-called April Revolution of 1978, 
communists led by Nur Mohammed Taraki had taken over the central government in 
Afghanistan. Taraki, however, could not maintain control of the country, and he repeatedly 
                                               
13 Chapters 1–9 of “Dvorets” were published in Nash sovremmenik, no. 7 (1994): 3-42; chapters 10–13 
(beginning) in Nash sovremmenik, no. 8 (1994): 15–37; chapters 13 (end)–27 in Nash sovremmenik, no. 9 
(1994): 18–61. 
14 Soviet troops streamed into Afghanistan on December 24 and Babrak Karmal was announced as the 
new president on December 29, 1979. 
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invoked a Friendship Treaty between the new communist state and the USSR in endless requests 
for Soviet economic and military assistance. Records show that, initially, Politburo leaders were 
reluctant to become involved. The exact reasons behind the Politburo’s decision to finally to 
invade will never be known, as witnesses to Politburo deliberations have died without leaving 
behind conclusive documentary evidence. Many historians agree, however, that the tipping point 
occurred in September 1979, when Prime Minister Hafizullah Amin assassinated Taraki and 
assumed control of the country: Brezhnev had been on particularly friendly terms with Taraki, 
and Amin was suspected of colluding with the CIA. Soon after Taraki’s death, Soviet special 
forces (spetsnaz), including the well-known 154th Independent Spetsnaz Detachment of the GRU 
or “Muslim Battalion” of mainly Central Asian soldiers, entered the country surreptitiously and 
awaited their orders. The KGB spetsnaz units known as Alpha Group and Zenith Group were on 
the ground, as well. In other words, both the Soviet Army and the KGB were actively involved in 
carrying out Operation Storm-333. By the end of December, large-scale Soviet forces were in 
place in Afghanistan, under the guise of a support mission for Amin’s unstable government. In 
fact, the “guise” was believed by most of the Soviet troops and even commanders in 
Afghanistan—not only Amin’s government and the Afghan army—until mere hours before 
Operation Storm-333 commenced on 27 December 1979.15 In his history of the Soviet invasion, 
Gregory Feifer provides an episode from the attack that highlights the confusing position in 
which soldiers on both sides suddenly found themselves: 
[Company 9 Commander Valery] Vostrotin ordered four of his soldiers to creep toward 
the buildings and capture the Afghan battalion commander. Interrogating the Afghan 
within an hour, he was surprised to learn he’d graduated from the same Soviet academy 
in Ryazan—Vostrotin’s own alma mater. 
                                               
15 Earlier that same day, an even more covert Soviet operation—to kill Amin by poisoning his food—was 
underway. However, his Soviet doctor was unaware of the plot and treated him, thus leaving Soviet 
leaders no choice but to launch the invasion. 
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 “What do you want with us?” the commander asked in genuine shock. Vostrotin 
had ignored as much as he could of the ubiquitous propaganda proclaiming the friendship 
of the Afghan and Soviet people. He carried out orders—whether to protect Amin’s 
government, as he’d believed he’d been sent to Afghanistan to do, or to help kill the 
president, as he’d been ordered to do hours earlier. His actions were the same; only the 
politics changed. But the Afghan’s question made him realize that some took the 
propaganda about Afghan-Soviet friendship to heart.16 
 
Soviet troops stormed the Tajbeg Palace, where Amin was in residence with his family, and 
assassinated President Amin.17 His eleven-year-old son was fatally wounded during the attack. 
Elsewhere in Kabul, they seized the Ministry of Interior building, the Internal Security (KHAD) 
building, the General Staff building, and several other government buildings. After the operation 
ended, Babrak Karmal was installed as the new head of state. According to official numbers, six 
troops from the “Muslim Battalion,” five KGB operators, and nine paratroopers were killed; 
other estimates put the Soviet losses at over one hundred.18 The drama of this operation and the 
events leading up to it, including the angst of certain characters over the sudden realignment of 
loyalties, form the backbone of Prokahnov’s The Palace. 
The novel, which is organized into four parts, opens at the beginning of December 1979. 
Our main character, Lieutenant Colonel Kalmykov (no first name or patronymic is ever given) is 
on leave in Moscow from commanding a battalion stationed in the desert outside of Afghanistan. 
At his lover’s apartment, he receives an urgent call to return to his battalion, which will be sent 
to Kabul with orders to protect the Palace from anti-communist rebels. The Soviet soldiers 
                                               
16 Gregory Feifer, The Great Gamble: The Soviet War in Afghanistan (New York: Harper, 2009), 74. 
17 In fact, Amin and his family had just moved in to the Tajbeg Palace on December 20. Although 
Prokhanov does not provide dates in his novel, facts such as this may help readers figure out when events 
in the novel are happening. For example, references are made to Amin’s upcoming move (“the day after 
tomorrow”) in Chapter 10. 
18 See Vasilii Mitrokhin, “KGB v Afganistane” (1987), wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/mitro-
russian.pdf, for claims of Operation: Storm-333 casualties above official statistics and see Aleksandr 
Liakhovskii, Tragediia i doblest' Afgana (Moscow: GPI Iskona, 1995) for a rebuttal. 
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quickly befriend the Afghan soldiers in the Palace guard, united in their desire to defend the 
communist cause. Although the presidency had gone to Amin after Taraki was killed in 
September, at this point in the novel, the abrupt transition of power is not met with suspicion 
from the Soviet soldiers, including Kalmykov. Written in third person from Kalmykov’s 
perspective and often featuring his internal monologue, the narrative provides the following 
overview of the transition from Taraki to Amin, as Kalmykov and his battalion train in the desert 
outside Afghanistan: 
Six months ago [around June] he [Kalmykov] was summoned to the intelligence 
department. The general set him a task: form a battalion for an expedition to Kabul. 
There, in Kabul, where the commotion was already beginning, it was necessary to protect 
the Afghan leader Taraki. The [anti-communist] opposition was taking up arms, the split 
was deepening in the [communist] party. The battalion of special forces started moving 
around in the desert, shooting, and driving vehicles. A portrait of Taraki hung in the room 
for political training. Soldiers, weary of the shooting range, read the president’s poetry. 
 The battalion, ready to board, was lined up near the takeoff field. The planes, 
lowering the ramps, were enveloped in mist and drizzle, when suddenly it became known 
that Taraki had been killed in Kabul. Vague indistinct rumors of strangulation. The 
companies were given a ride back to the barracks. In the room for political training the 
portrait was taken from the wall. There, where Taraki had hung before, a new portrait 
appeared—the dark-complexioned leader Amin. Black-eyed and formidable, the whites 
of his eyes blazing, he looked sharply at the soldiers. The officer from the political 
department peeked into the blue notebook and read over his biography, his merits before 
the people and the party.19 
 
Part Two reveals the main dramatic tension of the novel: Kalmykov is summoned to the 
general’s villa, where he is informed that Amin has turned out to be a “traitor, an executioner of 
his own people,” that he deceived the Soviet Union and Taraki. There are reports, the general 
continues, that Amin has begun negotiations to create a coalition government, presumably with 
                                               
19 Prokhanov, “Dvorets,” Nash sovremennik, no. 7 (1994): 17–18. Future references to Prokhanov’s 
“Dvorets” in Nash sovremennik will include number and page number, separated by a colon. For 
example, 7: 17–18. 
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the mujahideen, and—most shocking of all—“we also learned that he is a CIA agent!”20 He 
continues: 
According to intelligence, in the first days of the year Amin is preparing a coup! 
Thousands of party members, corps and divisional commanders, Soviet military and 
economic advisers will be arrested! A terrorist dictatorship will be established in the 
country! The US Rapid Deployment Force will land in Kabul! As a result, as we 
understand it, the Americans will receive in Afghanistan a military springboard on which 
medium-range missiles are deployed against the Soviet Union. On the hills and on the 
plateau, remote radar reconnaissance systems will be installed, allowing us to view the 
territory of the USSR to a depth of up to three thousand kilometers, to record the tests and 
training launches of our ballistic missiles.21 
 
Kalmykov receives his new orders: in the space of one week he is to devise an operation to 
“destroy” Amin and seize the Palace. Although Kalmykov feels that he has been misled and 
betrayed by his superiors, he does not waver in his intention to follow orders. The main action of 
the novel—Operation Storm-333—takes place in Part Three, the longest of the four parts. At the 
appointed hour, Kalmykov and his battalion invade the Palace from different entry points, 
wounding and killing several of their erstwhile Afghan friends along the way. When Kalmykov 
and his unit get inside the Palace, they find Amin’s body, already dead. In the novel, unlike in 
reality, the covert plot to poison Amin is not only successful, it was carried out by his personal 
physician. Part Three ends with descriptions of the Palace ablaze, in rubble, with dead and 
wounded bodies lying on its floors—the sights, sounds, and smells of war. In the fourth and final 
part of the novel, the battalion deals with the aftermath of the attack. Kalmykov returns to 
Moscow, where he reports to the Minister and provides details of the operation, losses, and 
prisoners. The minister praises Kalmykov and compares the operation in Kabul (favorably) to 
Czechoslovakia, thus reinforcing the idea that Operation Storm-333 has an important place in 
                                               
20 Ibid., 8: 25. 
21 Ibid. 
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larger Soviet military history. While Kalmykov is in the governmental office, however, the 
Minister answers a telephone call about Soviet actions in Afghanistan, authorizing an order for 
troops to advance as far as Kandagar and, after one month, to start building military barracks and 
laying asphalt. Although Kalmykov does not react, the Minister’s orders allude to a long war that 
has just begun. The novel ends where it began—with Kalmykov in bed with his lover—but now 
he is lost in tormented memories of the attack on the Palace in Kabul, while his lover weeps over 
him. 
On first reading, the novel may be taken as a straightforward dramatization of a historical 
event, albeit with strange metaphysical digressions and recurring references that seem to have no 
discernible deeper meaning or connection to the main plot. The main dramatic arc of the novel’s 
plot is outlined above: a patriotic soldier-hero fulfills his duty and completes his mission, despite 
some rather serious ethical misgivings. It is already a departure from his earlier novels about the 
war for Prokhanov to create a hero who questions the morality of the Soviet invasion, but, in 
addition to reflecting new political possibilities, Kalmykov’s internal dilemma also serves a 
literary function. It intensifies the drama of the main event—the storming of the Palace—as well 
as the death and violence accompanying it. The reader may very well feel sympathy for all actors 
involved, potentially even the “traitor” Amin. Less immediately obvious, however, is the 
function of Kalmykov’s constant flashbacks to his father’s death and his close relationship with 
his grandmother, for example, or his visions of light beams that connect Soviet and Afghan 
soldiers, his obsessive attention to the physical appearance of the Palace and personification of it 
as a beautiful woman, or his frequent reveries about the Moon (with a capital M) and the cosmos.  
In this chapter, I argue that these mystical motifs and subplots are connected to three 
interrelated extraliterary contexts that are central to a full understanding of the novel: the Russian 
 143 
military’s attack on the White House in Moscow during the 1993 constitutional crisis; Alexander 
Dugin’s concept of Neo-Eurasianism; and a synthetic approach to religious belief that draws on 
folklore, paganism, and mysticism. Prokhanov was also writing about these events and concepts 
in his newspaper Zavtra while he was working on his novel The Palace. However, in a novel 
even more than in his newspaper, Prokhanov is free to make expansive, imprecise allusions to 
the ideas of Eurasianism and mysticism that were in vogue at the time, associations that 
encourage the citizen-reader to feel the spiritual connection between Afghanistan and Russia, as 
well as to be converted to Prokhanov’s ideological beliefs about what the roles of the 
government, military, and citizenry should be in the new Russian Federation. 
 
THE WHITE HOUSE IN MOSCOW22 
Prokhanov was working on The Palace at least as early as October 1991, although it was 
not published until July 1994.23 For Prokhanov, this is an inordinately long time to spend 
working on one novel; he is more likely to complete a novel in three months than three years. 
One explanation for the delay, of course, is the—for Prokhanov—catastrophic, apocalyptic 
dissolution of the Soviet Union in December 1991, and his intense involvement during this 
period in the fight against liberalism, in general, and Boris Yeltsin, in particular. In December 
1990, Prokhanov had launched the ultraconservative weekly newspaper Den' to serve as a 
                                               
22 The building, which opened in 1981, was known as the House of the Soviets until 1993; during the 
Soviet period, and during the first few years of the Russian Federation, the Supreme Soviet of Russia used 
the building. After the 1993 crisis, the building was repaired and renamed House of the Government of 
the Russian Federation, although at this time it became known as the Russian White House. The reformed 
parliament body, elected in 1994, was thereafter known by its Tsarist-era title of State Duma and moved 
to another building. 
23 Howard Swartz, “Historical and Literary Investigation of the Treatment of the 1979-89 Soviet-Afghan 
War in Contemporary Russian Literature,” PhD diss. (University of Oxford, 1992), 194. 
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mouthpiece for the anti-liberal opposition movement, a diverse array of voices ranging from 
hardline Communists to ultra-rightwing nationalists. In July 1991, Prokhanov and eleven other 
conservative leaders signed the nationalist manifesto called “An Address to the People” 
(purportedly written by Prokhanov himself).24 Critics of the letter interpreted it as a nationalist 
incitement of the subsequent coup attempt in August later that year, when the State Committee 
on the State of Emergency (GKChP), popularly referred to as the “Gang of Eight,” attempted to 
wrest control of the Soviet Union from General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev, whose liberal and 
decentralizing reforms they opposed.25 After the failed coup, Prokhanov and other conservatives 
who were perceived to have supported it were removed from office in the Union of Soviet 
Writers. Prokhanov’s newspaper Den' lost the sponsorship of the Union of Soviet Writers—
although it remained backed by the Ministry of Defense—and gained the patronage of the newly-
established Union of Writers of Russia (Soiuz pisatelei Rossii), a non-governmental association 
with a “patriotic” orientation.26 While he did not finish The Palace during this busy period, 
Prokhanov did complete the novel Poslednii soldat imperii (The Last Soldier of the Empire), 
                                               
24 Robert Service, Russia: Experiment with a People: From 1991 to the Present (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 2006), 225–26. The signatories called for unity in the face of national 
disintegration and condemned the loss of material wealth and traditional spiritual values. They equated 
Gorbachev’s perestroika with surrender to alien and corrupt western powers (“Slova k narodu,” 
Sovetskaia Rossiia, July 23, 1991, 1). The letter was signed by twelve conservative leaders, including 
authors Iurii Bondarev and Valentin Rasputin, and generals Valentin Varennikov and Boris Gromov—
both of whom were involved in the Soviet-Afghan War. 
25 The GKChP was a group of eight high-level Soviet officials within the Soviet government, the 
Communist Party, and the KGB. 
26 The Union of Writers of Russia is not to be confused with the Union of Russian Writers (Soiuz 
rossiiskikh pisatelei), a different independent association that was established at the same time, but with a 
more liberal or “democratic” orientation. For more on Den' see Service, Russia, 144-45; Irina Rishina and 
Marina Kudimova, “Oboidemsia bez raskola?” Literaturnaia gazeta, August 28, 1991, 9; and Sergei 
Kiselev, “Den' zakryt, vse ushli na putch,” Literaturnaia gazeta, August 28, 1991, 3. 
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which depicts the events of August 1991.27 This, Prokhanov’s first novel published after the fall 
of the Soviet Union, does not contain the strong elements of Neo-Eurasianism or pagan 
mysticism that we will encounter in The Palace.28 
In addition to Prokhanov’s considerable activity fighting liberal reforms, editing his 
newspaper, and writing a different novel in the period between 1991 and 1994, there is another 
even more important reason for his delay in publishing The Palace: the constitutional crisis 
ending in the Russian Army’s attack on the Moscow “White House” on October 4, 1993. 
Prokhanov was intimately involved in supporting the opposition movement during the crisis, and 
he was deeply affected by the way it ended. In fact, this event served as an unexpected source of 
inspiration for the author in his new chronicle of the Soviet-Afghan War, providing the spark that 
Prokhanov needed to finally finish The Palace. In Lev Danilkin’s 2007 biography of Prokhanov, 
Chelovek s iaitsom, Prokhanov describes the 1993 constitutional crisis and his experience at 
great length—nearly an entire chapter is devoted to it. Although most of the conversation is 
related to changing political realities, Prokhanov also describes the artistic component to his 
experience of the events. 
“I sensed that the material of a novel was taking shape. I have known my whole life that 
all these episodes, all these trials [perezhivaniia] this way or that lie down into texts, 
become the flesh of a novel. I saw that the historical, biotic convulsion was once again 
emerging, such compression, a plot, and I foresaw how it would be born. Aside from a 
political task [i.e., to support the opposition leaders occupying the White House], there 
was also an artistic task: to see all of this, to live through it, to set myself in the place of it 
all, and I was at the staff meetings, observed the procedures, recorded the behavior of 
                                               
27 Poslednyi soldat imperii was published across three issues of Nash sovremennik in 1993: no. 7: 7–46; 
no. 8: 15–61; and no. 9: 10–50. 
28 However, in what may signal Prokhanov’s new mystical orientation toward Afghanistan, Poslednii 
soldat imperii was published in book form by “Kovcheg” alongside four short stories and novellas about 
the Soviet-Afghan War (“Rodnen'kii,” “Znak devy,” “Musul'manskaia svad'ba,” and “Sinitsyn”) that are 
republished here as a collection titled Znak devy: Mistika aziatskoi voiny. All four stories and novellas 
had already been published elsewhere. 
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everyone and everywhere—at the demonstrations, beneath the ground, in the clashes with 
OMON.”29  
 
Prokhanov does not say which novel was taking shape, and Danilkin seems to assume that he 
means the novel Krasno-korichnevyi (Red-Brown), which will not be published until six years 
after the events of September-October 1993.30 In one interview, however, Prokhanov reveals that 
“associatively it [The Palace] echoes the storming of the White house in Moscow in 1993.”31 In 
other words, the “historical, biotic convulsion” of the 1993 constitutional crisis that Prokhanov 
describes to his biographer is reflected in The Palace.  
The most obvious parallel is between the two buildings: the shelled White House in 
Moscow and the invaded Palace in Kabul. Prokhanov’s repeated emphasis on the Palace as an 
especially emotive building ties in with his and his newspaper’s emphasis on the visual of the 
smoking White House. The more subtle parallel lies in borrowed themes of betrayal by the 
Russian (Soviet) government and conflicted loyalties in the military and citizenry. Prokhanov’s 
aesthetic and thematic associations of the shelling of the White House with the Soviet invasion 
of Amin’s palace do not line up perfectly in his novel The Palace. The loose associations, 
however, do help explain some of the novel’s strangeness. Even more importantly, the way in 
which Prokhanov creates these suggestive parallels between the two events gives further insight 
                                               
29 Lev Danilkin, Chelovek s iatsom: Zhizn' i mneniia Aleksandra Prokhanova (Moscow: Ad Marginem, 
2007), 490. 
30 Prokhanov’s novel Krasno-korichnevyi was first published in numbers 1–8 of Nash sovremennik in 
1999. The title refers to the unlikely coalition of hardline communists (the reds) and far right-wingers (the 
browns), united in their common goal of defeating the liberal democrats. 
31 Charles Rougle and Elisabeth Rich, “Aleksandr Prokhanov,” South Central Review 12, no. 3/4 
(Autumn–Winter 1995): 26. 
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into his understanding of the roles that the army, citizenry, and government should play in post-
Soviet Russia. 
 
The 1993 constitutional crisis was a political stand-off between President Boris Yeltsin, a 
liberal reformer, and the Russian legislature, the majority of whom were still members of the 
Communist Party. During the conflict, the anti-Yeltsin faction was led by Vice President 
Alexander Rutskoi, a decorated Afghan War veteran, and Speaker of the Supreme Soviet Ruslan 
Khasbulatov, of Chechen origin. Both men were originally allied with Yeltsin and stood with 
him in resisting the 1991 coup attempt; they fell out with Yeltsin over his liberal reforms, 
especially his pursuit of so-called shock therapy to establish a market economy.  Facing political 
gridlock, on September 21, 1993, Yeltsin signed “Decree No. 1400” to dissolve the country’s 
legislature (the Congress of People’s Deputies and its Supreme Soviet) and set elections for a 
new bicameral parliament in December. In response, legislators impeached Yeltsin, proclaimed 
Vice President Rutskoi to be acting President, and barricaded themselves in the Moscow White 
House. On October 3, anti-Yeltsin demonstrators took over the Mayor’s office and stormed the 
Ostankino television tower. The next day, Yeltsin ordered Defense Minister Pavel Grachev to 
have his troops shell and storm the White House; leaders of the resistance were arrested and the 
building was secured by midday. The role of the army was central to the outcome of the conflict. 
Grachev was deeply loyal to Yeltsin, and he praised his troops for saving Russia from a civil 
war. Others, however, would criticize him for the lives that were lost. The ten-day conflict was 
the single deadliest event of street fighting in Moscow’s history since the 1917 Revolution. 
According to official sources, 187 people were killed and 437 wounded, while estimates from 
non-governmental sources put the death toll at as high as 2,000. In the years to come, Grachev 
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would fall even from Yeltsin’s graces, amid numerous accusations of corruption, earning the 
moniker “Pasha Mercedes,” and for his role in convincing Yeltsin to send troops to Chechnya in 
1994.  
Prokhanov actively supported the anti-Yeltsin legislators and demonstrators, and he was a 
constant presence in and around the occupied White House in September and October 1993. 
After the crisis ended, opposition leaders were arrested and Prokhanov’s newspaper Den' was 
banned from publication. Prokhanov, however, wasted no time in establishing another weekly 
newspaper, this time called Zavtra, with the subtitle “the newspaper of the spiritual opposition” 
(“gazeta dukhovnoi oppozitsii”). The first issue of Zavtra came out in November 1993, and it has 
appeared weekly ever since.32 A great deal of the newspaper was devoted to reminding readers 
about the “tragic events” and “dark days” of September-October 1993, for months and even 
years after the event.33 On the front page of the first issue in 1994, for example, there is a large 
close-up photograph of the clock in the center column at the top of the Moscow White House 
after the shelling, with billowing black smoke taking up nearly half of the picture. 34  
                                               
32 See Service, Russia, 144–45 and 225–26. Early issues of the newspaper may be available in Prokhanov, 
Khroniki pikiruiushchei imperii (Moscow: Ul'tra.Kul'tura, 2005). 
33 I was unable to access the earliest issues of Zavtra, from November and December 1993; microfilm 
was available only from 1994. The first issue in January is labeled as number 1, followed by the number 6 
in parentheses. Presumably, this means that five issues of the newspaper came out in November–
December 1993. My deep gratitude to Rob Davis, Librarian for Russian, Eurasian & East European 
Studies at Columbia University, for his help acquiring the 1994–95 issues of Zavtra on microfilm. 




Below the photograph is an article with the headline, “Who was the first to shoot Rutskoi?”—it 
continues, taking up the entire page. Also on the front page, there is the first in what will become 
a recurring rubric titled “A Voice from ‘Lefortovo,” an interview that Prokhanov conducts with 
opposition leaders who were arrested on October 4, 1993, and sent to the Lefortovo Prison in 
Moscow. It includes correspondences between Prokhanov and such high-level opposition leaders 
as Aleksandr Rutskoi, Viktor Anpilov, and Aleksandr Barkashov, whose letters are a mixture of 
political diatribe and emotional reminiscence.35 “A Voice from ‘Lefortovo’” will lose its title 
referring to the prison but remain an interview by Prokhanov with various kinds of witnesses to 
the October 1993 events: Mitropolit Ioann, Valerii Zor'kin, Kirsan Iliumzhinov, Valentin 
Varennikov, Ruslan Khasbulatov, Albert Makashov, etc. In each interview, Prokhanov urges his 
                                               
35 Konstantinov (January 1994, no. 1); Anpilov (January 1994, no. 2); Rutskoi (January 1994, no. 3); 
Achalov (February 1994, no. 6); Barkashov (March 1994, no. 8). 
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interlocutor to relive their days occupying and defending the White House, and to recount these 
events in detail. 
In the second issue of 1994, there appears another regular rubric devoted to the events of 
October 1993. Titled “Russia, Washed in Blood” (“Rossiia, kroviu umytaiia”), it is always 
accompanied by a small graphic of the White House, its top half blackened by tank shells, with 
eight human figures—defenders, presumably—standing in front: 
 
Next to the picture the first time it appears in 1994 is an introduction by Vladimir Bondarenko, a 
literary critic, journalist, and deputy editor-in-chief of Zavtra:  
The black October of 1993 remains forever a black mark in Russian history. The black-
white house became a symbol of national opposition. The new Satanist-democrats want 
to cross out this tragic, sacrificial symbol with some kind of new re-sanctification 
[pereosviashcheniem]. And this is after an orthodox service, with a moleben prayer 
[molebny], was continuously conducted during the October days at the House of Soviets, 
and on a tragic night many deputies confessed, were baptized in the walls of this house. 
The House of Soviets, in light of what happened, became for many an Orthodox 
sanctuary.  
Now they want to cross out the memory of the New Martyrs with a political, that 
is, unorthodox, re-sanctification. I am surprised only by that priest who committed such 
heresy. The memory of those days cannot be crossed out.  
It is also not possible to cross it out because the black-white house has already 
become a fact of Russian literature. Iurii Kublanovskii and Stanislav Zolottsev, Igor' 
Liapin and Oleg Kochetkov, and many others have dedicated their poems to the tragic 
events of those days.36 
                                               
36 Vladimir Bondarenko, “Rossiia, kroviu umytaiia,” Zavtra, no. 2, January 1994, 7. 
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Bondarenko’s introduction is titled “Omens Not of Sorrow but of Courage” (“Ne goresti, a 
muzhestva primety”). The image of the “black-white house” (cherno-belyi dom) to which he 
repeatedly refers is obviously a powerful “omen” for the opposition movement, and a symbol 
that—from the earliest days—has entered Russian literature. Even many years later, in an 
interview given on the twenty-third anniversary of the crisis, Prokhanov describes the image of 
the blackened, smoking White House building as a “bloody icon of patriotic opposition [that] 
should still inspire us to common action.”37 The visual of the shelled White House clearly holds 
special meaning for those involved in the opposition movement; one may even say that 
Prokhanov is fairly obsessed with it.  
 In his novel, the White House in Moscow and the Palace in Kabul are parallels. 
Prokhanov uses this to make an imperative for the reader in understanding the Afghan 
experience in terms of the recent Russian calamity. There are several moments in Prokhanov’s 
novel that serve to reinforce this association. For example, the Palace’s color is repeatedly 
described as white-yellow (belo-zheltyi) and a snowy-amber (snezhno-iantarnyi)—emphasis 
mine. In one passage, the Palace is described as first the “Big House” and then “amber eastern 
Palace” (v Bol'shom Dome, v iantarnom vostochnom Dvortse), juxtaposing the words House and 
Palace. The oddly powerful effect that the visual image of the Palace has on Kalmykov can be 
explained in large part by the association Prokhanov wants his readers to make between the 
Palace and the White House. The first time Kalmykov sees the Palace in Kabul, for example, it 
takes up an inordinate amount of space in the narrative: 
He [Kalmykov] climbed the stony trail, along the gray dusty dry slope, absorbing with a 
glance the entire huge openness of the surrounding sunny mountains, foggy ravines, 
                                               
37 Interview with Alexander Prokhanov, “Godovshchiny sobytii u Doma Sovetov ia vstrechaiu bez 
unyniia,” Zavtra, April 10, 2016, http://www.nakanune.ru/articles/112186/. 
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distant hardly visible villages. He climbed to the top and froze. Before him, through a 
shady lowland on an illuminated hill, white-yellow, snowy-amber, stood the Palace, 
slender, light, with a precious flickering of glass. It looked like a woman with lace around 
her naked neck, a handkerchief thrown over high gentle shoulders, with gems of beads 
and bracelets. 
The Palace arose so suddenly, was so beautiful, familiar, from some childhood 
visions, from troubled youthful dreams, from recent premonitions. Kalmykov, at the top 
of the hill, experienced instant admiration, as if rays were born along from the Palace and 
silently struck his heart [...]. 
It was the very Palace in whose name he, Kalmykov, traveled through the desert, 
fired weapons, buried himself in the sand, took onto himself unbearable labors. The 
planes in the night had flown toward this Palace, drawn by its magnetism. Here, by the 
Palace, the soldiers were placed in dirty barracks to protect and keep it. This wonderful 
[chudnyi] Palace had appeared to him at night in feminine embraces and whispers. The 
cards of the mystic [gadalka] Rosa had told about this Palace. And now Kalmykov stood 
in the mountains of a mysterious Asian country and looked at the white-yellow wonder, 
at the eastern Palace. [...] 
He descended back into the valley, toward people and cars, carrying within 
himself the sunny vision of the Palace. 38 
 
Later in the novel, the mere “sight” (videnie) of the Palace once again moves Kalmykov more 
than a building ordinarily would affect a person: 
In the night the Palace was shining with golden windows, scattering the glow of 
light into the cold darkness. It seemed to hover, not touching the ground, resting on the 
mountain with pillars of fire. Descended from unfathomable fantastic heights. Just about 
to push off and rocket upward. It will leave, disappear, turning into a tiny speck. 
Kalmykov stood on the hill, being blown around by a clean icy wind, and looked 
at the Palace. He wanted to go there, into the unfathomable halls, where, it seemed, a 
nighttime holiday was being held—to look at the Palace’s decorations, the chandeliers, 
the precious vases, the outfits and faces of the dancers. The Palace attracted him, drew 
him, enticed him with its mysterious beauty. With a burning brow, smiling, he stretched 
out to the golden glow. Slowly, he trudged back, carrying within himself the vision of the 
Palace.39 
 
In the barracks, especially at night, this “vision of the Palace” often appears to Kalmykov, calling 
to him with its “mysterious beauty.” Both of the excerpts above appear in Part One of the novel, 
when Kalmykov still believes that he is in Afghanistan in order to defend this building and its 
                                               
38 Prokhanov, “Dvorets,” 7: 30. 
39 Ibid., 7: 38. 
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occupants. His obsession with the Palace, however, is certainly odd. He feels a deep connection 
to the building that borders on the erotic. One of the many times that Kalmykov is staring at the 
Palace, admiring it, he “inhaled its freshness, experienced a feeling of tenderness, embraced its 
flexible slender waist [and] danced among the shining spaces.”40 And, in fact, in discussing the 
1993 constitutional crisis with his biographer, Prokhanov briefly mentions eros: “All these 
political movements were full of femininity, there was its own revolutionary erotica there.”41 For 
Prokhanov, erotic feelings are a natural and perhaps even necessary component of revolution. In 
his novel The Palace, this “revolutionary erotica” is expressed in his protagonist’s relationship to 
the building he is pledged to defend—perhaps akin to Prokhanov’s feelings about the building 
that he had intended to defend. 
In the end, both events—the 1979 invasion of Afghanistan and the 1993 shelling of the 
White House—are visually represented by a defeated seat of power and governance, with 
undertones of sadness that accompanies that image of destruction. A letter from Il’ia 
Konstantinov, a representative of the executive committee of the Federal Tax Agency, appears 
on the front page of the first issue of Zavtra in January 1994; he was arrested for his role at the 
White House on October 4, 1993, and his letter is the first “Voice from ‘Lefortovo’”—the prison 
in Moscow where he is being held without charges. The beginning of his letter, in a paragraph in 
bold, describes the “tragic events” of October 4: 
The storming of the House of Soviets was a mass shooting of daring brave-hearts 
[khrabretsov], trying with cobblestones and bottles of benzene to stop the military 
machines of infantry and tanks... Corridors swimming in blood [zalitye krov’iu koridory], 
the dead, barely covered by dirty jackets [griaznymi pidzhakami], the wounded screaming 
in delirium [v bredu], with no one to help them... Father Aleksei, administering 
communion to the dying and those preparing for death... the rumble [grokhot] of 
                                               
40 Ibid., 8: 22. 
41 Danilkin, Chelovek s iatsom, 489. 
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explosions of tank missiles [razryvov tankovykh snariadov]... the acrid smoke of the 
fire... the eyes, sunken from horror, of the women. 
 
When Kalmykov is given the unexpected order to attack rather than protect the Palace, he 
imagines the storming in details that are reminiscent of the White House on fire and smoking 
after being shelled by tanks: “Dug-in tanks with straight sighting burn the BTRs, pick off the 
towers, scraps of severed bodies. Bullets will cut down the security. [...] Fires and explosions in 
the neighborhood, sooty smoke from the Palace, and, across all the squares and markets [...] the 
tortured corpses of soldiers.”42 After the storming of the Palace actually takes place, a “strange 
thought” enters Kalmykov’s head: “is it really me standing by a broken window in an Asian 
Palace, with people dying on all floors [...] these moans, these red fires and explosions...”43 Once 
again, Kalmykov thinks of the Palace as a woman: “the entire Palace, from basements to 
rooftops, was breathing, crackling, moaning. It was like a woman who had been raped. Covers 
torn off, jewels pulled off, beaten, overwhelmed, agonized by uninterrupted libidinous torment. 
And the scent was sweat and blood. The scent of war. [...] the Palace moaned in an unceasing, 
strangled groan [zadushennym stonom].”44 The extreme descriptions of the defeated Palace can 
be explained, at least in part, by the author’s desire to invoke in his readers a similar extreme, 
emotional reaction to the recently shelled White House.  
 
The second significant parallel between the 1993 constitutional crisis and Prokhanov’s 
description of the Soviet invasion in The Palace is less obvious, but potentially more telling of 
                                               
42 Prokhanov, “Dvorets,” 8: 26, 28. 
43 Ibid., 9: 42. 
44 Ibid., 9: 46–47. 
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Prokhanov’s new understanding of the Soviet-Afghan War in Russian history: feelings of 
betrayal and conflicted loyalties. In the second issue of Zavtra in January 1994, Stanislav 
Zolottsev describes several people’s reactions to the storming of the White House. A “senior 
officer serving in the famous Pskov paratrooper division,” Zolottsev’s contemporary and “old 
comrade,” protests perceived accusations: 
But you yourself served, yourself are an officer! [...] You of all people know: we don’t 
spit without an order, not to mention anything else. Without concealing anything I say to 
you: yes, we were sitting; we were waiting an order. Well, not from Pashka Mercedes 
[Defense Minister Pavel Grachev], of course. We kind of thought: someone is “in touch” 
between the White House and our commanding officers. No, we waited for nothing! Be 
in heightened military readiness—yes, there was a team. But nothing more! That our 
division purportedly received an order from Headquarters to advance on Moscow, to 
defend the “democrats”—nonsense! There was no such order. Yes, no one would have 
forced us to storm the Supreme Soviet... 
 And to that Ruslan [Khasbulatov, Speaker of the Supreme Soviet], I would say a 
couple of warm words now! Well, isn’t it slovenly? Instead of writing his little articles 
about Russian history, he needed to be training with the army, specifically—with division 
commanders, lieutenants in the staff headquarters for the armed forces. You have lost the 
main part, big-city patriots: the connection, the contact with those, who press the button. 
[...] 
 And now we, especially the paratroopers, are basically between two fires. And 
now people look at us askance—ours, our own, and, judging by everything, they’re 
beginning to “press the cranberry” [kliukvu davit’] from above: God forbid, that they 
crumble our division, remind us of all the “sins”—from Afghan[istan] to Vilnius...45 
 
Zolottsev picks up his comrade’s expression “between two fires” to describe other recent 
difficult events in Russian history. He concludes that this is the “paradox of our crazy times,” 
that “militiamen, sincerely bearing arms for the Russian authority” can then suddenly find 
themselves fighting on the wrong side. The senior officer quoted by Zolottsev apparently 
includes the Soviet-Afghan War (and the Soviet attack on Vilnius in 1990) among such 
paradoxical military operations.  
                                               
45 Stanislav Zolottsev, “Zavtra tozhe den'...” Zavtra, no. 2, January 1994, 5. 
 156 
Elsewhere on the pages of Prokhanov’s newspaper, people’s deputy Ivan 
Shashviashvili—a leader of the Red-Brown coalition in the Russian parliament, described what 
he, as a defender of the Supreme Council building, witnessed on October 4, 1993: 
“Al’fa” entered the House of Soviets. An officer appeared in the meeting room wearing 
equipment, in a helmet without weapons. He introduced himself as Vladimir Sergeev. He 
addressed us: “Dear fathers and mothers, I’m from the group ‘Al’fa.” You see, we came to 
you without weapons. We do not want to cause you evil and death. You who are in this room 
are doomed. We are ordered to destroy you, but we refused to do this. Once again they want to 
force us, “Al’fa.” I took Amin’s palace in Kabul, I took the Vilnius TV tower, I was in 
Karabakh and Tbilisi. And everywhere, they were forcing us. Now we do not want to take sin 
on our souls, but want to take you out alive. I offer you this option: we make a corridor, and 
you pass through it out to safety. If one of the bandits tries to shoot you, we will suppress them 
with fire. You will be given buses and taken home. Officer’s word.”46  
 
Prokhanov deeply values the Russian military, and he can forgive the military’s mistakes in 
Afghanistan (and elsewhere) over the mistakes of the government that gives the military its 
orders. In an interview that he gave in June 1991 to Central Television, he concludes that a new 
“Russian Idea” would come from the synthesis of three political elements (the Russian 
Communist party, prerevolutionary ideology, and Russian liberals) and this “powerful statist 
front [...] would then assist the Army—his favorite institution—to establish order in the 
country.”47 A typical comment about the sacred role of the Russian Army appears in his 
interview of the governor of Pskov Evgenii Mikhailov, when he says: 
The ideology of the new Pskov renaissance could include the canonization of the entire 
Sixth Airborne Company, its transformation into a holy company, into a company of 
Russian ascetics and martyrs. This would promote the harmonious merging of the idea of 
                                               
46 Ivan Ivanov, “Anafema. Zapiski Razvedchika,” Zavtra, no. 2, August 1994, 6. The quote also appears 
in commentary section on this site: https://newsland.com/user/4297726154/content/chas-negodiaev-
zabytye-zhertvy-oktiabria-1993-goda/4399373. 
47 John B. Dunlop, The Rise of Russia and the Fall of the Soviet Union (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 1995), 175–76. 
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the Motherland, the idea of the church, the idea of Russian history and the Russian 
army.48 
 
The military is a sacred institution for Prokhanov. Prokhanov said in an interview that “filling 
those pages [of Chechen Blues] I felt like I was painting frescos, with soldiers as angels and 
saints, BTRs and tanks for horses and halos.”49 His books about the Chechen Wars have 
garnered far more post-Soviet attention from literary critics than his books about the Soviet-
Afghan War. The Palace seems to have escaped the notice of literary critics almost entirely. And 
yet, the sympathy and profound respect that Prokhanov describes for the Russian Army in the 
context of his Chechen War novels is also quite evident in The Palace. 
 Although our main character in the novel, Kalmykov, is the one leading the attack on the 
Palace whereas our author was defending the White House, Kalmykov is clearly conflicted about 
his orders; he could easily be the “Al’fa” leader or the paratrooper senior officer quoted above. 
Experiencing “panic, confusion, and horror” when he first learns of the new orders to storm the 
Palace, Kalmykov pictures to himself the future scene of destruction, the tanks firing, towers 
crumbling, bodies torn to shreds, and his friend in the Afghan Army, Major Valekh dying, 
waving his arm with Kalmykov’s watch on his wrist.50 The reader alone is privy to the guilt and 
doubt that Kalmykov suffers in response to this sudden reversal in loyalty; although he tries to 
give the general a list of reasons that this mission is “impossible,” he does not share the true 
reason for his hesitation: it feels like a “betrayal.” His superiors had assured him that he was 
                                               
48 Aleksandr Prokhanov, “Pskovskii lider (Beseda Aleksandra Prokhanova s gubernatorom Evgeniem 
Mikhailovym),” Zavtra no. 31, August 3, 2001, 2, https://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/2530781. 
49 Bondarev, “Vyigrannoe srazhenie,” 4. In his interview with Prokhanov, Bondarev declared that The 
Chechen Blues (1998) was the best book that Prokhanov had ever written. 
50 Prokhanov, “Dvorets,” 8: 26. 
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there to save the Palace, to defend it together with the Afghan soldiers, together with his Afghan 
friend Valekh, a member of the Palace Guard; but now, he thinks to himself with acute distress, 
he is supposed to kill Valekh and destroy the amber-colored Palace.51  
When Kalmykov conveys the new orders to his battalion—“seize the Palace, liquidate 
Amin”— he voices none of his doubts, although he does begin by asking his soldiers to “react 
calmly and correctly.” The first soldier to respond, however, seems to echo Kalmykov’s 
misgivings: “They let us into their house, and we ax them in the head!.. They set us to keep 
watch over their house, and instead we rob them!.. Although what the hell,” he concludes darkly, 
“the spetsnaz are for smashing into things!”52 It is a grim half-joke, but the meaning seems to be 
that Russian special forces will follow their orders, however wrong they may seem. Any debate 
about the new order soon ends, and the discussion turns to the details of the upcoming 
operation.53  
Kalmykov’s “Muslim Battalion” invites the Afghan Army palace guards to a party at 
their barracks. The Afghans arrive in a festive mood, wearing cologne, hugging their Soviet 
hosts. Tat’ianushkin gives each Afghan soldier a small red pin with the portrait of Iurii Gagarin 
as a gift and toasts “our military brotherhood, the honorable Afghan people, comrade Hafizulla 
                                               
51 As further evidence of the immoral behavior of the Soviet leadership at this moment, Kalmykov is 
given a minor mission to secretly transport Afghan government dissidents to safety at a remote villa, but 
to “destroy the load” if Afghan soldiers try to inspect the vehicle. The narrative voice, presumably 
reflecting Kalmykov’s inner thoughts, calls this part of the order “cruel and evil” (8: 33). Kalmykov takes 
great care to deliver the dissidents safely. 
52 Prokhanov, “Dvorets,” 9: 18–19. 
53 On the eve of the operation, Khakimov—a private who, in the second chapter of the novel, is the victim 
of brutal hazing by his fellow soldiers—attempts to commit suicide by blowing himself up with a 
grenade. Kalmykov saves his life by talking him down, but the brief event does suggest that the battalion 
is not simply, uniformly, resolute. It reminds us that these soldiers are real people, with complicated 
emotional lives and secret doubts about the roles they are playing in Kabul. 
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Amin.”54 But while the Afghan soldiers drink glass after glass of vodka, the Soviet soldiers pour 
only water into their own glasses. Kalmykov’s friend Valekh gives another impassioned speech 
about Afghan and Soviet friendship, and Kalmykov looks down at Valekh’s watch that he is 
wearing. In all, it is difficult not to feel qualms about such sly subterfuge. (The Soviet plan to 
remove the Afghan palace guards is spoiled, however, when their commanding officer becomes 
suspicious and makes them leave.) Kalmykov and his battalion are left with no choice but to 
attack the Palace Guard, the Afghan soldiers whom they had befriended. When night falls the 
next day, and the attack begins, Kalmykov tries to strengthen his resolve by repeating something 
that one of his soldiers had said when he learned of the new operation to attack the Palace: 
“Everyone, damn it, should have his own Spain, his own Czechoslovakia, his own Cuba!” The 
sentiment had seemed “courageous and righteous” to him at the time, as it “made him a 
participant in the heroic events of the past, bringing glory to the army and the government.” 
Facing the attack on the Palace and its guards, however, suddenly it rings hollow: “now these 
words and ideas seemed good-for-nothing [nekchemnymi], as though the night wind had blown 
the living content out from them [and] left a meaningless, drained shell [pustoporozhniuiu 
produvaemuiu skorlupu].”55 Kalmykov is a true and loyal Soviet soldier, devoted to bringing 
“glory” to his army and his government, but even he questions the righteousness of the Soviet 
“intervention” in Afghanistan and regrets the harm he causes the Palace’s defenders. 
 
ALEXANDER DUGIN AND NEO-EURASIANISM 
 
When Kalmykov’s plane touches down in Afghanistan, “in his bones he felt the meeting 
                                               
54 Prokhanov, “Dvorets,” 9: 23. 
55 Ibid., 9: 25–26. 
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with the foreign land [...] which gave him a place among its plants, the spirits of the wind and 
stars.”56 The Soviet soldiers set up camp in the desert until their Afghan Army counterparts 
arrive from Kabul, and Kalmykov lies down to sleep. Cool currents of air sneak into the gaps in 
his cloths, chilling his chest, and suddenly transporting him into a strange new relationship with 
the land around him: 
The breath of the foreign land covered him, and he, through this breathing, was 
connected to the mysterious forces of the East. To the ancient burials. To the remnants of 
the old foundations. To the treasures of ancient monies. The land, belonging to other 
people, bearing on itself countless generations of unknown people to take back their 
withered dust – this land is connected to him, Kalmykov. He sniffed with his rough dry 
nostrils as though he were an unseen nocturnal beast. He sniffed the iron machine, the 
lubrication of the weaponry, sleeping in the compartments of the soldiers. He 
investigated, in a beast’s way, the odors of the outsiders, tried to guess where they came 
from, what to expect from them. Motionless, numb, feeling the rough, cold contact with 
the earth, Kalmykov felt an affinity for her and at the same time, fear, curiosity, and 
alienation, as though to a mighty being who will either accept him with friendship, will 
be reconciled to his appearance, or will reject, destroy, turn him into a handful of bone 
meal, mixed with stones and dust.57 
 
Kalmykov’s apparent spiritual connection to Afghanistan is as profound as it is unexpected; 
despite several supernatural moments that have already occurred in the novel (and will be 
discussed in greater detail in the next section) there has been no obvious foreshadowing that the 
seasoned officer would be so affected by this particular place. He appears to inhabit the spirit of 
the country, which is personified as a “beast;” he experiences what it sees and smells as it 
investigates the “foreign” camp and military vehicles.  
The next scene continues in the same vein, reinforcing the sense that Afghanistan, for 
some reason, holds particular importance for the Russian soldier. When Kalmykov wakes up to a 
sunny, shining morning, he looks off in the direction of a mud-brick village and sees an Afghan 
                                               
56 Ibid., 7: 21. 
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man riding a donkey: 
A donkey was walking along the road, its rider in a turban and long-skirted clothes; he 
turned a swarthy black-bearded face toward the military vehicles, and drove the donkey 
on with a twig. 
 With a greedy young look, Kalmykov took in the sunny mountains, the village, 
the black-bearded rider. “Afghanistan,” he said [proiznes]. And from this sight and the 
sound of the pronounced word, he became restless [trevozhno] and cheerful. The newness 
of the landscape [landshaft], unlike anything else, flustered [volvovala] and cheered 
him.58 
 
At first, this seems like run-of-the-mill Orientalism, the exoticism of the East. There is the 
stereotypical emphasis on the Afghan man’s turban and garb, his black beard and “swarthy” 
complexion, his use of a donkey and twig (rather than the European variant of a horse and whip). 
However, when Kalmykov speaks aloud the country’s name—it is the first time that the word 
“Afghanistan” appears in the novel—it is as though he is invoking something sacred. Even more 
significant is Prokhanov’s use of the word “landshaft” for landscape (instead of “peizazh”), and 
it relates to the deep connection that Kalmykov feels with Afghanistan. In fact, Prokhanov never 
uses the word “peizazh” anywhere in the novel. Instead, the word “landshaft” is repeated twice 
more, both times in reference to the Palace, at the end of Chapter Thirteen—the day before 
Kalmykov must lead the attack: “He lay behind the canvas canopy, holding in his mind the entire 
surrounding landscape with the Palace [emphasis mine]. [...] The Palace seemed a huge heavenly 
body, hovering over the misty landscape of the earth [emphasis mine].”59 Beams of light reflect 
off the Afghan landscape—the icy slopes—to “penetrate” Kalmykov’s eye sockets, blood, and 
breathing.  
I argue that Prokhanov explores a deep spiritual connection between Russia and 
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Afghanistan for the first time in The Palace due to his new acquaintance with Alexander Dugin, 
who endows special meaning onto the word “landshaft” in his Neo-Eurasianist writing. 
Prokhanov had been editor-in-chief of the ultra-nationalist weekly newspaper Den' since its 
founding in December 1990. In 1991, at the height of the newspaper’s influence, Dugin emerged 
as one of the leading and most prolific ideologists writing for Den'. He would continue to play a 
special role in Prokhanov’s next newspaper, Zavtra, which was founded in November 1993 
immediately after Yeltsin banned Den', and which is still active in Russia today.60 Dugin’s 
articles in Prokhanov’s newspaper greatly contributed to the dissemination of Neo-Eurasianist 
theories in Russian nationalist circles in the early 1990s; since then, the doctrine of Neo-
Eurasianism has become fairly mainstream in Russia, and Dugin seems to exert real influence on 
certain military and political circles, including parts of the presidential administration.61 He 
draws on the theories of both classical Eurasianists from the early twentieth century (i.e., Lev 
Gumilev, Nikolai Trubetskoi, Petr Savitsky, etc.) and proto-Europeanists (i.e., Halford John 
Mackinder) that divide the world into sea-based (“thalassocracies”) versus land-based 
(“tellurocracies”) powers. It is largely through Dugin, for example, that the Eurasianist terms 
ethnos (etnos) and passionarity (passionarnost’) entered post-Soviet political discourse and 
became part of the coded language in the dog whistle politics of Russia today.62 The term 
“ethnos” refers to the ethnic element that defines an ethnic group. Gumilev argued for an 
                                               
60 See Dunlop, The Rise of Russia, 169–77. 
61 Marlène Laruelle, Russian Eurasianism: An Ideology of Empire, trans. Mischa Gabowitsch (Baltimore: 
The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2008), 11. 
62 For example, President Vladimir Putin slipped the term “passionarnost'” and a reference to Lev 
Gumilev into his annual address to the federal assembly in 2016. See Charles Clover, “Lev Gumilev: 
Passion, Putin and Power,” Financial Times, March 11, 2016, https://www.ft.com/content/ede1e5c6-
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organization of ethnic groups as super-ethnos, ethnos, and sub-ethnos; he regarded Russians, for 
example, as a super-ethnos. Gumilev’s concept of “passionarity” refers to the level of activity 
spent on expansion (i.e., the conquering other lands) that is typical for an ethnic group at a given 
moment in time. Both the terms “ethnos” and “passionarity” appear frequently on the pages of 
Zavtra.63  
Dugin links these ideas to several binaries that have been common in Russian intellectual 
history for centuries: West versus East, Western Christianity versus Orthodoxy, democracy 
versus ideocracy, individualism versus collectivisim, and societies marked by change versus 
societies marked by continuity. Tapping into the vein of Russian exceptionalism, Dugin divides 
the world into four civilizational zones: the American zone, the Afro-European zone, the Asian-
Pacific zone, and the Eurasian zone. There are water empires (thalassocracies) and land empires 
(tellurocracies) within each zone; for example, in the Afro-European zone, Germany is a 
tellurocracy and Britain a thalassocracy. The four civilization zones are further broken down into 
different classifications according to landscape, or landshaft. Among land empires, for example:  
[...] it is possible to distinguish between the civilization of the Steppe and the civilization 
of the Forest, the civilizations of the Mountains and the civilization of the Valleys, the 
civilization of the Desert and the civilization of the Ice. Varieties of the landscape 
[landshafta] in sacred geography are understood as symbolic complexes associated with 
the specifics of the state, religious, and ethical ideology of certain peoples.64 
 
He goes on to argue that mountains and trees are priestly images, whereas a small or medium hill 
in the steppe or desert (or its northern variation, the tundra) represents the seat of royal power, 
                                               
63 Just in the period between the shelling of the White House in October 1993 and the publication of The 
Palace in July 1994, for example, Dugin authors at least five articles. In March 1994, a new rubric 
appears in the newspaper, titled simply “Evraziia.” 
64 Aleksandr Dugin, Osnovy geopolitiki: geopoliticheskoe budushchee Rossii (Moscow: “Arktogeia”, 
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the center of the land empire. The empires of the Desert and the Steppe should “logically be 
geopolitical base of a tellurocracy.” The specific elements of a landscape, therefore, are quite 
literally sacred. Furthermore, as a land-based power, Russia should ally itself with fellow 
tellurocracies. Dugin pays special attention to Iran, a tellurocracy that he admires for its moral 
rigor and presents as “one of the few real forces of opposition against American globalization, 
and he invites it to unify the entire Arab world, as well as Pakistan and Afghanistan, under its 
leadership.”65 Dugin is the only Neo-Eurasianist to include in his political project the whole 
former socialist bloc, not only the Baltic states. In fact, he argues that the Eurasian empire, led by 
Russia, should expand beyond Soviet space to incorporate Manchuria, Xinjiang, Tibet, 
Mongolia, and the Balkans, extending right up to the Indian Ocean. In one of his earliest pieces 
calling for the formation of the Eurasian empire, published in the newspaper Den' in 1992, he 
discusses the important role of Colonel General Sergei Matveevich Shtemenko, who was the key 
figure of the Eurasian geopolitical lobby in the USSR after World War II. In 1948, Dugin points 
out, Shtemenko insisted on the special geopolitical role of Afghanistan, which would allow the 
USSR to gain access to the Ocean and strengthen the military power of the Soviet fleet in the 
Black and Mediterranean Seas.66 
Coming from a military family, Dugin regularly asserts that only the army and the secret 
services have a real sense of patriotism.67 His writing is filled with a strong military symbolism. 
In his 2004 book The Philosophy of War, for example, he says:  
The value of peoples, cultures, and societies is proved in war and through it... The 
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beautiful is what has as its foundation the accomplishment of self-affirmation. War 
renews Man, and the price to pay for this gigantic personal effort confirms his adherence 
to the community. War has always been a collective business, having as its goal the 
conservation of the people and the state, the increase of their power, of their space, and of 
their life regions. Herein lies the social and national significance of war.68 
 
Unlike Prokhanov, Dugin has not written very much specifically about the Soviet-Afghan War.  
Prokhanov has supported and agreed with Dugin’s promotion of Eurasianism as the main 
political theory and even ideology of the new Russian Federation from at least the early 1990s, 
when Prokhanov and Dugin worked together at Den' and then Zavtra.69 In Den', with the tagline 
“journal of spiritual opposition,” Prokhanov “promoted Eurasianiam in the belief that it could 
unite a ‘spiritual opposition.’ He evoked an alliance with the Arab-Muslim world against the 
West, with a messianic outlook.”70 Speaking to his biographer, Prokhanov declares that “the fate 
of Russia for a long time has flowed together with the fate of Eastern peoples, and a mighty, one 
of the main ones, vector of Russian history looks to the East. In today’s multifaceted power is 
united a common history, well-tried Revolution and Great War, a great many different peoples, 
including eastern peoples, who have fed from a common tree, cultivated in the middle of three 
oceans.”71 Presumably the three oceans that Prokhanov has in mind are the Pacific, the Arctic, 
and the Indian. This is important, because, in Neo-Eurasianist terms, the Atlantic Ocean would 
connote the West and, in particular, the United States. Whereas Russia, as leader of the 
“Eurasian” civilization, is pitted against the “Atlanticist” civilization, led by the United States. 
                                               
68 Dugin, Filosofiia voiny, back cover. Quoted in Laruelle, Russian Eurasianism, 135. 
69 Laruelle, Russian Eurasianism, 109. (Later, Laurelle continues, Prokhanov would condemn 
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Prokhonov’s particular interest in Dugin’s neo-Eurasianist theories explains smaller 
points in the novel, as well as the larger theme of connection between the Russian and Afghan 
land and people. His main character’s surname, for example, has clear Turkic origins. Kalmykov 
brings to mind the Kalmyk people, whose ancestors migrated from Dzungaria in 1607 to create 
the Kalmyk Khanate in 1630 in Russia’s North Caucasus territory. Today they form a majority in 
the autonomous republic of Kalmykia on the western shore of the Caspian Sea. To the south, 
Kalmykia borders with the Republic of Dagestan. For Prokhanov, the Kalmyk people may also 
evoke the 1993 constitutional crisis. In April 1994, Prokhanov published on the front page of his 
newspaper Zavtra his interview with Kirsan Iliumzhinov, the then 32-year-old newly-elected 
President of Kalmykia. Iliumzhinov went to Moscow in October 1993 “not as a businessman or a 
politician, but as a normal, honest citizen of our multi-national Russia.”72 After speaking at 
length about what Iliumzhinov witnessed when the White House was stormed, Prokhanov asks 
him to speak about the Kalmyk “ethnos,” a term closely associated with Gumilev’s concept of 
Eurasianism: “you presented your “Steppe Code of Justice” [i.e., the Constitution of Kalmykia, 
adopted earlier that month] which, as I understand it, is not a law, but a national commandment, 
accumulating in itself the traditions of the steppe, the ethnos, the cultural-religious philosophy of 
Kalmyks. Tell me about this action of yours. What kind of mystery lies conceals at the bottom of 
it [...]?” Iliumzhinov’s answer is focused on politics, so Prokhanov pushes him in the next 
question to focus on the “ethnos”:  
“The Kalmyks are an enormous, great, outgoing ethnos with roots in antiquity, and for 
me the Kalmyk steppes, Kalmykia is a metaphor of the great migrations of peoples with 
their own culture [prakul’turoi], their own cosmos, their own ethnic mystery, which 
slowly appears in the world, giving rise to newer and newer forms of perception and 
imagination. And Kalmyks survived a national catastrophe: one half was expelled with a 
hit across the limits of the Union, into China—the other [half] endured persecution. 
                                               
72 “Ia znal, chto idu pod obstrel,” Zavtra no. 14, April 1994, 1. 
 167 
Kalmyks carry within themselves, in their genesis are the features of a warrior, a 
herdsman, a monk, a man of fervent prayer. They were the first, as we know, who entered 
Paris in 1814. 
The Kalmyk worldview demands that leaders constantly engage them in dialogue, 
constantly pay attention to the culture of the people. I heard that in the republic they have 
very interesting innovations connected with the revival of religions. You are a person 
who is oriented toward politics, to constitutional work, commerce, business, but, in my 
opinion, there are also vertical components in you: you perceive the world as a mystery, 
as an irrational thing. How do you perceive this mysteriousness of the universe 
[mirozdaniia] and how is it realized in your culture and religious politics?73 
 
In his reply, Ilkiumzhinov highlights the conflict in the Kalmyk ethnic character, that Kalmyks 
“on the one hand are warriors, but on the other, there is the Buddhist religion, it has the quality of 
peacemaking [mirotvorcheskaia].” But then, as before, Iliumzhinov focuses more on the political 
realities and life of Kalmykia rather than thoughts about the metaphysical nature of the 
Kalmykian “ethnos.” In his final question, Prokhanov tries one more time.  
“You, as a Buddhist, as a person of that Eastern outlook [mirosozertsanie] should not feel 
the catastrophic quality [katastrofichnost’] of the world. For the European consciousness, 
the world is divided into good and evil, and between them rages a battle, moving closer to 
the end of the world, apocalypse, explosion. For a person of Eastern culture, such as for a 
Buddhist, there is no catastrophe, no end of the world, none of this global drama. There 
everything is much more subtle, softer, as though more endless. As a politician, do you 
feel the catastrophic quality of our era?”  
 
Iliumzhinov agrees with Prokhanov that, as a Kalmyk, he does not feel the “catastrophic quality 
of our era,” but then—once again—he returns to his favorite topic of sovereignty, and why he 
abolished the Constitution of Kalmykiia to pledge loyalty to the Russian Federation. He asks 
what will happen if Kalmykia becomes independent, along with Dagestan, etc. Whereas they 
would be weak on their own, they can all be strong together, as citizens of one nation. Although 
Iliumzhinov does not follow Prokhanov where he clearly wants to go—into a discussion of the 
Kalmyk ethnos—he does repeatedly argue for the political relationship between Russians and the 
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other (Turkic) ethnicities that Prokhanov and Dugin want to see, with Russia as the natural leader 
and the other ethnicities in line behind it. 
 In this period of close collaboration with Dugin, as has been discussed above, Prokhanov 
wrote two novels, The Last Soldier of the Empire (1993) and The Palace (1994). Whereas the 
former follows the events of the failed August 1991 coup and is written in much the same 
straightforward style as Prokhanov’s Soviet-era novels, The Palace represents Prokhanov’s first 
foray into a new literary style. For the first time, he uses fiction as a vehicle for the ideology and 
associations of Dugin’s neo-Eurasianism. This is evident in Kalmykov’s reaction to the ancient 
traditions and culture of Afghan life, as well as to the “sacred geography” of Afghanistan’s 
landscape. At a bazaar in Kabul, for example, Kalmykov is able to forget that he arrives with his 
battalion in a convoy of armored military vehicles. He found himself “in a different, fairytale 
time, where people dress in ancient clothes, have not forgotten ancient crafts and skills, bake 
primate bread, mint copper, pour the blood of sacrificial animals. He was happy and grateful to 
someone for letting him into this Asian congregation, this ancient ecumenical haggling.”74  
Later, when the Soviet and Afghan soldiers are sitting together at a feast, eating rice and 
mutton, drinking vodka, another important point of connection, of “brotherhood,” between 
Russia and Afghanistan presents itself: music. When the Soviet soldier Rasulov picks up a guitar 
and sings a typical Afghan “bard” song (“afganskuiu pesniu”), amateur war ballads composed by 
Soviet soldiers in Afghanistan. Ruslan’s “tongue-tied, hastily composed song evoked admiration 
from the Afghans,” who slapped the table, snapped their fingers, and clicked their tongues along 
to the music.75 Next, the Afghan soldiers stood up and sang their own war songs, “straining their 
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breasts, shaking their heads in the same way, prophesied, skipped, groaned a war hymn, in which 
steadfastness, courage, readiness to march in battle columns resounded.”76 Listening to them, 
Kalmykov’s heart “quivered, squeezed in pain, as it did when he listened to the songs of some 
bygone war.”77 After the Afghan finish their song, by some “invisible consent,” all of the men—
Soviet and Afghan—close their eyes and sing “Podmoskovnye vechera” (“Evenings Around 
Moscow”), one of the Soviet songs best known in the USSR at the time.78 Both sides “rejoice at 
the opportunity to say the same words, experience the same feelings.” 
Kalmykov did not like this sentimental, over-sung song. But, listening to it here in Kabul, 
among the pre-winter hills, where the rebel is hiding with a rifle, bullets are rushing and 
dead people are falling, he suddenly felt an acute tenderness towards those singing. The 
many-voices chorus combined them into a brotherhood in arms, in fate, in military 
allotment. 
His soul, burdened by worries and forebodings, rushed to the radiant space, 
remote into infinity. He felt the lightening-like growth of his soul, experienced an 
extraordinary ecstasy and tenderness. From his chest, from his heart, tore a rapid light-
bearing [svetonosnyi] beam [luch], through the shaggy fabric of his uniform, through the 
mud walls of the barracks, the gorges of the mountains, the dim nighttime clouds—
upwards, into infinity. There, in this immensity, it found and touched the nameless, 
limitless, miraculous, and went back, into his chest, into the gloomy barracks. The 
officers were singing [...] and he could not understand where he had just visited, and 
what, for a moment, his soul had met.79 
 
This odd metaphysical event that occurs after Kalmykov feels such close kinship with the 
Afghan soldiers reflects another important influence on Prokhanov, and indeed much of post-
Soviet Russian society in the 1990s. With the fall of the Soviet Union, the unofficial ban on 
                                               
76 Ibid. 
77 Ibid. 
78 The song was recorded for a documentary about the athletic competition Spartakiad of the Peoples of 
the RSFSR. It gained considerable popularity thanks to radio broadcasts; in 1957, the song won the 
international song contest and the first prize at the 6th World Festival of Youth and Students held in 
Moscow. 
79 Prokhanov, “Dvorets,” 7: 37. 
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religion also fell, followed by a sudden surge of interest in all sorts of spiritual and supernatural 
beliefs, including mysticism, folklore, and paganism. 
 The idea of a brotherhood-in-arms is important in most war stories, and it was certainly a 
key element in Prokhanov’s earlier novels on the Afghan War, but here there is this new layer of 
mysticism laid over top the idea of Soviet-Afghan brotherhood, where images of beams of light 
or balls of energy represent the spirit or the soul, and are used to suggest that this brotherly union 
of cultures can lead one to the heights of spiritual ecstasy and understanding. There are examples 
in the text of straight-forward “orientalism,” the type of exoticisms one often encounters in 
stories about the East, but there are more examples that, rather than simple orientalism, describe 
Kalmykov’s spiritual affinity for the Afghan land, city, and people. 
 
KALMYKOV’S SOUL:  
RUSSIAN ORTHODOXY, PAN-SLAVIC PAGANISM, NEW-AGE MYSTICISM 
 
 Prokhanov recalls that his first book, Idu v put’ (I’m On My Way), was “dedicated to the 
beautiful myth of the Russian past. It is mythological, connected with the Russian ethnos—
folklore, religion, faith, early paganism.”80 His use of the phrase “Russian ethnos” (emphasis 
mine) in this 1994 interview signals his preoccupation with Dugin’s ideology of neo-
Eurasianism. The quoted passage also demonstrates the importance of a mixture of spiritual 
beliefs to Prokhanov’s concept of Russianness, the defining characteristics of the Russian soul—
it includes paganism as well as Christian Orthodoxy. This synthetic approach to the religious part 
to Russian identity can be discerned in Prokhanov’s description of the 1993 constitutional crisis, 
as well. Taking Danilkin on a tour around the White House, recounting memories of the crisis, 
                                               
80 Rougle and Rich, “Aleksandr Prokhanov,” 18. 
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Prokhanov stops in a small wooded area and points to a flag made from “red material, black-
white-and-yellow material, and something else.” Prokhanov explains its importance: 
Here, where we stand is an important, mystical place. This is a commemorative 
memorial. We thought that on the barricades of the House of Soviets were united those 
who could not be united, the red and white ideology. This tree, I call it the pagan 
[iazycheskim] tree, bereginia, the days of commemoration [of the dead] bedecked in 
ribbons [lentochkami]. This paganism—here are ribbons, there, too, and there—
symbolizes the party of the greens, the black Veneti: in the patriotic movement there was 
a strong anti-Christian tendency. Next to the pagan tree—a commemorative chapel, a 
cross, to all the innocent martyrs. And there is a miniature of the barricades, made from 
the same materials, as those used in 1993. Slabs, broken from the asphalt, assembled, 
turnstiles, which enclosed our meetings, a lot of barbed wire, “Bruno’s spiral” 
[Concertina wire, or coiled razor wire], now there is less, someone’s filched it. [...] This 
barricade symbolizes the red aspect of the resistance. That is, the pagan tree plus the 
Christian chapel plus the red barricade. The unification of various objects that, together, 
form a whole...” 81 
 
Prokhanov emphasizes elements of paganism, Orthodoxy, and Communism that, in his mind, 
must work together to combat the forces of liberalism in Russia. This is a similar amalgamation 
of disparate symbols and values to the one we find in his 1994 novel, The Palace. 
This certainly fits in with the anti-modern layer to Dugin’s ideology, but, in truth, 
Prokhanov’s fascination with otherworldliness—from pagans to priests—goes beyond Dugin’s 
traditionalism. The Palace opens with a full paragraph-long meditation on the origin of the soul: 
Sometimes, in rare moments of loneliness and quiet, he tried to imagine where, from 
what depth his soul had emerged. From what indistinct flickering fog had it swum into 
life. On the tiny specks of memory, on the fleeting corpuscles of light, he was 
reconstructing [vosstanavlival] the moment of his own appearance. He clung to infantile 
fragile images, listened to weak echoes, tried to discern, to catch the line beyond which a 
separate, tangible, sensible—he himself emerged from a vague, indistinguishable whole. 
Removing memories, retreating into the past, into adolescence, into childhood, he seemed 
to be carried away on the thinnest light ray, burst into the smoky impenetrable cloud from 
                                               
81 Danilkin, Chelovek s iatsom, 487–88. According to ancient Slavic paganism, Bereginia is the Great 
Goddess, or spirit, that produced all things, a combination of “hearth-mother,” associated with the 
guardianship, of the family, of women, and even of the nation itself. 
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which he emerged. The sparkling infinity seemed to him behind this mist and fog. There, 
in this vast glitter, passing through the twilight, his soul will return82. 
 
Why does Prokhanov decide to begin his novel about the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in this 
way? To prepare the reader for a work that is primarily a vehicle for exploring Prokhanov’s take 
on an emerging ultra-rightwing ideology that promotes a Russian-led Eurasian empire founded 
on geographic as well as spiritual associations. Neo-Eurasianism as conceived by Dugin is 
mainly based on pseudo-historical arguments and pseudo-political science; Prokhanov, however, 
complements the historical-political side of his ideological argument with the symbolism of an 
extremely synthetic approach to spirituality that includes elements of paganism and Christianity, 
as well as mysticism and the occult. Several scholars have investigated the occult as a significant 
trend in post-Soviet Russian literature.83 Prokhanov, it seems, was attuned to this trend. The 
continuous subplot of The Palace centers on Kalmykov’s soul, his endeavor to understand it, and 
his meditations on the otherworldly bonds between his soul and others. 
  Almost every chapter in the book begins or ends with Kalmykov’s memories of his 
grandmother, his mother (less often), or his father (least often)—all of whom have died. Their 
ghosts haunt the pages of Prokhanov’s novel about the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan; 
Kalmykov, facing a major military operation, becomes fixated on the afterlife. In the beginning 
of the novel, we learn that Kalmykov’s father died when he was so young that he almost cannot 
                                               
82 Prokhanov, “Dvorets,” 7: 3. 
83 For more on the occult in Russian culture, see Valentina Brougher, “The Occult in Russian Literature of 
the 1990s,” The Russian Review 56, no. 1 (January 1997): 110–24; Bernice Glatzer Rosenthal, ed., The 
Occult in Russian and Soviet Culture (Cornell: Cornell University Press, 1997); Keith Livers, “The 
Tower or the Labyrinth: Conspiracy, Occult, and Empire-Nostalgia in the Work of Viktor Pelevin and 
Aleksandr Prokhanov,” Russian Review 69 (July 2010): 477–503, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-
9434.2010.00577.x; and Birgit Menzel and Michael Hagemeister, The New Age of Russia: Occult and 
Esoteric Dimensions, ed. Bernice Glatzer Rosenthal (Berlin: Peter Lang, 2012). 
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remember him; he was raised by his mother and grandmother. His outer world was his mother 
and grandmother; his father filled his “inner world,” his “soul.” Many of his memories drift into 
mystical reveries about where his father, mother, and grandmother reside in death—or, he 
sometimes thinks, perhaps they are not truly dead, after all. On the anniversary of his father’s 
death, for example, he takes a trip on skis into a snowy forest, and it seems to him that his father 
is watching him from the “misty white sun.” When Kalmykov comes across a tiny hut (izba) in 
the forest, he enters it. His glance around the single room registers a silver icon with a painted 
egg and a paper rose. The thought suddenly occurs to him that his father has not died, but was 
living in this “God-forgotten hut.”84 Leaving the hut and reentering the forest, Kalmykov sees a 
fox; their eyes meet, and “this is his father, turned into a fox, come out to meet him.” The fox 
tells him “there is no death,” and that they—father and son—will meet again “in the wonderful 
long-awaited winter,” presumably when Kalmykov dies and is reincarnated as a fox, like his 
father. The passage reflects a synthesis of Orthodox beliefs (icon, painted egg), Russian folklore 
(izba), and Slavic paganism (reincarnation) that was not uncommon in Russian culture in the 
1990s.85 
 In memories of his mother, Kalmykov thinks with sort of exaggerated wonder that so 
much of what he is had come from his mother. Looking at his mother when she was ill, nearing 
the end of her life, he thinks with amazement that he, “his breath, muscles, thoughts, really came 
from these powerless hands, from these half-closed puffy eyes, from her flesh, bones, breath.”86 
                                               
84 Prokhanov, “Dvorets,” 8: 29. 
85 In Slavic mythology, Anapel is the Slavic goddess of reincarnation; her name means “little 
grandmother.” 
86 Prokhanov, “Dvorets,” 7: 17. 
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The physical link between mother and child is represented in the refrain of “flesh, bones, and 
muscles” that will repeat itself in other contexts. On the eve of the operation to storm the Palace, 
Kalmykov looks at the soldiers in his battalion and thinks about the fact that “sharp hot metal” 
will tear and pierce their “bones, veins, and muscles.”87 (In the battle, Kalmykov’s “bones and 
muscles” are indeed “crushed.”88) The physical bond between Kalmykov and his mother extends 
to a cultural connection, as well. As an adult, Kalmykov realized that “everything that he had 
learned about his native history and culture was connected to his mother, her books, stories, and 
occasional travels together,” including Kuskovo Palace, the old dilapidated church in Razdory, 
and War and Peace with a description of the Battle of Austerlitz. Later, “if he happened to be in 
an old manor, or in a dilapidated village church, or open Pushkin or Chekhov, he immediately 
felt the presence of his mother, heard her voice, saw her face.”89 Kalmykov’s mother represents 
his spiritual, cultural, and physical connection to his “native history and culture.” 
Most of Kalmykov’s thoughts about the soul and the afterlife, however, are centered 
around his grandmother. When he is camping in the desert with his battalion on his first night in 
Afghanistan, for example, Kalmykov dreams about the stars and then about his grandmother, 
who had died but “who does not disappear to somewhere, but was simply moved from his 
childhood to these Asian lands, where he had arrived by plane. Here is her peacefulness and 
shelter, she quietly laughs and embraces her beloved grandson who has arrived by plane to 
her...”90 He also thinks about his grandmother, together with his mother, living in a hut in the 
                                               
87 Ibid., 9: 20. 
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Russian forest, and “he knew that he would not disappear anywhere, he would be here forever, in 
his native land.”91 Paganist fantasies about being one with nature and reincarnation aside, we 
know that his grandmother was secretly a Christian from the very beginning of the novel. In the 
first chapter, Kalmykov thinks about his grandmother’s mahogany table with an open volume of 
the Gospel on it.92 Toward the end of the novel, Kalmykov returns to the image of his 
grandmother as a Christian. As a young boy, he looked through the yellow burning crack in his 
room and saw his grandmother holding a small book of the gospels: 
Grandmother sighed, put the book to her chest, her face was pensive and dreamy. Her 
thoughts were hovering a distance from the cramped Moscow room, in other lands, where 
Christ entered the ancient city on a white donkey. The crowd rejoices, carpets spread on 
the ground, and his path is strewn with flowers.  
 He heard these gospel stories and parables from his grandmother in his childhood. 
They were not just stories, they were not entertainment, they were the stories of her own 
life, where something important, profound and instructive was being performed. 
 The wisdom of the words and deeds of those long-standing people served as a 
lesson and edification for his grandmother. She constantly studied, constantly compared 
her life with the behavior of those people. 
 For all his life he retained the conviction that there are rules on which to act, and 
these rules are written in a book with a gold edge. The grandmother acted according to 
these rules, and someone invisible who wrote the book was pleased with his 
grandmother. She raised her eyes to him, the invisible one, lying on the wooden bed with 
twisted spines at midnight in Moscow. 
 
In another flashback of his grandmother, he remembers the awe he experienced as a child, 
hearing her tell the ancient myths and legends of their family, thinking how those stories resonate 
with him even now.93 These constant shifts in time and place underscore a sense of spiritual 
connectivity and fluidity: these memories are consistently related in a highly emotional tone, 
                                               
91 Ibid., 8: 37. 
92 In the next paragraph, Prokhanov describes Kalmykov’s memory of his father’s library: “ancient color 
lithographs—Indian pagoda, Turkish minarets, pointed German gothic. An attractive mysterious world in 
which you can whirl away, turning into a sunbeam and slipping into the blue window opening.” 
93 Prokhanov, “Dvorets,” 9: 56. 
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with dramatic language; and what could be taken as ordinary events in a man’s life are instead 
described as supernatural, laden with mystical meaning and significances. 
In addition to the souls of his family, Kalmykov pays a great deal of attention the sun, 
moon, and stars. On the battalion’s flight into the Afghanistan, for example, Kalmykov walks 
into the pilots’ cabin: 
And the first thing he saw, still not seeing the crew in their headsets, or the dashboard 
with its dials and tumblers, the first thing that blinded him was the moon, huge, round, 
teary, like in droplets of white fat. It stood in the diamond-shaped glad, and it seemed that 
the plane had left Earth’s gravity, was moving toward the Moon, slowly approaching it. 
 The special forces battalion, loaded with weapons and armored vehicles, was 
flying to the moon on the instructions of the state. Among the waterless seas and cold 
craters, leaving on the whitish dust print of caterpillars and wheels, will circumnavigate 
the lunar desert, carrying out the order of the general. 
 
On his flight back home, leaving Afghanistan, Kalmykov remembers this moment when he had 
been flying in the opposite direction, and “the huge Moon was coming closer out of the black 
expanse, and it seemed liked the battalion was flying to the moon.” In Afghanistan, the sun is a 
constant presence, of course, but the most important reference in the context of this discussion is 
Kalmykov’s memory of a solar eclipse back home in Russia: 
The sun rose slowly, heavily, an egg falling out like a bloody shell in a liquid shell. [...] 
The sun began to fade, to turn black. Its edge was being eaten, it was consumed. A dull 
smoky shadow lay over the earth. He felt like his mind was terrified, he was touched by 
insanity. He wanted to run, hide from the wind, from the smoke of the dim light. [...] The 
horror that was in him was ancient, from the fading stars and luminaries, from the black 
sun, from which the heavy darkness was shed. The light, the oxygen of the earth, earthly 
life itself had ended. On all horizons and distances, cities and villages had been burned, 
half-naked people ran along the roads, carrying away their belongings and children, and 
they were caught up, bent, and the darkness fell. 
 
The solar eclipse—a common symbol for apocalypse—appears to send Kalmykov’s psyche back 
in time to some “ancient” pagan past, when Russia had been attacked. 
By several reports, superstition was common among Soviet soldiers in Afghanistan. As 
Artem Borovik observes in his book The Hidden War, “in Afghanistan people were often all too 
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ready to grab on to exorbitant superstition even though they might have denied it. People needed 
to see at least some measure of logic in the chaos of war.” He reported that—out of 
superstition—soldiers would attach toy parachutes to the antennas of their vehicles, so that their 
cars would not be swept away in an avalanche, and that soldiers would not say certain words or 
phrases that were considered bad omens. This is the kind of belief in the supernatural that we 
might expect but do not find in Prokhanov’s novel, The Palace. In addition to Kalmykov’s 
frequent (obsessive) meditations on the nature of the soul, there are several scenes with prophets 
and fortunetelling. When Kalmykov is still in Moscow at the beginning of the novel, he is lying 
in bed with his lover. (This is a woman whose memory will be constantly evoked throughout the 
novel, but who is never named, usually only referred to as “the woman.”) She has been 
chattering for a few pages, without one word of response from Kalmykov, when suddenly she 
reports that she recently received an anonymous letter from some kind of “prophetess” 
(prorochitsa), who wrote that there will be great misfortune for her, for Kalmykov, and for 
everyone. “There will be war,” the letter says, “and we will be burned and destroyed. And there 
will be pestilence, when everyone is dying from hunger and terrible diseases. And there will be 
another attack, when everyone is bickering, hating each other, turning upon one another. 
Something terrible is near, looking into every house, searching for its prey. There will be 
unhappiness. I don’t know what kind,” the woman says, “but it will happen!”94 This finally 
provokes Kalmykov’s first spoken words in the novel, as he assures his lover that “everything 
will be fine.” But the reader, knowing that this is a novel about the beginning of the nine-year-
long Soviet war in Afghanistan, and either experiencing firsthand or else also knowing the 
history of chaos in the 1990s in Russia, when this book was written, would find in this letter a 
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real sign of things to come—a clear and accurate prediction of catastrophe. This goes beyond the 
level of mere superstition that Borovik and others record in their writing about Afghanistan. 
Instead moments like these are approaching a kind of mysticism, where there is a spiritual 
understanding of the world and the future that is not based on rationality, science, or other 
observable factual phenomena. In fact, one of the main themes of this post-Soviet novel about 
the Afghan war is this concept of a mystical, otherworldly spiritual plane of existence—an 
altered state of consciousness that is somehow more true than the everyday reality, and that 
reveals the catastrophes lying in wait. Prokhanov promotes this idea through repeated references 
to prophets, fortune-telling, and divining the future—with a female figure often involved in 
providing the mystical connection, a conduit to that mystical realm. 
 Just before Kalmykov and his battalion will cross the border into Afghanistan, he and 
four officers attend a party hosted by Roza, a seductive Tatar woman who lives nearby and 
whose sole function seems to be to entertain the soldiers.95 On the eve of the men’s departure for 
the desert—still not knowing their precise mission—soldiers eat, they drink, they sing and play 
the guitar. Then a soldier calls for Roza to tell their fortunes, and she agrees, proclaiming, 
“You’re all tired of waiting! Listen, look into what you have before you! The cards know what 
lies ahead. I’ll tell your fortune with the cards!”96 She sashays over to a dressing table and pulls a 
deck of cards from the drawer. There are constant reminders of her femininity throughout the 
                                               
95 Roza is one of only two women to be named in the entire novel, and she is the only major female 
character to be named, which suggests that the name “Roza” holds some significance. It may refer to the 
“Roza” of Daniel Andreev’s Roza mira, which, although written in 1958, was not published until 1990. 
The book describes layers of spiritual reality that surround the world and foretells of a future religion, 
called Roza mira, that will unite all peoples and states. The connection between prophesies and women in 
The Palace also suggests the myth of Cassandra, who was cursed to utter prophecies that were true but 
that no one believed. 
96 Ibid., 7: 15. 
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passage: attention to her waist, her jewelry, her pink tongue licking her little lips, etc. She 
proclaims: “the cards know [your] fate!” as she lets the glossy cards drop onto the table. Roza 
looks at the cards and foretells that they will soon be on a long road leading to a rich ornate 
palace. Everyone will enter the palace, she says, but not everyone will come out the same, or at 
all. Then she goes around the room, telling the fortune of each of the four officers. When she 
asks Kalmykov if he wants to know his future, he refuses: there is no escape from fate, he says, 
but it is better not to know. 
 Throughout this scene, the narrative describes the strange sensations that Kalmykov 
experiences, particularly related to light and rays of light. For example, when Roza first takes out 
the deck of cards, Kalmykov felt as though the light flared from under the lampshade in the same 
way that the light shone in his head in response to the words of “the fortune-teller” and the 
glossy multi-colored cards. Later, after Roza has revealed everyone’s fortune—what will happen 
to them in the palace—Kalmykov thinks that the light flares again: the fruit on the platter shone 
with this light, the facets of the glasses glittered, and the faces of the officers were lit up in a 
transparent radiance. Then the narrative perspective expands beyond the officers and Roza’s 
apartment, flying over the barracks with sleeping soldiers, to the lot with parked military 
vehicles, to the desert sands printed with tracks of the transporter. And then suddenly back to the 
Roza, where “in the fortune-teller’s hand a tiny incorporeal mass assumed a round shape, a clot 
of super-dense energy.”97 This is one of countless examples of references to light, in the form of 
rays, beams or balls—such as the scene with Roza, or the scene with the Soviet and Afghan 
soldiers singing songs together, quoted at the end of the previous section. References to the bible, 
churches, or icons in the novel are reminders of Orthodoxy; references to the moon, sun, and 
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stars, to spiritual oneness with the natural world and reincarnation into wild animals, connote the 
older pan-Slavic pagan beliefs. The rays, beams, and balls of light—on the other hand—are a 
better fit for New Age mysticism. 
 
CONCLUSION 
Prokhanov seems to be satisfied with vague associations that, under a microscope, do not 
always line up. (For example, Roza’s memorable fortune-telling in the beginning of the novel is 
never revisited; apparently her mysterious predictions do not come true.) Prokhanov encourages 
his reader feel the connection between Afghanistan and Russia by making several associations: 
the invasion of Afghanistan with the 1993 shelling of the White House, in the terminology of 
Alexander Dugin’s neo-Eurasianism the shared “ethnos” of the Afghan and Russian peoples, and 
the novel’s subplot concerning the synthetic spirituality of Kalmykov’s soul, further suggestive 
of the deep spiritual bond between the all-important Russian soul and Afghanistan. Another 
significant association that Prokhanov makes in The Palace is the doomed fate that faces both 
Afghanistan and Russia, through a series of supernatural predictions of disaster and destruction. 
Above, I discussed the strange anonymous letter that Kalmykov’s lover receives from a 
prophetess, foretelling great suffering “for everyone.” As I mentioned, the Russian reader in 
1994 would certainly associate this prediction of suffering with the Soviet-Afghan war that is 
about to break out, but might also think of the Soviet Union’s demise and subsequent years of 
turmoil in Russia. This letter appears at the beginning of the novel, and speaks of unspecified, 
universal misfortune; however, there will be several moments throughout the book that 
emphasize a specifically Russian apocalypse. For example, the night before he learns that his 
new mission will be to attack the Palace, Kalmykov dreams that he is back home in Russia:  
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The motherland was in trouble and misfortune. Everything had gone back to a primitive 
way of life, everything was dying and collapsing. Over the black cold cities there was a 
red glow. It gleamed on the rails as he walked between frozen rusty train cars, and under 
the embankment, along the sticky swamps, wandered countless refugees. Among them 
was his mother, dressed in rags like a beggar, and an old man, leaning on a curved 
walking stick, and so many others, forgotten and familiar faces, like shadows, hunched, 
persecuted. Kalymkov moaned, tossing in his sleep, trying to get up. He knew that his 
place was there, in his dying native lands. There was work, service, sacrifice. He was 
ready to lay down his head for the old man’s haggard face, the little girl’s slender neck, 
the dilapidated mansion in an alley.98  
 
This dream clearly predicts the “catastrophes” coming for the Soviet Union, for Russia, 
alongside other predictions in the novel of catastrophe in Afghanistan. In contrast to his earlier 
Soviet-era writing, therefore, Prokhanov’s story about the Afghan war in his 1994 novel The 
Palace is remarkable for the extent to which he draws on mysticism to revise his narrative of the 
war. This supernatural interpretation of historical events foregrounds spiritual connections, 
represented by light beams, cosmic symbols, and the female as conduit, loosely associative of 
special affinities between Russian and Afghan peoples, civilizations, and cultures. Not least 
among these special affinities is the sense of intertwined destinies, and the intimation of tragic, 
apocalyptic fates that both Russia and Afghanistan will soon have to face. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
The Resurrection of Alexander Prokhanov’s Soviet-Afghan War:  
Authors, Readers, and the Ecstasy of Violence 
 
PROKHANOV THE PUBLITSIST 
The April Revolution in 1978 unexpectedly catapulted the leaders of the (pro-Soviet) 
People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan into the highest government offices. They 
immediately launched a campaign of violent repression, imprisoning and executing tens of 
thousands of people, and then embarked on a series of radical social and economic reforms. In 
response, protests erupted in villages and cities, most notably the Herat Uprising in March 1979, 
and threatened the new Communist government’s ability to retain control of the country. At the 
end of the year, Soviet troops entered Afghanistan under the guise of providing military aid. 
Instead of providing aid, however, special forces “liquidated” President Hafizullah Amin—who 
was suspected of working for the CIA—and Babrak Karmal was installed in his place. When 
Alexander Prokhanov arrived in Kabul the next month as a correspondent for Literaturnaia 
gazeta, many Soviet special forces had already returned home, victorious, but hundreds—and 
then thousands—of Soviet troops and civilians remained in Afghanistan to support the new 
regime. 
As was typical in Soviet journalism, Prokhanov’s works of publitsistika from Kabul 
conformed to the Kremlin’s narratives of what was happening in Afghanistan: the socialist 
revolution was alive and well, economic and social reforms were improving the lives of the 
grateful masses, and the mujahideen “bandits” were being secretly recruited, trained and funded 
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by outside powers (the United States).1 In contrast to more straightforward reporting, 
publitsistika is openly subjective and often has a personal perspective. It addresses contemporary 
issues with the aim to influence society’s opinion and political institutions, according to a social 
or moral ideal.2 The subgenre has long played an important role in Russian journalism, which—
like Russian literature, in general—traditionally has been preoccupied with finding Russia’s way 
to the ideal society. From 1980 to 1981, Prokhanov published about ten pieces of publitsistika in 
Literaturnaia gazeta about events in Afghanistan.  
In one article, Prokhanov quotes a political officer (a reliable conduit for the Kremlin’s 
message): “When we entered the country, the residents greeted us with fruit and cakes. I 
remember an old man crouched toward a tank and kissed the dusty car. [...] Our army does not 
interfere in the internal processes occurring in Afghanistan. The local reactionaries are repulsed 
by Afghan patriots, themselves.” Prokhanov observes the friendly, respectful interactions 
between the Soviet soldiers and the Afghan peasants. And, along the highway, behind a military 
vehicle, he sees “not a cannon, not a mortar-gun, but a tractor-truck pulling bales of grain.”3 In 
another report, he interviews an imprisoned “bandit,” who describes the training and weapons he 
received from Americans and Chinese at a base in Pakistan. For a moment, Prokhanov expresses 
dismay at the obstacles facing the communist cause in Afghanistan. Luckily, “the people’s 
                                               
1 The following articles by Alexander Prokhanov were all published in Literaturnaia gazeta during his 
first stint in Afghanistan: “Chto tvoriat bandity”, February 27, 1980, 9; “Vremia pakhoty i seva,” March 
19, 1980, 9; “Soldaty revoliutsii,” April 16, 1980, 14; “Edinye v revoliutsii,” May 17 1980, 14; “Na 
strazhe revoliutsii,” June 11, 1980, 9; “Vybor—revoliutsiia!” June 18, 1980, 14; “Pobedy trudnyi put',” 
December 24, 1980, 9; “Razgromlena banda,” January 7, 1981, 1; “Plemena i puli,” January 28, 1981, 9; 
“Za plugom,” February 11, 1981, 15. 
2 The most common example of publitsistika in Western journalism is the editorial. New Journalism could 
be considered a related offshoot. 
3 Prokhanov, “Vremia pakhoty i seva,” 9. 
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militia took up arms and stood in [the bandit’s] way.” He concludes with confidence: “For the 
revolution will prevail, no matter how it is hindered from outside.”4 With just a little help from 
Soviet troops and tractors, Prokhanov the publitsist assures his readers, the Afghan army and 
hardworking peasants will overcome any obstacle.  
His work as a correspondent in Kabul inspired his work as a novelist. He had been 
working on a novel about an architect, but he abandoned it to write a novel based on his 
experience in Kabul instead.5 Many of the new novel’s bucolic scenes (also involving tractors), 
descriptions of benevolent Soviet attention to the Afghan peasant, and amoral, hypocritical 
“bandits” seem to be taken straight out of Prokhanov’s works of publitsistika for Literaturnaia 
gazeta. In the 1980s Prokhanov applied his literary energy to writing that clearly exhibited the 
characteristics of publitsistika—even in his novels.6 In this mode, whether in newspapers or 
novels, Prokhanov communicated a clear, unambiguous message, so that his readers would know 
exactly what to think about the war: its causes and its goals, the heroes and the villains.  
 
THE ORIGINAL: 
TREE IN THE CENTER OF KABUL (1982) 
 
                                               
4 Ibid., Chto tvoriat bandity,” 9. 
5 Ibid., “Arkhitektor,” Literaturnaia gazeta, November 5, 1980, 7. The novel was to be called The Great 
City (Velikii gorod). 
6 Although Prokhanov was subsequently sent on assignment to other locales, he continued to write 
journalistic works about the Soviet-Afghan War. In 1983, for example, he wrote an opinion piece for 
Pravda entitled “The Revolution in Hindsight: A Word from a Publitsist,” in which he argued that the 
communist Saur Revolution in Afghanistan in April 1978 was “irreversible” (Aleksandr Prokhanov, “Pod 
pritselom—revoliutsiia,” Pravda, September 19, 1983, 6). When he returned to Afghanistan in 1985, he 
wrote “Zapiski iz bronia” (Literaturnaia gazeta, August 28, 1985, 14), “Formuly, gipotezy” 
(Literaturnaia gazeta, November 6, 1985, 6), and “Vyberem svet, a ne t'mu” (Pravda, October 24, 1985, 
4). His essay “Zapiski iz bronia” would later be incorporated into a novel with the same title. 
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During his first assignment as a correspondent in Afghanistan 1980-81, Prokhanov was 
also working on Tree in the Center of Kabul, his new novel about the first months of the Soviet-
Afghan War. In 1981 Literaturnaia gazeta Prokhanov would publish the first excerpt from his 
upcoming novel Tree in the Center of Kabul.7 In 1982, the full novel appeared in the literary 
journals Roman-gazeta and Oktiabr’.8 It was published in book form later that same year.9 In 
1983, an abridged version in English translation was published in the literary journal Soviet 
Literature.10 The plot of Tree in the Center of Kabul remains within the confines of the official 
Soviet narrative of the Soviet-Afghan War at that time: Soviet soldiers and citizens were in 
Kabul to conduct peaceful (non-combat) aid missions, in support of Afghanistan’s recent 
communist revolution. The story opens in the beginning of 1980 at the Soviet-Afghan border. 
Ivan Volkov, a Soviet journalist, and Said Ismail, an Afghan Communist Party (PDPA) activist, 
watch a cheering crowd of Russians and Soviet Uzbeks bid farewell to a convoy of tractors 
heading to southern Afghanistan as part of an aid package to the fledgling revolutionary 
government. Travelling independently to Kabul, Volkov encounters various characters 
representing different sides of the conflict. He attends a press conference for Babrak Karmal, 
where he meets Andre Vin’iar, a reporter from Le Monde.11 Later, he meets several Russians 
                                               
7 Prokhanov, “Vstrechi na Maivande,” Literaturnaia gazeta, April 22, 1981, 7. 
8 Ibid., “Derevo v tsentre Kabula,” Roman-gazeta, no. 15, 1982, 1–94; and “Derevo v tsentre Kabula,” 
Oktiabr, no. 1, 1982, 3–73 and no. 2, 1982, 74–137. 
9 Ibid., Derevo v tsentre Kabula (Moscow: Sovetskii pisatel', 1982). 
10 Alexander Prokhanov, A Tree in the Center of Kabul (abridged version), trans. Peter Greenwood and 
Holly Smith, Soviet Literature, no. 7 (1983): 3–129. 
11 Le Monde—a French daily newspaper—was the KGB’s key outlet for spreading anti-American and 
pro-Soviet disinformation to the French media. See Christopher Andrew and Vasilii Mitrokin, The 
Mitrokhin Archive: The KGB in Europe and the West (London: Penguin Books, 2000). 
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who will play important roles in his personal life: Marina Voronina, a secretary with whom he 
becomes romantically involved, and the historian Belousov, a former comrade whom he now 
disparages for lack of interest in contemporary political issues. He travels to Jalalabad, where he 
interviews enemy prisoners and watches the destruction of an enemy caravan by helicopter 
attack. Volkov returns to the capital just in time to witness an insurrection by the mujahedin 
rebels—presumably, this refers to the significant Kabul Revolt, which occurred on February 21, 
1979. Prokhanov, however, is more interested in describing the successful counterattack to the 
revolt: students, women, and soldiers take up arms to search the Old Town for the underground 
headquarters where bombs are being made. By the end of the novel, Said Ismail has persuaded 
the mullahs in Herat to forego a holy war against the Soviet-backed government, and the tractors 
arrive safely at their rural destination under the gaze of Volkov and Voronina. 
Reversing the war story topos of “fraternization with the enemy,” Prokhanov’s novel 
emphasizes, above all, the profound connection between the Soviet and Afghan peoples, on 
several levels. An excerpt of the novel, which appeared in Literaturnaia gazeta in 1981, was 
accompanied by an editor’s introduction that drew readers’ attention to the history of a long 
diplomatic relationship between the Soviet Union and Afghanistan. 
Sixty years ago, in his message to Afghanistan, Lenin wrote: “The Russian Soviet 
government and the High Afghan state have common interests in the East, both 
governments value their independence and want to see to see each other and all peoples 
of the East independent and free. Both states bring together not only the above-mentioned 
circumstances, but also the particularity that between Afghanistan and Russia there are no 
issues that could cause disagreement and throw even a shadow on the Russian-Afghan 
friendship. The old imperialist Russia has disappeared forever. The northern neighbor of 
the High Afghan State is the new Soviet Russia, which has extended the hand of 
friendship and brotherhood to all the peoples of the East and to the Afghan people first of 
all.” 
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 This Leninist covenant has defined the mutual relations between the Soviet state 
and Afghanistan all of the ensuring six decades. Just as it determines today’s Soviet-
Afghan friendship.12 
 
It quotes selections from a letter (poslanie) that Vladimir Lenin sent Amanulla-Khan, the Emir of 
Afghanistan, in April 1921. Then Prokhanov describes the “acute social fracture” that he 
witnessed firsthand in Afghanistan as a correspondent, and that the consequence of these trips 
was “my new novel, where I have tried to summarize everything I saw.”  
The friendship between nations is symbolized already in the novel’s opening pages. A 
parade of blue tractors, built by Soviet workers in Minsk, then transported down to Uzbekistan 
on the Soviet Union’s southern border, crosses the Amu Darya River into Afghanistan. Nil 
Timofeevich Ladov, a Soviet engineer  and agriculture expert who will help teach Afghan 
peasants how to use the tractors looks “first at the machines, as though to count them, then across 
the river to the Afghan shore, to the longed for and restless distance.”13 The movement of 
tractors across the border could be considered a transgression, analogous to the invasion of 
Russian troops, but Prokhanov is careful to frame the event as a friendly and welcomed act. The 
welcoming attitude of the Afghans is underscored already in the next paragraph, which 
introduces the Afghan hero, the political agitator Said Ismail, who is present at the “friendly 
meeting” and “happily looked at the rows of tractors, he could not tear himself away from the 
sleek glass, the bright painted steel.” The repeated emphasis on the aesthetic beauty of these 
machines—as shapely, sleek, and bright—reflects the “poetry of science,” a common theme in 
                                               
12 Prokhanov, “Vstrechi na Maivande,” 7. 
13 Ibid., Derevo v tsentre Kabula, 3. 
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Soviet literature that extols the aesthetic beauty of technology and scientific investigation.14 Said 
Ismail speaks to the assembled Soviet and Afghan citizens about “two people-brothers [dva 
naroda-brata] [who] are on a single path, one ahead, the other almost treading on him. And the 
one walking ahead turned back, stretched a hand to his brother, and squeezed it, delivered the 
gift of tractors.”15 Then, symbolically, Nil Timofeevich, Said Ismail, the director, and the dock 
worker all walk together over to the tractors to write the word “friendship” in red paint on the 
roof of the first tractor, along with their signatures: “it was as though they were writing a letter to 
those who were waiting for these tractors in the faraway, unknown place.”16 Later, in Kabul, 
Volkov sits in a hotel room and thinks about these tractors that are currently on their way 
through tunnels and mountains across Afghanistan, and he suddenly wishes that he could see 
them again. The convoy is attacked by rebels along the way, resulting the loss of a tractor and its 
Afghan driver, but it never slackens its pace and, ultimately, it reaches its destination in southern 
Afghanistan—with Volkov there to witness it. Throughout the novel, the Belarusian tractors 
moving across the Soviet border into and through Afghanistan function as a metaphor for the 
“friendship of the peoples.” 
At first, Prokhanov’s novel about political and military activity in Afghanistan was 
received with enthusiasm.17 That same year he won the high-profile Lenin Komsomol Prize for 
literature. Tree in the Center of Kabul received extensive promotion and praise on the pages of 
                                               
14 Rosalind J. Marsh, Soviet Fiction Since Stalin: Science, Politics and Literature (London: Croom Helm, 
1986), 141. 
15 Prokhanov, Derevo v tsentre Kabula, 4. 
16 Ibid., 5. 
17 See Georgii Viren, “Imia dlia vremeni,” Literaturnaia gazeta, December 26, 1984, 4; and A. D. 
Lizichev, “Sotsialisticheskaia armiia i literatura,” Znamia, no. 2 (1988): 160–76. 
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Prokhanov’s home newspaper, Literaturnaia gazeta. For example, in a review of recently 
published novels, signed only by “litterateur,” Prokhanov’s novel is advertised as an accurate 
representation of events in Afghanistan and the “true friends” of its revolution. The review 
concludes: “In the ideological controversies that constitute a significant part of the novelistic 
content of Tree in the Center of Kabul and in the writer’s direct journalistic digressions, is 
crystallized the idea of the revolutionary-transformational character of our era, the impossibility 
for any honest man to rise above the struggle, to evade the choice of an active position in life.”18 
In the following week’s issue fellow author Kim Selikhov writes an entire article devoted to 
Prokhanov’s new novel “about the revolutionary awakening of the Afghan people.”19 It lists the 
author’s credentials for writing on this topic, noting that “such creative success does not befall 
every writer” and that, in Tree in the Center of Kabul, “the features of Prokhanov-the-publitsist 
and Prokhanov-the-lyricist come together.” (At the end of the article, however, the author admits 
that there are telltale signs of “haste, the lack of scrupulous work on language, unjustified 
digressions,” and that the novel might have benefited from more detailed information about 
certain aspects of the situation in Afghanistan.)20 In Izvestiia on February 18, 1983, Makhnenko 
praises Prokhanov’s representation of “the uplifting and crystal-clear goal” of Soviet 
internationalists serving abroad to build, heal, and grow a new, happy society. 
This is what Nil Timofeevich Ladov, [an engineer in Tree in the Center of Kabul] 
decided, while still in the Uzbek border town of Termez, when he wrote the word 
                                               
18 “Dostoinstvo romana: Dnevnik ‘LG’ chitaia zhurnaly,” Literaturnaia gazeta, March 24, 1982, 2, 
https://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/26668520. See also Anthony Hyman, “Through the Looking Glass: 
A Look at the Official Soviet Version of the War in Afghanistan,” Quarterly Journal (English) of Writers 
Union of Free Afghanistan (WUFA) 1, no. 2 (1986): 39–46. 
19 Kim Selikhov, “Ispytanie plamenium,” Literaturnaia gazeta, March 31, 1982, 4. 
20 Selikhov, 4. Selikhov’s novel entitled Ne''obiavlennaia voina, which would be published in 1983, 
details the Afghans’ struggle against internal treachery and foreign imperialists, with practically no 
mention of Soviet soldiers. 
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“friendship” on the tractor that was made by workers in Minsk for the Afghan farmers. 
We see a column of peaceful Soviet machines moving from the border across the whole 
of Afghanistan. [Prokhanov] shows how the deceitful counterrevolution is protected by a 
way of life that is dominated by lawlessness, darkness, and hunger, just as the deceit, 
atrocities, foreign branding on weapons, and all the ‘logic’ of destruction inherent in war. 
Hunger is the same war that takes lives. The future is bread, which is what the column of 
[tractors] with the brand ‘Belarus’ signifies—this is peace, a concrete act to strengthen 
it.21 
 
This review underscores the paradox that Prokhanov’s earliest war novels were primarily about 
peace. 
In his history of the final decade in Soviet history, John Dunlop elaborates on the 
significance of Tree in the Center of Kabul in the whole trajectory of Prokhanov’s writing career.  
With his dithyramb to the Soviet war effort, Prokhanov appeared to find his natural 
‘niche.’ A latter day Rudyard Kipling, he seemed to sense that his role was to hymn the 
‘outer’ Soviet empire in all its color and diversity, to show how intrepid Soviet 
representatives did battle with the nefarious West, and especially with the viperine United 
States, in a noble effort to expand the spheres of influence of a more just Soviet society.22 
 
Indeed, in Prokhanov’s novels and short stories about the Soviet-Afghan War and other Cold 
War “hot spots,” a new kind of Soviet war literature emerged, one that—in the absence of 
another Great Fatherland War—glorifies combat experience in esoteric surroundings as an 
important test of Soviet manhood. In an interview about Tree in the Center of Kabul, Prokhanov 
was asked to elaborate on the genre of his new form of writing, which he had defined as “novel-
reportage.” 
The genre of The Tree in the Center of Kabul is born of the material itself. Why is it a 
novel-reportage instead of a chronicle or a book of facts, for example? For me, there are 
several stages of working on a novel of this genre. The first stage is the stage of 
notebooks. In them, I note down synchronized, dynamic pictures of life. For me these 
                                               
21 Iurii Makhnenko, “Literaturnaia stranitsa. Zametki kritika. Za vse v otvete,” Izvestiia, February 18, 
1983, 5. For another positive review, see Georgii Viren, “Imia dlia vremeni: O novykh romanakh 
Aleksandra Prokhanova,” Literaturnaia gazeta, December 26, 1984, 4. 
22 John B. Dunlop, The Rise of Russia and the Fall of the Soviet Union (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 1995), 170. 
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notebooks are molds/sculptures [slepki] from reality. From the notebook I make the first 
husk [vymisku]—mini-reportages for reports by telephone from the place of action for the 
newspaper or radio. After this or the other reportage has made its first round, a field of 
reader’s attention is created around it. Each time I consciously add into them fragments 
of things unsaid—sometimes the landscape, sometimes the psychological, situational 
motivation. And, naturally, the readers’ consciousness demands what is left beyond the 
limits of reportage. Reportages, after all, having passed through the channels of 
newspapers, journalists, radio, television, become the emblem of an event. Introduced 
into a novel, they create the effect of authenticity [dostovernosti]. Through the reportage, 
it is as though I am saying to the reader—believe me.23 
 
In other places, Prokhanov would explain his genre as a weapon in the spiritual and 
technological struggle against the western powers of darkness.24 
 
By the mid-1980s, Prokhanov’s prestige in the Soviet Union was already beginning to fade, as 
political winds shifted. Critics in the official press found fault with Tree in the Center of Kabul 
and Prokhanov’s other Afghan war novels and stories for perceived failures both political and 
artistic.25 In the West, Prokhanov was never well-liked; he received (negative) attention—mainly 
from Sovietologists—for his literary representation of Soviet war politics. Aaron Trehub, for 
example, derides Prokhanov’s writing from this period, 1980 to 1985, for “its almost lyrical 
celebration of violence and its tendency to portray the war in Afghanistan as the harbinger of a 
worldwide conflagration between socialism and capitalism.”26 Stephen Shenfield writes that 
                                               
23 Prokhanov, “Net vremeni dlia vyzhidanii,” Sovetskaia kul'tura, September 7, 1982, 6, 
https://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/38287837. 
24 See Prokhanov, “Zapiski na brone” and “Vyberem svet.” 
25 See L. Fink, “Esli sudit' po vysshemu schetu,” Literaturnaia gazeta, September 10, 1986, 7; Pavel' 
Basinskii, “Sluchai Prokhanov,” Literaturnaia gazeta, February 12, 1992, 4; and Sergei Yusenen, “The 
Vulnerability of Armour: Aleksandr Prokhanov under Fire from Literary Critics,” Radio Liberty Research 
Bulletin, no. 207/86 (May 26, 1986): 1–5. 
26 Aaron Trehub, “Soviet Press Coverage of the War in Afghanistan: From Cheerleading to 
Disenchantment,” Report on the USSR 1, no. 10 (March 10, 1989): 3–4. 
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Prokhanov had a “vested psychological interest in war” and “vicarious enjoyment of war.”27 
After Tree in the Center of Kabul, Prokhanov continued to write about the Soviet-Afghan war 
throughout the 1980s in two more novels, Sketches of a Battlefield Artist (Risunki batalista) and 
Sketches on an Armored Car (Zapiski na brone), as well as a novella “Brighter than Sky-Blue” 
(“Svetlei azury”) and several short stories, including “Heights of Salang” (“Versty Salanga”).28 
He had made his name as an author with Tree in the Center of Kabul in 1982 but, before the 
decade had ended, his star was already falling. 
 
THE REMAKE:  
PROKHANOV’S DREAM ABOUT KABUL (2001) 
 
As discussed in chapter two, Svetlana Alexievich edits her documentary prose about the 
Soviet-Afghan War to strengthen her anti-war message. Prokhanov’s hawkish narrative of the 
war also undergoes significant revisions. In an interview with Zakhar Prilepin, Prokhanov 
explains that he wanted to “translate” the Soviet-era novel into the present moment, to look at 
everything through the eyes of an older hero. He wanted to “extend the life” of the novel, which 
he was “sad” to part with; he calls it the “new aesthetic of the remake.”29 In 2001, Prokhanov 
released a “remake” of Tree in the Center of Kabul with a post-Soviet perspective, a much more 
complicated plot, and a new title: Dream about Kabul.30 Although much of the original novel 
                                               
27 Stephen Shenfield, “Making Sense of Prokhanov,” Détente, no. 9/10 (1987): 28–29. In this double 
issue, Prokhanov is featured again in an interview with the editor. 
28 Prokhanov, “Risunki batalista” Moskva, no. 9 (1986): 33–155 and no. 10 (1986): 11–106; Prokhanov, 
“Svetlei lazuri,” Oktiabr', no. 9 (1986): 3–55; Aleksandr Prokhanov, “Zapiski na brone.” 
29 Zakhar Prilepin, Imeniny serdtsa: Razgovory s russkoi literaturoi (Moscow: AST ASTREL', 2009), 22–
23. 
30 Since 1991, Prokhanov has released “remade” versions of nearly all of his Soviet novels, although the 
changes he makes to Tree in the Center of Kabul seem more extreme than in his other novels. Eliot 
 193 
remains, its story is now framed as flashbacks to 1980, when the hero—now older, retired, 
renamed Viktor Andreevich Belosel'tsev, a spy instead of a journalist, and living in Moscow 
sometime in the late 1990s—thinks back to his first mission to Afghanistan.31 
If readers know only one book by Alexander Prokhanov, it is probably the now infamous 
Mr. Hexogen, which won the prestigious National Bestseller prize in Russia in 2002 amid much 
controversy. Prokhanov’s Dream about Kabul “remake” serves as the first book in a seven-book 
series that follows two decades of Russian history. Beginning with the Soviet-Afghan War and 
other proxy conflicts in the 1980s, to the August 1991 coup and the 1993 uprising, the series 
concludes (in Mr. Hexogen) with Vladimir Putin’s accession to the presidency.32 (Mr. Hexogen 
is the only new piece of writing; the first six books are all “remakes.”) A few of the changes to 
the main character of Tree in the Center of Kabul, therefore, can be explained by Prokhanov’s 
need to make the book fit in with the rest of the series. Prokhanov weaves a web of conspiracy 
theories into the Dream about Kabul “remake” in the flashbacks to Afghanistan as well as in the 
“present day” Moscow of the late 1990s. The novel’s new conspiracies reflect the protagonist’s 
(and author’s) need to make sense of the sudden socio-political changes that occurred in the 
1990s. In 1980s Afghanistan, the conspiratorial efforts of the enemy-CIA and other foreign 
agents receive significantly more narrative space. In post-Soviet Russia, the complex web of 
                                               
Borenstein points out that the “Sergei Norka” group of authors made changes to various details in two 
short novels previously published in the early 1990s when these novels were added to one new short 
novel in 2004 to create a trilogy (“Nobody Expects the Russian Inquisition,” The Plots Against Russia, 
July 8, 2016, http://plotsagainstrussia.org/eb7nyuedu/2016/7/8/nobody-expects-the-russian-inquisition). 
31 Prokhanov, “Son o Kabule” in Voina s vostoka: Kniga ob afganskom pokhode (Moscow: ITRK, 2001), 
181–523; Prokhanov, Son o Kabule (Moscow: Armada-press, 2002). 
32 Prokhanov’s Collected Works in 15 Volumes, published 2010, includes the series that Prokhanov calls 
his “Septology of the Red Union” (“Semiknizhie krasnogo soveta”). The series consists of the following 
novels, in this order: Tree in the Center of Kabul, Africanist, A Hunter on the Islands, Battle at Rio-Koko, 
The Last Soldier of the Empire, Red-Brown, and Mr. Hexogen. 
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conspiracies involves four new characters: Fedor Ivanovich Imbirtsev, General Grigorii 
Mikhailovich Ivlev, Iakov L’vovich Kugel’, and Fedor Arsent’evichVerdyka.  
Imbirtsev, a rich casino-owner, asks Belosel'tsev to help transport a centrifuge to Iran 
through a third country (i.e., Afghanistan), so that people do not suspect that it came from 
Russia. In Prokhanov’s novel, Imbirtsev is not a traitor but actually a great patriot; he is sending 
Russian technology to Iran, because only Iran and the Middle East now pose any threat to 
America’s global dominance, and Iran needs nuclear capabilities in order to keep America and 
Israel in check. As Imbirtsev explains to Belosel'tsev, “Only the Islamic world, only the great 
and powerful Iran will stop the Jews and America. I want Tehran to be a nuclear sword, so that 
the Islamic ballistic rockets can fly all the way to New York. And I’ll do everything so that the 
Russian-Iranian union takes place.”33 Belosel'tsev’s reaction reveals makes it clear that 
Prokhanov expects his reader to react positively to Imbirtsev’s radical and anti-Semite remarks: 
“This hatred was sincere, directed at those whom Belosel'tsev powerlessly hated. But Imbirtsev 
was strong, daring, in him could be felt an un-annihilated strength and passion, and this 
captivated Belosel'tsev.”34 
 Next, retired general Ivlev, whom Belosel'tsev met years ago in Afghanistan—who is 
now an elected member of the Russian Duma—tells Belosel'tsev about his plan to foment an 
insurrection in Moscow, to protest corruption and other fraud in the Russian government. Then 
Iakov L’vovich Kugel’—a MOSSAD agent pretending to be a publisher—calls Belosel'tsev with 
an offer of a writing contract. Later, Kugel’ suggests that Belosel'tsev work as a political 
consultant for Verdyka, a rich merchant wants to be elected to the Duma in order to protect his 
                                               
33 Prokhanov, “Son o Kabule,” 199. 
34 Ibid. 
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personal and financial interests. Kugel’ calls Imbirtsev a “dark” and “dangerous” person, helping 
the most radical Russian nationalists—fascists—sell weapons. He tells Belosel'tsev that he has a 
folder with information about Imbirtsev’s plan to sell Russia’s nuclear technology to Iran, and he 
asks for Belosel'tsev help in making sure that this folder ends up in General Ivlev’s possession, 
so that he can blow the whistle on Imbirtsev’s plan. 
 Prokhanov’s sympathies lie with Imbirtsev and General Ivlev, whom Belosel'tsev 
concludes is a military hero but still a naïve child when it comes to Russia’s “sneaky” politics. 
Verdyka seems like a good candidate for Prokhanov’s approval. He is extremely religious, 
insisting that everyone say a prayer before eating or drinking or undertaking any activity; he has 
built a home for invalid veterans of the Afghan and Chechen wars; and, he is a monarchist, 
“constantly” thinking about the Great Russian Empire that will once again triumph, someday. 
The reader does not have access to Belosel'tsev’s thoughts in this scene, but Verdyka comes 
across as a cynical and ridiculous character, who compares himself to Peter the Great and 
Catherine the Great in his use of the poor to build his palatial home. 
In his twenty-first-century remake, Prokhanov focuses on two aspects that were 
discouraged in Soviet literature: religion and violence. In new material that deals with religious 
belief, Prokhanov draws much closer to Russian Orthodoxy, with references to Bible parables, 
hymns, and church services, as well as less conventional Christian philosophies. Although there 
is some violence in the original, Prohanov’s “remake” alters the meaning of the violence as well 
as adds many more scenes of violence that align with these new symbolic values. Whereas 
violence in the original version of the novel is rather sanitized and random, with a focus on the 
destruction of space rather than human life, violence in the remake takes on multiple meanings: it 
becomes a metaphysical means of accessing deeper truths; it supports important narratives of 
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imperialism and victimhood; and it illustrates one half of the binary order/violence, the basis for 
theories about the binary and cyclical nature of Russian history. Additionally, Prokhanov draws 
more attention to the status of literature and the power of language to affect socio-political 
change, thereby calling for a return of “literocentrism” in post-Soviet Russian society. Through 
this historical revisionism of his literary representation of the earliest days of the Soviet-Afghan 
War, Prokhanov attempts to comprehend and overcome the “trauma” of the Soviet Union’s 
collapse only a few short years after losing what would become the last Soviet war. 
Since Mr. Hexogen won the Russian Bestseller prize in 2002, Prokhanov has received 
renewed attention and interest—even from liberal readers, who do not read him literally but 
instead interpret the anti-Semitism and other offensive passages as ironic and therefore 
politically subversive and aesthetically innovative. His critics, however, contend that it is a 
misreading not to see the chauvinism in his novels for what it is, that the ideological commentary 
is very much in line with the political ruling elite, and that his aesthetic is merely a feeble 
appropriation of other authors’ innovations. Il’ia Kukulin, for example, argues that Prokhanov’s 
post-Soviet novels, despite appearing to be such a radical departure, are in fact a continuation of 
his Soviet-era writing.  
Beginning with the novel “The Chechen Blues” (1996), Prokhanov resumed his strategy 
left in the late 1980s: just as Prokhanov’s old novels described one after another various 
special operations outside the USSR, his new writings are a consistent mythologizing 
commentary on emergencies that were widely covered in the media and are perceived as 
a blow to the national identity of Russian society: the Chechen War (“The Chechen 
Blues” and “Walking in the Night”), the apartment building bombings in Moscow in 
1998 (“Mr. Hexogen”), the taking of hostages at the musical “Nord-Ost” and the 
catastrophe the submarine “Kursk” ( “Kreiserova Sonata”), the terrorist attack in Beslan 
(“Political Science”). Prokhanov invariably uses xenophobic, “conspiracy” versions of 
what happened [...]. This series represents the modern history of Russia as a series of 
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deadly cataclysms, behind which stands the struggle of the secret forces; the history of 
modern times was also interpreted in the pre-perestroika novels of Prokhanov.35 
 
I am also inclined to read Prokhanov’s novels more literally than ironically—his aesthetic style 
an appropriation, not innovation—and I agree that his conspiratorial narratives of events in 
recent Russian history are compatible with Putin’s regime rather than subversive. But this is why 
it is worth taking a closer look at the role of the reader, and how this has changed (or not) from 
his Soviet-era novel to his post-Soviet “remake.” In the original Soviet version, parameters for 
the author to reader relationship were unambiguous: the author transmits an ideological message 
to the reader, explicitly. In his post-Soviet “remake,” Dream about Kabul, Prokhanov wants to 
inspire his reader through suggestive symbolism and implicit associations with ideological 
positions. 
 
BUTTERFLIES AND RUSSIAN COSMISM 
 
The opening paragraphs of Dream about Kabul introduce the important metaphor of 
butterflies, which will run through the entire novel: 
The retired general of foreign intelligence Viktor Andreevich Belosel'tsev was sitting in 
the winter sun in his home office in Moscow. He was looked at the collection of 
butterflies that he had collected during the years of trips to jungles, savannahs, and 
rainforests. Military operations, bombardments, raids on partisan groups were conducted 
among an infinite throng of light-winged multi-colored creatures, passing through the 
dusty columns of armored cars, the weary chains of “commandos,” the diving 
helicopters. A scout, a hunter of knowledge, seizing the moments, he became a hunter of 
the winged exquisite marvel. With a net he snatched out of the hot African air a scarlet 
zebra butterfly [also known as Aphrodite], hearing how her wings rustled in the 
transparent muslin. The emaciated black-faced detachment passed by the poisonous 
mustard dust, and an Angolan soldier looked with amazement at the catcher.36 
                                               
35 Il'ia Kukulin, “Revoliutsiia oblezlykh drakonov: ul'trapravaia ideia kak imitatsiia nonkonformizm,” 
Polit.ru, April 8, 2007, accessed August 21, 2018, http://polit.ru/article/2007/04/08/kukproh/#_ednref111. 
36 Prokhanov, “Son o Kabule,” 181–82. 
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 The troops that he had fought with in America, Africa, Asia had been defeated 
long ago. The operations that he had worked on were meaningless. The regimes that he 
had helped had sunk into eternity. Soviet intelligence together with a huge country, which 
had seemed invincible and eternal, had turned to dust, into “worthless agents,” into 
rotting remnants of decaying impotent structures that he did not want to have anything to 
do with. From the great doctrines and deeds, from glorified armies and ocean fleets, from 
the all-powerful red empire that he had passionately served, all that remained was a huge 
wall-length collection of butterflies. The rows of glazed boxes, in which, like soldiers 
with thin spikes, numerous battalions of butterflies were marching, each one a colorful 
page of his traveling diary. With the subtlest letters—on colorful scales, among silver 
veins, gold and crimson spots—were recorded combat episodes, the names of agents, the 
faces of diplomats and military men, many of whom had been killed. The collection was 
a huge chronicle of a lived life with an array of precious patterned letters [bukvitsa]. It 
reminded [him] of the multicolored patchwork cloak in which his life was wrapped. 
 
Volkov, the Soviet-era hero of Tree in the Center of Kabul, was no lepidopterist, but butterflies 
flit through the pages of Prokhanov’s remake from beginning to end.37 They are often called 
“angels” and coincide with Belosel'tsev’s meditations on God, death, and immortality. Although 
butterflies are not unique to this novel—they appear with similar frequency in Prokhanov’s 
subsequent fiction—Dream about Kabul may be the first with this level of obsessive attention. 
Belosel'tsev’s interest in butterflies, as well as the idea of his butterfly collection as a 
“military journal” of his assignments, is a biographical detail that he shares with his author.38 
Apparently Prokhanov began collecting butterflies after he accidentally shot and killed a crane 
while hunting along the Enisei River. He was so upset by this “murder” that he vowed never to 
shoot another bird and thereafter hunted only butterflies.39 He admits, however, that killing 
butterflies is still “terrible,” because all creatures are born ready to live, and the butterfly’s 
                                               
37 With the modern convenience of word search, I can say with relative certainty that butterflies are 
mentioned no fewer than 87 times in Dream about Kabul. That is compared to only 16 times in The 
Palace, his 1994 novel about Afghanistan. 
38 Lev Danilkin, Chelovek s iatsom: Zhizn' i mneniia Aleksandra Prokhanova (Moscow Ad Marginem, 
2007), 554. 
39 Ibid., 552. 
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transformation from caterpillar to butterfly is such a mysterious “miracle.”40 His fetish for 
butterflies runs deeps. Prokhanov has had three large collections of butterflies; the first was lost, 
the second was given away as a gift, and the third he collected “in the third world, in which wars 
were going on, raging in jungles, rainforests, and savannahs, where there is just an abundance of 
butterflies.”41 He jokes that he agreed to correspondence assignments in such dangerous parts 
around the world in order to find exotic butterflies to add to his collection. He claims to have 
discovered a new butterfly in Tblisi, Georgia—where he was born—and named it after himself: 
“Del’finius prokhanikus.”42 One of his favorite exotic foods is fried butterflies. In his home 
hangs a drawing of himself with a huge butterfly over his heart.43 After Iurii Belikov interviewed 
Prokhanov for the Russian state television station “Channel One,” Prokhanov signed his novel 
Symphony of the Fifth Empire “To dear Iura, from the butterfly-man.” 44 It is also possible that 
Prokhanov enjoys the association with Vladimir Nabokov, the most famous Russian writer-
lepidopterist to use the butterfly motif; he has named Nabokov and “Nabokovian aesthetics” 
among his most significant literary influences.45 More recently, though, he has called Nabokov’s 
writing “monstrous” and agreed with decisions to pull his novels from Russian school libraries.46  
                                               
40 Natal'ia Dardykina, Otkroveniia znamenitostei (Moscow: “AST”, 2014), 472–73. 
41 Iurii Belikov, “Chelovek-babochka,” Zvezda, June 27, 2008. 
42 Dardykina, Otkroveniia znamenitostei, 473. 
43 Ibid., 476. This is the final image of Dardykina’s book. 
44 Belikov, “Chelovek-babochka.” 
45 Danilkin, Otkroveniia znamenitostei, 153. 
46 Tat'iana Fel'gengauer, “Osoboe mnenie: Aleksandr Prokhanov” (Interview), Ekho moskvy, November 
20, 2013. accessed August 21, 2018, https://echo.msk.ru/programs/personalno/1201220-echo/. 
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It is impossible to read Prokhanov’s twenty-first century fiction and not notice the 
omnipresent butterflies. As one interviewer notes, the image of the butterfly seems to be “the 
main philosophical image of Alexander Prokhanov, leading him through life.”47 But what is that 
philosophy? The butterfly works well as a vague but powerful symbol that, conveniently, can be 
used to represent several different philosophical ideas. In his 2007 biography, Danilkin 
summarizes the range of ideas that the butterfly can symbolize for Prokhanov: 
In Prokhanov’s works, the butterfly can signify an angel, the soul, the mystery of 
metamorphosis (egg—caterpillar—cocoon—imago); it can function in the capacity of an 
icon, a map, a cryptogram, a compact disk, where remembrance of a certain picture has 
been archived; he does not tire of devising metaphors. The butterfly is a metaphor for 
metaphors, a sign (or even symbol) of metaphor. And insofar as the metaphor is the way 
to overcome distance between two objects and develop meaning, the butterfly is an 
embodiment of the idea of development and negotiation. [...] if we see a butterfly, it 
means that the author is delicately trying to communicate to us that somewhere nearby an 
angel is present, a soul is flying, the Holy Spirit is breathing.48 
 
Danilkin’s interpretation of Prokhanov’s butterflies is focused on religious and spiritual 
meanings. Prokhanov supports this interpretation in a subsequent interview with Belikov, who 
points out that it is “not for nothing that in some artistic similes the butterfly is compared to a 
book, to the Bible.” Prokhanov agrees, replying that, for him, the “butterfly is almost a 
religion.”49 In this interview, however, Prokhanov further expands the list of possible meanings 
beyond the religious to include prehistoric, primeval, primordial. He describes the butterfly as 
“more mysterious than a bear, a falcon, or an eagle. Butterflies were created in a period when the 
Earth was very young. There is a strange sensation that the glittering and sparkling flashes of 
silver and metal on the thinnest of membrane-wings is the reflection of some ancient runes, the 
                                               
47 Belikov, “Chelovek-babochka.” 
48 Danilkin, Chelovek s iatsom, 559–60. 
49 Belikov, “Chelovek-babushka.” 
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relief of earthly landscapes that have disappeared, the map of the past Earth.”50 In Prokhanov’s 
remake, Dream about Kabul, too, the image of the butterfly is religious, spiritual, timeless, 
amaranthine—and it resonates with the ideas of Russian Cosmism, as will be explored below. 
In the first chapter of Dream about Kabul, Belosel'tsev focuses on a preserved monarch 
butterfly that he caught in Jelalabad during the Soviet-Afghan War. 
He looked once more at the precious boxes where each butterfly brought to mind 
the heraldry of knightly species and families. He stopped on the honey-gold 
monarch, with a black necklace of spots, with a pearly-white string similar to 
droplets. And he sweetly, painfully froze. From the butterfly, from her delicate 
plates spun a reflection of the past days. He felt on his face the breath of a faint 
wind. He caught the monarch in Jalalabad, among the fragrant rose bushes, on his 
first trip to Afghanistan. The wind that touched his face was the perfumed air 
filling the Garden of Eden, in which, like an angel, flew the diaphanous butterfly. 
This memory gave birth to an instant chain of scenes and faces, from which, like 
from the incorporeal molecules of memory, a world was recreated, where he, a 
young intelligence agent, acquired precious knowledge. About the East. About 
war. About death. About the mystery of love. About treachery.51  
 
The butterfly provides a link between past and present, permitting the convenient narrative 
transition from the retired general’s Moscow home in the 1990s back to the young spy’s first 
mission in Afghanistan at the beginning of the 1980s. As Belosel'tsev continues gazing at the 
butterfly, he suddenly wishes that he could be there again, among the “mountains of Central 
Asia, from which the defeated empire of the Russians recoiled.”52 The mystical effect of the 
butterfly intensifies such that Belosel'tsev “feels the approach of a noiseless wave running from 
the past,” as though the yellow butterfly wings are about “to close the broken time, to return 
                                               
50 Ibid. 
51 Danilkin, Chelovek s iatsom, 183–84. 
52 Prokhanov, “Son o Kabule,” 183–84. 
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[those] sounds, colors, and smells to him.”53 The spell is broken by the sudden ring of his 
telephone with what will become the first of many conspiracy plots in the novel: a misguided 
Russian “patriot” wants to send Belosel'tsev on a secret mission back to Afghanistan. At the end 
of the first chapter, Belosel'tsev will return home to his butterfly collection and once again 
become entranced by the monarch from Afghanistan. In the chapter’s final sentence, the 
butterfly, “like an aircraft carrier, picked him up and carried him into the vanished precious 
time” of that first trip to Afghanistan.54 The next chapter is the novel’s first flashback to 1980. 
The narrative transition from present to past is repeated precipitated by looking at the monarch 
butterfly’s spotted yellow wings. He suddenly feels, for example, that his life is like “a sharply 
drawn line, stretched like a string” from the point where it had suddenly “appeared in boundless 
light” to the point where it disappeared, “back into the darkness from which it emerged.”55 The 
butterfly, therefore, functions as a conduit between the two time periods: the stable Soviet empire 
of the past and the chaotic turbulence of the non-imperial present. (After all, the butterfly from 
Afghanistan is a “monarch” butterfly, connoting the monarch of an empire.) 
Expressed in another way, the butterfly moves between the life and death of the Soviet 
Union. The butterfly—with its dramatic transition from caterpillar to winged adult—is a 
common motif in literature symbolizing metamorphosis and rebirth, even resurrection and 
immortality.56 The monarch butterfly from Jalalabad fulfills this function in the novel, as well. In 
                                               
53 Ibid., 184. 
54 Ibid., 201. 
55 Ibid., 224. 
56 It is interesting in this context that butterflies were associated with warfare in ancient civilizations, 
although I have not found any evidence that Prokhanov is aware of this. 
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the flashback where Belosel'tsev captures and kills the monarch butterfly in Jalalabad, he (not for 
the first time) likens it to an angel in the Garden of Eden: “She [the butterfly] was the mistress of 
this paradise. Perhaps, a former gardener had turned into her. Or this was really an angel, and if 
you looked closely, then, between the golden vesture [odeianie] and wings, you could see a tiny 
miraculous face [chudnyi lik], encircled by a halo.” Belosel'tsev wants to catch it so 
“passionately” that he feels as though his life’s singular goal is the “possession” of this butterfly. 
He prays a “wordless, childlike prayer” with “passion and naïve faith” as he runs back to his 
room for a butterfly net: “he associated this butterfly with the hope for good, the miracle of his 
birth, the belief in immortality, the possibility of resurrection of his loved ones, the hope that his 
adversity will pass away, all diseases will recede, all bullets will miss.”57 The butterfly, 
therefore, is a symbol not only of life and rebirth, but—more radically—also a symbol of 
reincarnation, resurrection, and immortality. 
 The “belief in immortality, the possibility of resurrection of his loved ones” correlates 
directly with the religious philosophy of Nikolai Fedorov (1829–1903), whose ideas were 
certainly in vogue at the time Prokhanov that was writing Dream about Kabul. A Russian 
Orthodox philosopher, Federov theorized about the eventual perfection of the human race and 
society, which would result in physical immortality and even resurrection of the dead, attained 
through the “common task” of all of humankind’s scientists. He argued that Christ’s resurrection 
was not a miracle reserved only for the son of God, but a lesson intended to show mankind that 
resurrection and immortality on Earth were attainable even for mere humans. Space exploration 
and colonization were important to his theories, both because overpopulation would necessitate 
                                               
57 Prokhanov, “Son o Kabule,” 352. 
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finding other habitats as well as because scientists would need to collect the molecules of the 
dead that had drifted out into the cosmos centuries ago.58 
Prokhanov was among those in Russia who became interested in Fedorov’s ideas of 
Russian cosmism. In fact, Soviet historian Dmitry Shlapentokh writes that Prokhanov may be 
“the most vivid representative of those who saw in the Soviet/Russian civilization a grand 
Fedorovian underpinning,” and that “it was Fedorov who had helped him [Prokhanov] 
understand the meaning of life, Russian history, and global history.”59 From the late 1990s into 
the twenty-first century, Nikolai Fedorov was increasingly referenced on the pages of 
Prokhanov’s newspaper Zavtra. The first reference to Fedorov in the newspaper may be in an 
article from April 1997 about the Pashkov House (which is derisively described as a symbol of 
the current state of the Motherland). Fedorov is mentioned as the “great Russian philosopher-
cosmist, the author of The Philosophy of the Common Task,” because he worked at the Pashkov 
House as a librarian.60 The passage suggests that the author does not assume his readers would 
be familiar with Fedorov. Over the next few years, however, Fedorov becomes a regular 
reference in Zavtra. 
In June 2001—the same year that Dream about Kabul was first published—Prokhanov 
writes about Nikolai Fedorov in three separate pieces, three weeks in a row: an editorial on the 
                                               
58 Recall that molecules were referenced in the above-quoted passage about the Jelalabad butterfly, the 
memory of which “gave birth to an instant chain of scenes and faces, from which, like from the 
incorporeal molecules of memory, a world was recreated.” For more on Nikolai Fedorov and Russian 
Cosmism, see Boris Groys, ed., Russian Cosmism (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2018); Irene 
Masing-Delic, “Nikolai Fyodorov,” in Abolishing Death: A Salvation Myth of Russian Twentieth-Century 
Literature (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1992), 76-104; and George Young, The Russian 
Cosmists: The Esoteric Futurism of Nikolai Fedorov (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012). 
59 Dmitry Shlapentokh, “Fedorovism in Early Post-Soviet Russia: The Collapse of the Meta-imperial 
Project,” Slavonica 22, no. 1/2 (2017): 7. 
60 Dmitrii Zhukov, “Otkliknites'!” Zavtra, April 1, 1997. 
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death of Anatolii Sobchak, an essay about the nature of the Russian Empire, and a roundtable 
devoted to the philosopher. In his editorial titled “Liberalism as a Hole in History,” Prokhanov 
writes that, at Sobchak’s funeral, President Putin—and Russia—have at last bid “goodbye to 
liberalism.61 (Sobchak had been the first democratically-elected mayor of Saint Petersburg; Putin 
had been one of his deputies.) In the Russian consciousness, he argues, the concept of 
“liberalism” will be added to the list of national tragedies that include the Tatar-Mongol yoke, 
Napoleon’s invasion, and Hitler’s “bloody assault.” Prokhanov goes on to then describe an 
idealized picture of the Russian landscape and Russian history, which revolves around Nikolai 
Fedorov: 
Austere and beautiful is the face of the Motherland. Buttercups turn yellow on the shores 
of the blue Onega. Three wild horses graze in the meadows—a red one, a white one, and 
a black one. A young scientist is sitting on a hillock, reading a book by Nikolai Fedorov 
about the resurrection of the dead. An angel with the face of Iurii Gagarin will sound the 
horn and everyone who lived on earth before us will rise from their graves. And the 
princes Boris and Gleb, and Vladimir Krasnoe Solnyshko, and Philip Kolychev, and the 
archpriest Avvakum, and the beggar from the porch, and the Stalingrad infrantyman, and 
Sten’ka Razin, and Joseph Stalin, and all our great-grandfathers, children, fathers. Only 
the liberal will be denied resurrection. Scattered into impersonal atoms, he will be carried 
away under the influence of magnetic fields in a lifeless vacuum, blown away by the 
solar wind, slowly leaking into the “black hole” of the universe. 
 
Apparently, Prokhanov decides that his detailed image of Russia’s idealized future deserves a 
worthier place in his newspaper, as it reappears verbatim as the final paragraph in much longer 
essay, one week later, with a concluding sentence added: “Here, on the blossoming earth, among 
other peoples and kingdoms, will spread out the magnificent blooming paradise of Russia, the 
Empire of Light.”62  
                                               
61 Prokhanov, “Liberalizm kak dyrka istorii,” Zavtra, June 8, 2001. 
62 Prokhanov, “Rossiia—imperiia sveta,” Zavtra, Jun 15, 2001. 
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The following week, Prokhanov hosts a roundtable dedicated to Nikolai Fedorov and 
outlines the “essence” of Fedorovian philosophy, as he understands it: 
The philosophy of Fedorov—as it is understood by the laity—in general reduces to the 
following. Death is the fundamental problem of human existence and world-
consciousness. Death, if it is final, turns all human acts and ideas into an absurdity. 
Therefore, death, one way or another, is present in all religious  teachings, in all 
philosophical schools. [Смерть как ее преодоление, исключение, избежание.] In some 
doctrines and religions, it is metempsychosis, in others—eternal disappearance and 
rebirth, in the third—resurrection from the dead after the Second Coming. Fedorov, being 
a Russian man, a Christian professing the living Orthodoxy, believed without denying the 
entire Orthodox eschatology that the resurrection from the dead is possible and that 
Christ—in his desire to overcome universal death, to create a “new heaven and a new 
earth,” the New Jerusalem, relies on the efforts of humanity. It is humanity that must 
accomplish the great act of overcoming death. One of the future generations, the “sons,” 
having achieved unity, having overcome all the perils of the world and mastered all the 
subtleties of the sciences, can commit a huge universal, collective act, in which the 
previous generations, the “fathers,” rise from the dust. Fedorov has put such an all-
human, universal and at the same time extremely Russian task in scale.63 
 
Svetlana Semenova, a leading Cosmist and author of one of the first serious biographies of 
Nikolai Fedorov, applauds Prokhanov’s description of Fedorov’s teachings.64 In concluding the 
roundtable, Prokhanov relates a “landmark” episode from his childhood, when he and his 
schoolmates participated in landscaping a park, which included a cemetery, opposite their 
school. One day, he said, they built a soccer field and used a skull as a soccer ball. When their 
pioneer leader returned, they reburied the remains with the skull. Prokhanov explains the 
significance of this childhood memory: 
After many years I learned that Fedorov was buried in this cemetery. I look at the 
topography of this grave, and it was somewhere in the place where we had made the 
football field. And I still think with horror that I could have been playing football with 
Fedorov’s skull! Maybe I will be punished for it. And maybe, on the contrary, the 
understanding of this strange and terrible mystical paradox is what moves me around the 
                                               
63 “Da, bessmertie! (‘Kruglyi stol’, posviazhchennyi ucheniiu ‘vseobshchego dela’ Nikolaia Fedorova), 
Zavtra, June 29, 2001, 4. 
64 See Svetlana Semenova, Nikolai Fedorov: tvorchestvo, zhizni (Moscow: Sovetskii Pisatel', 1990) and 
Russkii kosmizm: antologiia filosofskoi mysli (Moscow: Pedagogika-Press, 1993). 
 207 
Earth, makes me overcome the entropy in our people, in our country, makes me support 
the dying, revive the dead. 
 I want our very modest “roundtable” to be the first monument to the unknown 
tomb of Fedorov. And who knows, maybe we will hold our second meeting in Zuevsky 
Park, under those trees. Perhaps the presence of Fedorov’s molecules, the water that 
drained from his body and became the leaves of the trees, that bone marrow that may 
have passed into our bones, will encourage us to a more metaphysical interpretation of 
our being and our tasks. 
 
Prokhanov repeats this anecdote three years later in an essay on Easter and the “national idea” of 
Russia.65 Citing this story, the historian Shlapentokh has concluded that Prokhanov understands 
the Soviet regime as ultimately a highly spiritualized, Fedorovian regime, regardless of some 
aspects of its ideology and practices. Thus, like Dugin’s Eurasism, Fedorov’s Cosmism allows 
Prokhanov to see the Soviet Union as  
the organized continuation of all Russian history, for Fedorovism was the very nature of 
Russian civilization. The mystical interaction with Fedorov’s remains was a spiritual 
trigger that slowly revealed to Prokhanov the meaning of his life, the Soviet regime, and 
the entire Russian civilization. Fedorov’s remains had revealed to him the ultimate 
meaning of everything, the meaning of human history—victory over death.66  
 
In a subtle nod to Fedorov, Prokhanov inserts this “ultimate meaning of everything” into the 
remake of his first Soviet-Afghan War novel. 
I am not the first to notice Fedorovian ideas in Prokhanov’s early twentieth-century 
novels. In her work on Mr. Hexogen (2001) and The Cruise Liner Joseph Brodsky (2006), for 
example, literary scholar Henrietta Mondry draws a similar connection. The protagonists in Mr. 
Hexogen conspire to commit acts of terrorism that will create such political confusion that their 
chosen leader will assume the presidency and establish a new world order. Mondry points out 
that “this new humankind will live eternally, as it will stop fighting against one another and put 
                                               
65 Prokhanov, “Paskha—natsional'naia ideiia Rossii,” Zavtra, April 16, 2004, 1. 
66 Shlapentokh, “Fedorovism in Early Post-Soviet Russia,” 7–8. 
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their efforts and resources to scientifically achieved immortality” as well as resurrect everyone 
from the past.67 In The Cruise Liner Joseph Brodksy, Trotsky’s great-grandson travels to Russia 
on a mission to resurrect Trotsky and Jewish members of the Central Committee killed by Stalin. 
According to Mondry, in the 2006 novel Prokhanov is still “clearly using the notion of the 
physical and literal resurrection taken from Nikolai Fedorov, thus recycling Fedorovian ideas in 
post-Soviet discourse where he combines them with Soviet cosmism and post-Soviet occult and 
esotericism.”68 But Mr. Hexogen and The Cruise Liner Joseph Brodksy are new novels, not 
remakes. In the fact that Dream about Kabul is a remake of Tree in the Center of Kabul, 
Prokhanov is engaging in a Fedorovian project to resurrect his old, dead novel—from an old, 
dead empire—using the same “molecules” but giving it a fuller life. In remaking and 
reimagining his Soviet-era novel about Afghanistan, in his attempt at the turn of the century to 
make Soviet history relevant to post-Soviet generations in a sense, Prokhanov brings it back to 
life. Prokhanov’s interest in Fedorovian ideas—wrapped up in the metaphor of the butterfly—are 
not only implanted in the new text of the remake, they are expressed in the very idea of a 
remake. 
 This is the evolution in Prokhanov’s use of the Soviet-Afghan War as the literary vehicle 
for the spiritual side of his ideological agenda in the new Russian Federation. In The Palace he 
describes a synthetic attitude to spirituality that combines elements of Orthodoxy, Slavic 
paganism, and mysticism.  Spiritual flights of fantasy in Dream about Kabul are refined to 
                                               
67 Henrietta Mondry, “Blood Rituals and Ethnicity in Alexander Prokhanov’s Fiction,” ASEES 27, no. 1/2 
(2013): 32. 
68 Mondry, “Ethnic Stereotypes and New Eurasianism: Alexander Prokhanov’s Novel ‘The Cruise Liner 
Joseph Brodsky,’” New Zealand Slavonic Journal 45, no. 1 (2011): 147–73, 165 (fn 45). See also 
Edmund Griffiths, “Alexander Prokhanov and post-Soviet Esotericism,” PhD diss. (Oxford University, 
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reflect his intense new interest in Fedorov and Russian Cosmism. Prokhanov gives readers a 
clear signal of this idea when Belosel'tsev associates “this butterfly” in the Jelalabad garden with 
“the belief in immortality, the possibility of resurrection of his loved ones.” It also corresponds 
to the greater weight that Prokhanov gives the Russian Orthodox religion in Dream about Kabul, 
as compared to Tree in the Center of Kabul, certainly, but also The Palace. For example, the 
story of Jesus’ resurrection, which is the cornerstone of Fedorov’s argument for the real 
possibility of resurrection and therefore immortality for all mankind, is part of the new material 
that gets added to the remake. In the final chapter, Belose’tsev has retired to live in the village, 
and his thoughts have turned to memories of his grandmother. She has been dead for a long time, 
but he feels her presence in the simple hut (izba), decorated for Christmas. He remembers her 
book of gospels—which Kalmykov, protagonist of The Palace, also remembers—on his 
grandmother’s bedside table. But this time there is greater detail:  
In these parables of the fishers of men, the dried fig tree, the water turned into wine, the 
miracles of the resurrected Lazarus, the temptation on the roof of the temple, the entrance 
to Jerusalem, the story of the secret evening, the Garden of Gethsemane, the kiss of 
Judas, the story of the crucifix, the sponge impregnated with vinegar, the robber who 
believed on the cross, the fairy tale of the Resurrection, the heavenly Throne, the host of 
heavenly angels—his grandmother’s life fit into all of this, as though it had been written 
with gold and scarlet paint on the walls and the vaults of the temple. Whenever he went 
to church and stood among the parishioners, hearing the sweet hymns, it seemed to him 
that in these hymns were telling about his grandmother’s life.69 
 
The capitalization of “Resurrection” in the passage above draws the reader’s attention to that 
Biblical story in particular, distinguishing it from the list of other parables and references. There 
had been no mention of church in Tree in the Center of Kabul or even in The Palace—except the 
occasional reference to a church as a building, part of the scenery. In Dream about Kabul, our 
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hero finally enters the church, attends church services, and describes the emotional effect of 
hearing church hymns.  
Discussions of Fedorov and Russian Cosmism in Zavtra around the turn of the twenty-
first century suggest that Prokhanov understands Fedorov’s “common task” to resurrect the dead 
and achieve immortality as inextricably linked to the Russian religious faith (mostly Orthodox 
but also pre-Christian Slavic paganism) and the Russian imperial destiny to expand vertically, up 
into the cosmos, as well as horizontally, across the earth. Prokhanov’s embrace of these 
Fedorovian ideas in Dream about Kabul does not contradict the significance of the Soviet-
Afghan War in Russia’s history, as he depicted it in his 1994 novel The Palace, but it refines and 
supports his argument for the important role Afghanistan plays in Russia’s imperial destiny. 
Without an explicit reference to either Fedorov or Cosmism, but only the implicit association of 
these ideas through references to resurrection, Prokhanov ensures that only readers who know to 
look for Fedorov will find him. 
 
IMPERIAL VIOLENCE AND THE READER 
In Prokhanov’s remake, one of the most noticeable developments is the addition of 
graphic violence. For what Prokhanov himself branded a “military-political work” and “war 
chronicle,” Tree in the Center of Kabul gives a rather sanitized account of military activity in 
Afghanistan; violence is noticeably absent.70 Soviet citizens—military and civilian—do not 
shoot a single bullet in the novel, nor otherwise actively engage in combat, nor face much danger 
beyond freak accidents that might happen almost anywhere. Only the female characters (a 
translator and a colonel’s wife) seem nervous in Kabul, whereas their male counterparts are 
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quick to reassure them and dismiss their fears. The first act of violence does not occur until more 
than halfway through the original version. Riding along in a helicopter, Volkov observes an 
Afghan army’s attack on a rebel caravan transporting weapons near Jalalabad. Only the camels’ 
deaths are described in gruesome detail: they are on their backs, “writhing in flames,” and one 
camel, running away with a smoking bale on its back, suddenly explodes, “scattering hairy 
[mokhnatuiu] soot, leaving nothing but swirling dust where the camel had been.”71 The two 
people in the caravan, on the other hand, are only described as “fleeing” and then “falling.” The 
scene ends with Volkov’s request for the helicopter to fly once more over the wreckage so that 
he can take photographs of the “devastated caravan” for his newspaper. There is no sign in the 
narrative that he or anyone has been affected by the violence and death just witnessed.  
Later, when Volkov encounters an angry mob on his way to the hotel from the airport, 
only the woman sitting beside him is afraid. In the original version of the novel, this uprising 
turns out to be an anticlimactic apogee: it is quelled within 24 hours, without coming close to 
achieving any of its objectives, and without giving the Afghan army or Soviet people in Kabul 
any real cause for concern. Moreover, Afghan secret intelligence reveals to Volkov a significant 
discovery: stereos had been placed throughout the city playing tapes of people shouting “Allahu 
akbar!” to create an illusion that there had been more people marching in the streets, further 
underscoring the novel’s representation of the uprising as never being a serious threat and, in 
some ways, even faked. Once again, the most gruesome narrative details during the uprising in 
the original version concern the non-human victims of this violence: 
The street was naked [golaia], slick, as though flayed, it preserved the 
tracks [sled] of the passing convulsion [sudorogi]. The crowd, having rushed 
back, had left behind a stench, reverberations of howling, dirty marks on the 
walls, formless crumbing clods, a pair of feeble puddles [luzhi]. 
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An overturned truck was burning slowly. From its smoking body [kozova] 
had spilled crushed blotches of red tomatoes. A bus had gone up in flames beside 
it. The front tires had burnt nearly to the rims, and the fire was filling the air with 
the reek of burning rubber. Slivers of glass ground underfoot by the crowd 
gleamed white on the asphalt. Shop windows with their Venetian blinds ripped 
down gaped at them as scraps of brightly colored cloth flapped in the breeze. On 
the other side, a two-story building was on fire. Firefighters in helmets hauled up 
a hose, the water jet gushed [bili] into the fire, and a thick steam poured from the 
blaze. 
 The armored carrier turned the corner, and Volkov saw the corpses lying 
right near the wheels on the bare asphalt. There was an Afghan soldier lying 
prone with limp legs that had crossed as he fell, his dark head in a puddle [luzhe] 
of blood, and two civilians beside him wrapped in striped cloaks. Next to them, 
maneuvering and training its antenna from one side to the other, rode an armored 
troop carrier with the red Afghan symbol. It skimmed the puddle [luzhe] of blood, 
leaving sticky, faded [gasnuvshchii] tracks [sled]. From an open fire hydrant, 
water gushed out [bili] nakedly [golo], shining and savage.72 
  
The above passage contains what may be the most detailed description of a corpse anywhere in 
the original version of the novel, but the narrative description of ravaged vehicles and other parts 
of the streetscape is somehow more evocative of violence. The street is “naked” and “flayed,” 
malformed by clods, puddles and other traces of the destructive “convulsion” of the mob. The 
overturned truck is personified as a “smoking body” and its scattered cargo of tomatoes 
representative of spilled blood. The “ripped” Venetian blinds of naked store windows suggest the 
image of a sexually assaulted woman, her clothing torn during the attack. The three bodies and 
the puddle of blood beneath the Afghan soldier’s head certainly indicate deadly violence, but this 
single sentence lacks the more graphic sensory details we encounter elsewhere in the above 
passage. Indeed, it is arguably more horrible when the armored car’s wheel inadvertently 
converts that puddle of blood into “sticky, faded [more literally, dying out] tracks” of blood. In 
this conversion, the blood is distanced from the corpse and instead becomes another feature of 
the terrible streetscape: dirty marks on the wall and bloody car tracks along the street. The use of 
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repeated words—gushing (bili), puddle (luzha), tracks (sled), and naked (golaia/golo)—also 
functions to tie together the different pieces of this tableaux, whether human or not, into one 
linguistically and aesthetically cohesive picture of destruction. The human corpses do not feel 
like the obvious focal point of the scene but rather only one part of the bigger whole. 
 After the uprising has ended, we learn that it has claimed one Soviet life: poor Nil 
Timofeevich Ladov, a land-improvement engineer teaching Afghan villagers how to use the 
Soviet tractors. A stray bullet had ricocheted off the bus door and struck Nil Timofeevich, who 
was standing on the bus just as he had encouraged Volkov to do mere minutes earlier. This 
death, therefore, is almost a chance accident. Although the bullet was shot during the uprising, 
the ricochet suggests that the shooter did not intend to hit Nil Timofeevich. The sense that it is all 
a matter of chance is underscored by Volkov’s reaction to the news that Nil Timofeevich had 
been shot: “‘That was my bullet!’ he thought. He bore within himself the sensation of this 
substitution, of the fortuity [sluchainost’] of life and death, and a secret relief that it hadn’t been 
him.”73 Volkov’s thoughts guide the reader’s interpretation of this single Soviet death in the 
novel, leading us to the conclusion that it represents more the general omnipresent possibility of 
sudden unexpected death facing us all every day, no matter where we are or what we are doing.  
Volkov’s emotional response to the experience of violence—whichever side it comes 
from—is subdued or simply absent.74 In the remake, Prokhanov removes this emotional restraint 
from his protagonist and other characters, altering the way the novel’s characters experience and 
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74 In fact, after the passage describing the devastated street and corpses (quoted above), the narrative 
registers no reaction from Volkov at all. He hops out of the APV to go on foot to the nearby party 
committee headquarters, merely requesting that they pick him up on their way back. Evidence of the 
mob’s violence has no discernible impact on him or his actions. 
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ascribe meaning to violence, which, in turn, alters the way that the reader experiences and 
understands it. He edits scenes or writes new ones that intensify the violence. Over-the-top 
violence is juxtaposed against exaggerated peace and harmony, in a never-ending cycle of chaos 
and order, chaos and order, that mimics Prokhanov’s understanding of Russia’s imperial history: 
the pattern of volatile catastrophes and stable empire repeating through the millennia. 
Catastrophe and violence, even chaos, is not a negative in Prokhanov’s remake—and therefore 
neither is the Soviet-Afghan War. It is all a necessary precedent to the period of imperial stability 
and, therefore, perhaps, a step in Russian history to anticipate and experience with pleasure; it is 
certainly not something to try to diminish or prevent. 
 
The reader does not have long to wait before encountering one of these new scenes of 
violence in Prokhanov’s remake of the novel. Belosel'tsev catches a ride to Kabul in an armored 
car that is following the caravan of tractors through the countryside. As they pass an Afghan 
village, shots suddenly ring out: one of the tractors has been hit, its driver shot in the head. The 
tractor rolls off the road and lies there “like an overturned helpless beetle.”75 Martynov, the 
Soviet officer in charge, reacts with fury; he orders his machine-gunners to start firing on the 
village and then to attack on foot. As soon as Martynov orders the attack, Belosel'tsev jumps out 
of the armored car to run after the soldiers though the village, eager to witness the battle up 
close. Standing just beyond the soldiers, who have circled around an elderly Afghan man, 
Belosel'tsev experiences a “new, complex” feeling in response to the “danger” he had survived. 
His wonderment at surviving when someone else has unexpectedly died is a continuation of a 
character trait we had already seen in Volkov’s reaction to Nil Timofeevich’s death in the 
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original version. As the passage goes on, however, Belosel'tsev’s complex feeling in response to 
the violent scene he is watching unfold in the village courtyard evolves into something quite new 
for this protagonist. Suddenly, inexplicably, 
By force of arms, under the cover of polished barrels [i.e., of guns] he 
[Belosel'tsev] burst into the house. Broke the fragile barrier that had obscured a 
foreign [chuzhoi] hearth and threshold. Penetrated the forbidden veil, which had 
hidden the innermost structure, inaccessible to the outside view. He, outsider and 
newcomer, under the cover of the ‘beteers’ [APVs], which sent roaring rounds into 
the sky, found himself in the center of the world, on a path he had been ordered 
onto in a different time. War and violence paved the way for him. The weapons 
dissolved the doors. And he saw something that was otherwise impossible to see. 
This violence, of which he had been a part, made him feel abashed, at fault. And 
yet it, violence, was an instrument of knowledge for him, a fast and economical 
means of research. Violence, like a scalpel, cut the veil, and in the first few 
moments it was possible to understand and see how the concealed organs were 
arranged, how the joints and tissues were placed. To take it all in with lightning-
fast eyes, before destruction had covered them with waves of pain and blood.76  
 
Belosel'tsev repeatedly points out that he can access this inaccessible point thanks to the 
presence of weapons and other means of force. It is a new perspective on the standard 
rationalization of violence in war: violence is now an important tool for unraveling the secret, 
hidden meaning in this new (re)imagining of the post-Soviet world. By this point in the remake, 
the added element of conspiracy has already been clearly established for the reader. Prokhanov’s 
addition of violence, particularly as it is framed in the passage above (which, again, occurs quite 
early in the novel), dovetails nicely with his addition of conspiracy theories. Volkov, the 
protagonist in the original version, is a journalist, so he is interested in gathering the facts of the 
story by conducting interviews and witnessing events. Belosel'tsev, the protagonist in the remake 
version, is a secret spy, so the basic facts are already known to him. He is obsessed with secret 
knowledge—a slippery, unstable understanding of people and their actions. He works to see 
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what is going on below the surface, to uncover hidden linkages between events, to find out who 
is pulling the strings and to what end—both in present-day Moscow, as well as in 1980s 
Afghanistan. In order to attain this deeper truth, the above passage suggests, Belosel'tsev 
rationalizes wartime violence as an instrument, a special tool available to him in this pursuit of 
knowledge rather than some other form of military gain. 
Furthermore, Belosel'tsev’s reaction to witnessing acts of violence (here and elsewhere in 
the novel) is an extremely emotional and individual experience. Violence elevates him to another 
realm, somehow endowing him with superhuman power, enhancing his powers of deduction and 
ability to understand more of the world around him, to see more than meets the eye. The almost 
psychedelic nature to the way that Belosel'tsev experiences violence is how violence functions to 
make the unknowable somehow more knowable in the novel’s remake. The passage quoted 
above offers a series of imaginative metaphors for this process. It begins with the more 
mundane— Belosel'tsev imagines the soldiers’ guns dissolving the door, a common symbol for 
thresholds—but it quickly becomes elaborate—the truth is the body’s organs obscured by layers 
of skin, and the violence is a scalpel that cuts away the covering. In the first scene of violence 
that Prokhanov adds to the novel, therefore, Belosel'tsev draws on the ecstatic experience of 
seeing violence and military force to heighten his senses of deduction, and to transgress the 
literal and figurative limits and boundaries usually imposed. 
After they leave the village and return to the caravan of tractors, Belosel'tsev sees the 
driver’s dead body lying on the side of the road, and, in a similar sort of psychedelic response to 
violence, he becomes entranced. The narrative describes the dead body in detail, starting with the 
way his boots poked out of his trousers and the thin hairs on his bared legs, moving up his body 
to his head and face, eventually reaching the “bloody hole” that now separated the man’s blue 
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eyebrows, and the “thick raspberry-colored blood, splashed like jam” that “glistened 
brilliantly.”77 Almost in a state of ecstasy, Belosel'tsev reviews the corpse aesthetically, like a 
piece of art. It is beautiful and mesmerizing to him, not ugly or frightening. 
Belosel'tsev approached the dead man, seeing the dirty cloth of the turban, the 
worn-out soles, the shadow on his cheek from his protruding hooked nose, and the 
glistening blood, frozen like red lacquer. The space around the dead man suddenly 
began to glaze and thicken like gelatin. Viscous waves ran around him. People’s 
faces, the blue tractors, the bars on the APCs, the yellow potter’s village, the 
surrounding mountains began to surge like a water reflection, and Belosel'tsev, 
losing consciousness, fell into the soft and colorless.78 
 
Presumably, the immensity of this sudden, violent death is incomprehensible and overwhelming 
for Belosel'tsev, and he faints. The sight of blood is a common enough trigger for vasovagal 
syncope, but the texts presents us with signs that this moment holds greater significance. Rather 
than experiencing simple blurred vision, for example, Belosel'tsev seems to access an alternate 
plane of reality governed by different physical laws, where space can glaze and thicken, run in 
waves, or surge like water. When Belosel'tsev regains consciousness, Martynov tells him that 
when he looked at the blood, it “knocked [him] over.” Those unaccustomed to blood should not 
look, he says: “Nature purposely keeps it in the darkness, in the veins. The blood thrashes 
anyone who looks at it in the light.” Martynov thus affords blood a mystical or supernatural 
power, and, in a way, the first sight of blood in the novel sends Belosel'tsev on his first out-of-
body experience. Belosel'tsev’s emotional response to his (participatory) observation of violence 
will be repeated throughout the novel.  
One of the most intricate new narrative strategies involving violence in the remake 
version occurs during Belosel'tsev’s trip to Jalalabad, when he rides in the helicopter with an 




Afghan officer and observes the attack on the caravan of weapons crossing over from Pakistan. 
In the original version, the Afghan officer’s brother—a rebel mujahed—is merely an interesting 
detail left largely undeveloped. In the remake version, however, the Jalalabad story centers 
around the dramatic new story of violent fraternal hatred between two brothers on opposite sides 
of the conflict, each bent on not only killing the other, but on catching the other brother alive so 
that he can then torture him to death. As new prelude to the helicopter attack, there are several 
pages describing an idyllic, harmonious childhood: the two brothers grew up like twins, best 
friends, with “one heart” and “one mind.” The trouble came when their father decided that they 
needed to experience life in a different country, so he sent Nadir to study abroad in the Soviet 
Union while his brother, Nasim, went to study in America. The brothers return home and, 
naturally, become instant enemies. After the April revolution, Nadir joins the Afghan army in 
support of the new communist government, and pro-America Nasim joins the mujahedin to fight 
against the Soviet-backed regime. 
A substantial amount of new material featuring violence centers around this fraternal 
hatred, initially from the mujahed brother’s side. The spy with information about the caravan is 
captured by Nasim’s gang, who tortures him, decapitates him, and leaves his body hanging in a 
sack for Nadir to find. More evidence of Nasim’s terrorism soon follows: the bodies of murdered 
mechanics lying alongside destroyed tractors, for example, and the destruction of a village 
school, with body parts of slain children lying amid the rubble.79 In the original version, the 
reader learns about some of this when Volkov reads the information in concise, dry military 
reports. In the remake version, however, the reader get to see its grim effects through 
Beloselt’sev’s eyes. This new material intensifying the mujahedeen’s viciousness functions to 
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confirm and reinforce an important part of the imperial narrative: the Other (here, the 
mujahedeen rebels) is savage, primitive, perhaps more animal than human, and morally deficient. 
The imperial power (here, the Soviet Union) therefore has moral superiority over this population, 
which endows the imperial power with the moral authority in its relationship with the Other and 
justifies any retaliatory violence.  
Ironically, Prokhanov’s edits to this episode in the novel not only relate to a new 
narrative of imperial power, but also to a narrative of victimhood. As Belosel'tsev gazes at these 
horrific scenes, he keeps repeating to himself “smotri,” commanding himself (and us the readers) 
to see the evidence of this violence, not allowing himself to look away. We very rarely have 
access to Belosel'tsev’s inner voice or monologue, and this is the only time in the novel that his 
inner voice is set apart in quotation marks, so this moment in the text is quite marked. These 
repeated commands to “see” disrupt the flow of the narrative, breaking it up into pieces, like the 
broken rubble of the school. The repeated word, set off in quotation marks, is a structural 
representation of the uncharacteristic difficulty that Belosel’tsev has in processing the gruesome 
scenes in front of him. The repeated self-reminder to ‘see, see, see’ functions—in terms of 
processing issues—as a mental twitch to restore open channels for (visual) information input, or 
perhaps a malfunctioning output channel. Unlike earlier, when Belosel'tsev had witnessed the 
Soviet troops storm the small Afghan village, he does not derive any spiritual or mystical 
awakening or access any deeper truth from viewing this violence. It is quite unambiguously 
depicted as an act of evil committed by inhuman monsters. Witnessing the evidence of this act 
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both justifies Beloselt’sev moral superiority as a representative of the imperial power, and 
simultaneously turns him (and the reader) into a victim of psychological harm.80 
Violence in the narrative structure of the remake can be found on a larger level in 
Prokhanov’s reframing of the novel as a series of flashbacks from 1990s Moscow to the original 
story in 1980 Afghanistan. The constant shifting between place and time impose a sense of 
violent discontinuity on the reader, as well as reflect a rupture in Belosel'tsev’s mind, which 
cannot seem to stay put in one chronotope. Critics such as Cathy Caruth, Shoshana Felman, and 
Geoffrey H. Hartman have argued that the use of flashbacks, silence, repetitions, and disrupted 
structures testify to the “shattering force of trauma.”81 In the remake, Prokhanov has certainly 
employed all four narrative techniques of flashbacks, silence, repetitions, and disrupted 
structures—whereas they are not present (or are significantly less present) in the original version. 
Scholars such as Boris Noordenbos have investigated how these critics help us understand the 
postmodern literature of authors like Viktor Pelevin, Vladimir Sorokin, and Viktor Erofeev, but 
Noordenbos contends that literary trauma theory does not help much with other Russian authors 
who “create literary fantasies about the coherence of Russian space and time” (i.e., Prokhanov).82 
Other critics have argued that Prokhanov is a hack writer who mimics the narrative techniques of 
postmodern Russian writers without understanding their true function, and presumably they 
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would not ascribe much significance to his addition of these narrative techniques to the remake.83 
Be that as it may, Prokhanov has repeatedly described his experience of 1991, 1993, and the late 
1990s in terms evoking trauma. Certainly, his alter-ego protagonist Beloselt’sev, old and 
abandoned by the new ruling elite, has considerable difficulty navigating the post-Soviet reality. 
Is it merely nostalgia for the rosy Soviet past that sends Belosel'tsev in reveries back to the 
1980s? Is the desire to construct “literary fantasies about the coherence of Russian space and 
time” so incompatible with trauma that is directly related to the loss of that coherence? It seems 
plausible to read the new violence that Prokhanov introduces to narrative structures in the 
remake version as part of a new narrative of victimhood, if not trauma conventionally 
understood.  
If the mujahedeen’s violence in Jalalabad plays into narratives of imperialism and 
victimhood, then the retaliatory violence of the Soviet and Afghan armies speaks to the novel’s 
new binary of order/chaos, creation/destruction. After Nasim the mujahed rebel has brutally 
murdered the spy, the mechanics, and the schoolchildren, Nadir the Soviet-trained officer rushes 
back to the Afghan army base to prepare a violent response. In a grisly scene that Prokhanov 
adds to the remake, Nadir tortures a prisoner for information about his brother’s whereabouts. 
The prisoner, drenched in blood and near death, finally tells Nadir that Nasim is hiding in the 
brothers’ old family home. Thus, after the Afghan helicopter bombs the camel caravan carrying 
weapons across the border, there comes a new scene in which Nadir launches an attack on his 
and Nasim’s “ancestral palace.” (Their family had been wealthy, and their home is described as a 
palace.) As the helicopter approaches its target, we get three different perspectives of the scene 
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unfolding. The violent bombing is preceded by a romantic description of the palace, the village, 
and the surrounding natural environment—rich in sensory detail. 
Ahead, surrounded by pink vineyards, half-circle reddish gardens, a village appeared. It 
was tender, whitish, as if sprinkled with the lightest powder. It was reminiscent of a crisp 
baked good, breathing, glowing, tenderly. Among the stucco duval, rounded like muffins, 
towered a domed fortress, equipped with towers and jagged uneven walls. Above the 
fortress stood a palace, slender, with carved apertures, colored columns, crowned with an 
azure vault, a precious patterned spire.84 
 
This is followed by Belosel'tsev’s rather Orientalist appreciation for this gem of the exotic East. 
 
Such palaces Belosel'tsev had seen in Persian miniatures, in children’s fairytale books, 
where magical journeys were described. The Eastern world and its ways, not touched by 
wars, not desecrated by strangers, preserved in beauty and majesty, opened up to 
Belosel'tsev between the helicopter’s blades.85 
 
And then the reader gets to see the same view through Nadir’s eyes. 
 
Nadir looked at the palace with fascination. It was his ancestral nest, where he had been 
born and had grown up, where his father had put him and his brother Nasim on his knees, 
and they had galloped on their father’s lap, laughing, supporting and embracing each 
other. There were the old soft carpets on which he and his brother had played, the aviary 
where stately turquoise-golden peacocks were strolling. Lying in the far corner were their 
broken wooden horses.86 
 
Despite the exotic beauty of the palace, despite even the sentimental value it must have for him, 
Nadir urges the pilot on, even moving forward to sit on the metal bar next to the pilot in the 
cockpit, as though he cannot stand to be the slightest distance farther from his target. As they 
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approach, the palace grows closer and bigger, Nadir finally launches the rockets on his home, 
bombing it to smithereens. 
And into its blueness, into the overflow of tiles, into the carved apertures and windows, 
the helicopter let loose a beam of missiles. Black wedges spun from the helicopter, turned 
into red receding coals, broke the dome, wresting smoke and ash from it, pierced through 
into the interior of the palace, and there, rupturing it with balls of fire, singed the 
bulkheads and walls, rugs and carved doors, porcelain dishes in cupboards, glass 
containers and lamps, split the house into brittle slices. Nadir, crazed, illuminated by the 
flame, threw forward his sharply clenched hands, as if pushing the shells and bullets into 
his ancestral nest. On his soundlessly screaming lips breathed the hateful word: 
“brother!” 
 They flew back, leaving behind a conflagration, a blue broken dome with a black 
smoking hole.87 
 
It is an extended description of all the different pieces that make up a home (dishes, cupboards, 
carpets, lamps) being utterly destroyed, exploding into fire, smoke, and ash. Although we do not 
see the brother’s body in the wreckage, it is implied that Nadir has so thoroughly annihilated the 
place that there is no way that his brother could have survived. 
The final description of the scene—the blue dome with a black smoking hole—is 
reminiscent of the tractor driver’s dead body, the first death in the novel: blue eyebrows 
separated by a red bloody hole. It links these two significant moments in the novel. As in 
Belosel'tsev’s reaction to the driver’s dead body on his way to Kabul, here, too, is an element of 
the supernatural. Nadir directs this act of violence as though under a spell, or himself casting it. 
His gaze, body language, and movements are described as though he is possessed. Like the 
tractor driver’s death in the beginning of the novel, this death of the brothers’ “ancestral nest” 
(and resulting death of the brother) is new material that Prokhanov adds to the remake. In each 
new episode, Prokhanov shows Belosel'tsev and then Nadir experiencing these acts of violence 
and destruction with over-the-top intensity and emotion. This excessiveness ties into the 
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exaggerated way that Prokhanov uses these new episodes to illustrate the inevitable cycle of 
Russia’s imperial history, rotating between stable empire and catastrophic chaos. It is only after 
extended and exaggerated descriptions of a beautiful palace and a harmonious home, for 
example, that we encounter the similarly exaggerated description of its decimation. 
Juxtapositions of exaggerated extremes in the binary of order/violence abound in the new 
material that Prokhanov has added to the remake version of the novel. To a lesser extent, we see 
a similar order/violence binary when Beloselt’sev notices that he can see a rose petal through an 
icicle. Initially, it is a symbol of calm and beauty. After he speaks to Kugel’ on the phone for the 
first time, he suddenly has a vision of the same beautiful icicle exploding in bloody gore, and 
somehow it then becomes a vision of a bullet ripping through his own chest. At the end of the 
tumultuous 1990s, Prokhanov was seeking ways to reinterpret the chaos in Russian society as 
order, to assure himself and his readers that a sense of meta-order exists despite appearances to 
the contrary.  
The remake moves the reader from order to violence, as well as from violence to order, 
showing that both sides of the Soviet-Afghan conflict can contribute to violence and to order; 
Prokhanov’s binary does not necessarily ascribe negative meaning to the violence. Instead, 
Prokhanov presents his order/violence binary as two sides to the same coin, a naturally occurring 
cycle in human history. In other words, Prokhanov believes that periods of history—especially 
Russian history—inevitably and naturally move between violence (or instability) and order (or 
stability). His reliance on binaries to explain Russian history reflects the apocalyptic discourse of 
Iurii Lotman and Boris Uspenskii’s essay, “The Role of Binary Models in the Dynamics of 
Russian Culture,” which “asserted that a maximalist and bipolar tendency in Russian culture had 
repeatedly resulted in an intellectual and political impulse to do away with the established culture 
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and value system overnight, so as to break into a radically new order (often conceived as 
diametrically opposed to the order it replaces).”88 Violence is the natural (Russian) precursor and 
successor to peace. Only after this current period of violence and death, Prokhanov believes, will 
the impending rebirth of Russia’s imperial state finally occur.  
 
In the previous chapter on Prokhanov’s 1994 novel The Palace, I discussed his 
collaboration with Alexander Dugin and interest Dugin’s theory of neo-Eurasianism. Since that 
initial contact with Dugin in the late 1980s and the early 1990s, Prokhanov has moved away 
from a focus on Eurasianism and toward broader theories about the rise and fall of empires. By 
the end of the 1990s, Prokhanov had begun to openly advocate a return to the monarchy in 
Russia and to predict that the establishment of Russia’s “Fifth Empire” is imminent. From this 
perspective, then, it is perfectly logical that Prokhanov would reframe and even celebrate the 
Soviet-Afghan War as the final imperialist war of the fallen Fourth Russian Empire (a.k.a., the 
Soviet Union), when Russians were fighting to promote and spread their ideological beliefs to 
the people of Afghanistan. As Prokhanov rewrites his novel about the Kabul putsch, therefore, he 
moves away from the Soviet internationalist narrative toward a more obviously imperial 
narrative. Accordingly, the new material depicts violence that is more obviously imperial in 
nature. And, of course, we must not forget our protagonist’s new name: Belosel'tsev, or ‘white 
settler.’ Most twentieth-century literature about colonialism is written from the post-colonial 
perspective, which typically addresses the negative consequences of colonization and 
decolonization, and depictions of colonial violence in literature are most often intended to 
                                               
88 Noordenbos, Post-Soviet Literature, 54. See also Ju. Lotman and B. A. Uspenskij, The Semiotics of 
Russian Culture, ed. Ann Shukman (Ann Arbor: Dept. of Slavic Languages and Literatures, University of 
Michigan, 1984). 
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illustrate these problems. Prokhanov’s remake, however, offers a pro-imperialist perspective of 
the Soviet-Afghan War, and the imperial violence he adds functions to support this standpoint. 
Whereas postcolonial literary theorists such as Dominic Head have established that the ‘white 
settler’ anti-hero in literature often pursues imperial violence as an ultimately failed “quest for 
ontological reassurance,” Prokhanov’s Belosel'tsev seems to experience imperial violence as a 
successful quest for ontological reassurance.89 
When Prokhanov added violence to the Afghan war stories that he wrote in the late 
1980s, after Gorbachev had relaxed censorship about the war, many Soviet literary critics 
disparaged it as gratuitous; one described Prokhanov’s violent scenes as going “beyond the 
boundaries of humanism.”90 It may be criticism that he took to heart, because—as the above 
discussion should demonstrate—the violence he adds to his remake in 2001 really cannot be 
considered gratuitous. In fact, one of the conspiracy theory plots that Prokhanov adds to remake 
seems to mock the self-serving use of violence to sell books. MOSSAD agent Kugel'’s initial 
ploy for Beloselt’sev’s visit is that his publishing firm is putting out a series on local conflicts of 
the USSR in its final years, and he asks to meet with Belosel'tsev to discuss Afghanistan. At the 
meeting, Kugel' explains that the book will describe the “militaristic, aggressive Islam that has 
ripped into Kabul, Tajikistan, Central Asia, and even reached Chechnya, where Russian soldiers 
are again faced with this danger.” He says that the book should awaken in the consciousness of 
the Russian public a feeling of danger before Islam and “destroy the myth that Russia has 
partners in the Islamic East. That Iran, Iraq, the Arabic world are strategic partners for Russians. 
                                               
89 Dominic Head, Cambridge Introduction to J. M. Coetzee (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2009), 40. 
90 Sergei Yusenen, “The Vulnerability of Amour: Aleksandr Prokhanov Under Fire from Literary Critics,” 
Radio Liberty Research Bulletin, no. 207/86 (26 May 1986): 1–5. 
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In the twenty-first century, these partners of Russia will be America, Europe, Israel.”91 From his 
computer, Kugel' shows Beloselt'sev photographs and videos of extreme violence from the 
Soviet-Afghan War, offering them for the book, which he suggests could be called Dream about 
Kabul.92 The narrative description of the violence Belosel'tsev sees in these images is unlike 
narrative descriptions of violence elsewhere in the novel, and the scene comes across as a 
statement against using this kind of violence in war writing. This meta-moment in the novel is 
repeated almost one hundred pages later, during Belosel'tsev’s flashback to the uprising, when he 
is riding in a APV into the middle of a riot. He thinks to himself that the scenes of terrible 
violence and destruction rolling outside the APV seem like a dream; then he imagines that it is a 
dream, and they are in an iron ark flying above Kabul, repeating to himself the phrase a “dream 
about Kabul” (282). Both times that the novel is named in the text, therefore, the reader’s 
attention is also directed toward wartime violence in Afghanistan. It is one detail in the important 
relationship between writing and war that Prokhanov inserts into his remake, and which will be 
the focus of the next and final section in this chapter. 
 
PROKHANOV THE POET-PROPHET 
The image of the butterfly and the imagery of violence intersect in what is perhaps, for 
Prokhanov, the most important development between 1982 and 2001: from Prokhanov the 
Publitsist to Prokhanov the Poet-Prophet. Although Belosel'tsev is no longer a journalist in the 
novel’s remake, but a secret intelligence agent pretending to be a journalist, several of the 
changes Prokhanov makes nonetheless indicate his desire for a return to the higher status of 
                                               
91 Prokhanov, “Son o Kabule,” 183. 
92 Ibid., 184–87. 
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writing and writers, in general, and, more specifically, anxiety about Prokhanov’s role as a poet-
prophet in Russia today. Of course, the image of “the writer as a prophetic figure” has played an 
unusually prominent and persistent role in the Russian literary tradition, extending all the way 
back to Alexander Pushkin.93 Prokhanov is certainly not alone among post-Soviet writers 
concerned about the lost status of literature and the poet-prophet in Russia. But he is one of the 
few to (successfully) hitch Russia’s literary wagon to the red star of Russian military 
patriotism.94  
The two scenes that conclude the above section draw a clear connection between the 
novel (via meta-narrative references to Dream about Kabul) and the “right” sort of violence, 
which is military action made meaningful by patriotism for the Russian empire. In fact, 
connections between literature, war, and religion abound throughout Prokhanov’s remake. To the 
two passages cited above can be added a multitude of references to poets and prophets that 
appear alongside butterflies and warriors. In the very first chapter, for example, when 
Belosel'tsev as a retired general is contemplating his enormous butterfly collection, he thinks that 
“each box resembled a holy icon, where a rigid, motionless crowd of saints, prophets, winged 
angels, crowned warriors, interpreters of divine truths, martyrs for faith, blessed organizers of 
temples, rigidly stood in rows.”95 When Belosel'tsev is visiting Kugel', he is taken to a “cult 
room,” where people worship a “cruel ancient god,” who subjugated “Russian snows and birch 
                                               
93 See Pamela Davidson, “The Validation of the Writer’s Prophetic Status in the Russian Literary 
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trees, Russian poets and warriors, priests and visionaries.”96 Afterward, Verdyka takes 
Belose'tsev to visit a home for Afghan war veterans, and one of them sings a song that 
Belosel'tsev recognizes. 
It was one of thousands of ‘Afghan’ songs, composed by unknown frontline poets, in 
simple motifs, telling stories of ambushes, helicopter strikes, mountain marches, the red 
sands of Registan, the green mosques of Heart, the vineyards of Kandahar, where bullets 
overtook the paratrooper, about the Salang Valley, where a column of trucks were set on 
fire.97 
 
And when Belosel'tsev thinks about the beautiful garden in Jalalabad, where he will catch his 
monarch butterfly, he thinks to himself that “here, among the roses, having completed their 
mournful earthly paths, prophets, poets, and soldiers were resting and relaxing.” (In other words, 
the bones and/or ghosts of Afghan prophets, poets, and soldiers were there in the garden with 
Belosel'tsev.) In these and countless other passages, Prokhanov is continually reminding his 
reader that literature is on a level equal to that of war and religion, and that poets, warriors, and 
priests together form the backbone of a patriotic-national consciousness.  
In Belosel'tsev’s first flashback, when he receives his orders to go to Kabul, the general 
explains to young Belosel'tsev that he is interested in impressions, not facts. He chose 
Belosel'tsev for this mission because he, our protagonist, possesses the “rare gift” of abstract 
thought and perception, which, the general says, is  
the most economical and holistic way of expressing truth. Real [military] 
intelligence is poetry. The Iliad or The Lay of Igor’s Campaign – these are the 
surviving records of military intelligence officers. You will write your own 
journalistic legend. [...] In a month you’ll come to my office and put three pages 
of the report on the table. This will be your Afghan Odyssey. We’ll illustrate it 
together with miniatures from the Book of Babur!98 
                                               
96 Ibid., 240. 
97 Ibid., 389. 
98 Ibid., 202. 
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There is the sense here both that you have to go to war in order to write something of value, 
something that will be remembered for centuries, and that it helps to have a writer’s sensibility in 
order to aid in that war effort, that writers deal in a truth more important than mere facts. This 
sense of deeper truths is consistent with most war literature around the world—including the 
documentary prose of Svetlana Alexievich.  
Prokhanov adds several extraliterary references to Russian authors in his remake. 
Thinking back to his childhood in Moscow with his mother and grandmother, for example, 
Belosel'tsev recites from memory Mikhail Lermontov’s well-known poem, “A Sail” (“Parus,” 
1832). Valentin Kataev’s 1936 novel about the 1905 Revolution takes as its title a line from the 
poem—“A lonely white sail gleams” (“Beleet parus odinokii”).99 Also, at the beginning of the 
uprising, when our hero is suddenly overtaken by a mob at the beginning of the Kabul uprising, 
Prokhanov adds a reference to the eighteen-century Russian writer Alexander Griboedov. Shortly 
after his arrival in Tehran as Russia’s ambassador (or “Minister Plenipotentiary”) to Persia, 
Griboedov was massacred by an angry mob that stormed the embassy in Tehran. There is an 
historical echo in the two military-political situations: anti-Russian sentiment was high in eastern 
empire following the last Russo-Persian Wars (1804–13, 1826–28) and unpopular treaties that 
benefited Imperial Russia. Prokhanov’s reference to Griboedov also calls to mind Alexander 
Pushkin’s literary travelogue “A Journey to Arzrum” (1836), in which he describes encountering 
the coffin carrying Griboedov’s body back home. Thinking back over the poet’s life, Pushkin 
remarks that Griboedov might not have died if he had chosen to refuse the “patronage of the 
                                               
99 Kataev’s novel is set in Odessa during the 1905 revolution. For more on the novel, see Katerina Clark, 
The Soviet Novel: History as Ritual (Bloomington, Indiana University Press), 104–05. Kataev’s Beleet 
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powerful” (i.e., the tsar’s proposal that he serve as ambassador to Persia), because “independence 
and self-esteem alone can lift us [writers] above the trifles and the storms of fate.”100 In fact, 
when Belosel'tsev suddenly remembers Griboedov and his “cruel end in the abyss of a Muslim 
rebellion,” this fleeting thought “scalded him, gave birth to a sharp animal desire to survive, the 
certainty that in this he would succeed.”101 In other words, he vows to himself that he will not 
suffer a similar fate, and, indeed, he manages to escape undetected by donning the local garb. 
The function of this moment—in which the fate of Belosel'tsev, author of the “Afghan Odyssey,” 
pointedly diverges from that of Griboedov, a Russian playwright in Persia—may not run much 
deeper than this superficial reference, signal intended to remind readers once again of the long 
Russian tradition of interconnections between literary and military-political moments in history. 
However, the incident may also suggest that, despite Prokhanov’s emphasis on violence and 
possibly sacrifice, his hero has no interest in crossing the line into martyrdom—or at least not 
with such an inglorious death. 
As with the pro-imperialist villain Verdyka, Prokhanov occasionally puts some of his 
ideological “truths” in the mouths of characters who are otherwise operating counter to the 
hero’s mission. The only writer in Dream about Kabul is Belosel'tsev’s old rivel, Zafar 
Dolgolaptev.102 At the end of the novel, Belosel'tsev and Dolgolaptev decide to make amends. 
Belosel'tsev confesses to Dolgolaptev: “here, in Kabul, I am beginning to understand that I was 
                                               
100 Aleksandr Pushkin, “Prorok,” in Sobranie sochinenii v desiati tomakh, vol. 2 (Moscow: 
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mistaken. My new understanding, opening up to me a miracle, forces me to look differently at 
the past. Back then we were trying to see the heavenly in the earthly. In this one moment—the 
eternal. And now this understanding is returning to me.”103 The reader learns that Belosel'tsev 
had originally studied history and literature, but that he gave it up in order to become an 
intelligence agent and serve his government. Dolgolaptev, however, counters that Belosel'tsev’s 
decision was about his pride and ego, that he wanted to serve history itself, “when the vector of 
historical creation expressed in a government’s idea coincides with his own separate fate.”104 
Their friendly conversation turns heated. Dolgolaptev speaks about a catastrophe lying in wait 
for the USSR, about the mistake of entering Afghanistan with tanks, and he says that if 
Belosel'tsev were really an intelligence agent then he should be shouting at everyone to stop 
moving in this ill-fated direction. Belosel'tsev is unmoved by the writer’s claims, although the 
post-Soviet reader knows these statements to be prophetic. 
It is not only Soviet or Russian characters who possess the power of the poet-prophet in 
Prokhanov’s remake. Said Ismail, the Afghan political agitator, repeatedly argues with his fellow 
Afghan communists for using words before bullets, pen and paper instead of guns and weapons. 
When Dostagir, for example, argues that a revolution needs guns (Kalashnikovs, to be specific), 
Said Ismail disagrees and says that a revolution needs brains, books, bread, and tractors.  During 
the uprising in Kabul, Said Ismail shows up and makes an important difference with his 
impassioned speeches. Dostagir jokes that Said Ismail is “as always, without weapons.” Said 
Ismail says that the rebels had green megaphones and he had a red megaphone: his words “won 
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the day.”105 When the reader finally sees him in action, speaking to the crowd, the narrative 
demonstrates respect for the power of his words to magically change reality, or, at least, the 
reader’s perception of reality. Most of Said Ismail’s speech is not recorded in the novel; instead, 
the narrative focuses the reader’s attention on the effect of the speech: “It seemed as though from 
his face shone a projector. And everyone who heard him, if just for a moment, burned with an 
answering light.”106 
Others have pointed out that Prokhanov’s novels fit into the current wave of “imperial 
literature,” which insists that the currently weakened post-Soviet Russian state is destined to 
become a new powerful empire. On other platforms, Prokhanov has predicted that, in the twenty-
first century, Russia’s “Fifth Empire” will emerge. This, in part, is the war effort that Prokhanov 
the Poet-Prophet is trying to aid now, by declaring a place for twenty-first-century Russian war 
novels alongside the classics of Ancient Greek and medieval Russian war literature, and by 
writing novels (or remaking old novels) that seem to celebrate the violence and chaos that 
Russian society is experiencing now in this transitional state, before the next Russian empire is 
reborn. In what appears to recall Fedorov’s “common task”—the goal of immortality that all 
humanity must work toward together— Belosel'tsev thinks to himself at the end of the novel that 
the truth (istina) could not be revealed to him alone, but “only to everyone together, at once, in a 
single effort to understand.”  
“Every time,” he thought, “we draw up blueprints for the envisioned paradise of earthly, 
perfect being, we are distracted by war, then a disaster [...]. In each of us there is this plan 
and a blueprint, which from ancient times was drawn by magicians and storytellers, 
rebels and revolutionaries, poets in imperial salons, commissioners in typhous barracks. 
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[...] In the world there is sense and purpose [tsel'], which blood and violence purifies, and 
I am going toward this goal [tsel'].107 
 
The idea of a poet-prophet born of “blood and violence” recalls Pushkin’s poem “Prophet.” A 
six-winged seraph rips out the poet-prophet’s sinful, slanderous, lying tongue and replaced it 
with a serpent’s forked tongue; cleaved open the poet-prophet’s chest to replace his heart with 
“blazing coal”; and only then, lying like a “corpse” does God command the poet-prophet to rise 
and “with words ignite the hearts of men.”108 Pushkin’s poem—like Prokhanov’s remake—
couples ecstatic (spiritual) inspiration and violence; recall the above-cited passages, when 
Belosel'tsev reacts with near ecstasy to the first corpse he sees in Afghanistan. 
When Belosel'tsev, often referred to as Prokhanov’s alter-ego protagonist, thinks to 
himself that in “each of us there is this plan” for paradise, it is significant that he is the only one 
moving toward this goal. Pushkin’s poet-prophet is a genius chosen by God to guide the rest of 
the world with his words; mere mortals (readers) can but hope to receive the divine message 
through an ecstatic experience of reading. Prokhanov the Poet-Prophet remakes his Soviet-era 
publitsistika-novel to fit into this kind of author-reader relationship, where the author is the only 
one with a connection to the sovereign power above, and his readers are passive subjects. 
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In this new age of undeclared and unofficial wars, citizens and even legislative bodies have less 
control over and knowledge of their leaders’ decisions to engage in military combat around the 
world. This aspect of modern warfare affects the relationship between the state and its citizens in 
ways that can, and should, bleed over into our understanding of the relationship between author 
and reader—especially in literature about such wars. In literary theory, the basic concept of an 
author as the creator of his literary world, in which readers are mere passive voyagers present at 
the author’s discretion, would therefore expand to embrace new dimensions and real-world 
implications. In their post-Soviet literature, both Svetlana Alexievich and Alexander Prokhanov 
portray the Soviet-Afghan War as state-initiated violence that is characteristic of the new 
paradigm of lengthy, unofficial, ideologically-driven, global war. It invites us to consider how 
the implied author and implied reader in their texts reflect, or respond to, the situation that we—
as citizens of a state at war—find ourselves.1 However, Alexievich and Prokhanov, located as 
they are on opposite sides of the political divide, arrive at different conclusions about what the 
relationship between author-state leader and reader-citizen should be. Through their respective 
literary representations of the Soviet-Afghan War, Prokhanov and Alexievich offer competing 
illustrations of the relationships that, in their opinion, a citizen should have with their elected 
leaders, military, and religion. 
 Alexievich, like Theodor Adorno and Ales' Adamovich before her, believes that 
twentieth-century traumas—such as the Soviet-Afghan War—require a radically different 
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approach to writing literature. As such she abandoned a career in journalism to write about recent 
Soviet traumas in the related form of documentary prose: both journalism and documentary 
prose rely on witness interviews as a primary source. When Alexievich first began writing about 
the Soviet-Afghan War in this new form at the end of the 1980s, she taught her readers that 
different personal experiences in and reactions to the war result in different but equally valid 
versions of truth. In the twenty-first-century version of Zinky Boys, however, the truth about the 
Soviet-Afghan War loses this nuance and complexity. That the war was the Soviet state’s 
inexcusable mistake becomes a foregone conclusion, a historical fact, and no longer up for 
debate. Instead, through her innovative experimentation with the traditional roles of author and 
reader, Alexievich uses her version of a war story to instruct readers on civic responsibility, 
which, in this context, means the reader’s responsibility to prevent such a mistake from being 
repeated. By writing in a form that forces the reader to become more active, Alexievich is also 
telling her readers to be more active citizens who are engaged in the process of building a new 
state, of transitioning from totalitarianism to democracy, where sovereign power is dispersed 
rather than centralized. In this way, Alexievich’s implied reader is a fully-realized citizen, 
expected to engage in praxis and “write” in the gaps that Alexievich leaves behind. 
 Prokhanov is less interested in exploring radical new roles for authors and readers. His 
implied author remains the sovereign of his literary world and the reader can only sit back to 
watch the author’s story unfold. The reader’s role is reflected in Prokhanov’s passive 
protagonists. From the Soviet-era Tree to the post-Soviet Palace and Dream, the hero merely 
observes other people and events to collect information (whether for a newspaper or military 
intelligence), but he does not act. He follows orders; even when he disagrees with those orders, 
he does not rebel. He might be able to see through conspiracies and tell good guys from bad, but, 
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ultimately, he is powerless to affect the plot’s outcome. Similarly, Prokhanov does not encourage 
his reader to engage with the text in a creative and active way. Aside from the added dimension 
of conspiracies, his post-Soviet novels do not read like detective fiction—a popular genre in 
Russia in the 1990s2—where the author leaves strategic clues that might allow the reader to solve 
the mystery. To the contrary, Prokhanov’s novels seem designed to trigger or inspire in his 
reader feelings of ecstasy, rather than deduction, again modeled by the protagonist’s euphoric, 
metaphysical experience of events. In ecstasy, the reader loses control of his rational mind and is, 
in a sense, possessed by the sovereign (the Divine). In this way, Prokhanov’s Soviet-Afghan War 
stories mimic and advocate the unthinking obedience of a depoliticized being in a state where the 
sovereign—rather than citizen—has authority over meaning, as well as the aesthetics of the 
genre. Moreover, there are hidden messages in Prokhanov’s Soviet-Afghan War novels that are 
akin to what, in a political speech, might be called “dog whistles.” A reader who is not “in the 
know” can read The Palace or Dream about Kabul and see nothing more than some kind of 
magical historicism (and “innovative” postmodern aesthetics) in the hero’s metaphysical 
experiences in Afghanistan. Readers of the novel who also read Zavtra (or who are otherwise 
familiar with Prokhanov’s political opinions), however, are likely to realize that these passages 
are the literary expression of Neo-Eurasianist and/or imperialist ideology. 
 In this dissertation I have discussed in detail the inner mechanics of Alexievich’s and 
Prokhanov’s works about the Soviet-Afghan War with a focus on the roles of author and reader. 
I argue that their different treatments of implied author and implied reader roles reflect their 
respective opinions about the ideological system that they hope to see develop in the emerging 
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post-Soviet states. Implicit throughout has been the (my) general ethical concern of how to write 
a war story, and my suggestion that, at certain points, in different ways, both Alexievich and 
Prokhanov have crossed the line into ethical gray areas. Alexievich, I conclude, writes in a way 
that precludes any but negative associations with the war and that obscures her authorial 
manipulation of documentary material. Prokhanov, I am far from the first to say, too easily 
excuses or even justifies the life lost in Afghanistan. Despite the similar approaches that I have 
taken to Alexievich and Prokhanov, however, this is not to suggest that they are ethical equals; 
they are not. Neither are they ideologically balanced. They serve the purposes of this 
dissertation, because they show well how the Soviet-Afghan War could be used as a vehicle for 
opposing ideologies—but, it should not be forgotten that Prokhanov’s monarchist, imperialist, 
xenophobic, and anti-Semitic ideology leans far more to the right than Alexievich’s pro-
democracy, anti-war ideology does to the left. 
 I have engaged with Prokhanov’s writing on his own terms because, for a significant 
portion of the post-Soviet population, his ultra-rightwing novels about the Soviet-Afghan War 
represent a pathway into one version of Russia’s political past and future. Alexievich offers her 
readers a different history of the war—connected to a different future for Belarus and the 
Russian Federation. At the turn of the twenty-first century, these represented the two dominant 
approaches to the Soviet-Afghan War in post-Soviet literature. Military comradery, unhesitating 
obedience, and mystical spiritualism are key elements in this literary prototype of what will 
develop into Prokhanov’s pro-imperialist ideology. In her Nobel Lecture, Alexievich describes 
herself as an ear, listening to the people around her, to the voice of the “everyman” veteran. 
Alexievich thus re-envisions the little guy, the romanticized Ivan of Russian literature, as a 
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reader-citizen with a voice and a responsibility to fight for that voice, for representation in the 
new post-Soviet state. 
 The veterans, it should be noted, were writing their version of the war at the same time 
that Alexievich and Prokhanov were polishing theirs. In 1997—the early days of internet servers 
and personal computers in Russia—the Soviet-Afghan war veteran Vladimir Grigor'ev (served 
1985–87) created a website with the domain name of www.afgan.ru. On the webpage “From the 
Author” Grigor'ev urges people to “look war in the eye,” because “wars do not end, they are 
always near us. States and their rulers [praviteli] are disappearing, but the human desire to solve 
this or that problem with the help of weapons and [soldiers] does not disappear.” He posted 
photographs, propaganda leaflets, and “martyrology” of Leningraders who had died in 
Afghanistan, in order to “show you [...] episodes of war” that have not yet “passed into history” 
for those who participated in it. Making a point to reach out to veterans of the recently-concluded 
First Chechen War, he writes: “We are eagerly waiting for the guys who have made it through 
the horror and pain of the last stage of the Chechen campaign [...] and they can tell us about it 
themselves.” Even a place that is ostensibly created for Afghan veterans is, from the beginning, 
linking the Afghan and Chechen war experiences. From this humble website beginning, 
thousands of Russian-speaking veterans of post-World War II wars and military conflicts have 
connected and shared their poetry, prose, memoirs, and visual art on a free and open platform. 
Grigor'ev received an unexpected flood of responses from not only other “afgantsy” and their 
relatives, but also Soviet/Russian veterans of the Vietnam War, the Falklands War, the Gulf War, 
the Tajik Civil War, the Chechen Wars, and others. The following year, with some help from 
other veterans, Grigor'ev created a new website, artofwar.ru, to house this outpouring of writing 
from Russian-speaking veterans. This raises at least a few important points that are implied by 
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the special attention that Alexievich and Prokhanov had already paid to the Soviet-Afghan War 
before Grigor'ev created his website. 
 First, the Soviet-Afghan War is used here as the referential context for every other war 
fought by Soviet and post-Soviet soldiers since World War II. On the new website, which 
includes “genres” that ranges from Abkhazia to Yugoslavia, from Africa to the Middle East to 
conflict in Eastern Europe, the category “Afganistan” has by far the most entries (3,747 
compared to Chechnya at 1107). The most recent additions are stories about Russian 
involvement in military conflicts in Ukraine (2014–present) and Syria (2015–present). Second, 
there is no attempt to categorize the authors or works by political view. The website is a network 
for veterans but not outwardly pro-military. Instead, it is compilation of raw, uncensored artistic 
reactions to wartime experiences, reflecting the possibility of very different understandings of 
the war. Third is the website’s implication that its authors tell a “true” or authentic war story 
based on their participation in the war. In fact, the only criteria for contributors, as expressed in 
the website’s introduction, is that the author participated in a military conflict. The easy authority 
of war participants in this forum challenges the (more tenuous) authority of mere observers, such 
as Alexievich and Prokhanov, to tout their versions of the Soviet-Afghan War, as well as their 
obvious efforts to frame their Soviet-Afghan stories within competing political ideology. 
 The works by Alexievich and Prokhanov that are studied in this dissertation were written 
in a period of Soviet and Russian history from the 1980s into the early 2000s, when the Soviet-
Afghan War was, indeed, forgotten. Prokhanov’s 1994 novel The Palace received very little 
attention from even his fans. Simply, most writers—and government leaders, military leaders, 
religious leaders, and citizens—had other interests and concerns. In the twenty-first century, this 
would begin to change. In 2000, Vladimir Putin was elected to the Russian presidency; shortly 
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thereafter, the Russian government started taking steps to reassert control over the official 
narrative of the Soviet-Afghan War and re-incorporate it into the Russian national consciousness. 
When the United States went after the Taliban in Afghanistan after 9/11, the Russian government 
took great pains to assure its citizens that Russia would support U.S. efforts with military 
intelligence only—no Russian troops would set foot in Afghanistan.3 The Soviet experience in 
Afghanistan was suddenly less forgotten. Four years later, in 2005, Fedor Bondarchuk’s The 
Ninth Company, based on a battle that took place during the Soviet-Afghan War, became the 
highest grossing film in the history of the Russian Federation. In a voiceover at the end of the 
film, as the hero sits atop a tank on his way out of Afghanistan, he says: “we didn’t know that in 
two years the country in whose name we fought would vanish, that wearing the medals of that 
extinct state would go out of fashion [...] we didn’t know that, in the frenzy of retreating, they 
simply forgot about us, on those faraway heights.” The underlying message, of course, is that all 
soldiers in the Soviet-Afghan War had been forgotten, not just the Ninth Company. Although 
The Ninth Company is also understood as commentary on the Chechen Wars, it is important to 
note the significant differences, including the higher public visibility of the Chechen Wars, the 
protests, the fact that Chechnya lies within Russia’s borders, as well as the widespread 
knowledge that the Russian position was in direct opposition to what the Chechen people 
themselves wanted.4 In the transition from the Soviet to the post-Soviet states of Lukashenko and 
Putin, Svetlana Alexievich and Alexander Prokhanov write the story of the Soviet-Afghan War 
as a parable of a forgotten war that should be remembered, albeit with very different morals. 
                                               
3 See Fred Weir, “Burning Question,” The Christian Science Monitor, October 15, 2001, last accessed 
August 31, 2018, https://www.csmonitor.com/2001/1015/p13s1-wosc.html. 
4 A more comparable contemporary conflict might be Russia’s intervention in Syria’s civil war. 
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Today, in the increasingly authoritarian post-Soviet states, the Soviet-Afghan War is officially 
remembered for being forgotten, and honoring the war has become an act of patriotism.5  
  
                                               
5 In February 2009, on the 20-year anniversary of the final withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan, 
Putin celebrated Afghan veterans with a ceremony at the Kremlin. A memorial to the war was installed 





Ackerman, Felix, and Michael Galbas. “Back from Afghanistan: Experiences of Soviet Afghan  
War Veterans in Transnational Perspective.” Journal of Soviet and Post-Soviet Politics  
and Society 1, no. 2 (2015): 1–17. 
 
Ackerman, Galia, and Frédérick Lemarchand. “Du bon et du mauvais usage du témoignage dans  




Aleksievich, Svetlana “My viartaemsia adtul'. . . Staroini z knigi ‘Tsynkavyia khlopchyki’ –  
manalogi tykh, khto praishol Afganistan.” Litaratura i mastatstva, October 6, 1989. 
 
———. Poslednie svideteli: solo dlia detskogo golosa. Moscow: Vremia, 2007. 
 
———. “Tsinkovye mal'chiki.” Druzhba narodov 7 (1990): 5–88. 
 
———. Tsinkovye mal'chiki. Moscow: Vagrius, 1996. 
 
———. Tsinkovye mal'chiki. Moscow: Vremia, 2016. 
 
———. “Tsinkovye mal'chiki: Monologi tekh, kto proshel Afganistan.” Komsomol'skaia  
pravda, February 15, 1990. 
 
———. Vremia second khend. Moscow: Vremia, 2013. 
 
———. Zacharovannye smertiu. Moscow: Izdatel'stvo “Slovo/Slovo,” 1994. 
 
———. “V tvorcheskoi masterskoi. Moia edinstvennaia zhizn'.” Voprosy literatury 1(1996):  
205–23. 
 
Alexievich, Svetlana. “Brooklyn by the Book: Svetlana Alexievich.” Interview by Sophie  
Pinkham. The Brooklyn Public Library, New York, June 12, 2016. Video, 60:27. 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BiJulj6qT_0. 
 
———. “Confronting the Worst: Writing and Catastrophe.” Paper presented at the PEN World  




———. Zinky Boys: Soviet Voices from a Forgotten War. Translated by Julia and Robin Whitby.  
London: Chatto and Windus, 1992.  
 
Alexiev, Alex. Inside the Soviet Army—Afghanistan. Report No. 3627. Santa Monica, CA: The  




Allan, Pierre, Paul Bucherer, Dieter Kläy, Albert A. Stahel, and Jürg Stüssi-Lauterburg,  
 eds. Sowjetische Geheimdokumente zum Afghanistankrieg 1978– 1991. Zurich:  
 Hochschulverlag, 1995. 414-22. Quoted in Artemy Kalinovsky, A Long Goodbye:  
 The Politics and Diplomacy of the Soviet Withdrawal From Afghanistan, 1980–1992.  
 Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2011.  
 
Alyabev, A. “Soviet Character: According to the Laws of Courage.” Krasnaia zvezda,  
 October 2, 1984. 
 
Andrew, Christopher and Vasilii Mitrokin. The Mitrokhin Arhive: The KGB in Europe and the  
 West. London: Penguin Books, 2000. 
 
Azkhgikhina, Nadezhda. “Ne muza, no tvorets.” Nezavisimaia gazeta, March 7, 2008.  
 https://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/13570723. 
 
Bakhtin, Mikhail. Problems of Dostoevsky’s Poetics. Edited and translated by Caryl Emerson.  
 Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1984.  
 
———. Problemy tvorchestva Dostoevskogo; Problemy poetiki Dostoevskogo. Moscow:  
“Khudozhestvennaia literatura.” 1972. Reprint, Kiev: “Next.” 1994. 
 
———. The Dialogic Imagination: Four Essays. Translated by Caryl Emerson and Michael  
Holquist. Edited by Michael Holquist. Austin: University of Texas Press, 1981. 
 
———. Toward a Philosophy of the Act. Translated by Vadim Liapunov. Edited by Vadim  
Liapunov and Michael Holquist. Austin: University of Texas Press, 1993. 
 
Balaev, Michelle, ed. Contemporary Approaches in Literary Trauma Theory. New York:  
 Palgrave Macmillan, 2014. 
 
Balmforth, Tom. “Soviet WWII Legend of Panfilov Guardsmen Debunked as ‘Fiction.’” Radio  
Free Europe Radio Liberty, July 12, 2015. https://www.rferl.org/a/soviet-wwii-panfilov- 
guardsmenfiction/27123430.html. 
 
Banerji, Arup. Writing History in the Soviet Union: Making the Past Work. New Delhi: Social  
Science Press, 2008. 
 
Barfield, Thomas. Afghanistan: A Cultural and Political History. Princeton: Princeton  
University Press, 2010. 
 
Barthes, Roland. The Pleasure of the Text. Translated by Richard Miller. New York: Hill and  
 Wang, 1975.  
 




Basinsky, Pavel. “Sluchai Prokhanov.” Literaturnaia gazeta, February 12, 1992.  
 
Baskir, Lawrence M., and William A. Strauss. Chance and Circumstance: The Draft, the War,  
and the Vietnam Generation. New York: Knopf, 1978. 
 
Bassin, Mark. The Gumilev Mystique: Biopolitics, Eurasianism, and the Construction of  
Community in Modern Russia. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2016. 
 
———, Sergey Glebov, and Marlène Laruelle, eds. Between Europe and Asia: The Origins,  
Theories, and Legacies of Russian Eurasianism. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh 
Press, 2015. 
 
Bek, Tat'iana, and Svetlana Aleksievich. “V tvorcheskoi masterskoi. Moia edinstvennaia  
 zhizn'.” Voprosy literatury 1 (February 1996): 205-23. 
 
Beliakov, Sergei. “Etiud v krasno-korichnevykh tonakh. Aleksandr Prokhanov.” Voprosy  
literatury 5 (2009): 44–57. https://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/21979257. 
 
Belikov, Iurii. “Chelovek-babochka.” Zvezda, June 27, 2008. 
 https://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/18535337. 
 
Berg, M. Literaturokratiia: problema pereraspredeleniia i prisvoeniia vlasti. Moscow: NLO,  
 2000. 
 
Blanchot, Maurice. The Writing of the Disaster. Translated by Ann Smock. Lincoln: University 
 of Nebraska Press, 1995.  
 
Borenstein, Eliot. “Nobody Expects the Russian Inquisition.” The Plots Against Russia. July 8, 
 2016. http://plotsagainstrussia.org/eb7nyuedu/2016/7/8/nobody-expects-the-russian- 
 inquisition. 
 
Borovik, Artem. Afganistan: eshche raz pro voinu. Moscow: “Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia,”  
 1990. 
 
———. “Afganistan: Predvaritel'nye itogi.” Ogonek 30 (July 23-30, 1988): 25-27.  
 
———. Kak ia byl soldatom amerikanskoi armii. Moscow: Izdatel'stvo Agenstva pechati  
Novosti, 1989.  
 
———. Spriatannaia voina. Moscow: PIK, nezavisimoe izdatel'stvo, 1992.  
 
———. “Vstretimsya u trekh zhuravlei.” Ogonek 28-30 (August 1987): n.p.  
 
Bondarenko, Vladimir. “Rossiia, kroviu umytaiia,” Zavtra, January 2, 1994.  
 




Booth, Wayne C. The Rhetoric of Fiction. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1961 [1983]. 
 
Bourke, Joanna. An Intimate History of Killing: Face to Face Killing Twentieth Century  
 Warfare. New York: Basic Books, 1999.  
 
Braithwaite, Rodric. Afgantsy: The Russians in Afghanistan, 1979–1989. London: Oxford  
University Press, 2011. 
 
Brougher, Valentina G. “The Occult in Russian Literature of the 1990s.” The Russian Review  
 56, no. 1 (January 1997): 110-24. 
 
Bruder, Margaret Ervin. “Aestheticizing Violence, or How to Do Things with Style.” PhD diss.,  
 Indiana University, 2003.  
 
Carleton, Gregory. Russia: The Story of War. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2017.  
 
“CC CPSU Politburo Resolution # 176/125, Concerning the Situation in ‘A’ [Afghanistan].”  
 History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, RGANI (formerly TsKhSD), f. 89,  
 per. 14, dok. 31. December 12, 1979.  
 http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/113675. 
 




Chaudet, Didier, Florent Parmentier, and Benoît Pélopidas. When Empire Meets Nationalism:  
Power Politics in the US and Russia. Burlington, VT: Ashgate Pub. Co., 2009. 
 
Childress, James F. “The War Metaphor in Public Policy: Some Moral Reflections.” In The  
 Leader’s Imperative: Ethics, Integrity, and Responsibility. Edited by J. Carl Ficarrotta. 
 West Lafayette, IN: Purdue University Press, 2001. 181-197.  
 
“Chto pishu? Chto chitaiu?” Literaturnaia gazeta, January 9, 1991.  
https://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/26632252. 
 
Chuprinin, Sergei. “Zhizn. Iskusstvo. Kritika. KRITIKA – ETO KRITIKA!” Voprosy  
 literatury 2 (February 28, 1987): 33-74. 
 
Clark, Katerina. The Soviet Novel: History as Ritual. Bloomington: Indiana University Press,  
 2000. 
 
Clover, Charles. “Lev Gumilev: Passion, Putin and Power.” Financial Times, March 11, 2016. 
 https://www.ft.com/content/ede1e5c6-e0c5-11e5-8d9b-e88a2a889797. 
 
Coleman, Heather, ed. Svetlana Alexievich: The Writer and her Times. Canadian 
 
 247 
 Slavonic Papers 59, nos. 3-4 (2017). 
 
Cooley, Alexander. Great Games, Local Rules: The New Power Contest in Central Asia. New  
 York: Oxford University Press, 2012.  
 
Cooper, Anne. “The Death of Glasnost: How Russia’s Attempt at Openness Failed.”  




“Da, bessmertie! (‘Kruglyi stol’, posviazhchennyi ucheniiu ‘vseobshchego dela’ Nikolaia  
Fedorova).”  Zavtra, June 29, 2001.  
 
Dal', Vladimir. Tolkovyi slovar'. Vol. 3. Moscow: “Khudozhestvennaia literatura”, 1935. 
 
Danilkin, Lev. Chelovek s iatsom: Zhizn' i mneniia Aleksandra Prokhanova. Moscow: Ad  
 Marginem, 2007. 
 
Dardykina, Natal'ia. Otkroveniia znamenitostei. Moscow: “AST.” 2014. 
 
Das, Bijay Kumar. Twentieth Century Literary Criticism. New Delhi: Atlantic, 2005. 
 
Davidson, Pamela. “The Validation of the Writer’s Prophetic Status in the Russian Literary  
 Tradition: From Pushkin and Iazykov through Gogol to Dostoevsky.” The Russian 
 Review 62 (October 2003): 508–36. 
 
“Declaration of the CC CPSU to the Party Leadership concerning the Situation in Afghanistan,  
 Attachment to CPSU Politburo Protocol #177.” History and Public  
 Policy Program Digital Archive, TsKhSD, F. 89, P. 14, D. 32. December 27, 1979.  
 http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/111554. 
 
de la Durantaye, Leland. Giorgio Agamben: A Critical Introduction. Stanford: Stanford  
 University Press, 2009.  
 
Der Spiegel. March 7, 1988: 180-186.  
 
“Dostoinstvo romana: Dnevnik ‘LG’ chitaia zhurnaly.” Literaturnaia gazeta, March  
 24, 1982. https://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/26668520. 
 
Drozdovskii, Dmitrii. “Svetlana Aleksievich: Khotela Napisat' Takuiu Knigu, Chtoby Ot Voiny  
Toshnilo Dazhe Generalov.” Zerkalo nedeli, April 9, 2016. 
https://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/46431027. 
 
D'iakova, Elena. “Svidanie: Svetlana Aleksievich: Bolevaia tochka – eto ne opora. No mir  





Dugin, Aleksandr. Filosofiia voiny. Moscow: Yauza, 2004. Quoted in Marlène Laruelle, Russian  
Eurasianism: An Ideology of Empire. Translated by Mischa Gabowitsch. Baltimore: The  
Johns Hopkins University Press, 2008. 
 
———. Osnovy geopolitiki: geopoliticheskoe budushchee Rossii. Moscow: “Arktogeia”, 1997. 
 
———. “Velikaia voina kontinentov.” Den' 15:93 (April 12-18, 1992). http://arcto.ru/article/171  
and http://arcto.ru/article/172. 
 
Dunlop, John B. The Rise of Russia and the Fall of the Soviet Union. Princeton, NJ: Princeton  
University Press, 1995. 
 
Dupree, Louis. Afghanistan. Princeton, NJ: Princeton UP. 1980. 
 
“Dve treti rossiian ne znaiut Svetlanu Aleksievich.” Novye izvestiia, November 2, 2015.  
 https://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/45635601. 
 
Dynin, Ivan. Posle Afganistana: “afgantsy” v pismakh, dokumentakh, svidel'stvakh ochevidtsev. 
  Moscow: Profizdat, 1990.  
 
Ensler, Eve. The Vagina Monologues. New York: Villard, 2001. 
 
Epstein, Mikhail. “Postmodernism, Communism, and Sots-Art,” 51–94 in Russian  
Postmodernism: New Perspectives on Post-Soviet Culture. Trans. Slobodanka Vladiv-
Glover. New York: Berghahn Books, 1999 [2016]. 
 
Erofeev, Viktor. “Pominski po sovetskoi literature.” In Russkaia literatura v zerkale  
kritiki. Edited by S. I. Timina, M. A. Cherniak, and N. N. Kiashto. Saint Petersburg:  
Khrestomatiia, 2003. 35-43. 
 
Etkind, Alexander. Warped Mourning: Stories of the Undead in the Land of the Unburied.  
Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2013. 
 
“Excerpt from transcript, CPSU CC Politburo meeting.” History and Public Policy Program  
 Digital Archive, APRF. September 20, 1979.  
 http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/111568. 
 
“Extract from CPSU CC Politburo Decision.” History and Public Policy Program Digital  
 Archive. December 6, 1979. http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/111579. 
 
Feifer, Gregory. The Great Gamble: The Soviet War in Afghanistan. New York: Harper, 2009. 
 





Fludernik, Monika. “Second-Person Narrative: A Bibliography.” Style 28, no. 4 (Winter  
 1994): 525-48. 
 
———. “Second-Person Narrative as a Test Case for Narratology: The Limits of Realism.” Style  
28, no. 3 (Fall 1994): 445–79. 
 
Fremont-Barnes, Gregory. The Soviet-Afghan War 1979-89. Long Island City, NY: Osprey  
Publishing, 2012.  
 
Galeotti, Mark. Afghanistan: The Soviet Union’s Last War. London: Frank Cass, 1995. 
 
Gapova, Elena. “Stradanie i poisk smysla: ‘moral'nye revoliutsii’ Svetlany Aleksievich.”  
Novoe Literaturnoe Obozrenie 99 (January 2015): n.p. 
http://www.nlobooks.ru/node/5953. 
 
Gavrilov, Iurii “Nadezhnye druz'ia.” Krasnaia zvezda, March 11, 1980. 
 
Giustozzi, Antonio. War, Politics and Society in Afghanistan, 1978–1992. Washington, DC:  
Georgetown University Press, 2000. 
 
Grachev, Ivan, Vladimir Vorsobin, and Dmitrii Steshi. “Nobelevskii laureat po literature  
Svetlana Aleksievich: Rossiia: voina, tiur'ma, bardak i barak.” Komsomol'skai pravda,  
December 9, 2015. https://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/45825403. 
 
Grau, Lester W., and Michael A. Gress, Russian General Staff.  The Soviet-Afghan War: How a  
Superpower Fought and Lost. Edited and translated by Lester W. Grau and Michael A.  
Gress. Lawrence, KS: Kansas University Press, 2002. 
 
Griffiths, Edmund. “Aleksandr Prokhanov and Post-Soviet Esotericism.” PhD diss., Oxford  
University, 2007. 
 
Grigor'ev, L. “Isk materei.” Vechernii Minsk, June 12, 1992. 
 
Gromov, Boris. Ogranichennyi contingent. Moscow: Izdatel'stvaia gruppa “Progress” /  
 “Kul'tura,” 1994.  
 
Groys, Boris, ed. Russian Cosmism. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2018. 
 
Hantzis, Darlene. “You Are About to Begin Reading: The Nature and Function of Second Person  
 Point of View.” PhD diss., Louisiana State University, 1988. 
 
Hartsock, John C. “Literary Reportage: The ‘Other’ Literary Journalism.” In Literary Journalism  
Across the Globe: Journalistic Traditions and Transnational Influences. Edited by John  
S. Bak and Bill Reynolds. Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 2011. 23-46. 
 
Head, Dominic. The Cambridge Introduction to J. M. Coetzee. Cambridge: Cambridge  
 
 250 
 University Press, 2009. 
 
Hyman, Anthony. “Through the Looking Glass: A Look at the Official Soviet Version of the  
War in Afghanistan.” Quarterly Journal (English) of Writers Union of Free  
Afghanistan (WUFA) 1, no. 2 (1986): 39-46. 
 
“I snitsya im Salang….” Pravda, July 24, 1984.  
 
Ivanov, Ivan. “Anafema. Zapiski Razvedchika.” Zavtra, Spetsvypusk 2, August 1994.  
 
Ivanova, Mariia. “‘Proshloe vse vremia ne pozadi, a vperedi nas’: pisatel' Svetlana Aleksievich o  
 ‘krasnom cheloveke’, romantike rabstva i likakh zla.” Theory and Practice, November  
 7, 2014. Accessed August 16, 2018. https://theoryandpractice.ru/posts/9820-svetlana- 
 Aleksievich. 
 
Jungstrand, Anna. “Svetlana Aleksijevitj och den dokumentära rösten. Om lyssnandets etik och  
 tilltalets dubbla botten i Zinkpojkar.” Tidskrift för litteraturvetenskap 46, no. 2 (2016):  
 49-63. 
 
Kalinovsky, Artemy. A Long Goodbye: The Politics and Diplomacy of the Soviet Withdrawal  
From Afghanistan, 1980–1992. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2011. 
 
Kariakin, Iurii. Samoobman Raskol'nikova. Moscow: “Khudozhestvennaia literatura.” 1976. 
 
Kots, Aleksandr. “Zhurnalist Vladimir Snegirev: Ia vinovat pered geroiami moikh reportazhei...”  
 Komsomol'skai pravda, February 2, 2014. Accessed August 29, 2018. 
 https://www.vladimir.kp.ru/daily/26195.7/3082321/.  
 
Kiselev, Sergei. “Den' zakryt, vse ushli na putch.” Literaturnaia gazeta, August 28, 1991. 
 
Kovalev, L. “Delo o ‘Tsinkovykh mal'chikakh,’ ili o tom, kak otreagirovali v Belarusi na odin  
telespektakl.” Krasnaia zvezda, June 2, 1992. 
 
Kovrov, M. “Igor' Serenko, Teatr ‘Soprichasnost’.” Zavtra, November 14, 1997.
 https://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/2533455. 
 
———. “Mistik russkoi pebedy (K 100-letiiu so dnia rozhdeniia Andreia Platonova).” Zavtra,  
September 3, 1999. https://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/2535859. 
 
Kristeva, Julia. Black Sun: Depression and Melancholia. Translated by Leon S. Roudiez. New  
 York: Columbia University Press, 1992.  
 
Kruzhin, Peter, and John Hartland. “Krasnaya zvezda Describes Reception of Soviet Troops in  
 Afghanistan.” Russkaia literatura, March 14, 1980.  
 
Kukulin, Il'ia. “Reaktsiia dissotsiatsii: Legitimatsiia ul'trapravogo diskursa v sovremennoi  
 
 251 
rossiiskoi literature.” In Russkii natsionalizm: Sotsial'nyi i kul'turnyi kontekst. Edited by  
Marlène Laruelle. Moscow: NLO, 2008. 257-358. 
 
———. “Revoliutsiia oblezlykh drakonov: ul'trapravaia ideiia kak imitatsiia nonkonformizma.”  
Polit.ru. April 8, 2007. Accessed August 21, 2018. 
http://polit.ru/article/2007/04/08/kukproh/#_ednref111. 
 
Larina, Kseniia, Sergei Shargunov, and Ruslan Aushev. “Sovetskie voiska v Afganistane: 
 Vzgliad v istoriiu spustia 25 let.” Ekho Moskvy, February 14, 2014.  
 http://www.echo.msk.ru/programs/year2014/1257300-echo/#element-text. 
 
Laruelle, Marlène. Russian Eurasianism: An Ideology of Empire. Translated by Mischa  
Gabowitsch. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2008. 
 
Latynina, A. “Kolokol'nyi zvon—ne molitva.” Novyi mir, August 1988. 
 
Liakhovskii, Aleksandr. Tainy afganskoi voiny. Moscow: “Planeta,” 1991.  
  
———. Tragediia i doblest' Afgana. Moscow: GPI Iskona, 1995. 
 
Lindbladh, Johanna. “The Polyphonic Performance of Testimony in Svetlana Aleksievich’s  
 Voices from Utopia.” Canadian Slavonic Papers 59, nos. 3-4 (2017): 281-312. 
 
Livers, Keith. “The Tower or the Labyrinth: Conspiracy, Occult, and Empire-Nostalgia in the  
 Work of Viktor Pelevin and Aleksandr Prokhanov.” Russian Review 69 (July 2010):  
 477-503. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9434.2010.00577.x. 
 
Lizichev, A. D. “Sotsialisticheskaia armiia i literature.” Znamia 2 (1988): 160–76.  
 
Losoto, Elena. Komandirovka na voinu. Moscow: “Kniga,” 1990.  
 
Lotman, Ju., and B. A. Uspenskij. The Semiotics of Russian Culture. Edited by Ann Shukman. 
Ann Arbor: Dept. of Slavic Languages and Literatures, University of Michigan, 1984. 
 
Makhnenko, Iurii. “Literaturnaia stranitsa. Zametki kritika. Za vse v otvete.” Izvestiia, February  
18, 1983. https://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/3116822. 
 
Male, Beverley. Revolutionary Afghanistan: A Reappraisal. London: Croom Helm, 1982.  
 
Markwick, Roger D. Rewriting History in Soviet Russia: The Politics of Revisionist  
Historiography, 1956–1974. New York: Palgrave, 2001. 
 
Marwick, Arthur. The New Nature of History: Knowledge, Evidence, Language. Basingstoke:  
 Palgrave, 2001. 
 
Marsh, Rosalind J. Soviet Fiction Since Stalin: Science, Politics and Literature. London: Croom  
 
 252 
 Helm, 1986. 
 
Masing-Delic, Irene. “Nikolai Fyodorov”. In Abolishing Death: A Salvation Myth of Russian  
 Twentieth-Century Literature. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1992. 76-104.  
 
Makhnenko, Iurii. “Literaturnaia stranitsa. Zametki kritika. Za vse v otvete.” Izvestiia, February 
18,1983.  
 
McLoughlin, Kate. “War and Words.” In The Cambridge Companion to War Writing. Edited  
 by Kate McLoughlin. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2009. 15-24. 
 
———. “War in Print Journalism.” In The Cambridge Companion to War Writing. Edited by  
Kate McLoughlin. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2009. 47-58. 
 
Menzel, Birgit, and Michael Hagemeister. The New Age of Russia: Occult and Esoteric  
Dimensions. Edited by Bernice Glatzer Rosenthal. Berlin: Peter Lang, 2012.  
 
Mitrokhin, Vasilii. “KGB v Afganistane.” 1987. wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/mitro- 
russian.pdf. 
 
Mondry, Henrietta. “Blood Rituals and Ethnicity in Alexander Prokhanov’s Fiction.” ASEES  
 27, nos. 1-2 (2013): 1-34. 
 
———. “Ethnic Stereotypes and New Eurasianism: Alexander Prokhanov’s Novel ‘The Cruise  
Liner Joseph Brodsky.’” New Zealand Slavonic Journal 45, no. 1 (2011): 147-73. 
 
Morson, Gary Saul. “The Reader as Voyeur: Tolstoi and the Poetics of Didactic Fiction.”  
 Canadian-American Slavic Studies 12, no. 4 (Winter 1978): 465-80.  
 
Murav'ev, V. S. “Dokumental'naia literatura.” Kratkaia literaturnaia entsiklopedia. Edited  
 by A.A. Surkov. Moscow: Sovetskaia entsiklopediia, 1962–78. 
 
Nepomnyashchy, Catharine Theimer. “Markets, Mirrors, and Mayhem: Aleksandra Marinina and  
the Rise of the New Russian Detektiv.” In Consuming Russia: Popular Culture, Sex, and 
Society Since Gorbachev, edited by Adele Marie Barker, 161–91. Durham: Duke UP, 
1999. 
 
The Nobel Prize. “The Nobel Prize in Literature 2015.” Nobel Media AB: 2014.  
https://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/literature/laureates/2015/. 
 
Noordenbos, Boris. Post-Soviet Literature and the Search for a Russian Identity. New York:  
 Palgrave Macmillan, 2016. 
 
Norris, Stephen. Blockbuster History in the New Russia: Movies, Memory, and Patriotism.  




O’Sullivan, Piper E. “Literary Politics of the Soviet-Afghan War.” PhD diss., Indiana University,  
2018.  
 
Oushakine, Sergei Alex. The Patriotism of Despair: Nation, War, and Loss in Russia. Ithaca,  
 NY: Cornell University Press, 2009.  
 
Petrashkevich, A.L., ed. Pamiat': Afganistan. Minsk: “Belaruskaia savetskaia entsyklapedyia,”  
1991.  
 
Phelan, James. “‘Self-Help’ for Narratee and Narrative Audience: How ‘I’—and ‘You’?—Read  
 ‘How’.” Style 28, no. 3 (Fall 1994): 350-65. 
 
Pikov, N.I., ed. Voina v Afganistane. Moscow: Voennoe izdatel'stvo, 1991.  
 
Pinkham, Sophie. “Witness Tampering.” New Republic, August 29, 2016.  
https://newrepublic.com/article/135719/witness-tampering. 
 
Prilepin, Zakhar. Imeniny serdtsa: Razgovory s russkoi literaturoi. Moscow: Astrel', 2009. 
 
Prince, Gerald. A Dictionary of Narratology (Revised Edition). Lincoln: University of Nebraska  
 Press, 2003. 
 
Prokhanov, Aleksandr. “Arkhitektor.” Literaturnaia gazeta, November 5, 1980.  
https://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/26705314. 
 
———. “Chto tvoriat bandity.” Literaturnaia gazeta, February 27, 1980.  
https://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/26705794. 
 
———. Derevo v tsentre Kabula. Moscow: Sovetskii pisatel', 1982. 
 
———. “Dvorets.” Nash sovremennik 7 (1994): 3–42; 8 (1994): 15–37; 9 (1994): 18–61. 
 
———. “Formuly, gipozety.” Literaturnaia gazeta, November 6, 1985. 
 
———. “Edinye v revoliutsii.” Literaturnaia gazeta, May 7, 1980: 14.  
https://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/26704265. 
 
———. “Godovshchiny sobytii u Doma Sovetov ia vstrechaiu bez unyniia.” Zavtra, April 10,  
2016. http://www.nakanune.ru/articles/112186/. 
 
———. “Ia znal, chto idu pod obstrel.” Zavtra, April 14, 1994. 
 
———. “Ideologiia vyzhivaniia.” Nash sovremennik 9 (1990): 3–9. 
 




———. “Kop'e natsii.” Zavtra, March 27, 1998. 
https://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/2533914. 
 
———. “Liberalizm kak dyrka istorii.” Zavtra, June 8, 2001. 
https://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/2530605. 
 
———. “Na strazhe revoliutsii.” Literaturnaia gazeta, June 11, 1980.  
https://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/26705098. 
 
———. “Net vremeni dlia vyzhidanii.” Sovetskaia kul'tura, September 7, 1982.  
https://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/38287837. 
 
———. Interview by Tat'iana Fel'gengauer. “Osoboe mnenie: Aleksandr Prokhanov.” Interview  
by Tat'iana Fel'gengauer. Ekho moskvy, November 20, 2013. Accessed August 21, 2018. 
https://echo.msk.ru/programs/personalno/1201220-echo/. 
 
———. “Paskha—natsional'naia ideiia Rossii.” Zavtra, April 16, 2004. 
 




———. “Pod pritselom—revoliutsiia.” Pravda, September 19, 1983.  
 https://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/21551199. 
 
———. “Poslednyi soldat imperii.” Nash sovremennik 7-9 (1994).  
 
———. “Plemena i puli.” Literaturnaia gazeta, January 28, 1981.  
https://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/26665726 and  
https://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/26667572. 
 
———. “Pskovskii lider (Beseda Aleksandra Prokhanova s gubernatorom Evgeniem  
Mikhailovym).” Zavtra, August 3, 2001. https://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/2530781. 
 
———. “Razgromlena banda.” Literaturnaia gazeta, January 7, 1981. 
https://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/26668112 and  
https://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/26665143. 
 
———. “Risunki batalista.” Moskva no. 9 (1986): 33–155; no. 10 (1986): 11–106. 
 
———. “Rossiia—imperiia sveta.” Zavtra, June 15, 2001.  
https://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/2530630. 
 





———. “Son o Kabule.” Voina s vostoka: Kniga ob afganskom pokhode. Moscow: ITRK, 2001. 
 
———. Son o Kabule. Moscow: Armada-press, 2002. 
 
———. “Svetlei lazuri.” Oktiabr' 9 (1986): 3–55.  
 
———. “Vremia pakhoty i seva.” Literaturnaia gazeta, March 19, 1980.  
https://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/26704619. 
 
———. “Vstrechi na Maivande.” Literaturnaia gazeta, April 22, 1981.  
https://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/26667005. 
 
———. “Vyberem svet, a ne t'mu.” Pravda, October 24, 1985.  
https://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/2156128 
 
———. “Vybor—revoliutsiia!” Literaturnaia gazeta, June 18, 1980.  
https://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/26705398. 
 
———. “Zapiski iz bronia.” Literaturnaia gazeta, August 28, 1985.  
https://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/26668506. 
 
———. “Za plugom.” Literaturnaia gazeta, February 11, 1981.  
https://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/26665851. 
 
Prokhanov, Alexander. A Tree in the Center of Kabul (abridged version). Translated by Peter 
 Greenwood and Holly Smith. Soviet Literature 7 (1983): 3–129. 
 
Pushkin, Aleksandr. “Prorok.” In Sobranie sochinenii v desiati tomakh, vols. 2 and 4.  
 Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe izdatel'stvo khudozhestvennoi literatury, 1959. 
 
Rand, Robert. “A Chronology of Soviet-Afghan Relations: April 1978 – January 1980.”  
 Russkaia literatura, January 2, 1980.  
 
“Record of Conversation between L.I. Brezhnev and N.M. Taraki.” History and Public Policy 
 Program Digital Archive. TsKhSD, F. 89, Per. 14, Dok. 25 [cited by  
Archive-Information Bulletin, 1993 as RGANI, op. 14, d. 25, ll. 8, copy, special  
file, CC]. March 20, 1979. http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/111282. 
 
“Regarding Publication in the Mass Media of Material Relating to the Activity of the Limited  
 Contingent of Soviet Troops in Afghanistan.” CC CPSU Document and Draft, written by 
Varennikov and Kirpichenko. RGANI Fond 89, Perechen 11, Document 103. n.d.  
 
“Report on the Situation in Afghanistan, Gromyko, Andropov, Ustinov, and Ponomarev to CPSU  
 CC.” History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, APRF, f. 3, op. 82, d. 173, s.  




Richardson, Brian. Unnatural Voices: Extreme Narration in Modern and Contemporary Fiction. 
  Columbus: The Ohio State University Press, 2006. 
 
Rishina, Irina, and Marina Kudimova. “Oboidemsia bez raskola?” Literaturnaia gazeta, August 
28, 1991. 
 
Robinson, Paul, and Jay Dixon. Aiding Afghanistan: A History of Soviet Assistance to a  
Developing Country. New York: Columbia University Press, 2013. 
 
Rosenthal, Bernice Glatzer, ed. The Occult in Russian and Soviet Culture. Cornell: Cornell  
 University Press, 1997. 
 
Rougle, Charles, and Elisabeth Rich. “Aleksandr Prokhanov.” South Central Review 12, no.  
3-4 (Autumn-Winter, 1995):18-27. 
 
Rubin, Barnett. The Fragmentation of Afghanistan: State Formation and Collapse in the  
International System. Karachi: Oxford UP, 1995. 
 
Sarin, Oleg, and Lev Dvoretsky. The Afghan Syndrome: The Soviet Union’s Vietnam. Novato,  
 CA: Presidio, 1993.  
 
Scarry, Elaine. The Body in Pain: The Making and Unmaking of the World. Oxford: Oxford  
 University Press, 1987. 
 
Selikhov, Kim. “Ispytanie plamenium.” Literaturnaia gazeta, March 31, 1982.  
https://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/26665866. 
 
Semenova, Svetlana. Nikolai Fedorov: tvorchestvo, zhizni. Moscow: Sov. Pisatel', 1990. 
 
Semenova, Svetlana. Russkii kosmizm: antologiia filosofskoi mysli. Moscow: Pedagogika-Press, 
1993. 
 
Service, Robert. Russia: Experiment with a People: From 1991 to the Present. Cambridge, MA:  
Harvard University Press, 2006. 
 
Shaw, George Bernard. Selected Plays. Vol. 3. New York: Dodd, Mead and Co., 1948. 
 
Shenfield, Stephen. “Making Sense of Prokhanov.” Détente nos. 9/10 (1987): 28–29.  
 
———. Russian Fascism: Traditions, Tendencies, Movements. Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe,  
2001. 
 
Shlapentokh, Dmitry. “Fedorovism in Early Post-Soviet Russia: The Collapse of the Meta-





Sidky, Homayun. “War, Changing Patterns of Warfare, State Collapse, and Transnational  
Violence in Afghanistan: 1978–2001.” Modern Asian Studies 41, no. 4 (2007):  
849–888. 
 
Skatov, Nikolai Nikolaevich. Russkaia literature XX veka. Prozaiki, poety, dramaturgi:  
biobibliograficheskii slovar' v 3 tomakh. Tom 3. Moskva: Olma-Press Invest, 2005. 
 
Slobozhanyuk, Captain A. “Loyalty: A Legless Veteran is Rehabilitated, Marries his Faithful  
 Girlfriend.” Krasnaia zvezda, June 23, 1984.  
 
“Slova k narodu.” Sovetskaia Rossiia. July 23, 1991.  
 
Snegirev, Vladimir. “Mesto sluzhby – Afganistan.” Komsomol'skai, August 7, 1981. 
 
———, and David Gai. Vtorzhenie: Neizvestnye Stranitsy Neob''iavlennoi voiny. Moscow: SP  
“IKPA.” 1991. 
 
“Snova snitsya Salang.” Pravda, September 10, 1985.  
 
Sobolev, Olga, and Angus Wrenn. The Only Hope of the World: George Bernard Shaw and  
Russia. Bern: Peter Lang Publishing, 2012. 
 
“Soviet Press Coverage of the Kabul Disasters.” Russkaia literatura, February 29, 1980.  
 
“Soviet TV Gives Its Viewers Rare Glimpse of Afghan War.” New York Times, July 24,  
 1985.  
 
Steele, Jonathan. Ghosts of Afghanistan: The Haunted Battleground. Berkeley: Counterpoint,  
 2011. 
 
Strachan, Hew. “The Idea of War.” In The Cambridge Companion to War Writing. Edited  
 by Kate McLoughlin. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2009. 7-14. 
 
Strayer, Robert W. Why Did the Soviet Union Collapse?: Understanding Historical Change.  
Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1998. 
 
Strel'tsova, Nina. Vozvrashchenie iz Afganistana. Moscow: Molodaia Gvardiia, 1990.  
 
Surganov, Vs. “Kachestvo vremeni. Sovetskaia proza-opyt, problem, zadachi.” Voprosy  
literatury 10 (1985): 3-95.  https://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/10302622. 
 
Swartz, Howard. “Historical and Literary Investigation of the Treatment of the 1979-89 Soviet- 
Afghan War in Contemporary Russian Literature.” PhD diss., University of Oxford,  
1992. 
 
Tatarinov, Aleksei. “Sovremennyi roman: vazhnye vstrechi s nebytiem.” Voprosy literatury  
 
 258 
6 (2013): 67–82. https://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/38949108. 
 
Taubman, Philip. “Soviet Lists Afghan War Toll: 13,310 Dead, 35,478 Wounded.” New York  




“That Meeting Shook Up My Whole Life.” Komsomol'skaia pravda, January 8, 1986.  
 
“The Confession That Shook Up My Whole Life.” Komsomol'skai pravda, April 16, 1986. 
 
“This Kind Doesn’t Surrender.” Sovetskaia Belorussia, January 6, 1985.  
 
Tkachenko, Petr. “Ia, konechno, vernus'... Posleslovie k istorii o ‘Tsinkovykh mal'chikakh.”  
 Zavtra, April 13, 1994. 
 
Timofeeva, Ol'ga. “Svetlana Aleksievich: Knigu o liubvi mne tiazhelee pisat', chem vse.”  
Moskovskie ndrovosti, September 15, 2006. 
 https://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/10041826. 
 
Toker, Leona. “Towards a Poetics of Documentary Prose – From the Perspective of Gulag 
Testimonies.” Poetics Today 18, no. 2 (Summer 1997): 187–222. 
 
Tolstoi, Lev. Polnoe sobranie sochinenii v devianostykh tomakh, iubileinoe izd. Vol. 4. Edited by  
V.G. Chertkov. Moscow: Gos. Izd-vo khudozh. lit-ry, 1929-1964. 
 
“Transcript of CPSU CC Politburo Discussions on Afghanistan.” History and Public Policy  
Program Digital Archive, TsKhSD, f. 89, per. 25 dok.1, ll. 1, 12–25. March 17, 1979. 
http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/113260. 
 
“Transcript of CPSU CC Politburo Session on Afghanistan.” History and Public Policy Program  
Digital Archive, TsKhSD, f. 89, per. 25, dok. 2. March 22, 1979. 
http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/113266. 
 
Trehub, Aaron. “Soviet Press Coverage of the War in Afghanistan: From Cheerleading to  
Disenchantment.” Report on the USSR 1, no. 10 (March 10, 1989): 3. 
 
———. “What’s in Store for Wounded Veterans of the Afghanistan War?” Radio  
 Liberty, July 20, 1984. 
 
Tynianov, Iurii. “On Literary Evolution.” In Readings in Russian Poetics: Formalist and  
 Structuralist Views. Edited by Ladislav Matejka and Krystyna Pomorska.  
 Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1971. 68-78. 
 
Umland, Andreas. “Aleksandr Dugin’s Transformation from a Lunatic Fringe Figure into a  
Mainstream Political Publicist, 1980-1998: A Case Study in the Rise of Late and Post- 
 
 259 
Soviet Russian Fascism.” Journal of Eurasian Studies 1, no. 2 (July 2010): 144-52. 
 
U.S. News and World Report, March 16, 1987: 39.  
 
Verkhovskii, Aleksandr, and Vladimir Pribylovskii. Natsional-patrioticheskie organizatsii v  
Rossii. Moscow: Izdatel'stvo ‘Institut eksperimental'noi sotsiologii,’ 1996. 
 
Viren, Georgii. “Imia dlia vremeni: O novykh romanakh Aleksandra Prokhanova.” Literaturnaia  
gazeta, December 26, 1984. https://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/26668273. 
 
Vukas, Danijela Lugarić. “Witnessing the Unspeakable: On Testimony and Trauma in Svetlana  
Alexievich’s The War’s Unwomanly Face and Zinky Boys.” Kul'tura i tekst 18, no. 3  
(2014): 19–39. 
 
Westad, Odd Arne. The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our  
Times. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007. 
 
“We Wear Masks.” Komsomol'skai pravda, September 24, 1985.  
 
White, Stephen. After Gorbachev. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 1990. 
 
“Why the Undeclared War against Afghanistan is Being Waged.” Pravda, February 14, 1985.   
 
Wortman, Richard. The Power of Language and Rhetoric in Russian Political History:  
Charismatic Words from the 18th to the 21st Centuries. New York: Bloomsbury  
Academic, 2018. 
 
Wright, James. Enduring Vietnam: An American Generation and Its War. New York: Thomas  
Dunne Books, 2017. 
 
Young, George. The Russian Cosmists: The Esoteric Futurism of Nikolai Fedorov and His  
Followers. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012.  
 
Yurchak, Alexei. Everything Was Forever, Until It Was No More: The Last Soviet Generation.  
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2006. 
 
Yusenen, Sergei. “The Vulnerability of Amour: Aleksandr Prokhanov Under Fire From Literary  
 Critics.” Radio Liberty Research Bulletin 207 (May 26, 1987): 1–5. 
 
Zhukov, Dmitrii. “Otkliknites'!” Zavtra, April 1, 1997.  
https://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/2532553. 
 




Telephone conversations between the author and the same unnamed man open each chapter of 
monologues in all editions of Zinky Boys. However, Alexievich has made significant revisions. 
In the three figures below, the text of the telephone conversations from the 1990 and 2016 
editions have been combined. The cross-through text indicates words and passages in the 1990 
version that were removed. The bolded text indicates added new words and passages in the 2016 
edition that did not appear in 1990 version. 
  
Figure 1. “The First Day: For Many Shall Come in My Name” 
АВТОР. Еще не проснувшимся утром длинный, как автоматная очередь, звонок: 
— Послушай, — начал он, не представившись, — читал твой пасквиль, если еще 
хоть строчку напечатаешь... 
— Кто ты вы? 
— Один из тех, о ком ты пишешь. Нас еще позовут, нам еще дадут в руки 
оружие, чтобы мы навели порядок. Придется ответить за все. Только печатайте  
побольше своих фамилий и не скрывайтесь за псевдонимами. Ненавижу пацифистов! 
Ты поднималась с полной выкладкой в горы, шла на бэтээре, когда семьдесят пятьдесят 
градусов выше нуля? Ты слышишь по ночам резкую вонь колючек? Не слышишь... Нет… 
Значит, не трогай! Это наше! Зачем тебе? Ты – баба, детей рожай! 
— Почему не назовешь себя? 
— Не трогай! Лучшего друга, он мне братом был, в целлофановом мешке с рейда 
принес... Отдельно голова, отдельно руки, ноги... Сдернутая кожа, как с кабана... 
Разделанная туша вместо красивого сильного парня... А он на скрипке играл, стихи 
сочинял. Вот он бы написал, а не ты... Мать его через два дня после похорон в психушку 
увезли. Она убегала ночью на кладбище и пыталась лечь вместе с нит. Она на кладбище 
спала, на его могиле. Зимой спала на снегу. Ты! Ты… Не трогай это! Мы были 
солдатами, нас туда послали. Мы выполняли приказ. Я дал военную присягу. Я знамя на 
коленях целовал. 
— “Берегитесь, чтобы кто не прельстил вас; ибо многие придут под именем 
Моим”. Новый завет. Евангелие от Матфея. 
— Умники! Через десять лет все стали умниками.  Все хотят Хотите 
чистенькими остаться.? Да пошли вы все к … матери! А мы – черненькие… Ты даже не 
знаешь, как пуля летит. Ты не Ни разу не стреляла в человек…, автомат в руках не 
держала. Я ничего не боюсь… Плевать мне на ваши Новые заветы! На вашу правду! Я 
свою правду в целлофановом мешке нес... Отдельно голова, отдельно руки, ноги, 
сдернутая кожа…Да пошли вы все к…!!...Другой правды нет…  — И гудок в трубке, 
похожий на далекий взрыв. 
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Все-таки я жалею, что мы с ним не договорили. Может быть, это был мой 
главный герой, раненный в самое сердце?…  
“Не трогай! Это наше!!” — кричал он. 
А это тогда чье?! 
Автор 
 
Figure 2. “The Second Day: Another Dies in Bitterness of Soul” 
АВТОР. Сегодня он снова позвонил. Теперь я зову его “мой главный герой.” К 
счастью, я была дома… 
ГЛАВНЫЙ ГЕРОЙ — Я не думал звонить... Но зашел сегодня в автобус и 
услышал, как две женщины обсуждали: “Какие они герои? Они там детей, женщин 
убивали… Разве они же ненормальные…? А их в школы приглашают, к нашим детям... 
Им еще льготы...” Выскочил на первой остановке, стоял и плакал… Мы были солдаты, 
мы и выполняли приказ. За невыполнение приказа в условиях военного времени — 
расстрел! Под трибунал пойдешь! А мы жили тогда по условиям военного времени. 
Конечно, генералы не расстреливают женщин и детей, но они отдают приказы. А сейчас 
мы во всем виноваты! Солдаты виноваты! Нам говорят: Теперь нас убеждают: 
преступный приказ выполнять преступление. А я верил тем, кто отдавал приказы! 
Верил! Сколько я себя помню, меня все время учили верить. Только верить! Никто не учил 
меня: думай — верить или не верить, стрелять или не стрелять?! Мне твердили: только 
крепче верь! Мы отсюда такими уехали, а не вернулись оттуда такими. 
АВТОР  — Это было со всеми нами. Мы можем  встретиться… Поговорить... 
ГЛАВНЫЙ ГЕРОЙ — Я могу говорить только с такими, как я. С теми, кто 
оттуда… Ты понимаешь? Да, я убивал, я весь в крови... Но он лежал... Мой друг, он мне 
братом был... Отдельно голова, отдельно руки, ноги, сдернутая … кожа... Я попросился 
сразу опять в рейд... Увидел в кишлаке похороны... Было много людей... Тело несли в чем-
то белом... Я хорошо в бинокль их всех видел… Я в бинокль за ними наблюдал… И я 
приказал: “Стрелять! Огонь!!”  
— Я думаю, как ты с этим живешь? Как тебе страшно? 
— Да, я убивал… Потому что я хотел жить... Хотел вернуться домой... А 
теперь… Я вернулся живой и не хочу жить. Завидую мертвым… Мертвым 
не больно… Нет, зачем? Зачем тебе это? Я только недавно перестал ночью 
думать о смерти. Три года каждую ночь выбирал, что лучше: пулю в рот или 
на галстуке повеситься?... Опять эта резкая вонь колючек… От нее можно 
сойти с ума… — И гудок в трубке… 
АВТОР. Почему мне кажется, что я его давно знаю? Что я слышала этот голос? 






Figure 3. “The Third Day: Do Not Turn to Mediums or Necromancers” 
АВТОР. “Вначале сотворил Бог небо и землю... 
И назвал Бог свет днем, а тьму ночью. И был вечер, и было утро: день один. 
И сказал Бог: да будет твердь посреди воды, и да отделяет она воду от воды... 
И назвал Бог твердь небом. И был вечер, и было утро: день второй. 
И сказал Бог: да соберется вода, которая под небом, в одно место и да явится 
суша. И стало так... 
И произвела земля зелень: траву, сеющую семя по роду ее, и дерево, приносящее 
плод, в котором семя его по роду его... 
И был вечер, и было утро: день третий…” 
Что ищу в Священном писании? Вопросы или ответы? Какие вопросы и какие 
ответы? Сколько в человеке человека? Одни думают — много, другие утверждают — 
мало.  Под тоненьким слоем культуры тут же обнаруживается зверь. Так сколько? 
Он бы мог мог бы мне помочь, мой главный герой. С утра прислушиваюсь к телефонной 
трубке, но она молчит. …Но он давно молчит… И только к вечеру… Неожиданно к 
вечеру—звонок: 
ГЛАВНЫЙ ГЕРОЙ. — Все глупо было? Да? Так выходит? Понимаешь, что это 
для меня? Для нас? Я ехал туда нормальным советским парнем. Родина нас не предаст! 
Родина нас не обманет! Нельзя безумному запретить безумие его... Одни говорят — мы 
вышли из чистилища, другие — из помойной ямы... Чума на оба ваших дома! Я жить 
хочу! Я любить хочу! У меня скоро родится сын... Я назову его Алешкой — имя погибшего 
друга… Отдельно голова… Отдельно руки, ноги, сдернутая кожа… Родится потом 
девочка, я хочу еще девочку, все равно будет Алешка… 
 Все глупо было? Да? Так выходит? Но мы же не струсили! Не обманули вас?! 
Нельзя безумному запретить безумие. Все, баста! Больше не позвоню... Человек с 
глазами на затылке идти не может. Я все забыл… забыл… забыл… Нельзя безумному 
запретить безумие его.. Для меня эта история кончилась…Я выхожу из нее... Нет я не 
застрелюсь … У меня будет сын… Алешка и  не брошусь вниз головой с балкона…Я 
жить хочу хочу жить! Любить! Я во второй раз выжил…Первый раз там, на 
войне…Второй раз  - здесь…Здесь тоже было одиноко и  страшно… Все! Прощай! 
АВТОР. Он положил трубку. Но а я еще долго с ним разговариваю, спорю, что-то 
доказываю, в чем-то убеждаю. Слушаю... 
“И был вечер, и было утро…” 
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